The Power of Innovativeness in Manufacturer–Retailer Relationships

ABSTRACT

Purpose: Retailers often challenge manufacturers through aggressive store brand policies and severe listing constraints. This study investigates manufacturer innovativeness as a managerial lever to shift the power balance between manufacturers and retailers.

Methodology/approach: Using data from 277 senior managers of Swiss and German consumer goods manufacturers and analyzing these data with structural equation modelling, the authors test hypotheses about the impact of manufacturer innovativeness on manufacturer–retailer relationship characteristics (i.e., retailer dependency, store brand aggressiveness, and listing constraints).

Findings: The study demonstrates that manufacturer innovativeness enhances retailer dependency, which in turn positively affects overall manufacturer performance. This relationship can be explained further: By increasing retailer dependency, manufacturers suppress retailers’ store brand aggressiveness and attenuate retailers’ listing constraints. Store brand aggressiveness affects overall manufacturer performance through listing constraints.

Research implications: Identifying levers such as innovativeness that assist manufacturers in fostering their power over retailers provides a new mode for understanding how manufacturers can influence the balance of power between manufacturers and retailers. The study provides support for the approach/inhibition theory of power on the inter-organizational level. Organizations with increased power are assumed to have approach-related tendencies and act in goal-consistent manner, whereas organizations with reduced power are assumed to develop the tendency to pursue inhibition-related actions, e.g., attending to threats. Furthermore, this study identifies channel relationship characteristics such as retailer dependency as a mediating path between manufacturer innovativeness and performance.

Practical implications: Managers need to strengthen the firm’s innovative capacity to enhance the performance of their companies. By developing the capability to provide radical innovations, manufacturers are able to enhance their performance not only directly but also indirectly by strengthening the manufacturer’s position with regard to retailers. This study underscores the relevance of innovativeness for strengthening the manufacturer’s position in its relationship with retailers that avoids problems with aggressive store brands and constrained listing conditions.

Originality/value/contribution: This study proposes manufacturer innovativeness as a managerial lever to shift the power balance between manufacturers and retailers.     

Manufacturer marketing initiatives and retailer information sharing

This research examines a retailer’s incentive to share information with its supplier when the supplier can also undertake initiatives to increase retail demand. It is well known that a retailer is averse to sharing market information with a manufacturer due to concern for a manufacturer’s strategic use of such information. This research shows that despite such strategic exploitation of market information, a retailer may want to establish information sharing channels with its supplier. Information sharing essentially shifts power upstream which, in turn, enhances the manufacturer’s incentive to bear costs to boost retail demand: the manufacturer is induced to invest merely by knowing that information is on its way. Hence, the retailer benefits from information sharing ex ante despite the costly ex post exploitation by the manufacturer. This finding is a stark contrast to the most of previous results which consistently point out how bad it is for the manufacturer to have the retailer’s demand information before setting prices. In fact, due to the investment effect, information sharing can lead to gains for the retailer, manufacturer, and consumers alike.     

Entry mode selection and its impact on an incumbent supply chain coordination

This paper considers a supply chain where a manufacturer sells its product through a retailer. In such a market, a potential entrant can make a substitute product by imitating the incumbent's product and then sells it to the common market with one of three alternative entry modes: (i) selling through the incumbent's retailer, (ii) selling through another independent retailer, or (iii) selling directly to consumers. Faced with the entrant's entry, the manufacturer has managed to offer a value-added service to add to its product's value at a cost. We investigate the entrant's optimal entry mode when the manufacturer offers profit-sharing contracts to the retailer and when it does not, and discuss the impact of the potential invader's entry on the incumbent firms' performances. The results show that: (1) the entrant sells directly to consumers when faced with weak value competition, and sells through another retailer against fierce value competition. (2) If the value competition is relatively fierce and the efficiency of the value-added service is relatively high as well, the incumbent firms can benefit from the new entry. (3) A profit-sharing contract, as a coordination policy, can fully coordinate the incumbent supply chain no matter whether there exists a potential entrant or not, yet the entry can affect the distribution of the profits between the incumbent manufacturer and retailer.     

Information asymmetry, pricing strategy and firm's performance in the retailer- multi-channel manufacturer supply chain

In this research paper, we assume a retailer-multi-channel manufacturer (with online and traditional retail channels) supply chain where both the multi-channel manufacturer and the retailer have private information about the state of consumer demand. In this setting, we examine the effect of an information sharing strategy on both firms' performance. Our results show that the multi-channel manufacturer always benefits from an information sharing strategy. When the product is highly compatible with the online channel, information sharing becomes much more valuable to the multi-channel manufacturer. On the other hand, the retailer's performance is not impacted by an information sharing strategy. Thus, a bargaining model is utilized to implement profit sharing for the multi-channel manufacturer and retailer so that an information sharing equilibrium can be reached. Based on our results, we derive optimal market strategies and identify probable paths of future research.     

Why would a big retailer refuse to collaborate on manufacturer SPIFF programs?

Big retailers that carry a large assortment of products rely on knowledgeable salespeople to provide purchase advice to customers and match customers with suitable products. Interestingly, big retailers vary in their policies regarding whether to allow their salespeople to receive manufacturer SPIFF (Sales Person Incentive Funding Formula) payments, which motivate salespeople advising at no cost of the retailer. In this study, we investigate a big retailer’s incentive to block manufacturer SPIFF programs, which has the consequence of demotivating salespeople from advising customers, from the perspective of vertical channel interactions. We scrutinize a big retailer’s decision to maximize its profit through managing its channel interactions with upstream manufacturers offering horizontally differentiated products, customers uncertain about true fits with competing products, and its salesperson who can match customers with suitable products through offering purchase advice. Our analysis shows that motivating the salesperson to advise customers is profitable for the retailer only if the such advising has moderate effectiveness in matching consumers and suitable products, and only in this case would the retailer collaborate on manufacturer SPIFF programs. Otherwise, salesperson advising hurts retailer profit and the big retailer benefits from blocking manufacturer SPIFF programs. Our study reveals the interesting theoretical insight that the incentives of a big retailer and upstream manufacturers to motivate sales advising reside in their incentives to battle for a more favorable channel status.     

How does the added new online channel impact the supporting advertising expenditure?

This research addresses the strategic effect of a newly added online channel on a manufacturer’s supportive advertising expenditure once a manufacturer opts to open an online channel to compete with its retailer. We first study the manufacturer–traditional retailer supply chain and consider three different scenarios: (1) product is less compatible with the online channel than with the traditional channel; (2) product is more compatible with the online channel than with the traditional channel; (3) product has the same compatibility with the online channel as with the traditional channel. Our results show that the added online channel significantly impacts the manufacturer’s investment in supportive advertising. Depending on the different product categories, the impact of the newly added online channel on the supportive advertising expenditure also will be different. Furthermore, we extend our model to study the manufacturer–online retailer supply chain and investigate the effect of that added online channel on the manufacturer’s supportive advertising to the online retailer. Based on our results, the manufacturer can utilize our findings to improve its decision-making when it plans to open an online channel to improve its product distribution.     

Factors Affecting Retailer Acceptance of New Packaged Goods:

Packaged goods manufacturers develop and introduce several different types of new products including innovations, "me-too" prodcuts, and line extensions. The authors build a theoretical model to help understand the retailer new product acceptance process for different types of new products. Factors influencing retailer acceptance of new packaged goods were identified and tested. Statistical comparisons of factors were performed across different types of new products and within a particular type of new product to develop a relative ranking of the most influential factors. The results show that many of the factors affecting retailer acceptance of different types of new products are under the control of the manufacturer. The results also show that the retailer new product acceptance process varied significantly from one type of new product to another. Implications for theory and practice, and directions for future research, are discussed.     

Distribution Channel Decentralization and Strategic Durability Choice

In a simple two‐period setting we examine a decentralized distribution (marketing) channel consisting of an up‐stream durable‐goods manufacturer and down‐stream retailer. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price and the product’s durability while the retailer selects an output level. We show that in this setting, the profit‐maximizing manufacturer unambiguously selects a higher durability than the socially efficient (cost‐minimizing) level in both uncommitted sales and rental markets. We show this ‘reversed planned obsolescence’ result is due to the strategic benefit of durability in this double‐marginalization (double monopoly mark‐up) setting. This is in stark contrast to the usual integrated channel result where the profit‐maximizing manufacturer will select an efficient level of durability in rental markets and an inefficiently low durability in uncommitted sales markets (due to the selling firm’s commitment problem with potential buyers). Intuitively, with a decentralized distribution channel, the manufacturer faces potential commitment problems with both current buyers and its down‐stream retailer. We show, only in cases where both sources of commitment issues are removed (i.e. the manufacturer can credibly commit to both potential buyers and its retailer), will the profit‐maximizing durability choice be socially efficient.     

Do channel members value the multiple-cooperation strategy?

When the manufacturer distributes his products through online and traditional channels, what type of innovative marketing strategy can be utilized to solve the channel conflict and improve the performances of all channel members? Our research addresses this important question by initiating a triple cooperative strategy for channel members to employ in a manufacturer – retailer dual-channel supply chain. Our results show that when the product is less compatible with online channel than with traditional channel, channel members can utilize a triple cooperative strategy to improve channel coordination and their individual performances effectively and efficiently. First, the manufacturer can utilize supportive retail sales effort as a valuable coordination mechanism to improve the performances of all channel members in the dual-channel distribution. Second, a channel coordinative price strategy can be utilized to further improve the performance of whole channel. Finally, a profit sharing mechanism is needed to create a Pareto result for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Furthermore, we extend our model to study the value of triple cooperative strategy in a manufacturer – two competitive retailers supply chain and derive the optimum marketing strategy.     

THE IMPACT OF ORDER FULFILLMENT SERVICE ON RETAILER MERCHANDISING DECISIONS IN THE CONSUMER DURABLES INDUSTRY

Historically, manufacturers held the upper hand in consumer goods supply chain relationships. There has been a pervasive shift of power to retailers over the past 20 years, however, ushering in an era of waning consumer loyalty to manufacturers' brands and increasing loyalty to retailers. While there is extensive research focusing on the manufacturer‐consumer relationship, retailers' increased ability to influence consumer purchases suggests that manufacturers should understand not only consumer perceptions of delivery service, but also retailer perceptions. We incorporate social network theory to examine the manufacturer‐retailer‐consumer linkages in the consumer durables industry, with the emphasis on the retailer in the role of the “broker” (Burt 1992). Specifically, we examine whether retailer perceptions of a manufacturer's order fulfillment service (OFS) positively impacts retailer perceptions of the manufacturer's brand, the importance of the product, and the likelihood of the retailers' salespeople to recommend the product to consumers. The research bridges OFS and retailer purchase behavior in a consumer durables industry characterized by high levels of consumer involvement, brand presence, and personal selling.     

Consumer acceptance of a revolutionary technology-driven product: The role of adoption in the industrial design development

Understanding how consumers adopt a state of the art product is important for the development and marketing of innovative products. The purpose of this study is to examine factors that affect consumer intentions to use a revolutionary technology-driven product (RTP). The research integrates two innovation adoption models, the Unified Technology Acceptance and Utilization Theory (UTAUT) and the Task-Technology Fit (TTF) model with two antecedents of consumer characteristics: consumer innovativeness and perceived value of a new product. The study examines consumer responses to an unfamiliar product, the TEASER which is a conceptual digital cookbook that offers taste sampling, thereby providing an online food-tasting experience. Consumers who are prone to innovativeness and who perceive value in a RTP’s aesthetics are able to discern the conditions that support their intent to use such a product. The resulting model expands the UTAUT and TTF theories by showing that UTAUT variables mediate between the variables of TTF and adoption intentions. These results support the need for nonlinear industrial development processes involving consumers.     

‘In the best position to reap mutually beneficial results’: Sole-agency agreements and the distribution of consumer durables in inter-war Britain

This article uses a case-study approach to explore the use of exclusive sole-agency agreements in the distribution and retailing of specialty branded consumer durables in inter-war Britain, a neglected topic in the business history literature. Utilising an extensive correspondence between piano manufacturer Broadwood and Sons, and Liverpool-based musical instrument retailer Rushworth and Dreaper (with comparisons made with two smaller sets of manufacturer–retailer correspondence) we argue that the stability of a sole-agency agreement encouraged the emergence of a highly reciprocal and collaborative relationship that led to innovations in marketing, selling, branding and product development. We urge a reconsideration of the value and effect of sole-agency agreements.     

On manufacturers complementing the traditional retail channel with a direct online channel

With the explosion of the Internet and the reach that it affords, many manufacturers have complemented their existing retail channels with an online channel, which allows them to sell directly to their consumers. Interestingly, there is a significant variation within product categories in manufacturer's use of the Internet as a direct distribution channel. The main objective of this study is to examine the strategic forces that may influence the manufacturer's decision to complement the retail channel with a direct online channel. In particular, we are interested in answering the following questions:

1. Why is it that in some markets only a few firms find it optimal to complement their retail channels with a direct Internet channel while other firms do not?
2. What strategic role (if any), does the direct Internet channel serve and how do market characteristics impact this role?

To address these issues we develop a model with a single strategic manufacturer serving a market through a single strategic retailer. In addition to the focal manufacturer's product the retailer carries products of competing manufacturers. Consumers in this market are one of two types. They are either brand loyal or store loyal. The retailer sets the retail price and the level of retail support, which impact the demand for the manufacturer's product. The retailer's decisions in turn depend on the wholesale price as well as the Internet price of the product if the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel. Our analysis reveals that the optimality of complementing the retail channel with an online channel and the role served by the latter depends critically upon the level of support that the retailer allocates to the manufacturer's product in the absence of the online channel. The level of support allocated by the retailer, in the absence of the online channel, depends upon the retail margins on the manufacturer's product relative to that on rival products in the product category. When the size of the brand loyal segment is small relative to the size of the store loyal segment then in the absence of the online channel, the manufacturer can lower wholesale price and enhance retail support, especially when the retail margins on the rival products are low. In contrast, when the size of the loyal segment is large and the retail margins on rival products are high the manufacturer will find it more profitable to charge a high wholesale price even if that induces the retailer to extend low levels of support. If the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel, some consumers who would have purchased from the retailer might prefer to purchase online. Our analysis reveals that when consumers' sensitivity to price differences across the competing channels exceeds a certain threshold it is not optimal for the manufacturer to complement the retail channel with an online channel. However, this price sensitivity threshold itself depends upon product/market characteristics, suggesting that manufacturers seeking to complement their retail channels with an online channel should look beyond the nature of threat the online channel poses to the retail channel in devising their optimal distribution strategies. When the retail margins on rival products are sufficiently small, complementing the retail channel with an online channel when optimal allows the manufacturer to price discriminate and enhance profits. In contrast when retail margins on rival products are sufficiently high, complementing the retail channel with an online channel serves to enhance retail support. We also identify market conditions under which profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer are greater with the online channel than that without it. This is particularly interesting since the online channel competes with the retail channel.     

Cadbury and the rise of the supermarket: innovation in marketing 1953–1975

This article uses company archival data, supported by evidence from the trade press, to examine the development of the manufacturer–retailer relationship in the case of Cadbury and the supermarket retailers distributing its products in the period 1953–1975. It reveals the influence upon Cadbury’s marketing strategies and practices of the increasing importance of supermarket retailing in relation to the confectionery as well as the grocery goods trades. It also provides new insight into the significance of these changes for Cadbury’s relationships with other manufacturers, and with small-scale retailers typified by confectioners, tobacconists and newsagents.     

Price and quality decisions in a vertically-differentiated supply chain with an “Online-to-Store” channel

Because of the prevalence of “Online-to-Store (OS)” channel, customers can purchase differentiated products online and pick up in-store. We develop a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to study the impact of an OS channel on quality levels, demands, prices, and profits of a manufacturer and a retailer in a supply chain. We assume that the retailer acts as a Stackelberg leader, and the manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg follower. The manufacturer produces and sells two products with vertically-differentiated quality levels to the retailer who in turn sells the products to customers through a Store channel, an Online channel, or an OS channel. The retailer incurs a handing cost if the OS channel is available, and consumers bear a shipping cost and a transaction cost when the products are purchased from the Online and Store channels, respectively. We find that the manufacturer should reduce both products’ quality levels and wholesale prices, whereas the retailer can increase the selling prices for a relatively small shipping cost and a not too small handling cost. When the products are available both online and in-store, however, the quality levels, wholesale prices and selling prices might increase for a small shipping cost and a not too small handling cost. Compared to the case in which both products are available online only with the OS channel, adding the Store channel is always beneficial for both parties. The intuition behind these results hinges on the trade-off between the handling cost and the increased market demand for the retailer. Moreover, the quality levels, the wholesale prices of both products, and the selling price of the low-quality product would decrease, while the selling price of the high-quality product increases for a sufficiently low transaction cost and a not too small shipping cost.     

How a novel option contract helps a green product to enter a traditional product's retailing channel: A mathematical modeling approach

Multi-sourcing is a practical strategy in retail channels that allows retailers facing uncertainties to respond more effectively to consumers' needs by distributing market demand across multiple supply sources. In this respect, this research investigates a price-setting retailing channel, including two manufacturers (a traditional manufacturer and a green manufacturer) and one retailer where end-of-life products can be collected. The retailer faces an uncertain price-dependent demand and sets orders from both supply directions based on a low-cost ordering approach. The primary purpose of this study is to develop an optimal solution to allow the green product to enter the retailing channel of the non-green product. Accordingly, this research develops and compares two different contractual mechanisms from the standpoint of the green manufacturer/retailer and the supply chain (SC): (1) a penalty-based contract and (2) a modified call option contract mixed with a cost-sharing mechanism. The main contribution of the current paper is to investigate an option contract for the effective management of a closed-loop supply chain and combine it with a cost-sharing contract as a new approach. Another contribution is that the developed model considers two practical channels for collecting and returning obsolete products to the green manufacturer: (1) the retailer is responsible for collecting and returning obsolete products, and (2) collecting and returning obsolete products is outsourced to a third-party logistics provider (3PL). Eventually, the models' efficiency is verified by investigating different numerical experiments, discovering that the proposed reservation-based contract outperforms the penalty-based contract for both parties' profitability and retailing channel's improvement. Besides, the present study finds that hiring 3PL significantly increases the green manufacturer's profit compared to other scenarios.     

信息共享下双渠道制造商与零售商协调研究

随着internet的应用越来越广泛,许多制造商不仅使用传统的销售商渠道销售产品,而且通过网上直销的方式进行产品销售,双渠道增加了渠道之间的竞争。零售商为了在渠道竞争中获得优势,可以通过花费一定的成本增加零售产品价值。通过建立博弈模型分析强势制造商在对零售商信息完全、信息不完全情况下的定价策略,分析得出制造商获得零售商信息的价值,以及零售商愿意向制造商分享成本信息时的临界收益,旨在提出参考建议。     

Effect of Store Brand Introduction on Channel Price Leadership: An Empirical Investigation

In this study, we conduct an empirical investigation of the impact of store brand introductions on the price leadership relations in a distribution channel between a retailer and national brand manufacturers. We analyze a multi-product category retail database from a major grocery chain, which captures both a period before and a period after the introduction of a store brand in each product category. By applying the time series approach to this data set, we show that store brand introductions frequently lead to price leadership changes, generally in a more favorable direction for the retailer than for the national brand manufacturer, evidenced by either the decay of the manufacturers’ price leadership or the rise of the retailer’s price leadership. However, such a change is not universal but tends to be concentrated among a certain quality tier of national brands, which is not always the low-tier, but sometimes the top-tier despite the low-price low-quality position of the store brand. The patterns detected in the data suggest that these changes are likely to reflect the retailer’s strategic effort to reshape the price leadership environment in a product category aided by the enhanced bargaining power and managerial sophistication that accompanied the store brand introductions.     

Empirical investigation of channel reactions to brand introductions

We investigate how incumbent manufacturers and retailers alter their pricing behavior in response to new product introduction. In performing our analysis, we need to be cognizant of the fact that the observed price changes can be due to entry-induced changes in a) demand conditions or b) costs or, on the other hand, to the competitive behavior of c) manufacturers and/or d) the retailer. In order to separate these four changes, we posit that manufacturer and retailer pricing is an outcome of maximizing a combination of shares and profits. This enhanced objective function allows us to measure competitive conduct benchmarked as less or more competitive than under the Bertrand-Nash framework. Our empirical analysis is based on the toothpaste category for the time period January 1993–February 1995. During this period, there were three brand introductions in two rounds of entry. Using the estimates from the demand and the supply model, we compute the changes in the retail and wholesale prices that are attributable to changes in demand conditions, manufacturer and retailer competitive conduct, and cost changes. These results support our conjecture that inferring the change in conduct solely based on a change in observed prices is likely to be erroneous. For the first new brand entry, we find that the brand introduction did not significantly increase competition between manufacturers. As a result, the balance of channel power between the manufacturers and the retailers remained unaltered. Both retailer and manufacturer profit margins increased after the first entry. However, subsequent to the second entry, retailer share of channel profits increased at the expense of the manufacturers; manufacturers even saw a decline in their absolute profit margins. We believe that this research will provide insight for manufacturers and retailers regarding how the various channel participants are likely to react to new product introduction. Furthermore, policymakers interested in understanding competitive reactions to new product introduction should find this research useful.     

To Be or Not to Be in Thrall to the March of Smart Products

This article explores how perceived disempowerment impacts the intention to adopt smart autonomous products. Empirically, the paper builds on three studies to show this impact. Study 1 explores the relevance of the perceived disempowerment in respect of smart autonomous products. Study 2 manipulates autonomy of smart products and finds that perceived disempowerment mediates the link between smart products’ autonomy and adoption intention. Study 3 indicates that an intervention design―that is, a product design that allows consumers to intervene in the actions of an autonomous smart product―can reduce their perceived disempowerment in respect of autonomous smart products. Further, Study 3 reveals that personal innovativeness moderates the role that an intervention design plays in product adoption: an intervention design shows a positive effect on adoption intention for individuals with low personal innovativeness, but for those with high personal innovativeness no effect of an intervention design is present on adoption intention. The authors suggest that managers consider consumers’ perceived disempowerment when designing autonomous smart products, because (1) perceived disempowerment reduces adoption and (2) when targeted at consumers with low personal innovativeness, an intervention design reduces their perceived disempowerment.