资本要求、“多而不倒” 救助与系统性风险

本文从银行之间资产回报相关性的角度研究系统性风险，通过构建理论模型考察了存在“多而不倒”救助时资本要求对系统性风险的影响，并且以11个国家（地区）2006-2012年的相关数据为样本进行实证检验。研究结果表明，一定条件下“多而不倒”救助是监管者的最优选择，然而当存在这种“事后”最优政策时，资本要求的提高可能会通过影响银行“事前”投资决策的方式扩大银行之间的系统相关性，提高系统性风险隐患。这一效应在金融自由化程度较低的国家表现得更为显著。中国的资本监管改革应注意与金融市场化改革相协调。     

基于分位数回归商业银行系统性风险研究

在宏观审慎监管框架下,对系统重要性银行的识别并对其提出更高监管要求是金融危机后的监管重点。文章选取代表不同类型的8家上市商业银行为样本银行,采用CoVaR模型和分位数回归技术对2007-2011年实体经济和金融数据进行实证分析。实证表明:从流动性方面看,资产规模较大的银行反而面临更高的流动性风险,其风险溢出效应更容易导致系统性风险的聚集,发生危机时对系统性风险贡献较大;在宏观经济周期逆转时,中小型银行相对大型银行更容易出现风险溢出效应导致系统性风险聚集;因此政策建议:银行业监管当局的监管重点在传统的资产规模庞大的银行,同时也要关注银行业务增长过快的中小银行,这些银行往往也是系统性风险聚集和金融危机爆发的始作俑者。     

Limiting Corporate Power

In this article, the authors examine the recent evolution of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in light of the ongoing and massive public sector bailout of "too big to fail" private banks. The authors propose that instead of using these semi public banks as vehicles for a backdoor bailout of their private peers, they could easily be employed as a centerpiece for a people's bailout.     

Charter value,risk-taking and systemic risk in banking before and after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008

ABSTRACT

We investigate how bank charter value affects risk for a sample of OECD banks by using standalone and systemic risk measures before, during, and after the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. Prior to the crisis, bank charter value is positively associated with risk-taking and systemic risk for very large ‘too-big-too-fail’ banks and large U.S. and European banks but such a relationship is inverted during and after the crisis. A deeper investigation shows that such a behaviour before the crisis is mostly relevant for very large banks and large banks with high growth strategies. Banks’ business models also influence this relationship. We find that for banks following a focus strategy, higher charter value amplifies both standalone and systemic risk for large U.S. and European banks. Our findings have important policy implications and cast doubts on the relevance of the uniform more stringent capital requirements introduced by Basel III.     

中国商业银行系统性风险溢价实证研究

全球金融危机的爆发使得系统性风险的溢出效应受到普遍关注,同时也暴露出主流的风险度量方法VAR存在重大缺陷。论文借鉴最新的CoVaR方法以及分位数回归技术,衡量了我国商业银行的系统性风险溢价,实证研究发现：第一,国有银行的系统性风险溢价大于股份制商业银行;第二,无条件风险价值VaR和条件风险价值之间没有必然关联,以VaR为核心指标的现行监管政策不能有效防范系统性风险溢价;第三,银行的值不仅受金融体系共同风险冲击的影响,还受银行自身特质的影响。     

#br# 不对称信息环境下的金融集权与分权*——基于中央政府视角的研究

近年来地方政府在金融管理和金融风险处置上的作用日益被强调,但中央与地方政府的金融管理权责却模糊不清。本文从中央政府的视角,从信息、道德风险以及金融外部性三方面来分析金融管理的集权与分权问题。研究发现在金融集权的模式下,由于地方政府的隐性干预,一国可能会处于高度的金融抑制状态。在金融分权情境下,地方状态信息对一项金融政策制定越重要、信息甄别成本越大,中央向地方政府授权的价值越大,同时中央对地方政府的道德风险容忍度越高。而当引入金融外部性,尤其是金融风险极易跨区域传染的特性时,有着强大的行政控制力和丰富的宏观金融工具的中央政府在协调地区间金融溢出效应,控制系统性金融风险方面相比地方政府具有比较大的优势。因而,本文认为在金融分权的情境下,政策性金融权力的下放并不是一个绝对的放与不放的问题,而是一个金融适度分权问题,即合理地将一系列的政策性金融权力配置给中央与地方政府,寻求最优金融分权结构,守住不发生区域性、系统性金融风险的底线。     

我国商业银行理财产品趋同:羊群效应抑或是监管诱导简

我国商业银行理财产品趋同是羊群效应、外部监管制度诱导下银行规避行为与企业投资“潮涌现象”共同作用的结果。理财产品趋同对传统银行信用创造机制产生巨大的替代效应,关联交易问题突出,极大地增加了投资风险以及市场系统性风险。监管体制应由机构监管向功能监管过渡,加强宏观审慎监管,控制系统性风险;同时,采取政策引导理财产品差异化。     

中国银行业系统性风险研究*——宏观审慎视角下的三个压力测试

本文在传统网络模型中加入去杠杆—降价抛售机制,研究以下两类宏观经济冲击对银行体系系统性风险的影响。从房地产贷款违约压力测试看,房地产贷款违约引起的传染风险是系统性风险的重要来源;传染损失比重和去杠杆次数结果则表明,2007年我国银行面临的传染风险最高,之后呈现快速下降的趋势;参数敏感性结果表明,网络模型中去杠杆、降价抛售以及破产对传染风险的相对重要性依次递减。从地方政府融资平台贷款违约压力测试看,大型商业银行受平台贷款违约的影响小于股份制和城市商业银行。此外,平台贷款违约概率存在阈值,在阈值之上银行损失和倒闭急剧攀升。基于银行倒闭压力测试,量化出本文的网络模型相对于传统网络模型的优越性。本文还发现中国金融体系的系统重要性与系统脆弱性指标的“错配”对于维持金融体系稳定非常关键。     

农村非正规金融正规化的模式比较与政策选择

中国农村非正规金融的正规化不仅有助于降低交易费用与信贷风险,还有益于提高资金的配置效率。中国农村非正规金融向正规金融转化主要有四种经典模式:即农村互助合作金融模式、"农村非正规金融组织+小额贷款公司+民营中小银行模式"、"农村非正规金融组织+村镇银行+地区性中小银行"模式、"农村合作银行或农村商业银行"模式。这四种模式为农村非正规金融正规化的途径选择提供理论依据。当然,要想农村非正规金融正规化,还需从法律壁垒、财税政策、运作成本、外部环境等方面多加谋划。     

How a Bank Bailout may Increase Systemic Risk

In 2008–2009, the US government spent trillions of dollars to bailout its financial system and prevent insolvency due to a deterioration in domestic loan portfolios. The following dips in US bond prices suggest that global investors feared that the US was over-extending itself and might be unable to repay its debt with taxes rather than inflation. The paper illustrates that if uncertainty arises about a large government's ability to raise taxes to repay its debt, then a debt-financed bailout which initially restores bank health may inadvertently contribute to the financial system's ultimate demise if banks are important lenders to a foreign country that pegs its currency to the domestic money.     

货币政策立场与银行风险承担——基于中国银行业的实证研究(2000—2010)

本文基于中国2000—2010年间的经济金融数据,应用动态面板系统广义矩法,考察我国货币政策立场对银行风险承担的影响。结果显示,货币政策立场显著影响银行风险承担,且受市场结构及商业银行资产负债表特征的影响。这说明从金融稳定的视角来看,货币政策并非中性,我国应将货币政策纳入宏观审慎监管框架,加强其与金融监管政策的协调配合,以促进经济金融稳定。     

金融危机背景下政府干预与银行信贷风险研究

金融危机冲击导致经营环境恶化,银行信贷萎缩,在政府施加的指令性贷款和自身经营利润最大化的双重任务约束下,银行道德风险增加,贷款资金投放背离政府救市意图。文章在一个双重任务约束模型框架下分析了危机中政府干预对国有商业银行贷款风险的影响,根据任务之间的关联度对银行的激励行为做出拓展性解释。动态面板GMM模型实证检验结果显示,政府干预没有造成不良贷款的上升,但对信贷规模的扩张存在明显影响,长期将造成银行资源的过度利用和潜在风险的上升。     

绿色信贷能否缓解银行系统性风险*——基于中国22家上市银行的证据

本文选取2009—2020年中国22家上市银行年度数据，构建面板回归模型,就绿色信贷对银行系统性风险的影响及其传导机制与异质性特征进行实证分析。研究表明：绿色信贷对银行系统性风险具有抑制作用。风险承担与盈利能力在绿色信贷与银行系统性风险的关系中承担着双重中介作用。绿色信贷对银行系统性风险的影响存在异质性特征。相对于国有银行、低环境规制时期银行及经济上行期银行，绿色信贷对非国有银行、高环境规制时期银行及经济下行期银行系统性风险的抑制作用更为明显。该成果将为防控中国银行业系统性风险提供重要的理论指导与决策参考。     

The link between the federal funds rate and banking system distress: An empirical investigation

We investigate the association between deviations of the monetary policy rate from its benchmark, and systemic risk between 2001 and 2017. We adopt an impulse response function framework that uses the local projections method model proposed by Jorda (2005). We find that paying interest on reserves by the Fed beginning in 2008 introduced a monetary policy regime shift between the period that the Fed did not pay interest on reserves and the period that it did. Consequently, while we identify a positive and significant link between deviations of the policy rate from its benchmark and systemic risk in the former period, this link was broken in the latter period. During the former period, upsurges in the fed funds rate raised bank costs and increased bank distress. In contrast, during the latter period, interest payment on reserves exceeded the policy rate, except for 2009Q1, and as a result, banks did not expand lending in response to the Fed's reserve injections, instead, holding large amounts of excess reserves. This practice produced greater bank profitability and reduced bank liquidity risk and credit risk, without increasing systemic risk.     

我国上市商业银行系统性风险中共同风险因素分析

通过实证分析我国14家上市商业银行以及金融指数的收益率的波动情况、相关系数和协方差,分析了我国上市商业银行的系统性风险中的共同风险因素。得到结论:14家上市商业银行对共同风险因素的反应较为一致;与其他上市商业银行相比,共同风险在大型商业银行的系统性风险中所占比重较大;与其他风险相比,大型商业银行对共同外部风险的反应更显著;金融指数能够较好地代表金融风险因素。     

Government guarantees and self-fulfilling speculative attacks

We develop a model in which government guarantees to banks’ foreign creditors are a root cause of self-fulfilling twin banking-currency crises. Absent guarantees, such crises are not possible. In the presence of guarantees banks borrow foreign currency, lend domestic currency and do not hedge the resulting exchange rate risk. With guarantees, banks will also renege on their foreign debts and declare bankruptcy when a devaluation occurs. We assume that the government is unable or unwilling to fully fund the resulting bailout via an explicit fiscal reform. These features of our model imply that government guarantees lead to self-fulfilling banking-currency crises.     

政府政策扶持、创新驱动对我国农业产业化龙头企业发展的影响——基于894家国家重点龙头企业的实证分析

利用894家我国农业产业化国家重点龙头企业的生产经营数据,对其生产经营状况进行了描述性分析。采用固定效应模型,实证分析了影响农业产业化龙头企业的主营业务销售收入、利润和带动就业能力的因素。研究结果显示:目前的财税支持政策在一定程度上促进了农业产业化龙头企业的发展,但对企业的盈利能力及竞争力的作用比较有限;技术研发与应用增强了企业发展驱动力,但由于投入大、见效慢、风险高等,因此投入增长较缓慢。最后提出了不断优化和完善财税和信贷扶持政策的建议。     

Analysing Systemic Risk in the Chinese Banking System

We examine systemic risk in the Chinese banking system by estimating the conditional value at risk (CoVaR), the marginal expected shortfall (MES), the systemic impact index (SII) and the vulnerability index (VI) for 16 listed banks in China for the 2007–2014 period. We find that these measures show different patterns, capturing different aspects of systemic risk of Chinese banks. However, rankings of banks based on these measures are significantly correlated. The time‐series results for the CoVaR and MES measures suggest that systemic risk in the Chinese banking system decreased after the global financial crisis but started rising in 2014.     

Monetary and fiscal coordination in preventing bank failures and financial contagion

This paper uses a theoretical model to analyze the optimal combination of monetary response (lowering of interest rates) and fiscal bailouts in preventing bank failures and financial contagion. I show that the optimal way of rescuing failing banks is to combine the two. This is because lower interest rates reduce the size of the bailout required to rescue failing banks as they reduce the cost for banks to raise and retain deposits. The main result of the paper is that banks are willing to monitor their investments more closely when they anticipate a monetary response in addition to bailouts in case of a banking crisis. Additionally, capital requirements such as the Basel Accords do not always incentivize banks to monitor their investments if there is a potential contagion from unhealthy to healthy banks.     

Hospital Competition with Soft Budgets

We study the incentives for quality provision and cost efficiency for hospitals with soft budgets, where the payer can cover deficits or confiscate surpluses. While a higher bailout probability reduces cost efficiency, the effect on quality is ambiguous. Profit confiscation reduces both quality and cost efficiency. First‐best is achieved by a strict no‐bailout and no‐profit‐confiscation policy when the regulated price is optimally set. However, for suboptimal prices, a more lenient bailout policy can be welfare‐improving. When we allow for heterogeneity in costs and qualities, we also show that a softer budget can raise quality for high‐cost patients.