Expectations and learning under alternative monetary regimes: an experimental approach

Summary We design and analyze experimental versions of monetary overlapping generations economies under alternative policy regimes. Economies with a constant level of real deficit financed through seignorage, economies in which the level of deficit is adapted in order to follow a monetary policy with a target rate of inflation, and economies with preannounced changes in deficit levels are reported here. We also examine the behavior of an economy with no stationary competitive equilibrium. Our time series are compared to rational expectations equilibrium paths and to adaptive learning dynamics.Financial support for our work from the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota, the National Science Foundation (SES-8912552), Richard M. and Margaret Cyert Family Funds, and the Ministry of Education of Spain is gratefully acknowledged. We wish to thank Javier Diaz-Giménez, Jean Michael Grandmont, Robert Lucas, Albert Marcet, Charles Plott, Edward Prescott, Thomas Sargent, Neil Wallace and Michael Woodford for commenting on our work. We also thank Vijay Rajan for developing the software for the computerized experimental environment, and Jackie Cuccaro and Dhananjay Gode for their research assistance.     

Bayesian–Walrasian equilibria: beyond the rational expectations equilibrium

In general rational expectations equilibrium (REE), as introduced in Radner (Econometrica 47:655–678, 1978) in an Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie setting with uncertainty, does not exist. Moreover, it fails to be fully Pareto optimal and incentive compatible and is also not implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form game (Glycopantis et al. in Econ Theory 26:765–791, 2005). The lack of all the above properties is mainly due to the fact that the agents are supposed to predict the equilibrium market clearing price (as agent’s expected maximized utility is conditioned on the information that equilibrium prices reveal), which leads inevitably to the presumption that agents know all the primitives in the economy, i.e., random initial endowments, random utility functions and private information sets. To get around this problematic equilibrium notion, we introduce a new concept called Bayesian–Walrasian equilibrium (BWE) which has Bayesian features. In particular, agents try to predict the market-clearing prices using Bayesian updating and evaluate their consumption in terms of Bayesian price estimates, which are different for each individual. In this framework agents maximize expected utility conditioned on their own private information about the state of nature, subject to a Bayesian estimated budget constraint. Market clearing is not an intrinsic part of the definition of BWE. However, both in the case of perfect foresight and in the case of symmetric information BWE leads to a statewise market clearing; it then becomes an ex post Walrasian equilibrium allocation. This new BWE exists under standard assumptions, in contrast to the REE. In particular, we show that our new BWE exists in the well-known example in Kreps (J Econ Theory 14:32–43, 1977), where REE fails to exist. This work was done in the Spring of 2005, when EJB was a visiting professor at the University of Illinois.     

Rational expectations and fixed-event forecasts: An application to UK inflation

This paper tests a version of the rational expectations hypothesis using ‘fixed-event’ inflation forecasts for the UK. Fixed-event forecasts consist of a panel of forecasts for a set of outturns of a series at varying horizons prior to each outturn. The forecasts are the prediction of fund managers surveyed by Merrill Lynch. Fixed-event forecasts allow tests for whether expectations are unbiased in a similar fashion to the rest of the literature. But they also permit the conduct of particular tests of forecast efficiency - whether the forecasts make best use of available information - that are not possible with rolling-event data. We find evidence of a positive bias in inflation expectations. Evidence for inefficiency is much less clear cut.First version received: June 2002/ Final version received: November 2003We would like two anonymous referees and an editor for comments that have significantly improved the paper. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England.     

The Liverpool macroeconomic model of the United Kingdom

The paper describes the Liverpool Model, a rational expectations model of the UK economy used for forecasting since March 1980. The model is of the ‘new classical’ type, in that all markets clear; in the labour market, there is a union sector with one-year nominal wage contracts but the non-union sector clears excess demands. Equilibrium (or ‘natural rate’) values of output, employment, real wages, etc are endogenously determined. In- and out-of-sample errors, a full set of simulations, and a complete listing are included. The interim experience of the model as a test bed for rational expectations methods is ‘far from discouraging’.     

Econometric policy evaluation and expectations

Recently large-scale econometric models have been criticized as inappropriate tools for policy evaluation. One critical point often mentioned is the way expectations are formed. This paper shows that the way the process of expectations formation is considered does not play a crucial role. Instead, the ability to model agents' reactions to changes in policy is the essence of the critique. As long as government behaviour is sufficiently accessible in the model, applied econometrics may still use large-scale systems for which rational expectations solutions would be troublesome if not impossible to reach.     

Economic planning for market economies : The optimality of planning in an economy with uncertainty and asymmetrical information

The paper is based on a disequilibrium model which is Keynesian in the ‘short run’, ie with given expectations, but which admits of a continuum of equilibria when expectations are rational. Expectations are adaptive (so that they are rational only in the long run) but can be influenced by an indicative plan. The government and the private sector have differing information sets, each knowing some things the other sector does not (spontaneously) know. It is shown that in this world, an optimal plan dominates a self-fulfilling plan, which in turn dominates a no-planning equilibrium.     

Experimental economics under the microscope

Although experimental economics has been one of the most rapidlyexpanding fields in economics in recent years, it has so farattracted little sustained methodological discussion. This paperis intended as a step towards filling the gap, and providespreliminary answers to the following questions. (i) What aredistinctive characteristics of the experimental method in economics?(ii) To what extent are the results obtained in the laboratorytransferable to non-laboratory situations? (iii) What are thelimits of the experimental method in economics? (iv) Why isit that experimentation, which has been so successful in thenatural sciences, remains so controversial in the social sciences.     

Time is money: The effect of clock speed on seller’s revenue in Dutch auctions

We study the role of timing in auctions under the premise that time is a valuable resource. When one object is for sale, Dutch and first-price sealed bid auctions are strategically equivalent in standard models, and therefore, they should yield the same revenue for the auctioneer. We study Dutch and first-price sealed bid auctions in the laboratory, with a specific emphasis on the speed of the clock in the Dutch auction. At fast clock speeds, revenue in the Dutch auction is significantly lower than it is in the sealed bid auction. When the clock is sufficiently slow, however, revenue in the Dutch auction is higher than the revenue in the sealed bid auction. We develop and test a simple model of auctions with impatient bidders that is consistent with these laboratory findings.

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Evaluating how predictable errors in expected income affect consumption

This article studies whether anomalies in consumption can be explained by a behavioural model in which agents make predictable errors in forecasting income. We use a micro-data set containing subjective expectations about future income. This article shows that the null hypothesis of rational expectations is rejected in favour of the behavioural model, since consumption responds to predictable forecast errors. On average, agents who we predict are too pessimistic increase consumption after the predictable positive income shock. On average, agents who are too optimistic reduce the consumption.     

Are the antiglobalists right? Gains-from-trade without a Walrasian auctioneer

We show that the “fear” of globalisation can be rationalised by economic theory in the standard AD/AS equilibrium model, if we substitute the coordinational role of the Auctioneer by an implementation device based on learning (Guesnerie in Am Econ Rev 82, 1254–1278, 1992). When endowing producers with a learning ability to forecast market prices, individual profit-maximizing production decisions become interdependent in a strategic sense (strategic substitutes). Performing basic comparative statics exercises, we show that “competitiveness” matters in a precise sense: as foreign producers gain access to the home market, home producers’ ability to forecast market prices is undermined, so being their ability to forecast the profit consequences of their production decisions. A standard open economy exercise shows that the efficiency gains triggered by increased competition have to be traded-off against higher uncertainty (a lower likelihood to coordinate upon the welfare enhancing free-trade equilibrium). We interpret it as a new rationale for the existence of barriers to trade targeting coordination, rather than protecting mere inefficient sectors or industries (political economy driven). Finally, we show that classical measures evaluating ex-ante the desirability of economic integration (net welfare gains) do not always advice free trade. I wish to specially thank Roger Guesnerie, Thierry Verdier and an anonymous referee for their helpful suggestions. Comments by Facundo Albornoz, Pol Antràs, Gregory Corcos, Maurice Kugler, Robin Mason, Victor Norman, Emmanuel Ornelas and Susanna Thede are sincerely acknowledged. Audiences at the U. of Alicante, U. Autonoma de Barcelona, ETSG 2005 (Dublin), FGV-EPGE (RJ, Brazil), LACEA 2005 (Paris), the Miwest Trade Meeting at Minneapolis 2007, the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH), SBE 2005 (Natal, Brazil), U. of Southampton and T2M 2005 are acknowledged. The contents constitute chapter 4 of my PSE-EHESS PhD thesis, extended while I visited the NYU Economics department, sponsored by A. Bisin. Financial support from the Bank of Spain and CNRS is sincerely acknowledged.     

Rationally mispriced assets in equilibrium

We present a simple model of trading in a financial market where agents are asymmetrically informed and information is transmitted through the price system. We characterize the equilibrium for this economy and show that ‘rational mispricing’ of assets occurs if the price system fails to reveal the insider information accurately. It is argued that the communication of wrong information through equilibrium prices is compatible with full rationality on the part of the investors and may explain deviations from the efficient markets hypothesis.     

Sequentially complete markets remain incomplete

We show by means of an example that the result of Arrow [Arrow, K.J. (1953), Le rôle des valeurs boursières pour la répartition la meilleure des risques, Econométrie, 41–47, CNRS, Paris; translated as The role of securities in the optimal allocation of risk bearing, Review of Economic Studies, 31, 91–96] is problematic when there exist multiple equilibrium continuations to the initial-period component of an intertemporal equilibrium.     

Expectations in micro data: rationality revisited

An increasing number of longitudinal data sets collect expectations information regarding a variety of future individual level events and decisions, providing researchers with the opportunity to explore expectations over micro variables in detail. We present a theoretical framework and an econometric methodology to use that type of information to test the Rational Expectations (RE) hypothesis in models of individual behavior. This RE assumption at the micro level underlies a majority of the research in applied fields in economics, and it is the common foundation of most work in dynamic models of individual behavior. We present tests of three different types of expectations using two different panel data sets that represent two very different populations. In all three cases we cannot reject the RE hypothesis. Our results support a wide variety of models in economics, and other disciplines, that assume rational behavior. We would like to acknowledge outstanding research assistance from Huan Ni. The Michigan Retirement Research Center (MRRC) and the TIAA-CREF Institute made this research possible through their financial support of two related projects. Benítez-Silva also acknowledges the financial support from NIH grant AG1298502 on a related project, and also from the Fundación BBVA, and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology through project number SEJ2005-08783-C04-01, and wants to thank the Department of Economics at the University of Maryland and the Department of Economics at Universitat Pompeu Fabra for their hospitality during the completion of this paper. Three anonymous referees provided excellent comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are the authors’.     

Are low-price promises collusion guarantees? An experimental test of price matching policies

In a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of Price Matching Guarantees (PMG) to raise prices above the competitive levels. PMG are introduced both as a market rule (the selling price is always the lowest posted price) and as a business strategy (subjects decide whether or not to offer them). Our results show that PMG lead to a clear collusive outcome as markets quickly and fully converge to the collusive prediction if PMG are imposed as a market rule. Whenever subjects are allowed to decide whether to adopt PMG or not we observe that almost all subjects decide to adopt them and prices get very close to the collusive ones.      

Market crashes,speculation and learning in financial markets

A natural conjecture is that if agents’ beliefs are almost correct then equilibrium prices should be close to rational expectations prices. Sandroni (J Econ Theory 82:1–18, 1998) gives a counterexample in an economy with sunspots and complete markets. We extend Sandroni’s result by showing that the conjecture is generically true for economies with complete markets. We consider a standard General Equilibrium model with large but finite horizon and complete markets. We show that, for almost every such economy, if conditional beliefs eventually become correct along a path of events then equilibrium prices of assets traded along this path converge to rational expectations equilibria in the sup-norm. Moreover, we establish that, generically, there exist along any such path local diffeomorphisms between individual beliefs and equilibrium prices. I would like to thank C. Ewerhart and A. Kirman for their comments, as well as the seminar participants at the University of Minho, the General Equilibrium Workshop 2005 in Zurich, and the 15th Asian General Equilibrium Conference 2007 in Singapore. An anonymous referee also provided very valuable comments.     

Competitive equilibrium hyperinflation under rational expectations

This paper shows that a competitive equilibrium model, where a representative agent maximizes welfare, expectations are rational and markets are in equilibrium can account for several hyperinflation stylized facts. The theory is built by combining two hypotheses, namely, a fiscal crisis that requires printing money to finance an increasing public deficit and a predicted change in an unsustainable fiscal regime.We thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments. A. B. Cunha acknowledges financial support from the Brazilian Council of Science and Technology (CNPq).