PRICE CONSTRAINTS,FORWARD MARKETS AND THE COMPETITIVE FIRM UNDER PRICE UNCERTAINTY*

This article proposes a model of the competitive firm simultaneously facing price constraints and forward markets under price uncertainty. The incorporation of a forward market is shown to be very important because a risk-averse firm will set its production decision to the forward price regardless of its attitude toward risk. In addition, we show that risk aversion is a sufficient condition for a decrease in risk to reduce the amount hedged when risk is reduced through a mean-preserving price squeeze.     

THE MEASUREMENT OF CONSTANT PRICE AGGREGATES IN CANADA*

This paper is in part directed towards a partial examination of Canadian concepts and methods used in the deflation of constant price estimates of gross domestic product from both an expenditure and industry-of-origin point of view, and in part toward certain problems arising in the development of a conceptually balancing set of accounts in real terms. It also provides reference material to allow the reader to pursue the detailed methodology and data underlying the Canadian constant price accounts.     

产出损失和政策效应分化下的G20合作

在对金融危机造成的实体经济产出损失进行测算的基础上,本文着重从经济基础层面对当前G20合作的现实困境加以解释.笔者认为,金融危机对全球经济的冲击形成了G20深化合作的内在动力,但与此同时,冲击的不对称性以及政策效应的分化特征也造成了当前G20进一步深化合作的现实困难.此外,在发展中国家的内部分化特征更为显著的背景下,金融危机后全球经济格局中发达国家主导的局面不会发生根本变化,而围绕市场开放和外部经济失衡调整的利益纷争也必然会有所加剧.     

THE SECOND‐PRICE AUCTION SOLVES KING SOLOMON'S DILEMMA*

The planner wants to give k identical, indivisible objects to the top k valuation agents at zero costs. Each agent knows her own valuation of the object and whether it is among the top k. Modify the (k+ 1)st‐price sealed‐bid auction by introducing a small participation fee and the option not to participate in it. This simple mechanism implements the desired outcome in iteratively undominated strategies. Moreover, no pair of agents can profitably deviate from the equilibrium by coordinating their strategies or bribing each other.     

THE CHOICE OF APPORTIONMENT FACTORS UNDER FORMULA APPORTIONMENT*

This paper investigates the choice of apportionment factors under a corporate tax system of Formula Apportionment. In contrast to perceived wisdom, we show that the apportionment formula contains both mobile (capital) and immobile (labor) factors, regardless of whether the formula is determined decentrally by jurisdictions or centrally by a central planner. The central planner uses the formula as a corrective instrument to internalize fiscal externalities. We calibrate the model to the European Union and show that replacing the current system of Separate Accounting by Formula Apportionment would substantially increase tax revenue and welfare under both centralized and decentralized formula choices.     

BACKGROUND RISK AND THE THEORY OF THE COMPETITIVE FIRM UNDER UNCERTAINTY*

This paper examines the optimal production decision of a firm under output price risk á la Sandmo when the firm also faces a dependent background risk. It is shown that standard risk aversion plus a non-negative association between the output price risk and the background risk are sufficient to ensure a reduction in the firms optimal output upon introduction of the background risk. The paper investigates the impact of a deterministic transformation of the background risk on the firms optimal production decision. It is shown that decreasing absolute risk aversion in Ross' sense is among the sufficient conditions that generate an unambiguous negative comparative static result.     

INTERNATIONAL DEVIATIONS FROM THE LAW OF ONE PRICE: THE ROLE OF SEARCH FRICTIONS AND MARKET SHARE*

This article examines the size and persistence of international deviations from the law of one price in an industry with search frictions. Cost differences lead foreign and domestic firms to price differently within countries. When local firms are more common in each country, there are large and persistent price differences across countries. Large and persistent changes in international relative costs lead to large and persistent changes in international relative prices. Dynamic considerations imply that the amount of a cost shock firms pass through to prices is U‐shaped in the market share of firms receiving the shock.     

THE LIQUIDITY TRAP,THE REAL BALANCE EFFECT,AND THE FRIEDMAN RULE*

This article studies the behavior of the economy and the efficacy of monetary policy under zero nominal interest rates using a model with population growth that nests, as a special case, the conventional specification in which there is a single infinitely lived representative agent. The article shows that with a growing population, monetary policy has distributional consequences that give rise to a real balance effect, thereby eliminating the liquidity trap. These same distributional effects, however, can also work to make many agents much worse off under zero nominal interest rates than they are when the nominal interest rate is positive.     

THE DECISION TO HIRE MANAGERS IN MIXED MARKETS UNDER BERTRAND COMPETITION*

This paper analyses the decisions of firms as to whether or not to hire managers when there is a public firm competing with a private firm in the product market. It is shown that under Bertrand competition with heterogeneous goods both firms hire managers. This is in contrast with the result obtained under Cournot competition, where only the private firm hires a manager. Moreover, welfare is lower if both firms hire managers than if neither firm does. In contrast, under Cournot competition welfare is greater if both firms hire managers.     

THE EFFECT OF REGULATION ON WAGES AND INTERMEDIATE PRODUCT PRICES UNDER BILATERAL MONOPOLY1

This paper seeks to determine whether, under bilateral monopoly, profit rate regulation induces an input price bias in addition to the well known Averch-Johnson capital intensity bias. Using a Nash-type employer-union, fixed bargaining power model, it is found that regulation may induce lower as well as higher wage rates. Similarly, when the two parties are respectively capital equipment supplier and user, regulation of the user's profit rate has an ambiguous effect on the equipment rental rate. In both cases the input price effect is shown to depend on the elasticity of factor substitution and on how demand elasticity varies with output.