UNITARY BOARDS AND MUTUAL FUND GOVERNANCE

A unique governance structure for mutual funds is unitary board—one board overseeing all funds in the entire family. We find strong evidence for unitary board as an effective governance mechanism. Funds with unitary boards are associated with lower fees, are more likely to pass the economies of scale benefits to investors, are less likely to be involved in trading scandals, and rank higher on stewardship. In contrast, funds with larger or more independent boards charge higher fees and rank lower on stewardship. Our findings indicate that unitary boards of small size, rather than independent boards, may be more beneficial to fund shareholders.     

MUTUAL FUND TRADES: ASYMMETRIC LIQUIDITY PREFERENCES AND FUND PERFORMANCE

We investigate the role of the liquidity of stocks traded by mutual funds on the performance of funds experiencing substantial and sustained redemptions (outflows) or inflows. Accordingly, we identify 770 redeeming fund‐periods and 1,757 inflow fund‐periods and find a statistically significant relation between the liquidity of the stocks they trade and the quantity of the stock traded. Notably, when funds experience redemptions, those with low portfolio liquidity have an elevated preference for selling more‐liquid stocks. In the following period, such funds statistically and economically underperform funds that sell less‐liquid stocks. This is consistent with redemptions detrimentally affecting shareholders that remain in a fund.     

MARKET TIMING AND MUTUAL FUND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION

This study uses a methodology that is independent of beta estimates to provide empirical evidence on the success of market timing by mutual fund managers. A fund's success at market timing is evaluated by determining if the percentage of the portfolio invested in stocks increases prior to an upturn in the general level of stock market prices and declines prior to a downturn in the level of stock prices. No evidence is found that managers possess, as a group, any market timing ability.     

INFLUENCES AND TRENDS IN MUTUAL FUND EXPENSE RATIOS

A common question for the mutual fund industry, which has experienced a fivefold increase in assets over the last few years, is whether it shows declining production costs. Prior studies on fund expenses give conflicting results because several factors, from asset size to management style to share class, affect costs. Controlling for these and other factors shows the average stock fund expense ratio declined 1 basis point per year and bond fund ratios decreased 1 to 3 basis points per year, depending on the investment objective, from 1994 to 1998. Funds participating in no‐transaction‐fee supermarkets are more expensive than equivalent nonparticipants. JEL classification: G20, G28     

MUTUAL FUND BROKERAGE COMMISSIONS

The brokerage commissions paid for portfolio transactions by a large sample of equity mutual funds are investigated. Median brokerage commissions measured as a percentage of net assets are 21 basis points per year with a standard deviation of 27 basis points. The commission levels are negatively correlated with fund size and positively correlated with fund turnover and expense ratio. The average brokerage commission measured as a percentage of assets traded exceeds the typical execution-only commissions for large institutional traders. This finding is consistent with many mutual fund brokerage commissions including payments for research, so-called soft dollar payments. Funds' expense ratios are positively correlated with commissions per trade, inconsistent with the idea that mutual fund managers who pay soft dollars for research have a corresponding reduction in management fees.     

MUTUAL FUND DAILY CONDITIONAL PERFORMANCE

The empirical finance literature reveals that conditional models estimated with monthly data generally improve fund performance. Furthermore, it has been shown that using daily instead of monthly returns in an unconditional framework increases the proportion of abnormal performances relative to timing. In this article, we study conditional performance estimated with daily data in a bivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) framework. Our daily conditional alphas and global performances with GARCH are significantly better than those estimated with other parametrizations and they persist over time. Finally, the proportion of abnormal timing performances diminishes significantly when conditional parametrizations are used.     

MARKET VOLATILITY AND PERVERSE TIMING PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL FUND MANAGERS

Prompted by the recent volatility in equity markets, I investigate performance evaluation methods and the mutual fund managers' ability to select undervalued investments and time major market movements during the high-market-volatility period of the 1980s. Specifically, I examine mutual fund managers' stock-selection and market-timing abilities by employing a five-factor risk-adjusted model based on Carhart's four-factor loading model and Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer's quadratic timing model adjusted for perverse timing behavior. Individually, some managers persistently affect fund performance through the selection of undervalued investments, however, at the expense of timing performance. In addition, funds that demonstrate an ability to time major market movements showed persistence in timing performance before and after the October market crash of 1987.     

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MUTUAL FUND EXPENSES

Mutual fund investors are subjected to many fees and expenses related to both the management of the fund assets and the sale and distribution of the fund's shares. In recent years these expenses have increased as a percentage of assets. The preoccupation of mutual fund investors with using performance evaluation as a selection criterion is misguided because of the volatility of investment returns. Whether the fund's performance is due to superior management or just good luck is difficult to determine. On the other hand, mutual fund expenses are stable. As such, the mutual fund investor should pursue a policy of choosing funds with low expenses. In this paper we conduct an empirical analysis of these expenses. The results of our analysis of equity funds suggest that expense-conscious investors should look at the fund size, age, turnover ratio, cash ratio, and existence of a 12b-1 fee as key determinants of expenses. Our analysis of bond funds suggests that the key factors are the fund's sales charge, weighted average maturity, size, and existence of a 12b-1 fee.     

SHORT SELLING: THE MUTUAL FUND ALTERNATIVE

Short selling allows investors to shape prospective investment return opportunities along desired lines, offers the ability to hedge factors such as unanticipated inflation, provides a means to exploit perceived return anomalies, and facilitates the equilibrium pricing of securities. Currently, a short position can be created directly, with options, or with futures contracts. Each procedure has some advantages and some drawbacks with respect to the others. The alternative of mutual fund short selling in the family of funds framework neither dominates nor is dominated by existing methods. Implementation would, therefore, augment investor welfare.     

ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN MUTUAL FUND ADMINISTRATION

Since many mutual fund expenses are fixed costs, asset growth should reduce the ratio of fund expenses to average net assets. A translog cost function is estimated for a sample of 2,610 funds to evaluate the existence and extent of economies of scale in mutual fund administration. The elasticity of fund expenses with respect to fund assets is significantly less than one, indicating there are economies of scale in mutual fund administration. Average costs diminish over the full range of fund assets; however, the rapid decrease in average costs is exhausted by about $3.5 billion in fund assets.     

THE COST OF MUTUAL FUND DISTRIBUTION FEES

Many individuals purchase shares in mutual funds as investments. With a lack of evidence supporting performance persistence in fund returns, investors should consider expenses as a fund-selection tool since fund expenses have a negative effect on fund returns. One of the largest expenses incurred by fund investors is distribution expenses, which include both load charges and annual fees. Close to two-thirds of all equity funds charge investors for fund distribution. The true cost of these distribution fees to investors is hard to measure because a myriad of distribution arrangements have evolved that vary both the timing and magnitude of distribution charges. We derive a simple methodology that expresses the present value of distribution costs as a percentage of the original investment in fund shares for any expected holding period. This methodology allows direct comparison of the effect on investors of distribution fees for mutual funds with different types of sales arrangements.     

MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE PERSISTENCE AND COMPETITION: A CROSS‐SECTOR ANALYSIS

Existing work on mutual fund performance persistence obtains diverse results, depending on the group of funds studied. We examine whether performance persistence within a peer group of competing mutual funds depends on the group's composition. The U.K. mutual fund industry is ideal for such an examination because funds compete within strictly defined sectors. We consider several attributes related to the intensity of competition within a sector and use them to explain sector‐level persistence. We find robust evidence that persistence is higher in sectors where concentration of assets under management is higher.