MARKET STRUCTURE AND TRADING VOLUME

Historically, trading volume reported for NASDAQ stocks has been overstated vis‐à‐vis New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks, both because of the dealer's participation in trades as a market maker and because of interdealer trading. Beginning in 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission changed order‐handling rules and trade‐reporting rules, which may have reduced or eliminated the overstatement of NASDAQ trading. We examine trading volumes of firms changing from NASDAQ to the NYSE since 1997 and document that reported trading volume for NASDAQ stocks continues to be overstated. Moreover, the degree of overstatement is much larger for firms with high trading volume.     

Why effective spreads on NASDAQ were higher than on the New York stock exchange in the 1990s

Two hypotheses have been advanced to explain why spreads on NASDAQ were substantially higher than those on the NYSE in the 1990s: “collusion” and “preferencing and payment for order flow.” We present data on all actively traded stocks in these markets of relative effective spreads (RES), aggregated monthly over 1987–1999 and advance a third hypothesis: NASDAQ “SOES-day-trading.” We estimate NASDAQ and NYSE informed-trade losses and gains to market makers and other liquidity providers on six trade sizes, and find that losses on trades we ascribe to SOES day traders were substantially greater than those on other trades, offset somewhat by gains from small-trade-size investors. NASDAQ market makers' response to these losses and additional operations costs incurred to reduce the losses resulted in greater RES and increased trading within the best quotes, predominantly on larger trade sizes. The data are consistent with the “SOES-day-trading” hypotheses, but not with the other two. Furthermore, the mandatory SOES “experiment” provides insights into the negative effects of automated trading systems (such as ECNs, which now dominate NASDAQ) when their design does not adequately consider opportunistic traders.     

Public re-release of going-concern opinions and market reaction

This paper examines the market reaction to the public announcement of going-concern (GC) opinions through the news media. In the early 2000s, NASDAQ and AMEX required firms listed on their exchanges to publicly announce previously disclosed information, such as the issuance of a GC opinion, through a press release or the news media. We examine the stock market reaction to the re-release of GC opinions. We find significant abnormal stock return volatility and trading volume at the re-release of this information. Further, based on an analysis of intraday transactions, we find higher abnormal trading activity in small trades around the re-release of the GC opinion, but largely no changes in large trades during the same period. In this respect, the investors that initiate the small trades act as if they are surprised by the information contained in the press release of GC opinions. Such an action, in turn, can be viewed as evidence of a delayed response to the information in GC opinions by a section of investors.     

On the Timing and Execution of Open Market Repurchases

Little is known about the timing and execution of open marketrepurchases. U.S. firms are under no obligation to disclosewhen they are trading, and generally report only quarterly changesin shares outstanding. We use 64 firms' supplementally disclosedrepurchase trading data to provide the first examination ofrepurchase timing and execution. Across the days reported inour sample, firms adopted a variety of execution styles rangingfrom immediate intense repurchasing to delayed and smoothedrepurchasing. We find no clear evidence that repurchases aretimed to coincide with, precede, or follow, days on which informationis released. We benchmark the costs and value of a given repurchaseprogram against naive accumulation strategies achieving thesame terminal portfolio. While there is considerable variationacross the firms, NYSE firms on average beat their benchmarks,whereas NASDAQ firms do not. Finally, we document the liquidityimpact of open market repurchases. We find that repurchasingcontributes to market liquidity by narrowing bid-ask spreadsand attenuating the price impact of order imbalances on dayswhen repurchase trades are completed.     

Institutional Equity Trading Costs: NYSE Versus Nasdaq

We compare execution costs (market impact plus commission) on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq for institutional investors. The differences in cost generally conform to each market's area of specialization. Controlling for firm size, trade size, and the money management firm's identity, costs are lower on Nasdaq for trades in comparatively smaller firms, while costs for trading the larger stocks are lower on NYSE. The cost differences estimated from a regression model are, however, sensitive to the choice of time period.     

French and U.S. trading of cross-listed stocks around the period of U.S. decimalization: Volume, spreads, and depth effects

We analyze how U.S. decimalization affects stocks cross-listed in France (Euronext) and the U.S. (NYSE). The French stocks examined are much larger than the non-U.S. stocks examined in prior studies of decimalization, and their U.S. trading is likely to be dominated by institutions. So, we explore whether a reduction in depths in the U.S. due to decimalization makes the U.S. market less competitive for institutions trading these French stocks. We find evidence consistent with the above. First, the average NYSE trade size for these stocks relative to that on Euronext declines substantially after decimalization. Second, we categorize individual trades by the number of shares traded. We find that mainly driven by large trades, the NYSE proportion of trading of French firms declines markedly after decimalization. Third, using regression analysis, we find that the decline in the U.S. share of institutional trading volume is significantly positively related with the decline in NYSE depths relative to Euronext, and the decline is greater for French firms. Overall, we find consistent results indicating a migration of institutional order flow in French firms to France after NYSE decimalization. Also, intraday analysis indicates that the institutional volume in both France and the U.S. is greatest when both the markets are open.     

Regulation NMS and Market Quality

We show that both the quoted and effective spreads increased, the quoted depth decreased, and the market quality index decreased after the implementation of Regulation National Market System (NMS) (Reg NMS). We also find an increase in the price impact of trades and the dispersion of the pricing error after Reg NMS. The order execution speed is slower, the order fill rate is lower, and the order cancellation rate is higher for most trades after Reg NMS. Hence, contrary to the Securities and Exchange Commission's belief, Reg NMS has proven to be detrimental to most traders. NASDAQ provided faster and more reliable executions than the NYSE/AMEX, and NASDAQ gained market shares from the NYSE/AMEX and other trading venues after Reg NMS.     

Measuring abnormal daily trading volume for samples of NYSE/ASE and NASDAQ securities using parametric and nonparametric test statistics

We extend prior research on the empirical properties of daily trading volume and methods to detect abnormal trading volume in two ways. We compare the performance of a nonparametric test statistic with the parametric test statistic used in prior research and we study samples of NASDAQ securities as well as samples of NYSE/ASE securities. Prior research has focused exclusively on NYSE securities. We find the nonparametric test statistic is more powerful in detecting abnormal trading volume than the parametric test statistic in both samples of NYSE/ASE and NASDAQ securities. We also document that abnormal trading volume will be detected more often in samples of NYSE/ASE securities compared to NASDAQ securities.     

Learning from experience and trading volume

We build a model where trading allows inexperienced agents to discern useful information sources. Upon losing money by trading on invalid information sources, investors learn from their experience and switch to alternative sources. Such activity leads to initial expected losses but later profitable trades. Trading activity is found to be increasing in the mass of such agents. Volume is greatest in firms with uncertain cash flows. Further, a greater number of information sources implies greater volume. This is consistent with the explosive growth in volume accompanying the growth of the internet, which presumably increases the number of heterogeneous information sources.     

Emerging from Bankruptcy with When‐Issued Trading

We examine the set of firms that emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy and traded on a when‐issued basis before their official return to the regular way in NASDAQ, Amex, or NYSE. We find that this when‐issued market is liquid and price efficient. The when‐issued closing price is a good indicator of the first closing price in the regular way market. Emerging firms that have when‐issued trading experience lower regular way volatility and smaller relative spreads than those without when‐issued trading. Our probit regressions show that firm size is an important determinant of the adoption of when‐issued trading.     

Trade signing in fast markets

This study assesses the accuracy of trade signing algorithms in fast trading environments using NASDAQ and NYSE trade and quote data. Using data that contain true trade signs, we show that the Lee and Ready algorithm outperforms the tick rule and classifies trades at least as well as in earlier studies from slower trading environments, even in subsamples where the market is particularly fast. We conclude that trade signing remains viable in fast markets, and that the use of quote data continues to increase trade classification accuracy.     

The impact of reporting changes on hidden liquidity: Evidence from the Chicago stock exchange

This paper analyzes the NYSE Chicago's move to the Pillar integrated trading platform in November 2019. Following the move to Pillar, reported trading volume increases significantly for both equities and exchange traded funds (ETFs). The increase in trading volume and volume share in the NYSE Chicago is largely driven by trades against hidden liquidity. This increase in hidden liquidity is economically significant and is largely determined by the reporting of qualified contingent trades, QCTs. Although these trades were reported in the NYSE's Daily Trades and Quotes (DTAQ) files, these trades were not reported to the SEC's MIDAS database until to the move to Pillar. This paper shows the cross trade volume in the CHX comprises a significant amount of hidden volume in the U.S.     

Liquidity and market efficiency: A large sample study

Chordia et al. (2008, hereafter CRS) examine short horizon return predictability from past order flows of large, actively traded NYSE firms across three tick size regimes and conclude that higher liquidity facilitates arbitrage trading which enhances market efficiency. We extend CRS to a comprehensive sample of all NYSE firms and examine the dynamics between liquidity and market efficiency during informational periods. Our results indicate that although all NYSE firms experience an overall improvement in market efficiency across periods of different tick size regimes, this improvement varies significantly across the portfolios of sample companies formed on the basis of trading frequency, market capitalization, and trading volume. After controlling for these factors, we further document a positive association between a continuous measure of liquidity and market efficiency, and show that this effect is amplified during periods that contain new information, as reflected in high adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread.     

Predicting earnings in a poor information environment

Financial intermediaries, such as analysts, play an important role in providing information to investors. However, a large segment of the market (about 39% of CRSP firms between 1992 and 2009) is not served by financial analysts, leaving investors in a poor information environment. In this paper, we examine whether other publicly available information signals, such as insider trades, institutional holdings, and firms’ stock repurchases, can be used to predict information about earnings for these firms. We find that CFOs’ trading decisions are associated with new information contained in the annual earnings reports for firms with no or scant analyst coverage. In contrast, for firms with multiple analyst coverage, insider trading decisions are not predictive of new information in earnings reports. Our results suggest that some public information signals, such as insider trades, can be used to alleviate the poor information environment faced by investors. However, the market may not have fully priced the information contained in these signals.     

Financial Economists' Roundtable Statement on THE STRUCTURE OF SECURITIES MARKETS

Market practitioners, regulators, and economists are now debating the merits of a national market system—a single, fully integrated securities market that would be coordinated by a central computer and mandated by the SEC. This brief statement, signed by 29 distinguished financial economists, argues that such a system is a badidea. The multiplicity of U.S. markets is a sign of innovation and vibrant competition, not a problem that requires regulatory intervention. As a variety of markets with different technologies and trading procedures vie for somewhat different groups of customers with different needs, the result is competing market centers—registered exchanges (such as NYSE and AMEX) with designated specialists; NASDAQ with competing dealers; third market dealers in listed securities; and alternative trading systems (regulated as brokers) serving institutional investors or providing on-line trading to individual investors. Moreover, the fact that the different U.S. markets are linked in various ways and degrees—for example, by information and by private order routing systems of brokers and markets—should caution us against viewing market "fragmentation" as a public policy problem in need of a solution     

SECURITY RETURN DISTRIBUTIONS AND MARKET STRUCTURE: EVIDENCE FROM THE NYSE/AMEX AND THE NASDAQ MARKETS

This paper documents significant and persistent deviations from normality in security return distributions for the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from 1974 to 1988. Controlling for January and size effects, we find that the deviations of security return distributions from normality decline with increasing portfolio size and investment horizon for the NYSE and AMEX, especially for daily returns. Deviations appear to be greater for the NASDAQ than for the two exchanges even for firms of the same size. Ratios of monthly to daily variances are also larger for the NASDAQ. These results suggest that nonparametric or other robust statistical techniques should be used when valuing equity options and other derivatives, especially when examining NASDAQ security returns. They further imply that trading strategies based on market inefficiencies are more likely to succeed on the NASDAQ.     

The Dynamics of Security Trades,Quote Revisions,and Market Depths for Actively Traded Stocks

We examine the dynamics of return volatility, trading volume, and depth—in an intraday setting for a sample of actively traded NYSE and NASDAQ stocks. We show that depth is a useful intervening variable and mitigates the impact of trading activity on price volatility. Furthermore, depth is affected by the perception of prevailing information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders. We demonstrate empirically that the NYSE supplies greater depth under conditions of high, perceived information asymmetry as compared to NASDAQ. NASDAQ makes up for this deficiency by its capability of managing large volume shocks without a major decline in depth.JEL Classification: C32, D82, G10     

Are insider trades informative?

We examine insider trading activities of all companies tradedon the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq during the 1975-1995 period. Ingeneral, very little market movement is observed when insiderstrade and when they report their trades to the SEC. Insidersin aggregate are contrarian investors. However, they predictmarket movements better than simple contrarian strategies. Insidersalso seem to be able to predict cross-sectional stock returns.The result, however, is driven by insider's ability to predictreturns in smaller firms. In addition, informativeness of insiders'activities is coming from purchases, while insider selling appearsto have no predictive ability.     

The role of trades in price convergence: A study of dual-listed Canadian stocks

We examine the role of trades in restoring price parity for equities trading in multiple markets. Using a sample of stocks trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange and on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, we contrast price convergence when market makers (a) observe only lagged quotes from both markets and (b) also observe local order flow. Traditional error correction model estimates show that prices in the two markets adjust towards parity in response to quoted price discrepancies, meaning that observation of the cross-market quote helps restore parity. Including order flow in an augmented error correction model, we find that incremental price convergence occurs when trades are routed to the market with the better price, and the importance of quotes in the price convergence process is reduced. Cross-sectional analysis reveals that the importance of order flow in each market is decreasing in firm size and increasing in measures of liquidity. Our findings point to an important, and hitherto unexamined, role for trades in promoting inter-market price convergence.     

Trades outside the quotes: Reporting delay,trading option,or trade size?

In the period 1993 through 2002 examined in this study, quoted and effective spreads declined substantially on Nasdaq and to a lesser degree on the NYSE. At the same time, however, trades outside the quotes increased dramatically on Nasdaq. Because investors would prefer to trade at the quotes rather than outside the quotes, we examine why trades outside the quotes are observed. We focus on how the continuous market mechanism itself influences the outcome of orders and the reporting of trades, and we conclude that slippage exists in the market mechanism. Outside-trades occur on Nasdaq, first, because of delays in reporting trades, second, because the ability of dealers to delay execution of trades creates a look-back option, which when exercised results in outside-trades, and third, because large trades can take place at prices outside the quotes. Outside-trades are rarely observed on the NYSE because the market is more centralized. While the pattern of trading on the NYSE is not inconsistent with the presence of a look-back option, our tests provide no direct evidence that specialists are exercising such an option.