Is there a gender effect on the cost of bank financing?

In this paper, we address the question of whether the gender of a firm’s leader affects the cost of bank funding faced by small and medium enterprises in Europe. Using a large sample of observations of non-financial firms, during the years 2009–2013, we empirically test for the presence of discrimination, comparing female-led and male-led firms. After controlling for a rich set of variables and addressing potential endogeneity, our results show that i) female-led enterprises are more likely to face worse price conditions for bank financing compared to their male-led counterparts and, ii) firms whose leadership changes from female to male are more likely to benefit from an improvement in interest rate levels. This evidence is robust to different model specifications and various methodological approaches. The existence of such bias in the credit markets highlights the need of policy measures addressing female-led businesses, thus reducing their bank financing burdens and enhancing their entrepreneurial opportunities.     

Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes

Making the central bank an agency with the mandate and reputationfor maintaining price stability is a means by which a governmentcan choose the strength of its commitment to price stability.This article develops four measures of central bank independenceand explores their relation with inflation outcomes. An aggregatelegal index is developed for four decades in 72 countries. Threeindicators of actual independence are developed: the rate ofturnover of central bank governors, an index based on a questionnaireanswered by specialists in 23 countries, and an aggregationof the legal index and the rate of turnover. Legal independence is inversely related to inflation in industrial,but not in developing, countries. In developing countries theactual frequency of change of the chief executive officer ofthe bank is a better proxy for central bank independence. Aninflation-based index of overall central bank independence contributessignificantly to explaining cross-country variations in therate of inflation.     

通货膨胀目标制:理论、实践及其启示——兼论我国房地产市场调控

通货膨胀目标是由官方公开宣布未来一段时间内需要达到的通货膨胀目标或区间,明确承认低的、稳定的通货膨胀率是货币政策的首要长期目标。从长期看,中央银行可以产生系统的影响的惟一宏观经济变量只有通货膨胀率。没有中央银行的默许,通货膨胀就无法扎根。虽然石油价格冲击、持久干旱、升高的税收或者新的政府法令都有可能推动物价指数上升,除非中央银行对此不闻不问,否则,通货膨胀是不可能长久存在的。     

Stabilizing non-fundamental asset price movements under discretion and limited information

Inflation, output and interest rate stabilization are all potential central bank objectives. We explore whether monetary policy should respond to asset price fluctuations when they are driven by irrational expectational shocks to the future returns to capital. In our model, an optimistic shock to future returns generates both an increase in equity prices and physical investment. The increased investment is inefficient and, thus, a central bank optimally responds to this expectations shocks. This induces a trade-off between stabilizing nominal prices and non-fundamental asset price movements. We compare the optimal policy under different assumptions: full versus limited information and commitment versus discretion. If the central bank has limited information about whether an asset price movement has a fundamental or non-fundamental origin, then the central bank responds less aggressively to the non-fundamental exuberance shocks than under full information. Without commitment, a central bank responds more aggressively to non-fundamental exuberance shocks.     

The benefit of being a local leader: Evidence from firm-specific stock price crash risk

This paper investigates whether being a local leader affects a firm's stock price crash risk. We find that local leadership, in terms of being a relatively large firm in a surrounding locality, decreases a firm's stock price crash risk. The results are robust to both an instrumental variable and a difference-in-differences regression approach. We also document that the impact on crash risk depends on the extent to which local communities are likely to be monitoring local firms through their stock market participation rates, the information environment surrounding these firms, and the level of industry competition. Overall, our results highlight a novel benefit of being a local leader, as it is associated with a higher level of local monitoring which renders the firm less prone to crash risk.     

金融调控中的物价稳定与金融稳定:从分离到融合的逻辑演进

从历史上考察,中央银行实施货币政策和充当最后贷款人,客观上使其具有了保持物价稳定和维护金融稳定的职能。20世纪80年代以后,许多国家的金融调控出现了明显变化,逐步向稳定物价的单一目标方向发展,金融监管则出现了"去央行化"的趋势,使中央银行失去了维护金融稳定的能力和手段。经济全球化产生了很多影响物价稳定与金融稳定的新因素,要求中央银行在保持物价稳定的同时,对金融稳定给予更多关注。全球金融危机后,国际社会和主要经济体加快了宏观审慎管理体系的构建,这为解决物价稳定与金融稳定的协调配合提供了新思路。如果将物价稳定与金融稳定纳入到宏观审慎管理的视野,就有可能在金融调控中二者兼顾,建立起新的金融调控范式。     

股票价格具有货币政策指示器功能吗——来自中国1997～2006年的经验证据

本文运用VAR模型考察了以股票价格为代表的金融资产价格对我国通货膨胀的影响。实证分析表明,我国股票价格的变动对产出缺口存在一定的正向影响,但是这种影响不太稳定,说明我国股票价格通过总需求渠道对未来通货膨胀产生的影响比较微弱。同时,我国股票价格的变动能引起未来CPI和WPI的同向变化,尤其与CPI的关系非常稳定,说明股票价格在一定程度上包含了我国未来通货膨胀的信息。因此,我国股票价格可以作为一个帮助判断未来经济走势和通货膨胀变动趋势的货币政策指示器。     

货币政策传导过程中的金融体系研究

金融体系在货币政策传导过程中起“中介”作用,货币渠道过程是通过金融市场从货币政策冲击到市场零售利率的价格传导过程,信贷渠道是通过商业银行从中央银行到商业银行的数量传导过程。完善我国金融体系有利于提高货币政策传导效果,同时也是市场经济体制改革的要求,我国中央银行实施货币政策时应该考虑区域金融差异的客观事实。     

Conducting the international orchestra: Bank of England leadership under the classical gold standard

A large literature assigns to the Bank of England a leadership role in the management of the classical gold standard. This paper documents the exceptional behavior of the Bank of England's discount rate — in particular, that it tended to lead discount rates abroad. It then develops a game-theoretic analysis of central bank interaction under the classical gold standard. Sterling's reserve currency status is shown to provide a rationale for Stackelberg leadership by the Bank of England. Contrary to popular notions, however, Britain's foreign creditor status does not provide a basis for the Bank of England's leadership strategy.     

Monetary policy for inattentive economies

We offer a contribution to the analysis of optimal monetary policy. We begin with a critical assessment of the existing literature, arguing that most work is based on implausible models of inflation-output dynamics. We then suggest that this problem may be solved with some recent behavioral models, which assume that price setters are slow to incorporate macroeconomic information into the prices they set. A specific such model is developed and used to derive optimal policy. In response to shocks to productivity and aggregate demand, optimal policy is price level targeting. Base drift in the price level, which is implicit in the inflation targeting regimes currently used in many central banks, is not desirable in this model. When shocks to desired markups are added, optimal policy is flexible targeting of the price level. That is, the central bank should allow the price level to deviate from its target for a while in response to these supply shocks, but it should eventually return the price level to its target path. Optimal policy can also be described as an elastic price standard: the central bank allows the price level to deviate from its target when output is expected to deviate from its natural rate.     

Macroprudential regulation,credit spreads and the role of monetary policy

We study the macroprudential roles of bank capital regulation and monetary policy in a borrowing cost channel model with endogenous financial frictions, driven by credit risk, bank losses and bank capital costs. These frictions induce financial accelerator mechanisms and motivate the examination of a macroprudential toolkit. Following credit shocks, countercyclical regulation is more effective than monetary policy in promoting price, financial and macroeconomic stability. For supply shocks, combining macroprudential regulation with a stronger anti-inflationary policy stance is optimal. The findings emphasize the importance of the Basel III accords in alleviating the output-inflation trade-off faced by central banks, and cast doubt on the desirability of conventional (and unconventional) Taylor rules during periods of financial distress.     

货币政策目标、资产价格波动与最优货币政策

货币政策目标的实现程度是判定货币政策优劣的标准。通过建立中央银行的决策模型,推导出忽略和考虑资产价格的最优货币供应量反应函数,并据此对中国不同货币政策目标下的宏观经济运行进行模拟,以认识货币政策目标对资产价格波动与最优货币政策之间关系的影响,结果表明最优货币政策是否应该对资产价格的波动反应取决于货币政策目标。因此,应充分重视货币政策目标的取向,同时加强对最优货币政策目标确定的研究。     

银行价格竞争、融资约束与企业研发投资——基于“中介效应”模型的实证研究

近年来我国利率市场化改革积极推进,实体经济发展积极向创新驱动转型,一个亟须研究厘清的关键问题是,银行业竞争如何驱动企业创新活动？本文关注银行价格竞争对企业创新的影响,以2013—2018年沪深两市的上市企业为样本,采用“中介效应”因果分析模型,实证检验了银行价格竞争对企业研发投资的影响,并识别出以融资约束为中介渠道的作用机制。研究发现,银行价格竞争不仅会提高银行的风险容忍度,直接增加R&D投资的信贷供给意愿,而且还会通过降低贷款价格和增加贷款可得性来缓解企业整体的融资约束,间接促进企业创新活动。这一机制在解除贷款利率管制之后以及在民营企业层面体现得更加明显。本文的研究结果对于深化金融市场化改革、改善金融服务实体经济效果以及实施经济创新驱动发展战略,具有明确的政策启示。     

货币政策应该关注资产价格和汇率吗?

在Rudebusch and Svensson(1999)模型中引入了房地产价格、股票价格和汇率因素,以此为基础推导出最优货币政策反应函数。该反应函数显示,中央银行既要应对产出和通货膨胀变化,还应该考虑资产价格和汇率波动。基于GMM方法的实证分析表明,该反应函数能够较好刻画过去10多年间中国中央银行的货币政策。总体而言,该反应函数可以作为中国货币政策制定和执行的参考框架,货币政策应该对资产价格和汇率波动给予一定程度的关注。     

Monetary policy when potential output is uncertain: Understanding the growth gamble of the 1990s

The Fed kept interest rates low and essentially unchanged during the late 1990s despite a booming economy and record-low unemployment. These interest rates were accommodative by historical standards. Nonetheless, inflation remained low. How did the Fed succeed in sustaining rapid economic growth without fueling inflation and inflationary expectations? In retrospect, it is evident that the productive capacity of the economy increased. Yet as events unfolded, there was uncertainty about the expansion of the capacity of the economy and therefore about the sustainability of the Fed's policy.This paper provides an explanation for the success of the Fed in accommodating growth with stable inflation in the late 1990s. It shows that if the central bank is committed to reverse policy errors it makes because of unwarranted optimism, inflation can remain in check even if the central bank keeps interest rates low because of this optimism. In particular, a price level target—which is a simple way to model a commitment to offset errors—can serve to anchor inflation even if the public does not share the central bank's optimism about shifts in potential output. The paper shows that price level targeting is superior to inflation targeting in a wide range of situations. The paper also provides econometric evidence that, in contrast to earlier periods, the Fed has recently put substantial weight on the price level in setting interest rates. Moreover, it shows that CPI announcement surprises lead to reversion in the price level. Finally, it provides textual evidence that Alan Greenspan puts relatively more weight on the price level than inflation.     

Central bank behavior: A positive empirical analysis

The central bank is analyzed as a utility-maximizing unit acting in the framework of a politico- economic model. It derives utility from keeping the price level stable and is constrained by government, the structure of the economy, and the political commitment to stable exchange rates. It uses a satisficing strategy, concentrating on keeping conflicts with government below a certain level. In the case of serious conflict, the central bank follows the policy directions undertaken by government but with a time lag. The complete model comprising endogenous consumer/voters, government and central bank is econometrically tested for Germany, with good results.     

Reconciling Bagehot and the Fed's Response to September 11

Bagehot (1873) states that to prevent bank panics a central bank should provide liquidity at a "very high rate of interest." In contrast, most of the theoretical literature on liquidity provision suggests that central banks should lend at an interest rate of zero. This is broadly consistent with the Federal Reserve's behavior in the days following September 11, 2001. This paper shows that both policies can be reconciled. With commodity money, as in Bagehot's time, liquidity is scarce and a high price allows banks to self-select. In contrast, the Fed has a virtually unlimited ability to temporarily expand the money supply so self-selection is unnecessary.     

On the optimal monetary policy response to noisy indicators

We describe a behavior of a central bank when its measures of current inflation and output are subject to measurement errors, in a framework of optimizing models with nominal price stickiness. In our model, a central bank sets the interest rate equal to its current estimate of the so-called Wicksellian natural rate of interest. This is shown to imply that the interest rate responds to the central bank's estimates of both current inflation and output gap, as advocated by Taylor (1993). It is also shown that the noise contained in the indicators justifies a degree of policy cautiousness. A reduced-form representation of optimal policy should exhibit interest-rate smoothing, which is often found in the empirical literature on monetary policy reaction functions.     

中国房地产价格波动与货币政策：一个实证研究

本文采用家庭还款额的支付性指数HAI来测算中国房地产价格的合理性,发现中国房地产市场自1998年以来就存在严重的泡沫;通过对央行货币政策操作目标与房地产价格波动做回归分析,得出央行货币政策对房地产价格波动作出显著响应;建立结构向量自回归模型研究房地产价格波动在给定货币政策准则下对产出缺口和价格稳定的）中击,得出近年来房地产价格波动对价格稳定冲击比较大,对产出冲击比较小的结论;最后提出货币当局应针对房地产价格波动制定最优货币政策准则。     

银行信贷、房地产价格与经济增长的非线性关系研究——基于省际面板平滑转换模型的实证检验

选用中国2000~2014年31个省的面板数据,以银行信贷为转换变量,通过构建面板平滑转换模型对我国房地产价格与经济增长的非线性关系进行考察。研究发现：当信贷增长率低于28.74%时,房价增长率对经济增长产生比较显著的正向影响;当信贷增长率高于28.74%时,房价增长率对经济增长起到了明显的阻碍作用。因此,为了实现“稳定房价和保持经济平稳增长”的目标,央行应将信贷增速维持在低增长体制的最优区间中。同时,央行还应该改善信贷结构,鼓励和引导金融资源进行合理配置。