Firm-specific information and systemic risk

Although there is substantial literature linking news to the asset return volatility of a single asset, little attention has been paid to how news influences the relationships between firms. This paper addresses this issue by examining how firm-specific scheduled and unscheduled news arrivals influence the systemic risk of individual firms based on a sample of 47 US financial institutions. Whereas negative surprises from scheduled news announcements and a higher rate of unscheduled news both increase the systemic risk of a firm, positive news surprises decrease this systemic risk. In addition, negative scheduled news and a higher rate of unscheduled news across the sector increases the total connectedness or systemic risk across the sector as a whole. These effects are magnified when the market is already in distress. The results indicate that regulators should consider more than volatility and pay attention to the news flow when monitoring systemic risk.     

Schumpeterian competition in heterogeneous oligopolies

The modeling of Schumpeterian competition as a process of innovation, imitation and selection was first presented by Nelson/Winter (1982) in a simulation study and further analyzed in a similar but general analytical formulation by Iwai (1984a, 1984b). Their results concerning the relations between the combination of the different forces of Schumpeterian competition and market structure respectively the distributions of profits are interesting, but restricted to competitive markets. Comparing rules of thumb and satisficing for the Ramp;D decisions the present study analyzes the process of Schumpeterian competition in a heterogeneous oligopoly. Firstly, the authors find for the Ramp;D-concentration relation results contrary to the traditional interpretation of Schumpeter. Secondly, Iwai’s (1984a, 1984b) qualitative results hold in this less restrictive modeling.     

Tacit collusion in repeated auctions

This paper considers the question of tacit collusion in repeated auctions with independent private values and with limited public monitoring. McAfee and McMillan show that the extent of collusion is tied to the availability of transfers. Monetary transfers allow cartels to extract full surplus. A folk theorem proved by Fudenberg et al. (Econometrica 62 (1994) 997-1039) shows that transfers of future payoffs are almost as good if players are patient and communicate before auctions. We ask how the scope of collusion is affected if players dispense with explicit communication and their monitoring is limited. Collusion better than bid rotation is still feasible, but full surplus cannot be extracted. This constraint becomes less severe with more players and large cartels can become asymptotically efficient even with very limited monitoring.     

Imitation—theory and experimental evidence

We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation and subject it to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the different predictions of previous imitation models are mainly explained by different informational assumptions, and to a lesser extent by different behavioral rules. In a laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find significant effects of seemingly innocent changes in information. Moreover, the generalized imitation model predicts the differences between treatments well. The data provide support for imitation on the individual level, both in terms of choice and in terms of perception. Furthermore, individuals’ propensity to imitate more successful actions is increasing in payoff differences.     

The benefits of voluntary leadership in experimental public goods games

We study the effects of voluntary leadership in experimental public goods games when each group member can volunteer to contribute before the other members. We find that voluntary leadership increases contributions significantly, compared to a treatment where leadership is enforced exogenously.     

An experiment on learning with limited information: nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow

We present the results of an experiment on learning in a continuous-time low-information setting. For a dominance solvable version of a Cournot oligopoly with differentiated products, we find little evidence of convergence to the Nash equilibrium. In an asynchronous setting, characterized by players updating their strategies at different frequencies, play tends toward the Stackelberg outcome which favors the slower player. Convergence is significantly more robust for a “serial cost sharing” game, which satisfies a stronger solution concept of overwhelmed solvability. As the number of players grows, this improved convergence tends to diminish, seemingly driven by frequent and highly structured experimentation by players leading to a cascading effect in which experimentation by one player induces experimentation by others. These results have implications both for traditional oligopoly competition and for a wide variety of strategic situations arising on the Internet.     

Information and learning in oligopoly: An experiment

This paper presents an experiment on learning in repeated games, which complements the analysis of playersʼ actual choices with data on the information acquisition process they follow. Subjects play a repeated Cournot oligopoly, with limited a priori information. The econometrics hinges on a model built upon Experience Weighted Attraction learning, and the simultaneous analysis of data on the information gathered and on actions taken by the subjects. Results suggest that learning is a composite process, in which different components coexist. Adaptive learning emerges as the leading element, but when subjects look at the strategies individually adopted by their competitors they tend to imitate the most successful behavior, which makes markets more competitive. Reinforcement learning also plays a role, as subjects favor strategies that have yielded higher profits in the past.     

Tax and subsidy incidence equivalence theories: experimental evidence from competitive markets

A basic tenet in microeconomics is tax incidence equivalence, which holds that the burden of a unit tax on buyers and sellers is independent of who actually pays the tax. By contrast, policymakers and the public often mistake statutory incidence for economic incidence. Using competitive laboratory markets, I test both tax incidence equivalence and an analogous theorem for subsidies. For sufficiently large markets, the results show strong support for both theories; there is little to no evidence, even in the short run, of the popular misperception that statutory incidence equals economic incidence. In smaller markets in which competitive forces are weaker and relative bargaining strengths may play a role, the evidence for tax incidence equivalence is weaker as minor price discrepancies may persist between markets.     

Japan's oligopolies: Potential economy wide gains from structural reforms

Japan's slowdown preceded those in the other advanced economies and is therefore of global significance. While its initial causes were financial, a resurgence will depend on productivity growth, key determinants of which are investment and industrial structure. This paper focuses on the costs of a structure dominated by oligopolies and the potential gains from combined competition and tax reform. We first identify industry concentration levels and economic rents using firm specific data and then incorporate these in a calibrated economy-wide model. Simulations suggest that competition policy and more openness to investment in services could deliver 5–17% of additional GDP. These stimulate investment via returning external wealth. Gains are spread most evenly if competition policy is combined with company tax reform. This retains fiscal balance and improves the domestic purchasing power of all Japanese incomes.     

Temporary Bottlenecks,Hydropower and Acquisitions*

We apply a model with four markets, two regions and two time periods, to study the effects of an acquisition in a hydropower system with temporary bottlenecks. The effect on welfare is found to be ambiguous. In some instances an acquisition leads to larger differences in prices between markets, which gives rise to an increase in deadweight loss. In other instances it leads to a reduction in price differences between markets, particularly if the dominant firm acquires a firm which was active in the market where the dominant firm used to dump its production before the acquisition.     

On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation

We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot-Nash outcome, one or both Stackelberg outcomes, or a continuum of points including the Cournot-Nash outcome and one or both Stackelberg outcomes. A simple theorem that uses agents’ standard one-period reaction functions and the one-period Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria delineates the equilibrium set. Applications include contribution, oligopoly, and rent-seeking games.     

Imitation and the evolution of Walrasian behavior: Theoretically fragile but behaviorally robust

A well-known result by Vega-Redondo (1997) [18] implies that in symmetric Cournot oligopolies, imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome. We show that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in costs, since every outcome where agents choose identical actions will be played some fraction of the time in the long run. We then conduct experiments to check this fragility. We obtain that, contrary to the theoretical prediction, the Walrasian outcome is a good predictor of market outcomes. Finally, we suggest a new theory based on a mix of imitation and other learning processes that explains subjects' behavior fairly well.     

Bertrand versus Cournot competition in a downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership

Focusing on foreign ownership in the private firm, we examine the Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopolistic market with vertical market structure. We have found that if public and private firms were charged with uniform price for their inputs, then Cournot-Bertrand ranking in market outcomes confirms those obtained by Ghosh and Mitra (2010). This implies that under uniform pricing in the upstream sector, the vertical market structure does not have substantial influences on Cournot-Bertrand ranking. However, if discriminatory pricing is adopted, firm's profits, output, and social welfare are often reversed to those obtained from uniform pricing in the upstream sector. Given the closeness of products, if the share of foreign ownership is sufficiently low, social welfare in Cournot competition can exceed that of Bertrand competition, contrasting with the standard welfare ranking that Bertrand welfare is strictly higher than Cournot. This implies that Cournot competition can be more socially desirable than Bertrand in mixed oligopoly with vertical market structure if discriminatory pricing scheme is adopted by foreign upstream monopolists.     

Third-party punishment and counter-punishment in one-shot interactions

This paper presents experimental evidence from a simple three-person game showing that many individuals are willing to avenge third-party punishment in one-shot interactions. The threat of counter-punishment has a large negative effect on the willingness of third parties to punish selfish behavior. In spite of this, the extent of selfish behavior is identical to that in a treatment without counter-punishment opportunities. We discuss explanations for this puzzling finding.     

FREE VERSUS SECOND‐BEST ENTRY IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLIES WITH FIRM‐SPECIFIC NETWORKS

This paper endogenizes the number of firms in an industry with positive network effects, complete incompatibility, and firms that compete in quantity. To this end, we compare two possibilities: free entry and second‐best number of firms (the one that maximizes social welfare). We show that with business‐stealing competition, free entry yields, in general, more firms than the socially optimal solution. In addition, we find that by the nature of the industry with firm‐specific networks, total production may be greater or lower under free entry than with a regulator; moreover, some industries attain their maximum social welfare with a monopoly.     

The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly

We derive alternative sufficient conditions for the value of public information to be either positive or negative in a Cournot duopoly where firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale.     

R&D games in a Cournot duopoly with isoelastic demand functions: A comment

In a recent paper, Tramontana (Economic Modelling, 27; 350-357, 2010) investigates the stability properties of a Cournot Duopoly game when the demand function is isoelastic. In this note, we show that for some well known applications of two-stage Cournot games (D. Aspremont and Jacquemin, American Economic Review, 78, 1122-1137, 1988) an isoelastic demand function can guarantee both the existence and the uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium even in cases where existence is not obtained with linear demands.     

Cooperation and framing effects in provision point mechanisms: Experimental evidence

Andreoni (1995) showed that pure framing effects may influence contribution in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms (VCM) by comparing a standard public goods game, called the positive frame condition (giving to the public good), with a negative frame condition (taking from the public good) where the subjects' choice to purchase a private good makes the other subjects worse off. This paper aims at testing the robustness of such framing effects in the context of Provision Point Mechanisms (PPM). Our approach is original in that it combines both framing and provision point dimensions by comparing maintaining (taking from the public good) and creating (giving to the public good) contexts using Provision Point experiments. Consistent with previous findings, we find that individuals tend to be less cooperative in the maintaining frame than in the creating frame. Our results also show that the framing effects are stronger under a PPM than under a VCM and increase with the provision point level. These results may have important consequences for the management of environmental resources.     

Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games

We describe an experiment based on a simple two-person game designed so that different learning models make different predictions. Econometric analysis of the experimental data reveals clear heterogeneity in the subjects’ learning behavior. But the subjects follow only a few decision rules for basing their play on their information, and these rules have simple cognitive interpretations. There is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, and many equilibria in mixed strategies. We find that the only equilibrium consistent with the data is one of the mixed strategy equilibria. This equilibrium is shown, surprisingly, to be consistent with Jordan's Bayesian model.