The trade reducing effects of market power in international shipping

Developing countries pay substantially higher transportation costs than developed nations, which leads to less trade and perhaps lower incomes. This paper investigates price discrimination in the shipping industry and the role it plays in determining transportation costs. In the presence of market power, shipping prices depend on the demand characteristics of goods being traded. We show theoretically and estimate empirically that ocean cargo carriers charge higher prices when transporting goods with higher product prices, lower import demand elasticities, and higher tariffs, and when facing fewer competitors on a trade route. These characteristics explain more variation in shipping prices than do conventional proxies such as distance, and significantly contribute to the higher shipping prices facing the developing world. A simple back of the envelope calculation suggests that eliminating market power in shipping would boost trade volumes by 5.9% (for the US) to 15.2% (for Latin America). Our findings are also important for evaluating the impact of tariff liberalization. Cargo carriers decrease shipping prices by 1–2% for every 1% reduction in tariffs.     

Market integration and tariff cooperation between asymmetric countries

This study explores the relationship between market integration—specifically a reduction in trade costs—and the sustainability of tariff cooperation, using a repeated game approach. We explore the property of noncooperative and cooperative tariffs about trade costs and the size of the domestic industry. We find that market integration does not induce the tariff rates to be lowered bilaterally in the noncooperative policy regime. By contrast, the cooperative regime brings about a bilateral tariff reduction when the market becomes integrated. Furthermore, by using the repeated game approach, we demonstrate that market integration facilitates cooperation between asymmetric countries.     

Customs Union or Free Trade Area? The Role of Political Asymmetries

When trade policy is determined endogenously by lobbying, it matters whether countries are arranged into a customs union or a free trade area. This paper compares the two regimes when the member governments are asymmetric in their susceptibilities to lobbying and in their bargaining power within a customs union. In the model, a customs union never leads to lower tariffs for both countries, whereas it can lead to higher tariffs for both.     

Trade,foreign direct investment or acquisition: Optimal entry modes for multinationals

We examine multinationals' optimal entry modes into foreign markets as a function of market size, FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs. Our results highlight why large countries are more likely to attract acquisition investment, while intermediate sized countries may be served predominantly through trade, even in the presence of high tariffs. Small countries are most likely to experience either FDI or no entry. We also show how these results vary with the competition intensity in the host country.FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs are crucial not only in determining whether to engage in FDI or trade, but they are also shown to influence the acquisition choice as trade and FDI threats influence the acquisition price. Finally, we explore the welfare implications of tariff reductions for both the local firm and the multinational and investigate political motives to impose endogenous tariffs that influence not only the welfare of a local firm, but also the entry mode of the multinational.     

Tariff Revenue Competition in a Free Trade Area: The Case of Asymmetric Large Countries

The striking result has been shown by Richardson that tariff revenue competition between two symmetric member countries of a free trade area (FTA) results in complete elimination of external tariffs if there exists a pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium at all. Richardson also conjectures without building a model that if member countries are asymmetric in market size, there exists a pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium in which both countries set positive external tariffs. We explicitly extend his tariff competition model into the case of asymmetric FTA member countries, and confirm his conjecture. We also show that there exists a mixed‐strategy Nash equilibrium in the case of symmetric countries.     

Export performance of developing countries: Does landlockedness matter?

Landlockedness imposes additional costs on trade and reduces international competitiveness. This paper examines the determinants of export performance in developing countries, within a comparative perspective of landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) and non‐landlocked developing countries, by using a standard gravity modeling framework. The study covers data from 1995 to 2015. The results suggest that despite recent trade policy reforms, the overall export performance of LLDCs is lower than that of non‐landlocked developing countries due to the inherent additional trade costs associated with landlockedness. The conventional wisdom that export performance is aided by economic openness also applies to LLDCs, but distance‐related trade costs have a greater negative impact on exports from LLDCs than on other developing countries. The immediate trade policy challenge for LLDCs is therefore to create a more trade‐friendly environment by lowering tariffs, reforming exchange rates and entering into regional trade agreements.     

贸易成本与国内产业地理

中国目前的产业地理是在国内外经济一体化同时深入发展的背景下形成和发展起来的。本文以贸易成本为核心变量,在空间经济学的理论框架下研究了国内外经济一体化对国内产业地理的影响。通过拓展Krugman and Livas(1996)的两国三地区模型,设定国内两地区对称和不对称两种情形讨论国内外贸易成本对国内产业地理的作用,并以后者模拟中国东中西部地区与外部市场不对称的情形;通过数据模拟呈现内外贸易成本、市场规模与产业空间分布的关系。     

Distorted Trade Barriers: A Dissection of Trade Costs in a “Distorted Gravity” Model

It is common in the trade literature to use iceberg transport costs to represent both tariffs and shipping costs alike. However, in models with monopolistic competition these are not identical trade restrictions. This difference is driven by how the two costs affect the extensive margin. We illustrate these differences in a gravity model. We show theoretically that trade flows are more elastic with respect to tariffs than transport costs and find a linear relationship between the elasticities with respect to tariffs, iceberg transport costs, and fixed market costs. We empirically validate these results using data on US product‐level imports.     

Fortress Europe: Jericho or Château d’If?

Traditional analysis of customs union formation suggests that it leads to an increase in members' external tariffs. This paper stresses two aspects of European trade and trade policy—a large volume of intra-industry trade between similar countries and a political motivation for tariffs—and highlights a role for tariff coordination in a model of differentiated products in which tariffs affect domestic costs and thus export prices and the magnitude of monopolistic rents. We show that when workers choose the tariffs and receive but a small portion of tariff revenues, the union's tariff wall falls.     

Misreporting trade: Tariff evasion,corruption, and auditing standards

Official international trade statistics report commerce between every pair of countries twice: once for the importing country and once for the exporter. In principle, the two values differ only by transport costs, but as has long been recognized, they also differ systematically with product‐level tariffs. We aggregate across products to construct a dataset of annual aggregate bilateral trade, separately for the importer and exporter reports. With these data, we show that the reporting differences also vary systematically with country characteristics aside from tariffs: incomes, auditing standards, corruption, and trade agreements.     

Whom to send to Doha? The shortsighted ones!

Analyses of the effects of trade policies focus on comparisons of two different steady states, restricting the investigation to the long run. In order to account for the adjustments and to capture the relevant transmission mechanisms of changes in trade costs, such as market size, entry and exit, as well as productivity changes of firms, we base our trade policy analysis on a dynamic new trade theory model. This approach has two advantages. (i) It allows us to take account of the transitional process after a change in tariffs. (ii) It allows us to take account of the shortsightedness of policy makers. We show that Nash-equilibrium tariffs based on a dynamic trade model are lower than Nash-equilibrium tariffs based on a static model. We also show that shortsighted politicians tend to set lower tariffs than politicians with a longer planning horizon.     

Market Size, Trade, and Productivity

We develop a monopolistically competitive model of trade with firm heterogeneity—in terms of productivity differences—and endogenous differences in the "toughness" of competition across markets—in terms of the number and average productivity of competing firms. We analyse how these features vary across markets of different size that are not perfectly integrated through trade; we then study the effects of different trade liberalization policies. In our model, market size and trade affect the toughness of competition, which then feeds back into the selection of heterogeneous producers and exporters in that market. Aggregate productivity and average mark-ups thus respond to both the size of a market and the extent of its integration through trade (larger, more integrated markets exhibit higher productivity and lower mark-ups). Our model remains highly tractable, even when extended to a general framework with multiple asymmetric countries integrated to different extents through asymmetric trade costs. We believe this provides a useful modelling framework that is particularly well suited to the analysis of trade and regional integration policy scenarios in an environment with heterogeneous firms and endogenous mark-ups.     

Distance,skill deepening and development: will peripheral countries ever get rich?

This paper models the relationship between countries' distance from global economic activity, endogenous investments in education and economic development. Firms in remote locations pay greater trade costs on both exports and intermediate imports, reducing the amount of value added left to remunerate domestic factors of production. If skill-intensive sectors have higher trade costs, more pervasive input–output linkages or stronger increasing returns to scale, we show theoretically that remoteness depresses the skill premium and therefore incentives for human capital accumulation. Empirically, we exploit structural relationships from the model to demonstrate that countries with lower market access have lower levels of educational attainment. We also show that the world's most peripheral countries are becoming increasingly economically remote over time.     

Asymmetric trade protection leading not to productivity but to export share change

This article revisits a classical theme in economics, that is, the relationship between trade protection and economic performance, with an improved treatment of the endogeneity of tariffs and with consideration of alternative performance criteria. This paper also considers the effects of asymmetric protection, such as higher tariffs on consumer goods and lower tariffs on producer goods. Using sectoral data on Korean manufacturing during the period from 1967 to 1993, this study finds that the effect of trade protection by tariff tends to show up not in terms of total factor productivity but in terms of revealed comparative advantage and export shares of sectors. Such an effect tends to be greater in consumer goods, which are the main targets of promotion by higher tariffs. This study verifies the potentially positive role of tariffs under certain conditions, especially under discipline from world markets.     

A Stackelberg Game Model of Trade in Renewable Resources with Competitive Sellers*

We model international trade in renewable resources between a single buyer and competitive sellers as a Stackelberg differential game. The buyer uses unit and ad valorem tariffs to indirectly encourage conservation of the renewable resource under study. First, we show that the efficacy of these trade policy instruments in promoting conservation depends fundamentally on whether harvesting costs are stock dependent or independent. When harvesting costs are stock independent, the optimal open‐loop tariffs are dynamically consistent. In contrast, when harvesting costs are stock dependent, the optimal open‐loop tariffs are dynamically inconsistent. Secondly, we point out that whether the terminal value of the resource stock is higher with the stock independent or the stock dependent cost function cannot be resolved unambiguously. Thirdly, we show that it does not make sense for the buyer to use both tariffs simultaneously. Finally, we discuss the implications of these and other findings for renewable resource conservation in general.     

OPTIMUM-WELFARE AND MAXIMUM-REVENUE TARIFFS IN MIXED OLIGOPOLY WITH FOREIGN COMPETITORS

This paper re-examines the important tariff ranking issue under a linear mixed oligopoly model with foreign competitors and asymmetric costs. We demonstrate that under Cournot competition, when the size of domestic private and foreign private firms become more unequally distributed, optimum-welfare tariff will exceed maximum-revenue tariff. We also show that under Stackelberg competition, when the domestic government protects its domestic sector, it will levy higher optimum-welfare tariffs versus maximum-revenue tariffs; however, when it decides to open its doors more for foreign competitors, it will need to levy higher maximum-revenue tariffs versus optimum-welfare tariffs. The above results remain valid whether the domestic public firm acts as a leader or a follower.     

Trade liberalization and markups: Micro evidence from China

This paper presents evidence from highly disaggregated Chinese firm-product data that, given productivity, input tariff reductions induce an incumbent importer/exporter to increase product markups. We further investigate empirically the mechanisms underlying this trade liberalization effect, and find that input tariff reductions decrease marginal costs, and their effects on markup adjustments are more profound among firms with higher import dependence. Moreover, we exploit unique features of Chinese data by comparing results for two trade regimes: ordinary trade (wherein firms pay import tariffs to import) and processing trade (wherein firms are not subject to import tariffs). While the aforementioned trade liberalization effects and mechanisms only apply to ordinary trade, processing trade samples are used in a placebo test. The paper also shows that more productive firms charge higher markups for products. All these findings are robust to alternative markup measures including one estimate using physical-quantity output data, different production function specifications, a subsample consisting only of pure exporters, and estimations based on our theoretical derivations.     

Liberalizing Services Trade In APEC: A General Equilibrium Analysis with Imperfect Competition

The paper studies services-sector trade liberalization in the Asia–Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Forum using a global, multicountry, multisector applied general equilibrium model with an imperfectly competitive service sector. Reducing the service sector's nontariff barriers is modeled by eliminating the possibility for oligopolistic firms to price-discriminate between client countries within APEC and lowering the fixed costs of the firms doing service exporting business. The results suggest that services trade liberalization reinforces existing sectoral trade balances. Increase in demand for intermediate services tends to reinforce rather than counteract the role of primary factors in determining sectoral comparative advantage. The western APEC members received the greatest welfare gains from services trade liberalization, while the developing economies gained more if only tariffs were eliminated.     

Growth,expectations and tariffs

We present a growth model of international trade in which expectations about profitability and growth influence innovation and investment. Adaptive learning dynamics determine transition paths for countries with differing structural parameters. Countries limiting trade by tariffs on imports of capital goods can experience gains in growth and perceived utility for a finite time, whereas the rest of the world is adversely affected. Asymmetric gains persist longer when structural advantages of the country applying tariffs are larger. Substantial differences in levels of innovation, output and utility can appear within our asymmetric country setting.     

NAFTA and the Realignment of Textile and Apparel Trade: Trade Creation or Trade Diversion?*

A modified version of the partial‐equilibrium gravity model, originally proposed by Fukao et al. (2003 ), is employed to investigate the changing pattern of US textile trade. We use US Bilateral Manufacturing Imports and Exports data for 1989–2001 to assess the impact of labor wages, tariffs, and exchange rates on the composition of US textile imports before and after the creation of NAFTA. The analysis is performed at the SIC two‐digit industry level and the more disaggregated four‐digit sector level. We find little evidence of trade diversion in textiles frequently attributed to NAFTA, while trade creation is clearly present. Furthermore, lower wages in some textile‐exporting countries (e.g. countries in Asia) do not appear to significantly increase these countries' shares of US textile imports at the expense of other trading partners. However, variations in currency exchange rates and tariffs have substantial effects on the composition of US imports.