需要保护的是价格还是竞争

自律价的出台背景去年下半年以来，中国一些行业的龙头企业在有关部门的推动下，纷纷联盟，签定了“行业自律价格”公约，试图通过限定价格水平，协议固定价格等行政干预措施，限制恶性竞争，维护公平竞争的市场经济秩序。行业自律价的发布和监督检查是以行业协会等行业组织为主进行，政府只作必要的引导和协调。（汽车行业轿车产品价格自律公约》要求，“保证不发生高价暴利和低价倾销的不正当竞争，不以任何形式变相降价销售”。钢铁行业规定“不低于完全成本价出售钢铁产品，不搞任何形式的变相低价销售钢材”。广东燃气具骨干企业万家乐…     

行业自律价的产业经济学分析

随着我国市场化改革的不断深入，价格竞争已经成为许多企业频繁使用的策略。但近年来我国一些行业频频爆发恶性价格战，为了防止这种恶性价格竞争继续蔓延，许多行业由政府和行业协会出面制定行业自律价。行业自律价作为一项政策手段，其目的是为了摆脱恶性竞争，优化行业资源配置。但行业自律价对资源配置的调节是无效率的，因为它延长了市场调节的时间，保护了市场竞争中的无效率；行业自律实践上缺乏操作性。     

浅析买方市场下“最低限价就是自律价”的消极作用

探析了“最低价就是行业自律价”的提法和消积作用。     

共谋:企业自戕的绞索

随着买方市场的形成,市场竞争日益加剧,价格大战此起彼伏,愈演愈烈。西方国家法律明令禁止的企业共谋,在我国越来越频繁地出现。1998年许多行业纷纷订立“自律价”,1999年四大DVD厂商实施战略联盟、八大彩管厂商定“停产保价”     

谈部分行业的商品降价与扩大内需

扩大内需仍然是我国经济发展面临的艰巨任务 ,在各种扩大内需的方法和措施中 ,以部分具有带动作用的行业为突破口 ,使其商品和服务降价 ,是一个有效途径     

倪润峰又扔“原子弹”

既被誉为行业领袖又被斥为“好战分子”的四川长虹老总倪润峰，每隔一段时间，就会在彩电行业中掀起轩然大波。在９９年沉默了一个季度后，长虹彩电再次全面降价，降价幅度从５０元至１０００元。去年岁末，长虹突发奇招，一掷老本，垄断了全国７０％的彩管，此举令业内人...     

浅谈价格战的替代战略

价格战是一个零和游戏,除非降价能够被获得的成本效益抵消,否则通过价格手段而获得市场份额将损害整个行业的长期利益。陷于价格战的企业将任凭消费者摆布,企业产品质量会因降价而受到影响,最终影响消费者的利益。长远来看,商家和消费者的利益都被削弱。因此,文章通过探讨价格战带来的风险,提出价格战的替代战略,为企业指出价格战以外的经营模式和竞争手段。     

中国移动通信业价格竞争:一个基于垄断租金维度的解释

中国移动通信业价格竞争一直是众多专家学者关注的对象,本文从垄断租金的视角给出了行业价格竞争的一种解释.我国移动通信行业起初积累的高额垄断租金在不对称管制的触发机制作用下促进了行业降价博弈的形成.而这种降价博弈一经形成,它的既定方向又在以后的发展中得到了自我强化.但是,随着行业有效竞争程度的提高以及起初积累的高额垄断租金的耗散,运营商在随后的隐性价格和后价格竞争阶段中通过将熊彼特租金和李嘉图租金转化为新的市场力量所形成的垄断租金则对行业的价格竞争起着正向调节的作用,而且这种正向调整作用随着竞争程度的提高不断弱化.     

论品牌形象塑造

随着市场竞争的不断加剧,企业靠推销、降价、有奖销售等手段已难以推动市场,企业参与竞争的手段正逐步从价格竞争转向非价格竞争。在诸多非价格竞争中,品牌竞争越来越成为最重要、最有效的手段。经济界人士提出:品牌是迈入二十一世纪的入场券。如何创造品牌,制定依托品牌发展战略是现代企业极具现实意义的大事。     

价格战高挂“免战牌”

在近年来犹如脱缓野马的价格大战中，不少企业经济效益大幅度下降。于是，曾经恨不得战至你死我活的各路“经济诸候”纷纷挂起“免战牌”，推出行业自律价，以期制止价格大战的再度发生和蔓延。价格大战多败俱伤近年来以降低竞争为内容的价格大战此起彼伏、硝烟弥漫、烽火连天，其规模之宏大、程度之惨烈是空前的。从彩电价格大战到汽车价格大战，从VCD价格大战到微波炉价格大战，一战接一战。价格大战的结果使不少行业出现全体亏损。根据财政部统计，1998年l－8月，全国4．08万户国有工业企业盈亏相抵净亏损67．2亿元，与上年同期盈利253…     

论产品价格、劳动力价格与消费需求

价格高水平变动与消费需求变动的关系比较间接。劳动力相对其他商品的价格不断提高，是经济发展表现出的普遍规律。劳动力价格对产品价格不断提高是消费需求持续增长的必要条件。通过企业之间的竞争来实现劳动生产率的提高和非农产业就业人数的增长，是实现大众消费良性循环的根本措施。     

Price Competition Between Teams

This study uses an experimental approach to examine whether markets are sensitive to the internal incentive structure of the competitors. Toward this goal, we modeled the competitors in a price competition duopoly game as three-player teams. Each player simultaneously declares a bid (price) and the team whose total bid was lower won the competition and was paid accordingly. The losing team was paid nothing, and in case of a tie, each team was paid half its price. This duopoly game was studied under two conditions; a cooperative treatment in which the team's profit was divided equally amongst its members and a non-cooperative one in which each individual member was paid her own bid. Whereas the Nash equilibrium is for each player in either treatment to demand the minimal price possible, we predicted that convergence to the competitive price would be much faster in the cooperative treatment than in the non-cooperative one. The experimental results firmly confirmed this prediction.     

Pro‐Consumer Price Ceilings under Regulatory Uncertainty*

We examine optimal price ceilings when the regulator is uncertain about demand and maximizes expected consumer surplus. With perfect competition, if regulatory uncertainty is large enough, then softer intervention is called for, with the price ceiling set at a relatively high level compared with a full information scenario. In an imperfectly competitive setting where symmetric firms compete in supply functions, with large enough uncertainty, the optimal ceiling increases with the degree of competition, so greater competitive pressure justifies less restrictive regulation. Under perfect competition, we also determine a cut‐off level of rationing efficiency below which a price ceiling should not be used.     

我国航空运输服务业的市场结构及价格竞争策略分析

我国航空运输服务业从宏观上分析具有寡头垄断的市场结构特点,从航线运营的角度分析却具有垄断竞争的特点,因此我国航空运输服务市场还处在重要的发展变革阶段。在我国空运市场特定的经济环境下,旅客的购买决策受到多种因素的影响,航空公司的价格竞争主要表现为不同价格的子舱位数量的决策,并且具有复杂的价格体系。在同一航线上经营的不同企业一方面要针对价格需求弹性大和时间需求弹性大的旅客采取强硬的价格竞争策略;另一方面也要注重差异化价格竞争策略, 避免恶性竞争的发生。     

Petrol Price Cycles

This article provides an overview of the burgeoning academic literature on price dynamics and price cycles in retail petrol markets. I first present evidence of petrol price cycles and studies that describe what types of petrol markets tend to exhibit price cycles. I further discuss empirical investigations of firms’ pricing strategies in cycling markets. In light of the empirics, I outline theories of competition and consumer demand in petrol markets that help us understand various facets of petrol price cycles.     

普通住宅房价与地价因果关系的检验及其政策含义

本文在综述房价与地价关系研究成果的基础上,结合土地市场与住宅市场二者属性,构建一个认识房价与地价关系的基础。理论研究表明,在不完全竞争的市场中,地价是房价上涨的一个重要但非决定性因素,土地需求作为引致需求受房价影响较大。同时,本文利用1998年至2009年季度数据对房价和地价进行G ranger因果关系检测,计量结果表明：短期内房价与地价互为影响,房价对地价影响更为显著;长期内,房价是地价的G ranger因,而不是相反。计量结果可以揭示房地产市场信号短期与长期传递的机制。在此基础上,本文提出房地产市场治理的应对之策。     

Trade Imbalance and Domestic Market Competition Policy

This study investigates the effect of a country's suppression of competition in its market for nontradables. It assumes that the initial equilibrium is stationary and demonstrates that if competition is suppressed in a small country, the country's trade surplus increases in the short run. In the large country case, the same change creates an excess demand for future tradables and affects the relative price between present and future tradables. Using a two‐country model, the study shows that this price change redistributes real wealth from the country with a trade deficit to the country with a trade surplus.     

On Price Caps Under Uncertainty

This paper shows how standard arguments supporting the imposition of price caps break down in the presence of demand uncertainty. In particular, though in the deterministic case the introduction or lowering of a price cap (above marginal cost) results in increased production, increased total welfare, decreased prices, and increased consumer welfare, we show that all of the above comparative statics predictions fail for generic uncertain demand functions. For example, for price caps sufficiently close to marginal cost, a decrease in the price cap always leads to a decrease in production and total welfare under certain mild conditions. Under stronger regularity assumptions, all of the monotone comparative statics predictions from the deterministic case also do not hold for a generic uncertain demand if we restrict attention to price caps in an arbitrary fixed interval (as long as the price caps are binding for some values in that interval).     

Trade Policies for Exporting Industries under Free Entry

This paper computes optimal export taxes and domestic production subsidies for exporting industries under free entry. We show that domestic welfare is not at maximum, as is typically believed, when the export price is a monopoly price, and the domestic price is a competitive price, because a market structure effect has to be taken into account. Furthermore, we show that the optimal tax/subsidy formulas for an oligopoly coincide with those under perfect competition, if foreign and domestic demand functions are both linear. We also discuss optimal trade policies when only one instrument is available, and we run numerical simulations to determine and compare optimal trade taxes under endogenous and exogenous market structures.     

Price Expectations and International Quota Trading: An Experimental Evaluation

This paper reports a preliminary experimental test of international quota trading on a market characterized by several dominant traders. Uncertain quota demand and supply imply true market-clearing prices that in general differ from an expected competitive quota price. However, in the experiment the expected price level emerges as a focal point on which the bulk of quota trade contracts are keyed. Thus, incomplete price discovery occurs.