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1.
We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.  相似文献   

2.
企业社会责任是近几年来全球最热的经济话题之一,但是我国对企业社会责任这个舶来品还存在许多模糊甚至错误的认识,不利于企业社会责任的理论研究与实践.文章基于ISO26000框架,在给出企业社会责任内涵的基础上,就社会责任的相关问题进行了辨析.企业社会责任是指企业为其决策与运营活动给自然生态环境和利益相关方带来的不利影响而应履行的基本义务.对现代企业来说,社会责任不仅仅只是一种自律性的“软”约束,更是一种他律性的“硬”约束;社会责任不仅仅是企业家的社会责任,更是企业必须履行的基本义务;企业履行社会责任绝不是增加负担,相反它是企业基业长青的前提;SA8000只涉及企业劳工实践和人权主题,而ISO26000则为企业社会责任管理提供了一个较为全面的解决方案  相似文献   

3.
Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This paper reinterprets the evidence on lying or deception presented in Gneezy (Am. Econ. Rev. 95(1):384–394, 2005). We show that Gneezy’s data are consistent with the simple hypothesis that people are one of two kinds: either a person will never lie, or a person will lie whenever she prefers the outcome obtained by lying over the outcome obtained by telling the truth. This implies that so long as lying induces a preferred outcome over truth-telling, a person’s decision of whether to lie may be completely insensitive to other changes in the induced outcomes, such as exactly how much she monetarily gains relative to how much she hurts an anonymous partner. We run new but broadly similar experiments to those of Gneezy in order to test this hypothesis. While we also confirm that there is an aversion to lying in our subject population, our data cannot reject the simple hypothesis described above either.
Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.   相似文献   

4.
唐黎 《经济研究导刊》2010,(20):199-201
大学生是民族的希望、祖国的未来,大学生教育也是公民道德建设“诚信”道德教育的重中之重,有效地帮助他们自觉树立诚信意识,提高他们的道德素质,把他们培养成为中国特色社会主义事业的合格建设者和接班人,是目前亟待解决的一个问题。  相似文献   

5.
康珊 《时代经贸》2006,4(12):20-21
进入后配额时代的纺织品面临巨大的挑战,屡屡遭受打击.本文以纺织品竞争优势为立足点进行分析,并以美国纺织产业升级作比较。指出由我国纺织品竞争优势的不足,分析其原因,促进纺织品的产业结构升级。  相似文献   

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文章基于文献研究和典型案例分析,从供应链外部环境、内部合作与系统可持续发展三个方面总结了社会责任主体发生变迁的原因,进而提出了供应链社会责任这一概念,并阐释了供应链社会责任的内涵,指出了供应链社会责任的核心企业主导、链间外部性以及责任收益不对称的三大特点,通过系统分析企业社会责任、可持续供应链和绿色供应链等相关理论对企业承担社会责任动力机制的研究,提出了公共政策强制力、社会公众压力、市场竞争驱动力、需求拉动力以及供应链内部约束力等五力集成的供应链社会责任动力机制模型,最后进行了研究总结并指出了未来研究的方向。文章的研究拓展了企业社会责任研究的范畴,对供应链系统的可持续发展与成员企业社会责任的整体提升提供了可行的政策建议。  相似文献   

9.
To improve the effectiveness of government policy, it is necessay to develop a good picture of what a firms in a knowledge-intensive economy is and does. In this paper, we have drawn on the recent surge of books and articles on the resource- and knowledge-based theories of the firm and their implications for competitive advantage. We would like to contribute to that discussion summarizing that debate and exploring the implications for government policy. In new theories of the firm, emphasis is placed on the crucial importance of knowledge, a production factor which is not easily imitated. Exampb of government policy which are based on these new inskhts are the recognition of the importance of demanding clients, the emphasis on the unique potential of the local business environment and the stimulation of transfer of knowledge between firms and networks instead of subsidizing project for knowledge development in isolated firms. A more realistic view of business behaviour will improve the effectiveness of policy, thereby generally improving the competitive position of firms.  相似文献   

10.
We analyze experimentally two sender–receiver games with conflictive preferences. In the first game, the sender can choose to tell the truth, to lie, or to remain silent. The latter strategy is costly. In the second game, the receiver must decide additionally whether or not to costly punish the sender after having observed the history of the game. We investigate the existence of two kinds of social preferences: lying aversion and preference for truth-telling. In the first game, senders tell the truth more often than predicted by the sequential equilibrium analysis, they remain silent frequently, and there exists a positive correlation between the probability of being truthful and the probability of remaining silent. Our main experimental result for the extended game shows that those subjects who punish the sender with a high probability after being deceived are precisely those who send fewer but more truthful messages. Finally, we solve for the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria of a reduced form of the baseline game with two types of senders. The equilibrium predictions obtained suggest that the observed excessive truth-telling in the baseline game can be explained by lying aversion but not by a preference for truth-telling.
Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. Financial support through the Ramón y Cajal program of the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science is gratefully acknowledged. This work was initiated while the author was working at Maastricht University.  相似文献   

11.
基于波特菱形分析中部吸引FDI的优势构建   总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0  
文章在简单介绍了波特的国家竞争优势理论之后,运用该理论结合中部的实际情况对构成该地区竞争优势的四大要素进行了分析,最后根据前文的论述提出了一些构建优势的建议。  相似文献   

12.
基于企业社会责任的竞争具有三种模式,社会责任与业务协同竞争的模式具有其特有的优势,诸多企业具有向该模式转型的必要。该模式的优势源于以该模式经营的企业的知识特点,其他企业可通过组织学习实现向该模式的转型。  相似文献   

13.
The purpose of this paper is to respond to the comment by James H. Love on our 1991 paper inEmpirica explicitly examining the impact that the two distinct methods used to measure entry rates have had in influences made from statistical analyses. While we generally concur with Love's extension of our original paper, we do suggest that both theecological approach to measuring entry rates as well as thelabor market approach has an important contribution to make. What determines which method should be used to measure entry is the fundamental question being addressed.  相似文献   

14.
应用SCP分析范式对山西煤炭产业的产业组织进行实证分析。分析认为,山西煤炭产业的市场集中度及产品差别化程度较低,价格竞争是企业应对市场竞争的主要行为,其实质是运输方式及运费的竞争。山西煤炭企业在产业兼并重组中处于从属地位,当前广泛采用的全产业链发展策略为山西煤炭企业的发展指明了方向。山西煤炭产业对资本、土地和劳动的利用效率近年来在不断提升。  相似文献   

15.
Successful small businesses effectively use outside information. High tech small firms are designed to be flexible and innovative. They are often built upon a successful innovative product. These organizations are challenged to remain innovative in a fast-paced competitive environment. However, they face constraints due to the costs associated with the development of continuous innovation. This paper presents technology mining as a method to aid small firms in remaining knowledgeable about innovative ideas. In doing so, the authors present findings from a small high tech company whose issues are typical of other small high tech firms. Areas for improvement and recommendations to address those areas are also presented for review and further reflection.  相似文献   

16.
产业生态:产业经济学研究的第四个领域   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
产业活动与环境的冲突成为现代产业经济学研究的一个新课题。产业生态作为产业经济学研究的一个重要组成部分,既为解决资源与环境问题提供了破解,也丰富了产业经济学理论体系,是对产业经济学的创新性研究。论文将产业生态作为产业经济学研究的第四个研究领域,与产业组织、产业结构、产业区域有机结合起来,构建了产业经济学理论框架,对产业生态理论与实践进行了探索。  相似文献   

17.
随着市场经济的发展,我国现代企业在发展过程中出现了一些令人担忧的伦理危机,主要表现为一些现代企业在生产、交换、消费等领域的经济伦理问题,不仅直接损害了消费者的利益和社会的长远利益,扰乱了社会主义经济秩序,而且严重影响了现代企业的生存和发展。研究现代企业经济伦理是全球化经济一体化发展下的国际竞争新形势的需要,从制度伦理、经济伦理的角度,明确现代企业未来建设的方向,有利于现代企业提高竞争优势,实现可持续发展。最后,现代企业建设还需处理好伦理道德的主体性与规范性、现实性与理想性的关系。  相似文献   

18.
基于社会责任的企业组织变革研究   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
全球性的竞争压力使得企业的经营风险和压力快速增加,竞争已经发生着深刻的变化,变革就成为这一时代的主题,企业新一阶段的组织变革要符合社会责任倡导的基本要素,本研究以社会责任理论为支撑,推敲组织变革与社会责任理论的契合点,构建基于社会责任的组织变革理论框架,剖析社会责任对组织变革的影响因素,使企业组织在结构设计、制度确立、文化培育方面按照社会责任的要求改革。  相似文献   

19.
本文从复杂性系统自组织理论及生态物理学的视角,考察和研究了区域产业群落形成过程中产业生态位、产业集聚核、区域产业场、产业聚集势的作用和重要性,导出了产业聚集势及其势曲线随产业场的变化情况,在一定程度上分析和揭示了区域产业群落的生成机理和发展演化规律.  相似文献   

20.
消费者的企业社会责任认知研究   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
本文在对企业社会责任(CSR)相关文献分析、研究的基础上,从消费者的视角出发构建企业社会责任构成模型,研究消费者认知CSR的维度。通过对问卷数据的分析,发现产品自身质量、售后服务、商业道德、危机事件的处理、公益行为及管理层社会形象这6个方面构成了消费者对企业社会责任的认知,这对企业树立良好的社会形象、增加企业的知名度与美誉度具有重要的指导意义。  相似文献   

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