Compatibility between monetary and fiscal policy under EMU

The debate over the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as a part of European Monetary Union, has highlighted the need to assess the extent to which fiscal policies of union members should be constrained as a pre-requisite for price stability within the union. In this paper, we develop a two country open economy model, where each country has overlapping generations of finitely lived consumers who supply labour to imperfectly competitive firms which can only change their prices infrequently. We examine the case where the two countries have formed a monetary union, but where the fiscal authorities remain independent. We show that the fiscal response required to ensure stability of the real debt stock is greater when consumers are not infinitely lived. In principle, this allows for some compensating behaviour between governments, but we show that the scope for compensation is limited. The monetary authority can abandon its active targeting of inflation to stabilise the debt of at most one fiscal authority, and any other combination of policies will either result in price level indeterminacy and/or indefinite transfers of wealth between the two economies. Finally, in a series of simulations we show that fiscal shocks have limited impact on output and inflation provided the fiscal authorities meet the (weak) requirements of fiscal solvency. However, when monetary policy is forced to abandon its active targeting of inflation, then fiscal shocks have a much greater impact on both output and inflation.     

Debt sustainability in emerging market countries: Some policy guidelines from a fan-chart approach

This paper uses a probabilistic approach to simulate the medium-term public debt trajectories of several major emerging market countries. We extend the standard debt sustainability analysis framework so as to more faithfully reproduce these countries’ economic reality in two aspects. First, we allow them to differ in the cyclical stance of their fiscal policy and in their degree of fiscal responsiveness to debt. Second, we explicitly integrate the specific risk premium paid by each country when borrowing in foreign currency. It allows us to evaluate the impact of alternative policies that the government may consider to improve sustainability. The results lead to three policy recommendations: i) a country should consider decreasing its exposure to currency risk only in extreme cases (like Argentina); ii) on the contrary, greater fiscal responsiveness (i.e. stronger fiscal tightening whenever there is a debt increase) could enhance sustainability to a much greater extent; iii) countries with low responsiveness to debt or a poor fiscal consolidation track record should be cautious with countercyclical fiscal policies, as they may trigger an unsustainable debt trajectory in the trough of the economic cycle.     

The Effect of Monetary Policy on Exchange Rates during Currency Crises: the Role of Debt,Institutions, and Financial Openness*

This paper empirically examines the effect of monetary policy on exchange rates during currency crises. We find strong evidence that raising the interest rate: (i) has larger adverse balance sheet effects and is therefore less effective in countries with high domestic corporate short‐term debt; (ii) is more credible and therefore more effective in countries with high‐quality institutions; (iii) is more credible and therefore more effective in countries with high external debt; and (iv) is less effective in countries with high capital account openness. Our results support the idea that the effect of monetary policy depends on its impact on fundamentals, as well as its credibility, as suggested in the recent theoretical literature.     

FiMod — A DSGE model for fiscal policy simulations

This paper develops a medium-scale dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium (DSGE) model for fiscal policy simulations. Relative to existing models of this type, our model incorporates two important features. First, we consider a two-country monetary union structure, which makes it well suited to simulate fiscal measures by relatively large countries in a currency area. Second, we provide a notable degree of disaggregation on the government expenditures side, by explicitly distinguishing between (productivity-enhancing) public investment, public purchases and the public sector wage bill. In addition, we consider a labor market characterized by search and matching frictions, which allows to analyze the response of equilibrium unemployment to fiscal measures. In order to illustrate some of its applications, and motivated by recent policy debate in the Euro Area, we calibrate the model to Spain and the rest of the area and simulate a number of fiscal consolidation scenarios. We find that, in terms of output and employment losses, fiscal consolidation is the least damaging when achieved by reducing the public sector wage bill, whereas it is most damaging when carried out by cutting public investment.     

Monetary policy and exchange market pressure–evidence from sub-Saharan Africa

The purpose of this study was to assess the impact of monetary policy on foreign exchange market pressure (EMP) in developing country contexts for some selected countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and to measure the ability of monetary policy to significantly address currency pressures that arise from trading on the global market. This study was motivated by the fact that most of the SSA countries are developing economies that have negative net export positions and stand to lose significantly from consistently deteriorating foreign exchange position. The study, therefore, employs a dynamic panel model to test the hypothesis that a tighter monetary policy stance lends strength to a currency and vice versa, using 20 SSA economies for the period from 1991 to 2010. This study finds a negative and significant relationship between monetary policy and EMP, implying an easing of EMP in the face of contractionary monetary policy. The findings also point to significant relations between aggregate output, levels of public debt, the current account balance, terms of trade and EMP. Findings of this study have important implications as regards the policy direction on exchange rate and currency management.     

政策可信性变动对菲利普斯曲线稳定性的影响——来自中国的经验证据

文章以1994年前后的价格冲击下人民银行将适应性政策转变为非适应性政策这一事件为背景,考察了公众对政策可信性的变动及其对通胀预期形成方式和菲利普斯曲线稳定性的影响。我们首先在理性预期假定下设定引入政策可信性变量的菲利普斯曲线模型。通过对"产出-物价"曲线的判断,SVAR模型中通胀冲击下通胀和产出缺口的响应函数以及菲利普斯曲线模型的递归最小二乘法检验,得出我国公众对政策的可信性增加,进而导致其通胀预期形成方式中的前向参照政策信息的成分增加,菲利普斯曲线发生改变。这就意味着,如果人民银行试图维持通胀预期形成方式和菲利普斯曲线的稳定,就应该保证政策可信性具有稳定性,而且,从长期实现价格稳定目标的角度来看,人民银行还应不断提高这一政策的可信性。     

Monetary Policy Coordination and the Level of National Debt

This paper uses the Canzoneri-Henderson benchmark framework of monetary policy coordination in interdependent economies to analyze how high levels of national debt affect monetary policy interactions. Using a two-country model, I first study how central banks interact in a flexible exchange-rate regime. I find that a low-debt country is better off interacting with a country with high debt, when both economies are affected by an aggregate inflationary shock. I also consider a political dependence scenario, in which central banks are subject to political pressure. In the case of a debt-burdened country, the political incentive to reduce interest payments on debt will spur a Gordon–Barro like inflation bias. However, under a flexible exchange-rate regime, the low-debt country will not be affected. Under a monetary union instead, political pressure may affect the low-debt country as well, and possibly create an inflation bias even greaterthan in the flexible exchange-rate regime. This scenario presents another example of how Rogoff's counterproductive monetary cooperation may arise under European Monetary Union.     

The effects of public deficits on money growth in the European Union

The impact of government debt on the money supply has been studied for different countries, with an emphasis on developing countries and the U.S. This topic becomes especially interesting in European Union countries that have high public deficits and low inflation rates. It is also very relevant in the monetary union, with a European central bank controlling monetary policy and introducing monetary measures for all the member countries. The main goal of this paper is to analyze if there is any relationship between public deficits and monetary growth in the European Union. The conclusions presented in the previous literature are ambiguous. Some studies concluded that there is little evidence that government debt influences money in some of the member countries.     

Structural reforms,fiscal consolidation and external rebalancing in monetary union: A model-based analysis

The paper analyses the impact of structural reforms on external positions in monetary union in a 3-region version of QUEST III. Wage cost moderation and fiscal consolidation improve the current account balance in the medium term, but positive income effects tend to offset the initial increase in the long term. The general pattern is robust across alternative levels of initial foreign indebtedness. While lasting imbalance correction requires a contraction of debt-financed domestic demand, supply-side reform can mitigate the associated output contraction. A scenario is given as illustration that would reverse the 20% competitiveness loss in the EMU periphery during the 2000s and reduce foreign and government debt by 30% and 50% of GDP within ten years.     

A Coalition-Form Analysis Of The “One Country - One Vote” Rule In The Governing Council Of The European Central Bank *

This paper analyses the “one country—one vote” rule for monetary policy decision

making of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank in a framework of cooperative game theory. The Shapley value is used as a solution concept. In contrast to former papers analysing the allocation of abstract "voting power" in committees of international organisations, preferences for monetary policy are modelled to obtain a prediction about potential transfers implied by an equal allocation of voting rights when countries are of different size. It is shown that if the number of countries participating to a currency union grows and the weight of the largest country within the currency union becomes small, the allocation of voting rights becomes irrelevant in the sense that transfers per country tend in any case to zero. [C71, E5, F02]     

Is East Asia an optimum currency area?

This paper assesses the empirical desirability of the East Asian economies to an alternative exchange rate arrangement (a monetary union) that can potentially enhance the exchange rate stability and credibility in the region. Specifically, the symmetry in macroeconomic disturbances of the East Asian economies is examined as satisfying one of the preconditions for forming an Optimum Currency Area (OCA). We extend the existing literature by improving the methodology of assessing the symmetry shocks in evaluating the suitability of a common currency area in the East Asian economies employing the Bayesian State-Space Based approach. We consider a model of an economy in which the output is influenced by global, regional and country-specific shocks. The importance of a common regional shock would provide a case for a regional common currency. This model allows us to examine regional and country-specific cycles simultaneously with the world business cycle. The importance of the shocks decomposition is that studying a subset of countries can lead one to believe that observed co-movement is particular to that subset of countries when it in fact is common to a much larger group of countries. In addition, the understanding of the sources of international economic fluctuations is important for making policy decisions. The falling share of country specific factor and the rising role of region factor indicate that East Asia has become increasingly favorable for a monetary union. However, the share of country-specific factor that is still significant implies that it could be costly to renounce individual currencies to advance into a monetary union in East Asia.     

Impact of foreign prices and interest rates on canadian economy under alternative monetary and exchange rate regimes

The main objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of U.S. short- and long-term monetary policy under both flexible and managed floating systems, using the new CANDIDE Model 2.0. We have also examined the role of domestic monetary policy in the Canadian economy under both fixed and flexible exchange rate systems. The following are some of the important findings of our study:

1. Our results support the traditional view that under the fixed exchange rate regime, monetary authorities cannot successfully pursue an independent monetary policy from its trading partners — an effort to increase money supply will be almost offset by increases in the balance of payments deficit. In contrast, in the flexible exchange rate regime, monetary policy is more effective in producing an increased growth in output and employment. However the increased output growth comes at the cost of higher prices induced by increased wages and a depreciation of the Canadian dollar.
2. Our results suggest that the impact of U.S. interest rates on investment, GNE, employment, productivity, and government debt is less severe in a pure floating exchange rate regime, compared to the managed floating system. However, the impact of U.S. interest rate policy on the Canadian inflation rate is worse in the case of flexible exchange rate regime. Even though real income and inflation are less favourable in both cases, our results indicate a trade-off between output growth and inflation.
3. Our results imply that under a pure floating monetary authorities can determine the long-run rate of inflation in Canada independent of others. However, the United States and Canadian economies are interrelated during the adjustment process, even under the flexible exchange rates, through the terms of trade and the wage-price spiral channels.

     

Monetary and macroprudential policy with foreign currency loans

In a number of countries a substantial proportion of mortgage loans is denominated in foreign currency. In this paper we demonstrate how their presence affects economic policy and agents’ welfare. To this end we construct a small open economy model with financial frictions, where housing loans can be denominated in domestic or foreign currency. The model is calibrated for Poland - a typical small open economy with a large share of foreign currency loans (FCL). We show that the presence of FCLs negatively affects the transmission of monetary policy and deteriorates the output-inflation volatility trade-off it faces. The trade-off can be improved with macroprudential policy but the outcomes are still worse than under this same policy mix applied to an economy with domestic currency debt. We also demonstrate that a high share of FCLs is harmful for social welfare, even if financial stability considerations are not taken into account. Finally, we show that regulatory policies that discriminate against FCLs may have a negative impact on economic activity and discuss the redistributive consequences of forced currency conversion of household debt.     

Optimal monetary policy regime for oil producing developing economies: Implications for post-war Iraq

This paper theoretically investigates optimal monetary policy regime for oil producing developing countries. We analyze credibility and reputation of the Central Bank and macroeconomic dynamics under alternative monetary policy regimes. We construct a detailed and realistic model that can be used to analyze macroecomic structure and expectation dynamics of an oil producing open economy. We take into account the asymmetric information between the public and the central bank and theoretically investigate how this asymmetric information impacts the real economy and the credibility of the central bank. The simulation results indicate that central bank achieves higher credibility and lower inflation under dollarization and higher output levels under currency board regime. The model constructed in this paper has many policy implications for oil producing open economies. Using the implications of the model, we make monetary policy regime recommendations for post-war Iraq.     

Credibility costs in the monetary integration game*

Euro candidates are expected to maintain the value of their currency within the fluctuation band of the new exchange rate mechanism for at least two years. This paper highlights some unpleasant macroeconomic effects that could occur during this interval. The problem is cast as a two‐stage sequential game between private agents and the government of the applicant country. The policy‐maker decides whether to devaluate the domestic currency or not at two distinct dates; it makes a last choice just before accession to the monetary union. Under an assumption of incomplete information of private agents about the government's priorities on inflation and economic activity, the game presents a hybrid perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In the pooling configuration, an initial policy of zero devaluation does not signal the final devaluation decision. As private agents cannot completely rule out the risk of a ‘last devaluation’, a premium adds to interest rates and entails a systematic output loss.     

“Core” and “Periphery” in a Monetary Union: A Macroeconomic Policy Game

We develop a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study strategic interactions between macroeconomic policy makers, namely the central bank and governments. In this union, the governments of participating countries pursue national goals when deciding on fiscal policies, whereas the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objective variables. The union considered is asymmetric, consisting of a core, with lower initial public debt, and a periphery, with higher initial public debt. For a symmetric demand shock, we derive numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank using the OPTGAME algorithm. We show that mildly active cooperative countercyclical policies dominate noncooperative solutions and a scenario of no policy intervention. Optimal policies call for a brief expansionary action to bolster the effects on output and a return to a small fiscal primary surplus as soon as the crisis is over until the targeted level of public debt is reached.     

Imperfect credibility,sticky wages,and welfare

This paper studies optimal monetary policy under imperfect credibility in a New Keynesian model with staggered price and wage setting. In our imperfect credibility framework, the central bank commits to a policy plan but occasionally reneges on past promises with a given common knowledge probability. We find that the welfare gains from increasing credibility are approximately linear on the initial credibility level. We also find that the output-inflation stabilisation trade-off is nonmonotonic as higher credibility does not always reduce output volatility. The variance decomposition shows that wage markup shocks are the main driver of economic fluctuations and that these shocks are better contained, even in relative terms, when credibility is high. We then show that the degree of credibility impacts the effect of wage flexibility on welfare. When credibility is low, monetary policy is less potent and the economy can experience a feedback loop between wage volatility and price volatility. We show, though, that once wage markup shocks are taken into account, wage flexibility is usually welfare improving.     

Public debt indexation and denomination with an independent central bank

This paper examines the interaction between public debt management and the design of monetary institutions. The analysis shows that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is more effective in containing inflationary expectations than the use of foreign currency or inflation-indexed debt. If delegation of monetary policy is viable, the optimal policy is to issue nominal debt. This increases the sensitivity of taxes and output to unexpected inflation, thus minimizing the inflation needed to offset supply shocks. Evidence on central bank independence, debt composition and output variability suggests that the normative argument has some positive content.     

Monetary policy and fiscal limits with no-default

This paper discusses monetary and fiscal policy interactions that stabilize government debt. Two distortions prevail in the model economy: income taxes and liquidity constraints. Possible obstructions to fiscal policy include a ceiling on the equilibrium debt-to-GDP ratio, zero or negative elasticity of tax revenues, and a political intolerance of raising tax rates. At the fiscal limit two mechanisms restore solvency: fiscal inflation, which reduces the real value of nominal debt, and open market operations, which diminish the size of government debt held by the private sector. Three regimes achieve this goal. In all regimes monetary policy is passive. In all regimes a muted tax response to government debt is consistent with equilibrium. The propensity of a fiscal authority to smooth output is found to determine what is an acceptable response (in the form of tax rate changes) to the level of government debt, while monetary policy determines the timing and magnitude of fiscal inflation. Impulse responses show that the inflation and tax hikes needed to offset a permanent shock to transfers are lowest under nominal interest rate pegs. In this regime, most of the reduction in the real value of government debt comes from open market purchases.