Characteristics Associated with the Corporate Decision to Adopt Long‐term Performance Plans

This study investigates why firms adopt long‐term performance plans. The results provide evidence that firms that adopt long‐term performance plans have higher risk as measured by Beta, have lower percentages of managerial stockholdings, have higher levels of investment in research and development expenditures two years prior to adoption of a long‐term performance plan, and experience increases in the ratio of debt to total assets in the two year period prior to long‐term performance plan adoption. Also, firms increase their investments in research and development and capital expenditures following adoption of long‐term performance plans.     

Do corporate tax cuts increase investments?

This paper studies the effect of corporate taxes on investment. Since firms with a foreign parent have more cross-country profit shifting opportunities than domestically owned firms do, their effective tax rate and, consequently, their tax-induced costs to investment are lower. We therefore expect capital investment responses to a corporate tax cut to be heterogeneous across firms. Using firm-level data on German corporations, we exploit the 2008 tax reform, which substantially cut corporate taxes as an exogenous policy shock and expect domestically owned firms' investments to be more responsive to the reform. We show exactly this in a difference-in-differences setting. We find that the reduction in corporate tax payments led to a one-to-one increase in the real investments of domestic firms. The effect is stronger for domestic firms relying more on internal funds. Correspondingly, labor investment increased more for domestic firms, ensuring a constant mix of input factors. In addition, we show that domestic firms' sales grew faster after the tax cut than the sales of foreign-owned firms. Our results imply that corporate tax changes can increase corporate investment but that domestic firms benefit more than foreign-owned firms from a tax cut through higher investment responses resulting in greater sales growth.     

Operating Performance and Stock Returns of Firms Calling Convertible Preferred Stocks

Abstract:   Using methodologies developed by Barber and Lyon (1996 and 1997 ), we examine the long‐run operating performance and stock returns of firms around in‐the‐money calls of convertible preferred stock. Our study intends to be a direct test of the hypothesis that managers call in‐the‐money convertibles when they view a decline in the firms' performance. We find no evidence that calling firms underperform non‐calling benchmark firms. On the contrary, we find mild evidence that the post‐call operating performance of calling firms is better than a carefully selected group of benchmark firms and call firms' post‐call stock returns are no worse than benchmark firms.     

THE STOCK RETURN PERFORMANCE OF CORPORATIONS THAT ARE PARTIALLY OWNED BY OTHER CORPORATIONS

A corporation may acquire minority ownership in another corporation and then attempt to exert control, either by monitoring management or by coopting management and transferring wealth to itself. A sample of fifty-one corporations that have had a corporate partial owner for at least five years is matched against a nonpartially owned control group. Risk-adjusted monthly stock returns of partially owned firms are significantly lower than those of control group firms, supporting the wealth transfer hypothesis. Firms with Victor Posner-controlled partial owners perform worse than other partially owned firms.     

The Information Signaling Hypothesis of Dividends: Evidence from Cointegration and Causality Tests

This paper uses cointegration and causality tests to study the temporal behavior of dividends and earnings at the individual firm level. We find that, for a sample of 143 non‐utility firms, approximately one‐fifth of the firms exhibits a temporal relationship between dividends and earnings that is consistent with the information signaling hypothesis of dividends. In the case of 72 utilities, about a third exhibit dividend policies that are consistent with the signaling notion of dividends. Further examination of firm characteristic differences between signaling and non‐signaling firms shows that, in the case of non‐utility firms, signaling firms tend to be smaller, have a lower growth rate of total assets, and have a higher leverage ratio. In the case of utilities, we find no major differences in firm characteristics between signaling and non‐signaling firms.     

Ownership and Performance in a Lightly Regulated Environment

This article examines the relation between ownership and performance for New Zealand electricity lines firms over the period 1998 to 2006. The sample is of interest because it represents all firms within a single product industry (local electricity distribution), which is a natural monopoly subject to a light‐handed regulatory regime. Thus we are able to examine the theories of ownership on performance, while controlling for regulation, industry, product market competition, accounting methods and other factors that might impact profitability, such as network reliability and network density. The results suggest that listed firms have similar profitability to council‐owned firms and both listed and council‐owned firms outperform trust‐owned firms. The likely reason for the poorer performance of trust‐owned firms is that they have different agency costs than listed and council‐owned firms and the trustees have lower responsibility than directors. Hence, they have lower incentives to be profitable.     

Do Banks Follow Their Customers Abroad?

The market share of US business loans made by foreign‐owned banks has increased dramatically since 1980. At the same time, foreign direct investment in the US rose, so that much of the growth in foreign‐owned US‐based bank lending to businesses in the US could conceivably be accounted for by an increase in loans to the nonbank US affiliates of firms headquartered abroad, an expectation consistent with the conventional wisdom that banks "follow their customers" abroad. Our study investigates the lending patterns of US‐based banks from Japan, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK, countries that account for the vast majority of foreign bank activity in the US. Simultaneously, we look at the borrowing patterns of nonbank US affiliates of firms from those countries. We find that banks from four of the six countries (Japan, Canada, the Netherlands, and the UK) allocated a majority of their loans to non‐home‐country borrowers for some or all of the 1981–1992 period. These findings suggest that the "follow the customer" hypothesis may have a more limited applicability than previously supposed.     

Family values: Ownership structure,performance and capital structure of Canadian firms

This study examines how family ownership affects the performance and capital structure of 613 Canadian firms from 1998 to 2005. In particular, we distinguish the effect of family ownership from the use of control-enhancing mechanisms. We find that freestanding family owned firms with a single share class have similar market performance than other firms based on Tobin’s q ratios, superior accounting performance based on ROA, and higher financial leverage based on debt-to-total assets. By contrast, family owned firms that use dual-class shares have valuations that are lower by 17% on average relative to widely held firms, despite having similar ROA and financial leverage.     

The Wealth Effects of Capital Investment Decisions: An Empirical Comparison of Korean Chaebol and Non‐Chaebol Firms

Abstract:   This paper investigates the capital investment decisions of Korean firms and their impact on shareholder wealth. Overall, we find positive abnormal returns surrounding the announcements of 697 cases of investment projects during the period 1992–1999. This paper also finds that the investment decisions of business group ( chaebol ‐affiliated) firms do not increase shareholder wealth, while the capital investment decisions of non‐ chaebol firms generate significantly positive abnormal returns. The multivariate tests provide consistent evidence that the announcement effects for chaebol firms are lower than for non‐ chaebol firms, after growth opportunities, investment size and firm size are controlled for. The findings support the view that the organizational structure of Korean chaebols creates an incentive for managers to make non‐value maximizing capital investment decisions.     

The Performance of the Foreign‐Owned Sector of UK Manufacturing: Some Evidence and Implications for UK Inward Investment Policy

This paper analyses the reported performance of foreign‐owned manufacturing subsidiaries in the UK between 1994 and 1998. The paper is set in the context of uncertainty about the performance of some foreign‐owned sectors of UK manufacturing and the implications of this performance for the beneficial spillover effects sought by policy‐makers from foreign‐owned capital. Japanese‐owned subsidiaries are the focus of particular attention, with reported profits and tax liabilities significantly below those of subsidiaries from other national sources. The wider ramifications of this finding are analysed for the UK case, particularly in terms of the need to take into account the wider exchequer effects of inward investment in the general evaluation of the financial assistance provided to foreign firms.     

Shareholders’ tax incentives and changes in the organizational form of foreign operations

This study examines whether the tax incentives of home-country shareholders influence the organizational form changes of foreign operations. While a corporation and a limited company (LC) in South Korea are treated the same for Korean tax purposes, an LC can be treated as a pass-through entity for U.S. tax purposes. This tax treatment of LCs can create incentives for U.S. owners to convert their Korean corporations to LCs. We find that private corporations owned by U.S. shareholders are more likely to convert to LCs than those owned by non-U.S. shareholders. We also find that the tax costs and benefits of conversion affect the likelihood of LC conversion for U.S.-owned firms. Overall, our results suggest that multinational corporations use organizational form changes as a tool for international tax strategies.     

Shareholder Protection,Ownership, and Dividends: Russian Evidence

This article investigates the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and dividend policy in Russian firms. Using a sample of Russian listed firms over the period 1998–2003, we estimate models for dividend pay probability and payout size. We find that there has been a significant increase in dividend payout levels which coincide with improvements in legal shareholder protection. State controlled firms are more frequent dividend payers as compared to other majority owned firms. We also find that dual share firms, in which corporate charters protect minority interests, have a higher dividend pay probability; while firms reporting according to US GAAP, which may be less likely to manipulate earnings, have a lower dividend payout.     

Ownership and the Value of Political Connections: Evidence from China

Research has found that political connectedness can have both positive and negative effects on firm value. To resolve these mixed findings, we investigate the impact of political ties conditional on ownership for a sample of Chinese firms over the period 1999–2006. We find that private firms with politically connected managers have a higher value and obtain more government subsidies than those without connected managers, whereas local state‐owned enterprises with connected managers have a lower value and employ more surplus labour than those without connected managers. Our results indicate that the effect of political ties is subject to firm ownership.     

Earnings Conservatism, Litigation and Contracting: The Case of Cross‐Listed Firms

Abstract:   We compare earnings conservatism of UK companies cross‐listed in the US to that of UK companies without a US‐listing. We expect that conservatism will be more pronounced for cross‐listed firms than for firms with a UK listing only, because the cross‐listed firms face a stricter enforcement regime. Furthermore, cross‐listed firms may use a listing on a US exchange to signal high‐quality reporting to investors. Using a matched‐pairs research design, we find that earnings of UK cross‐listed firms are significantly more conservative than earnings of UK firms without a US listing. Moreover, cross listed firms display particularly high levels of conservatism during the early years of their cross‐listing. This indicates that firms use earnings conservatism to commit to highly demanding reporting requirements and in doing so communicate a perception of investor care.     

股权分置、资金侵占与上市公司现金股利政策

上市公司控股股东是否直接或以现金股利方式间接侵占公司资金一直是困绕学术界和实务界的共同性问题。与以往的研究不同,本文发现现金股利和资金侵占同是大股东实现其股权价值最大化的手段,二者具有可替代性,协整检验的结果也表明二者不是弱外生变量。本文通过联立方程模型将上市公司现金股利政策与资金侵占结合起来考虑,发现国有控股的公司发放的现金股利水平在前一阶段最高;国有法人控股的公司,现金股利发放的水平在后两阶段最高,但资金被侵占的程度最低;社会法人控股股东对现金股利的偏好与国有法人控股股东无异,但其控股的公司资金被侵占的程度最为严重;国有股控股的公司,其资金被侵占的程度介于二者之间。本文通过对公司股利政策的连续考察发现随着证监会推进上市公司改革的逐步深入,非流通股控股股东减少了对上市公司资金的直接侵占,但现金股利形式却变得越来越普遍。     

Performance of Private to Public MBOs: The Role of Venture Capital

Abstract:   Using a unique dataset, we examine financial performance, and venture capital involvement in 167 MBOs exiting through IPOs (MBO‐IPOs) on the London Stock Exchange, during the period 1964 –1997. VC backed MBOs seem to be more underpriced than MBOs without venture capital backing, based on average value‐weighted returns. MBOs backed by highly reputable VCs tend to be older companies, and exit earlier than MBOs backed by less reputable VCs. The results contradict 'certification' and 'grandstanding' hypotheses supported by US data ( Megginson and Weiss, 1991 ; and Gompers, 1996 , respectively). We found no evidence of either significant underperformance, or that VC backed MBOs perform better than their non‐VC backed counterparts in the long run. However, MBOs backed by highly reputable venture capital firms seem to be better long‐term investments as compared to those backed by less prestigious venture capitalist firms. The results remain robust after using different methods to measure performance, and after controlling for sample selectivity bias.     

Voluntary Disclosure of Management Earnings Forecasts in IPO Prospectuses

Asymmetric information and mechanisms for its resolution in the initial public offering (IPO) process are subjects of extensive research and debate. In this paper, we investigate the impact of one such mechanism, namely voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecasts by issuers of IPOs, as a means of reducing asymmetric information as well as ex ante uncertainty. Our focus is on the relative importance of this voluntary disclosure mechanism on both IPO underpricing and post‐issue return performance. Our results indicate that management earnings forecasts provide important and incremental information compared to other means of reducing asymmetric information, and these disclosures appear to improve the environment of IPO issuance. For example, our underpricing results show that firms that choose to provide forecasts leave 'less money on the table' with a lower degree of underpricing. In terms of post‐issue performance, firms whose forecasts turn out to be optimistic are penalized significantly relative to other forecasters and non‐forecasters.     

The Recognition and Timing of Deferred Tax Liabilities

Abstract:   This paper examines the characteristics of firms that account for deferred tax liabilities related to government investment grants under an extended adoption timing period. Not only the recognition but also the timing decision is associated with changes in future performance and changes in the debt structure. Recognisers outperform non‐recognisers in the future, while early recognition is related to post recognition performance but only for those firms that currently perform well. Changes in the balance sheet structure are also related to both decisions. Firms with recent increases in the debt level tend to postpone recognition, while currently well‐performing firms that increase their future debt level are less likely to recognise deferred taxes.     

Board Monitoring and Earnings Management: Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals?

Abstract:   This paper examines whether the incidence of earnings management by UK firms depends on board monitoring. We focus on two aspects of board monitoring: the role of outside board members and the audit committee. Results indicate that the likelihood of managers making income‐increasing abnormal accruals to avoid reporting losses and earnings reductions is negatively related to the proportion of outsiders on the board. We also find that the chance of abnormal accruals being large enough to turn a loss into a profit or to ensure that profit does not decline is significantly lower for firms with a high proportion of outside board members. In contrast, we find little evidence that outside directors influence income‐decreasing abnormal accruals when pre‐managed earnings are high. We find no evidence that the presence of an audit committee directly affects the extent of income‐increasing manipulations to meet or exceed these thresholds. Neither do audit committees appear to have a direct effect on the degree of downward manipulation, when pre‐managed earnings exceed thresholds by a large margin. Our findings suggest that boards contribute towards the integrity of financial statements, as predicted by agency theory.     

Decomposing and Testing Long‐term Returns: an Application on Danish IPOs

An improved method for measuring and testing long‐run returns is proposed. The method adjusts for the right‐skewed distribution of long‐run buy‐and‐hold by decomposing average cross‐sectional buy‐and‐hold returns into mean components and volatility components. The method is applied to initial public offerings in Denmark. The mean‐component under performance of initial public offering stocks compared to the market is 30% and significant after 5 years. Compared to matching firms the under performance of IPO stocks is 13% after 5 years but insignificant.