Saving face and group identity

Are people willing to sacrifice resources to save one’s and others’ face? In a laboratory experiment, we study whether individuals forego resources to avoid the public exposure of the least performer in their group. We show that a majority of individuals are willing to pay to preserve not only their self- but also other group members’ image, even when group identity is minimal. When group identity is made more salient, individuals help regardless of whether the least performer is an in-group or an out-group. In contrast, people are less likely to sacrifice for individual strangers, showing a major role for group identity and reputation concerns within groups relative to an interpretation in terms of moral norms.     

Tweeting identity? Ukrainian,Russian, and #Euromaidan

Why and when do group identities become salient? Existing scholarship has suggested that insecurity and competition over political and economic resources as well as increased perceptions of threat from the out-group tend to increase the salience of ethnic identities. Most of the work on ethnicity, however, is either experimental and deals with how people respond once identity has already been primed, is based on self-reported measures of identity, or driven by election results. In contrast, here we examine events in Ukraine from late 2013 (the beginning of the Euromaidan protests) through the end of 2014 to see if particular moments of heightened political tension led to increased identification as either “Russian” or “Ukrainian” among Ukrainian citizens. In tackling this question, we use a novel methodological approach by testing the hypothesis that those who prefer to use Ukrainian to communicate on Twitter will use Ukrainian (at the expense of Russian) following moments of heightened political awareness and those who prefer to use Russian will do the opposite. Interestingly, our primary finding in is a negative result: we do not find evidence that key political events in the Ukrainian crisis led to a reversion to the language of choice at the aggregate level, which is interesting given how much ink has been spilt on the question of the extent to which Euromaidan reflected an underlying Ukrainian vs. Russian conflict. However, we unexpectedly find that both those who prefer Russian and those who prefer Ukrainian begin using Russian with a greater frequency following the annexation of Crimea, thus contributing a whole new set of puzzles – and a method for exploring these puzzles – that can serve as a basis for future research.     

Do the skilled and prime-aged unemployed benefit more from training? Effect heterogeneity of public training programmes in Germany

This study analyses the treatment effects of public training programmes for the unemployed in Germany. Based on propensity score matching methods, we extend the picture that has been sketched in previous studies by estimating the treatment effects of medium-term programmes for different skill and age groups. Our results indicate that programme participation has a positive impact on employment probabilities and earnings for almost all sub-groups. We find little evidence for the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects, and the magnitude of the differences is quite small. Our results thus – at least in part – conflict with the strategy to provide training increasingly to individuals with better employment prospects.     

Social motives in intergroup conflict: Group identity and perceived target of threat

We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the perceived target of threat—groups or individuals—and the symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by the out-group, but not on one׳s own influence on the outcome of the out-group. The perceived target of threat dramatically alters decisions to participate in conflict. When people perceive their group to be under threat, they are mobilized to do what is good for the group and contribute to the conflict. On the other hand, if people perceive to be personally under threat, they are driven to do what is good for themselves and withhold their contribution. The first phenomenon is attributed to group identity, possibly combined with a concern for social welfare. The second phenomenon is attributed to a novel victim effect. Another social motive—reciprocity—is ruled out by the data.     

Reputation,Social Identity and Social Conflict

We interpret the psychology literature on social identity and examine its implications. We model a population of agents from two exogenous and well defined social groups. Agents are randomly matched to play a reduced‐form bargaining game. We show that this struggle for resources drives a conflict through the rational destruction of surplus. We assume that the population contains both rational players and behavioral players. Behavioral players aggressively discriminate against members of the other social group. The existence and specification of the behavioral player is motivated by the social identity literature. For rational players, group membership has no payoff‐relevant consequences. We show that rational players can contribute to the conflict by aggressively discriminating and that this behavior is consistent with existing empirical evidence. Our paper relates to the empirical literature which finds that social heterogeneity tends to be increasing in economic variables which we interpret as indicating inefficiency. We provide an explanation that, as social groups compete for surplus, disagreement and inefficiency can result. Our work also relates to the social conflict literature, which examines the relationship between macro level factors such as unemployment and civil disturbances. This literature finds that the amount of social conflict tends to be increasing in the inequitability of the environment.     

Perfect and imperfect real-time monitoring in a minimum-effort game

This paper presents the results from a minimum-effort game in which individuals can observe the choices of others in real time. We find that under perfect monitoring almost all groups coordinate at the payoff-dominant equilibrium. However, when individuals can only observe the actions of their immediate neighbors in a circle network, monitoring improves neither coordination nor efficiency relative to a baseline treatment without real-time monitoring. We argue that the inefficacy of imperfect monitoring is due to information uncertainty, that is, uncertainty about the correct interpretation of a neighbor’s actions. Information uncertainty prevents individuals from inferring safely that their group has managed to coordinate from the available information.     

Sen’s criticism of revealed preference theory and its ‘neo-samuelsonian critique’: a methodological and theoretical assessment

This paper evaluates how Amartya Sen’s critique of revealed preference theory (RPT) stands against the latter’s contemporary, ‘neo-Samuelsonian’ version. Neo- Samuelsonians have argued that Sen’s arguments against RPT are innocuous, in particular once it is acknowledged that RPT does not assume away the existence of motivations or other latent psychological or cognitive processes. Sen’s claims that preferences and choices need to be distinguished and that external factors need to be taken into account to analyze the act of choice then appear to be irrelevant. However, while it is true that contemporary revealed preference theory (CRPT) partially evades Sen’s critique, I show that the latter is still relevant outside the restricted areas of consumer choice and market dynamics. In particular, Sen’s views regarding the importance of incomplete preferences and the multiplicity of levels of agency can hardly be integrated into the framework of CRPT. This is a significant limit, given the imperialistic claims of some of the proponents of the latter.     

Sen is not a capability theorist†

This paper aims to clarify the status of capability in Sen’s idea of justice. Sen’s name is so widely associated with the concept of capability that commentators often assume that his contribution to the study of justice amounts to a capability theory, albeit underdeveloped. We argue that such a reading is misleading. Taking Sen’s reticence about operationalization seriously, we show that his contribution is inconsistent with a capability theory. Instead, we defend the idea that the capability approach plays a heuristic role: capability is a step in his argument against alternative materials, but is not meant as a definitive end. Sen defends a critical perspective primarily to encourage public reasoning and respect for agency as regards the definition of what should count in the evaluation of social states.     

Communication in intergroup conflicts

Numerous studies suggest that communication may be a universal means to mitigate collective action problems. In this study, we challenge this view and show that the communication structure crucially determines whether communication mitigates or intensifies rent-seeking for pure public goods. We observe the effect of different communication structures in the context of a finitely repeated intergroup contest and demonstrate that conflict expenditures are significantly higher if communication is restricted to one's own group as compared to a situation with no communication. However, expenditures are significantly lower if open communication within one's own group and between rivaling groups is allowed. We show that under open communication intergroup conflicts are avoided by groups taking turns in winning the contest. Our results do not only qualify the role of communication for collective action but may also provide insights on how to mitigate the destructive nature of intergroup conflict and group rent-seeking.     

A new ICEEMDAN-based transfer entropy quantifying information flow between real estate and policy uncertainty

We quantify the dependence between real estate indices and global economic policy uncertainty for 12 top-advanced countries. Generally, real estate investments are found to be highly risky to information flow from global economic policy uncertainty. amidst policy uncertainty, we find diversification, safe haven, and hedging prospects – based on the market conditions – at short term frequencies only, for the pairs between (a) Japan and the US; (b) Singapore and the US; (c) China and Canada; (d) China and Hong Kong. Our findings underscore market efficiency (inefficiency) at mid-and long-term (short-term) frequencies. In the presence of policy uncertainty, our findings underscore the operability of ingrained market dynamics between real estate investments in the mid-and long-term horizons. It is prudent for investors to combine real estate investments with other asset classes that are less risky to (or are positive recipients of) information flow from global EPU to hedge against adverse market shocks from any asset in the portfolio based on market conditions. Practically, not only should legislations be flexible to the changing market trends in the short term, but they should also be strategically crafted to retain the fundamental market dynamics between real estate investments in the mid-and long-term economic horizons.     

THE CARE AND HANDLING OF MONETARY AUTHORITIES*

Sometimes a group of people want to hire some agent (a monetary authority, for instance) to force them to cooperate with one another. This can cause problems, not only of the standard principal-agent type, but also of inconsistency, which appears here as renegotiation. The group faces a conflict between controlling the agent – the agency problem – and controlling themselves – the inconsistency problem. Terms of office are a good way to resolve this problem, and in fact, for people patient enough, the renegotiation problem disappears. This model provides insights into why the public dislikes inflation, why the market for presidents does not clear in Walrasian fashion, and why the controversy about “rules versus discretion” provides no policy guidance.     

When are stabilizations delayed? Alesina-Drazen revisited

In an influential article, Alesina and Drazen [1991. Why are Stabilizations Delayed? American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188] model delay of stabilization as the result of a struggle between political groups supporting reform plans with different distributional implications. In this paper we show that ex ante asymmetries in the costs of delay for the groups will reduce the probability of conflict and will lead to a shorter expected delay. Accurate common information about the cost of delay may lead to no delay at all. In an asymmetric conflict, a wider divergence in the distributional implications of reform will reduce the probability of conflict but will lead to a longer expected delay. We motivate the asymmetric model of delay by reference to Latin American episodes of the 1980s.     

Crime and local inequality in South Africa

We examine the effects of local inequality on property and violent crime in South Africa. The findings are consistent with economic theories relating local inequality to property crime and also with sociological theories that imply that inequality leads to crime in general. Burglary rates are 25–43% higher in police precincts that are the wealthiest among their neighbors, suggesting that criminals travel to neighborhoods where the expected returns from burglary are highest. Finally, while we find little evidence that inequality between racial groups fosters interpersonal conflict at the local level, racial heterogeneity itself is highly correlated with crime.     

Racial disparities in life insurance coverage

We evaluate the extent to which there are racial disparities in life insurance coverage using multiple years of the Survey of Income and Program Participation between 2001 and 2010. We find that African Americans hold significantly more life insurance – especially whole life insurance – after controlling for other factors. We demonstrate that our findings diverge from prior work because we examine all households instead of focusing exclusively on married and cohabitating households. Although earning shocks due to mortality likely contribute to racial disparities in wealth, the influence is mitigated by the racial composition of life insurance holdings.     

Moldova's internet revolution: Analyzing the role of technologies in various phases of the confrontation

In recent times we have witnessed the fundamental impacts that information and communication technologies (ICTs) have had on the outcomes of contentious political confrontations. In this paper, we analyze the role played by Internet-based and cellular ICTs in Moldova's Revolution of April 2009. Specifically, we identify what, why, and how technologies were used during various phases of the uprising. Our findings show that: 1) the protesters organized their initial mobilization through social network services (SNS) and short message service (SMS); 2) Twitter was mostly used during later phases of the revolution – the active street protests and the subsequent information war – for communication about the conflict both locally and globally; and 3) through skillful use of new Internet-based ICTs, it is possible to conduct a successful revolution without noticeable prior offline organization. Theoretical and practical implications for the use of ICTs in contentious political environments are also discussed.     

Civil war and economic growth: the case for a closer look at forms of mobilization

This paper explores the idea that the lack of robust evidence on the growth impact of civil war could partially be a consequence of considering civil war as a unified conceptual category, regardless of the ordinate of group identity invoked in mobilizing for war. To do so, we distinguish explicitly between episodes of internal conflict where contestants mobilized along the lines of ethnicity and ones where mobilization occurred along other markers of group identity. Using alternative definitions of civil war and System GMM estimation to address the endogeneity of conflict and per capita income, we obtain a negative contemporaneous impact of non-ethnic civil war on economic growth over the period 1975–2005. By contrast, the impact of ethnic war is statistically insignificant.     

Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information,abstention, and coordination in standing committees

We examine abstention when voters in standing committees are asymmetrically informed and there are multiple pure-strategy equilibria – swing voterʼs curse (SVC) equilibria where voters with low-quality information abstain and equilibria when all participants vote their information. When the asymmetry in information quality is large, we find that voting groups largely coordinate on the SVC equilibrium which is also Pareto optimal. However, we find that when the asymmetry in information quality is not large and the Pareto optimal equilibrium is for all to participate, significant numbers of voters with low-quality information abstain. Furthermore, we find that information asymmetry induces voters with low-quality information to coordinate on a non-equilibrium outcome. This suggests that coordination on “letting the experts” decide is a likely voting norm that sometimes validates SVC equilibrium predictions but other times does not.     

基于博弈论的上市公司会计信息披露失真成因分析

笔者运用博弈论作为主要的分析工具,通过对证券市场各利益主体逐个分析,揭示了信息披露失真的主要成因。上市公司会计信息披露失真是各参与方利益冲突而相互博弈的结果,是由个体理性出发而导致的集体非理性。在分析信息披露失真原因基础上,给出了相应的治理对策建议和应达到的理想的纳什均衡。     

Networks or neighborhoods? Correlations in the use of publicly-funded maternity care in California

This study focuses on “network effects” in the utilization of publicly-funded prenatal care using Vital Statistics data from California for 1989-2000. Networks are defined using 5-digit zip codes and a woman's racial or ethnic group. Like others, we find evidence that the use of public programs is highly correlated within groups defined using race/ethnicity and neighborhoods. These correlations persist even when we control for many unobserved characteristics by including zip code-year fixed effects, and when we focus on the interaction between own group behavior and measures of the potential for contacts with other members of the group (“contact availability”). However, the richness of our data allows us to go further and to conduct several tests of one important hypothesis about networks: that the estimated effects represent information sharing within groups. The results cast doubt on the idea that the observed correlations can be interpreted as evidence of information sharing. In particular, we find estimated effects to be as large or larger among women who have previously used the program as among first-time users.     

Auction fever: Rising revenue in second-price auction formats

The prevalent term “auction fever” visualizes that ascending auctions – inconsistent with theory – are likely to provoke higher bids than one-shot auctions. To explore and isolate causes of auction fever experimentally, we design four different strategy-proof auction formats and order these according to expected rising bids based on pseudo-endowment effect arguments (psychological ownership and disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept). Observed revenues in the experiment in the four formats rank as expected if bidders have private uncertain values (the private information of a bidder is the distribution of her value). A control treatment supports our view that the traditional private certain values approach prevents auction fever in the laboratory. Another control treatment with a procurement auction relates the auction fever bids to bids in a one-shot auction with real endowments. We conclude that, when bidders are uncertain about their valuations, auctions that foster pseudo-endowment may raise bids and revenues.