Contracting costs and the window of opportunity for straight debt issues

We analyze whether fluctuation in economy-wide factors cause time-series variation in the contracting costs of moral hazard, adverse selection, and financial distress for a sample of straight debt issues. We find that the announcement period abnormal returns to debt issues are more negative in periods of higher interest rates and in industry downturns. When we partition the impact of each issue- and firm-specific measure of contracting costs across high and low levels of each economy-wide variable, we find that only the measures of agency cost are significant in general, and measures of financial distress become relevant for those debt issues that constitute a leverage increase for the firms.     

Foreign Exchange Exposure Elasticity and Financial Distress

Financially distressed firms have limited ability to manage exchange rate exposure over time which could cause their fundamental value to be sensitive to the cash flow volatility related to currency movements. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the likelihood and costs of financial distress help explain cross‐sectional variations in return sensitivity to currency movements. We find that the level of exchange rate exposure elasticity is related to proxies for the likelihood of financial distress, growth opportunities, and product uniqueness. Further, firms with a greater likelihood and higher costs of financial distress exhibit greater abnormal returns in response to large exchange rate shocks.     

Financial Distress and Corporate Performance

This study finds that highly leveraged firms lose substantial market share to their more conservatively financed competitors in industry downturns. Specifically, firms in the top leverage decile in industries that experience output contractions see their sales decline by 26 percent more than do firms in the bottom leverage decile. A similar decline takes place in the market value of equity. These findings are consistent with the view that the indirect costs of financial distress are significant and positive. Consistent with the theory that firms with specialized products are especially vulnerable to financial distress, we find that highly leveraged firms that engage in research and development suffer the most in economically distressed periods. We also find that the adverse consequences of leverage are more pronounced in concentrated industries.     

Labor unemployment risk and corporate financing decisions

This paper presents evidence that firms choose conservative financial policies partly to mitigate workers' exposure to unemployment risk. We exploit changes in state unemployment insurance laws as a source of variation in the costs borne by workers during layoff spells. We find that higher unemployment benefits lead to increased corporate leverage, particularly for labor-intensive and financially constrained firms. We estimate the ex ante, indirect costs of financial distress due to unemployment risk to be about 60 basis points of firm value for a typical BBB-rated firm. The findings suggest that labor market frictions have a significant impact on corporate financing decisions.     

Endogenous leverage and expected stock returns

This note clarifies conditions under which endogenous choice of debt induces a negative relation between leverage or default risk and expected stock returns. In the context of the model of George and Hwang [2009. Journal of Financial Economics 96, 56–79], we correct the contention that variation in bankruptcy costs across firms is sufficient. Variation in asset risk parameters can lead to the desired relation, but may not when also controlling for variation in book-to-market ratios. A simple parameterization of cross-sectional heterogeneity in risk and profitability implies a negative association of expected return with leverage and distress risk and a positive association with book-to-market.     

Structural and Return Characteristics of Small and Large Firms

We examine differences in structural characteristics that lead firms of different sizes to react differently to the same economic news. We find that a small firm portfolio contains a large proportion of marginal firms-firms with low production efficiency and high financial leverage. We construct two size-matched return indices designed to mimic the return behavior of marginal firms and find that these return indices are important in explaining the time-series return difference between small and large firms. Furthermore, risk exposures to these indices are as powerful as log(size) in explaining average returns of size-ranked portfolios.     

Risk and Return: A Revisit Using Expected Returns

This paper uses direct estimates of expected returns to examine the link between standard measures of financial risk and investor return requirements. The results show that systematic risk commands a significant positive risk premium, much larger than found using historical returns as proxies for expectations. Furthermore, there are nonlinearities in the relationship between risk and return. Finally, we show that expected returns and risk premiums in the equity markets change over time and that these changes are related to changes in interest rates on U.S. government obligations.     

Dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts and credit rating

This paper shows that the puzzling negative cross-sectional relation between dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts and future stock returns may be explained by financial distress, as proxied by credit rating downgrades. Focusing on a sample of firms rated by Standard & Poor's (S&P), we show that the profitability of dispersion-based trading strategies concentrates in a small number of the worst-rated firms and is significant only during periods of deteriorating credit conditions. In such periods, the negative dispersion–return relation emerges as low-rated firms experience substantial price drop along with considerable increase in forecast dispersion. Moreover, even for this small universe of worst-rated firms, the dispersion–return relation is non-existent when either the dispersion measure or return is adjusted by credit risk. The results are robust to previously proposed explanations for the dispersion effect such as short-sale constraints and leverage.     

Firm Size,Book-to-Market Ratio,and Security Returns: A Holdout Sample of Financial Firms

Fama and French (1992) document a significant relation between firm size, book-to-market ratios, and security returns for nonfinancial firms. Because of their initial interest in leverage as an explanatory variable for security returns, Fama and French exclude from their analysis financial firms, thus creating a natural holdout sample on which to test the robustness of their results. We document that the relation between firm size, book-to-market ratios, and security returns is similar for financial and nonfinancial firms. In addition, we present evidence that survivorship bias does not significantly affect the estimated size or book-to-market premiums in returns. Our results indicate data-snooping and selection biases do not explain the size and book-to-market patterns in returns.     

Initial Technical Violations of Debt Covenants and Changes in Firm Risk

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether initial technical debt covenant violations are associated with significant increases in the equity risk of violating firms. Our results indicate that first-time violations are associated with significant increases in both systematic and unsystematic risk. The increase in systematic risk is attributable primarily to rising levels of financial leverage as opposed to changes in the underlying asset beta. We also find that the change in unsystematic risk experienced by first-time debt covenant violators is a significant predictor of future exchange delisting, even after controlling for other factors typically associated with increasing financial distress.     

Firing Costs and Capital Structure Decisions

I exploit the adoption of state‐level labor protection laws as an exogenous increase in employee firing costs to examine how the costs associated with discharging workers affect capital structure decisions. I find that firms reduce debt ratios following the adoption of these laws, with this result stronger for firms that experience larger increases in firing costs. I also document that, following the adoption of these laws, a firm's degree of operating leverage rises, earnings variability increases, and employment becomes more rigid. Overall, these results are consistent with higher firing costs crowding out financial leverage via increasing financial distress costs.     

Estimating Risk‐Adjusted Costs of Financial Distress

The search for the optimal, or value‐maximizing, capital structure involves weighing the expected benefits of higher leverage against the expected “costs of financial distress.” These costs include not only the direct costs of reorganization, but less quantifiable effects of financial trouble such as damage to the firm's reputation, the loss of key employees and customers, and the loss of value from forgone investment opportunities. This article proposes a new method for valuing expected financial distress costs. While researchers have provided estimates of the costs associated with financial distress when it takes place, whether or when these costs will be incurred is, of course, unknown at the time the financing decision. As a result, the “correct” discount rate for valuing expected distress costs is difficult to derive. Instead of adjusting the discount rate to reflect historical default rate probabilities, the authors' method uses “risk‐neutral” probabilities of encountering distress that allow for discounting at the risk‐free rate. The risk‐neutral probabilities of default are derived by incorporating the systematic risk premia implicit in corporate bond yield spreads. This method results in a significant increase in estimates of financial distress costs. In a simple example presented by the authors, distress costs estimated at about 1.6% of firm value using the conventional method turn out to run about 5% after adjusting for the increased systematic risk associated with financial distress.     

Can Operating Leverage Be the Cause of the Value Premium?

Recent theoretical models (Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino, 2004) predict an association between the book-to-market equity ratio (BE/ME) and operating leverage in the cross-section. Consistent with these models, we find a positive association between BE/ME and the degree of operating leverage (DOL), between DOL and stock returns, and between DOL and systematic risk. Overall, our findings provide support for a risk-based explanation for the value premium that is consistent with existing theoretical models. The evolution of systematic risk associated with firm-level investment activity, rather than financial distress, seems to be the main determinant of the value premium.     

Capital structure with risky foreign investment

Firms facing significant business risks have incentives to mitigate the costs of these risks by adjusting their capital structures. This paper investigates this link by analyzing the exposures of multinational firms to political risk. The evidence indicates that returns on investment in politically risky countries are more volatile than returns elsewhere. Multinational firms reduce their leverage in response to these political risks: a one standard deviation increase in foreign political risk is associated with 3.5% reduced leverage. The effect of foreign political risks on leverage is most pronounced for firms in industries whose returns are most susceptible to political influence.     

ASYMMETRIC COVARIANCE,VOLATILITY, AND THE EFFECT OF NEWS

We propose that covariance (rather than beta) asymmetry provides a superior framework for examining issues related to changing risk premiums. Accordingly, we investigate whether the conditional covariance between stock and market returns is asymmetric in response to good and bad news. Our model of conditional covariance accommodates both the sign and magnitude of return innovations, and we find significant covariance asymmetry that can explain, at least in part, the volatility feedback of stock returns. Our findings are consistent across firm size, firm leverage, and temporal and cross‐sectional aggregations.     

Testing asset pricing models with changing expectations and an unobservable market portfolio

When the assumption of constant risk premiums is relaxed, financial valuation models may be tested, and risk measures estimated without specifying a market index or state variables. This is accomplished by examining the behavior of conditional expected returns. The approach is developed using a single risk premium asset pricing model as an example and then extended to models with multiple risk premiums. The methodology is illustrated using daily return data on the common stocks of the Dow Jones 30. The tests indicate that these returns are consistent with a single, time-varying risk premium.     

Financial Distress and the Cross‐section of Equity Returns

We explicitly consider financial leverage in a simple equity valuation model and study the cross‐sectional implications of potential shareholder recovery upon resolution of financial distress. Our model is capable of simultaneously explaining lower returns for financially distressed stocks, stronger book‐to‐market effects for firms with high default likelihood, and the concentration of momentum profits among low credit quality firms. The model further predicts (i) a hump‐shaped relationship between value premium and default probability, and (ii) stronger momentum profits for nearly distressed firms with significant prospects for shareholder recovery. Our empirical analysis strongly confirms these novel predictions.     

The financial distress pricing puzzle in banking firms

This paper examines whether the financial distress pricing puzzle observed for non-financial firms is also observed for financial firms and how this puzzle differs according to the extent of short-sale constraints. By using the eight distress measures developed for financial firms, we find that there is a strong negative relation in the cross-section between financial distress and subsequent bank stock returns, regardless of adjustment for risk. However, this distress pricing puzzle is statistically significant only for high short-sale constrained banks, but not for low short-sale constrained banks. Thus, short-sale constraints are at least one non-risk attribute that causes the distress pricing puzzle for financial firms. We also find that despite its simple form, compared to the other complex distress measures, non-performing loans (NPLs) are the most informative in predicting future bank stock returns as well as bankruptcy and failure.     

Outsourcing with long term contracts: capital structure and product market competition effects

This paper analyzes how capital structure and product market competition affect the firms’ strategic choice between outsourcing with long term contracts and outsourcing to the spot market. When outsourcing to the spot market firms are exposed to price uncertainty, whereas a long term contract allows them to set in advance the outsourcing price. We show that, to the extent that leverage and uncertainty can lead to financial distress costs in bad states of nature, firms may use long term contracts as a risk management device to hedge input price uncertainty. With a monopoly in the final product market, the outsourcing decision involves a trade-off between a positive convexity effect of input price uncertainty under the spot regime and the option to avoid financial distress costs under the long term contract regime. Moreover, product market competition among buyers can lead to an increase in financial distress costs not only for firms outsourcing to the spot market but also for firms outsourcing with a long term contract. We examine the monopolist’s outsourcing decision and derive the equilibrium for an oligopoly, and show that the equilibrium depends on the magnitude of these costs and on the level of efficiency of the supplier.     

Financial reporting quality and idiosyncratic return volatility

Campbell et al. (2001) document that firms’ stock returns have become more volatile in the U.S. since 1960. We hypothesize and find that deteriorating earnings quality is associated with higher idiosyncratic return volatility over 1962–2001. These results are robust to controlling for (i) inter-temporal changes in the disclosure of value-relevant information, sophistication of investors and the possibility that earnings quality can be informative about future cash flows; (ii) stock return performance, cash flow operating performance, cash flow variability, growth, leverage and firm size; and (iii) new listings, high-technology firms, firm-years with losses, mergers and acquisitions and financial distress.