A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites

We analyze the problem of a jury that must rank a set of contestants whose socially optimal ranking is common knowledge among jurors who may have friends among the contestants and may, therefore, be biased in their friends' favor. We show a natural mechanism that is finite and complete informational, with no simultaneous moves (i.e., it is solvable by backward induction), which implements the socially optimal ranking with subgame perfect equilibria.     

Public attention to “Islamic terrorism” and stock market returns

Does public attention to Islamic terrorism affect the performance of Islamic and conventional indices? We answer this question by empirically examining the effects of US public attention to Islamic terrorism on returns of US Islamic and conventional indices between 2004 and 2017. US public attention to Islamic terrorism is measured using Google Search Volume, which reflects active public attentiveness, and media coverage, which measures passive attentiveness. We test its effect on the stock returns of Islamic and conventional indices by using difference-in-difference analysis. The results indicate that US public attention to Islamic terrorism negatively affects US Islamic indices, suggesting that investors may make amalgams between terrorism and Islamic finance. These clichés may lead them to sell Sharia-compliant assets when US public attention to Islamic terrorism is high. Taken together, our findings provide new evidence and financial implications for investors and providers of Islamic financial products.     

Does Social Media Get Your Attention?

The author investigates how social media affects stock prices and post–earnings announcement drift in response to companies’ quarterly earnings announcements. Using quarterly earnings data as well Twitter and StockTwits data, the author utilizes Twitter volume and a residual methodology to generate an attention proxy that is orthogonal to the growth of Twitter accounts. The author finds that the new attention brought by social media after the earnings announcements positively affects the cumulative abnormal returns. Further, even companies reporting bad news can still have positive immediate cumulative abnormal returns if they attract enough attention from investors after an earnings announcement. The new attention effects are different in both magnitudes and statistical significance between social media popular and unpopular industries.     

Efficiency-Wage Unemployment and Intersectoral Wage Differentials in a Heckscher–Ohlin Model

The paper analyzes a Heckscher–Ohlin (HO) model with efficiency-wage unemployment (henceforth HOe model). We show that all HO results have close HOe analogues. Additionally, conditions are derived under which immigrants might not only find employment for themselves but also raise employment for natives. Moreover, we analyze the ranking of countries with respect to their rate of unemployment, showing that this ranking may be reversed as countries move from autarky to trade. All results are clearly linked to factor intensities and the pattern of intersectoral wage differentials.     

Factor‐biased public infrastructure and wage inequality

This paper analyzes how factor‐biased public infrastructure affects the skilled–unskilled wage inequality. In the basic model with a full employment economy, we find that when the weighted dependence of skilled labor and capital in the urban skilled sector on public infrastructure is large enough relatively to that of unskilled labor and capital in the urban unskilled sector, the wage inequality will be expanded. We also discuss labor‐biased and capital‐biased public infrastructure in our framework, and find that the relative dependences of relevant labor or capital on public infrastructure are important determinants of wage inequality. In the extended models, we analyze separately the issue of wage inequality in the economy with unemployment and the totally open capital market, and find the results of the basic model almost still hold.     

Design and evaluation of ranking-type Delphi studies using best-worst-scaling

The ranking-type Delphi method has received widespread use in a large number of research areas. In order to rank a set of items, ranking-type Delphi studies use different ranking approaches which may be biased. This is intensified by the fact that the number of issues a participant can reasonably rank is limited. This paper describes an approach for the design and evaluation of ranking-type Delphi studies using best-worst-scaling (BWS). The statistical BWS design is based on a balanced incomplete block design to construct the comparison sets. The statistical evaluation encompasses the measurement of stability and consensus with the use of the coefficient of variation. Overall, our approach (1) enables to design a ranking with up to 22 items in a manner that participants can reasonably rank, (2) avoids and overcomes shortcomings of common ranking approaches, and (3) offers a statistical procedure for an unambiguous evaluation.     

Underreporting of Top Incomes and Inequality: A Comparison of Correction Methods using Simulations and Linked Survey and Tax Data

Household surveys do not capture incomes at the top of the distribution well. This yields biased inequality measures. We compare the performance of the reweighting and replacing methods to address top incomes underreporting in surveys using information from tax records. The biggest challenge is that the true threshold above which underreporting occurs is unknown. Relying on simulation, we construct a hypothetical true distribution and a “distorted” distribution that mimics an underreporting pattern found in a novel linked data for Uruguay. Our simulations show that if one chooses a threshold that is not close to the true one, corrected inequality measures may be significantly biased. Interestingly, the bias using the replacing method is less sensitive to the choice of threshold. We approach the threshold selection challenge in practice using the Uruguayan linked data. Our findings are analogous to the simulation exercise. These results, however, should not be considered a general assessment of the two methods.     

Misleading Rankings of Research in Business

Abstract. The attempts by Schulze and colleagues and Ritzberger to develop a joint ranking of journals for economics and business research are critically evaluated. Their lists suggest that the quality of top business journals is substantially lower than that of many economics journals. If, however, the authors of these lists do not want to claim a general superiority of one discipline (economics) over another one (business), they should give a clear indication that these lists are only applicable for economists. This warning appears to be necessary because Fabel and colleagues derive a ranking of universities and departments with respect to research productivity in business from the business research discriminating list RbR_IMP by Schulze and colleagues. While Diamantopoulos and Wagner already show a lack of face validity of these results, this article explains that the reason for this lies not only in the downgrading and also biased weighting of the business journals across subfields, but even more importantly, in a remarkable incompleteness of the database.     

Near-efficient equilibria in contribution-based competitive grouping

We examine theoretically and experimentally how competitive contribution-based group formation affects incentives to free-ride. We introduce a new formal model of social production, called a “Group-based Meritocracy Mechanism” (GBM), which extends the single-group-level analysis of a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) to multiple groups. In a GBM individuals are ranked according to their group contributions. Based on this ranking, participants are then partitioned into equal-sized groups. Members of each group share their collective output equally amongst themselves according to a VCM payoff function. The GBM has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. One is non-contribution by all; this equilibrium thus coincides with the VCM's equilibrium. The second equilibrium is close to Pareto optimal. It is asymmetric and quite complex from the viewpoint of experimental subjects, yet subjects tacitly coordinate this equilibrium reliably and precisely. Extensions of the basic GBM model to incorporate various features of naturally occurring group formation are suggested in the conclusion.     

Desirability bias in foresight: Consequences for decision quality based on Delphi results

In foresight activities uncertainty is high and decision makers frequently have to rely on human judgment. Human judgment, however, is subject to numerous cognitive biases. In this paper, we study the effects of the desirability bias in foresight. We analyze data from six Delphi studies and observe that participants systematically estimate the probability of occurrence for desirable (undesirable) future projections higher (lower) than the probability for projections with neutral desirability. We also demonstrate that in the course of a multi-round Delphi process, this bias decreases but is not necessarily eliminated. Arguably, the quality of decisions based on Delphi results may be adversely affected if experts share a pronounced and common desirability for a future projection. Researchers and decision makers have to be aware of the existence and potential consequences of such a desirability bias in Delphi studies when interpreting their results and taking decisions. We propose a post-hoc procedure to identify and quantify the extent to which the desirability bias affects Delphi results. The results of this post-hoc procedure complement traditional Delphi results; they provide researchers and decision makers with information on when and to which extent results of Delphi-based foresight may be biased.     

Media exposure and individual choices: Evidence from lottery players

To what extent individual choices are influenced by media exposure? We try to provide evidence on this aspect considering how the sales of lotto tickets are determined by the size of the top prize (the jackpot) compared to the amount of attention that media devote to the game. We use data on the Italian SuperEnalotto (2003–2010) and estimate ticket sales in relation to the jackpot size and to several measures of lotto media coverage. To take into account that media attention may be affected by the amount of tickets sold we instrument media coverage with the availability of other newsworthy materials (sport events and disasters). It emerges that media attention to the game is inversely related to the availability of other news. Two-Stage-Least Squares Estimations show that, given the jackpot size, players are affected by media exposure as they spend more on lotto when media attention to the game is higher.     

Media freedom and democracy in the fight against corruption

Democratization and media freedom have been suggested as useful tools in the fight against political corruption, but so far their interplay in this fight has received scant attention. We present a game theoretic model which allows for varying quality of media freedom and democratic institutions. The model predicts, among others, that democratization and media freedom are complements in the fight against political corruption. We test our theoretical predictions using differences-in-differences estimations and panel data covering 129 countries from 1980 to 2007. We find evidence of causal effects of democratization and media freedom on corruption, and that the two are complements. Our main results hold after controlling for income, country fixed effects, and continent-specific time-varying shocks.     

French media bias and the vote on the European constitution

This article analyses the behavior of the French media during the campaign for the 29 May 2005 referendum on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. The media were biased in favour of the Treaty. The media bear a share of responsibility in the rejection of the Treaty in leading people who felt that the media were disconnected from the people's concerns to vote against the Treaty.     

Inequality and media capture

Popular support of redistributive policies depends on information they have about the tax system and efficiency of public projects. Mass media provides a convenient means for manipulating public opinion, even when voters understand that the media can be biased. I develop a theory of media capture in which the rich can influence information published in a media outlet at a cost. The model shows that higher inequality is associated with lower media freedom; this effect is stronger in democratic regimes. I find empirical support for the model in both panel data and cross-country analysis.     

Mass media and preferences for redistribution

This paper investigates how mass media potentially act on preferences for redistribution. Our hypothesis is that media contribute to shaping the value system of a person, which affects support for redistribution. A theoretical model is proposed which combines demand- and supply-driven media bias. On the demand side, the model considers two types of individuals: non-partisan, whose values are influenced by the media, and partisan, who have strong opinions not affected by the media. We assume that although partisan individuals prefer unbiased information, they hold beliefs that they like to be confirmed; therefore, they tend to consume media with an ideological position similar to theirs. On the supply side, we focus on interest groups’ pressure on media coverage. Our results suggest that the anti-equality lobby is willing to pay more than the competing lobby. Moreover, we show that media bias is a decreasing function of the advertising revenues and an increasing function of the relative weight of ideology vs pluralism in individuals’ demand for media. Adding a second media outlet reduces the likelihood of media bias but not its extent. Finally, if both lobbies are active, the two outlets’ ideological positions are polarised.     

有偏技术进步对碳强度的影响及传导机制研究

通过构建包含资本、劳动和碳要素的超越对数函数模型,对中国30个省（市）（因数据缺失,不包含西藏和港澳台地区）技术进步偏向进行判别,通过构建多重中介效应模型,探究其影响碳强度的传导机制,并分析不同资源丰裕度下传导机制的异质性。主要结论：(1)碳要素偏向型技术进步和碳强度呈显著正相关,技术进步偏向碳节约型有助于推动碳减排;(2)碳要素偏向型技术进步可通过能源利用效率和经济发展水平中介效应间接影响碳强度;(3)资源型省（市）主要通过提高经济发展水平路径,而非资源型省（市）主要通过提高能源利用效率路径促进碳要素偏向型技术进步的减排效应;(4)碳要素偏向型技术进步的减排效应存在显著双门槛效应,能源利用效率越大、经济发展水平越高,碳要素偏向型技术进步对碳强度的影响越大。因此,需加大技术进步偏向碳要素节约的诱导力度,注意不同资源丰裕度下碳减排的不同路径,加强能源利用效率提高,推动经济绿色发展,助力“双碳”目标实现。     

国际贸易、偏向型技术进步与要素收入分配

全球范围内初次收入分配中资本所占份额呈现增长趋势的事实在近年来引起广泛关注,偏向型技术进步成为一个重要的解释视角。本文构建了要素收入份额的决定方程,证实了偏向型技术进步的重要性,并从国际贸易的角度寻找其变化的原因。然后利用1980—2007年的跨国经济发展数据,探索国际贸易、偏向型技术进步对发展中国家要素收入份额的影响机制,发现发展中国家的技术进步偏向资本,从而导致要素收入向资本倾斜;进一步的,引入现有文献中用于解释收入份额变化的外商直接投资、劳资谈判能力等因素,发现我们的结论依然是稳健的。本文的研究充实了对发展中国家的技术进步偏向和要素收入的研究,有助于理解中国的技术进步来源和方向。     

Does informative media commentary reduce politicians' incentives to pander?

Elections sometimes give policy makers incentives to pander, i.e., to implement a policy that voters think is in their best interest, even though the policy maker knows that a different policy is actually better for the voters. Pandering incentives are typically attenuated when voters learn, prior to the election, whether the policy chosen by the incumbent truly was in their best interest. This suggests that the media can improve accountability by reporting to voters information about whether an incumbent made good policy choices. We show that, although media monitoring does sometimes eliminate the incumbent's incentive to pander, in other cases it makes the problem of pandering worse. Furthermore, in some circumstances incumbent incentives are improved when the media acts as a “yes man”—suppressing some information that indicates the policy maker made the wrong choice. We explain these seemingly paradoxical results by focusing on how media commentary affects voters' tendency to apply an asymmetric burden of proof to the incumbent, based on whether she pursues popular or unpopular policies.     

A Spatial Theory of News Consumption and Electoral Competition

We characterize the optimal editorial positions of the media in a model in which the media influence both voting behaviour and party policies. Political parties are less likely to choose partisan policies when more voters consume informative news. When there are two media outlets, each should be slightly biased relative to its audience in order to attract voters with relatively extreme views. Voter welfare is typically higher under a duopoly than under a monopoly. Two media outlets under joint ownership may provide more diverse viewpoints than two independent ones, but voter welfare is not always higher.     

Does a Nearby Murder Affect Housing Prices and Rents? The Case of Sydney

We measure the impact of murders on prices and rents of homes in Sydney. We find that housing prices fall by 3.9 per cent for homes within 0.2 miles of the murder in the year following the murder, and weaker results in the second year after a murder. We do not find any effects of murders on rents. Higher media coverage and being located closer to the murder (within 0.1 mile) have no additional effect on prices. Taken together, our findings suggest that proximity to a murder affects nearby property prices, particularly in the first year after the incident.