On sabotage in collective tournaments

In this paper a tournament between teams (a collective tournament) is considered, where each contestant may spend productive effort in order to increase his team’s performance or sabotage the members of the opponent team. It is shown that each team directs all its sabotage activities at exactly one of the opponent team’s least able members. This is due to two effects, a decreasing-returns effect and a complementarity effect. The result is of particular interest, as findings on individual tournaments indicate that very able players should usually be sabotaged most strongly.     

Selection Tournaments, Sabotage, and Participation

This paper studies sabotage in tournaments with at least three contestants, where the contestants know each other well. Every contestant has an incentive to direct sabotage specifically against his most dangerous rival. In equilibrium, contestants who choose a higher productive effort are sabotaged more heavily. This might explain findings from psychology, where victims of mobbing are sometimes found to be overachieving. Moreover, sabotage equalizes promotion chances. The effect is most pronounced if the production functions are linear in sabotage, and the cost functions depend only on the sum of all sabotage activities: in an interior equilibrium, who will win is a matter of chance, even when contestants differ a great deal in their abilities. This, in turn, has adverse consequences for who might want to participate in a tournament. Because better contestants anticipate that they will be sabotaged more strongly, it may happen that the most able stay out and the tournament selects one of the less able with probability one. I also study the case where some contestants are easy victims, that is, easier to sabotage than others.     

Rankings,Performance, and Sabotage: The Moderating Effects of Target Setting

Competitive performance rankings are widely used in organizations. Such incentive systems enable agents to improve their performance ranking not only by increasing their own performance, but also by undermining their competitors’ performance. While previous accounting studies have stressed the positive effect of ranking systems on managerial effort, the present paper investigates when such ranking systems may induce sabotage, and how this unintended effect can be mitigated. Our study is based on a laboratory experiment designed to investigate (a) whether competitive performance feedback increases an agent’s inclination to disrupt the efforts of competitors, in a case where ranking has no effect on compensation and (b) whether the presence of a self-set absolute performance target moderates these effects. Our results show that ranking increases both performance and sabotage. Adding an absolute performance standard appeared to reduce sabotage. However, when there is an absolute target, performance is higher in the absence of ranking. Overall, our results thus suggest that performance benefits from the use of either a relative or an absolute performance target, but not from their simultaneous use.     

There is no ‘I’ in team: Career concerns,risk‐taking incentives,and team outcomes

The National Basketball Association contracting rules provide plausibly exogenous variation in career concerns near contract end. We use this setting to study how individual career concerns affect risk‐taking behavior and can sabotage team performance. Using the frequency and duration of player injuries from 1991 to 2013 we measure individual risk‐taking behavior. We find that the average player's likelihood of missing a game due to injury falls by 0.06 percentage points (or over 100% relative to the mean injury rate) in the final 3 months of his contract, and when missing games due to injury is unavoidable, his recovery time drops by 22 days. However, “elite” players with virtually no career concerns actually miss more games due to injury. Finally, we find that elite players missing too many games and “average” players playing before healthy, combine to hurt team performance. For each additional player in the last 3 months on contract, the win probability for that team falls by over 2.6%.     

Your failure is my opportunity—Effects of elimination in contests

In this paper, we consider a sequence of multi-prize all-pay auctions, where low-performing players are eliminated along the way. We provide sufficient conditions such that equilibrium behavior is unaffected by the prospects of winning prizes in later rounds. When these conditions are not met, we identify a novel externality effect and derive equilibria in a model with two rounds. We compare our results to knockout tournaments in which players are partitioned into subcontests in each round.     

Dissent,sabotage, and leader behaviour in contests: Evidence from European football

This paper provides an empirical investigation of misconducts in contests based on data from European football. We extend previous studies by differentiating between dissents with the referee and misconducts directly aimed at sabotaging the competitor. We find that sabotage is more likely committed by teams with lower ability. Dissent is more likely to be shown by teams lagging behind in score and by away teams. We further find that captains engage more in sabotage during important matches and challenge referees' decisions immediately after sanctions of teammates. Finally, we also observe a deterrence effect of sanctions on all types of misconduct.     

Winner’s effort maximization in large contests

We investigate the temporal structure that maximizes the winner’s effort in large homogeneous contests. We find that the winner’s effort ranges from a lower bound of 0 to an upper bound of one third of the value of the prize, depending on the temporal structure; the upper (lower) bound is approached with an infinite number of players playing sequentially (simultaneously) in the first periods (period). Nevertheless, when the number of players is large but finite, we show that winner’s effort is maximized when all players play sequentially except in the very last period and that, within the family of such optimal temporal structures, more players play simultaneously in the very last period than sequentially in all other periods. Furthermore, out of all players, the percentage of those playing simultaneously in the very last period goes to 100% as the number of players grows larger and larger.     

The Impact of Intermediate Information on Sabotage in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Contestants

Applying detailed within‐tournament information about intermediate scores and contestants' ability in rank‐order professional soccer tournaments, this study empirically analyzes the impact of interim results on the sabotage activities of heterogeneous contestants. Intermediate information that suggests that a contest is decided early decreases total sabotage. Splitting contestants into favorites and underdogs reveals that both contestants sabotage the most if intermediate information about the score compensates for or decreases ex ante heterogeneity between the teams. However, engaging in sabotage does not pay off for the contestants. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

浅论中国移动通信集团开展青年工作的特点和规律——以中国移动通信集团广西有限公司柳州城中分公司为例

随着电信产业重组时代的到来，未来中国三大电信运营商全业务的竞争格局将会愈演愈烈。在外部因素发生巨大变化的历史条件下，中国移动通信集团进行了相应组织架构的调整，因此其人力资源管理也需顺应市场发展趋势作出相关调整，尤其要调整对青年员工的管理工作。文章以中国移动通信集团广西有限公司柳州城中分公司为个案，在对其青年员工现状统计分析的同时，对青年工作的开展、组织及特点、规律进行提炼，从而探索出更有利于提升员工素质的方案。     

Equal Pay for Unequal Work: Limiting Sabotage in Teams

We demonstrate the value of "equal pay" policies in teams, even when team members have distinct abilities and make different contributions to team performance. A commitment to compensate all team members in identical fashion eliminates the incentive that each team member otherwise has to sabotage the activities of teammates in order to induce the team owner to implement a more favorable reward structure. The reduced sabotage benefits the team owner, and can secure Pareto gains under plausible circumstances.     

Sabotaging in contests with monitoring efforts

This paper considers a 3‐stage contest with both sabotage and monitoring efforts that aim to reduce sabotage. In the first stage, the regulator sets his monitoring efforts for each contestant. In the second stage, each contestant determines his sabotaging efforts, based on the monitoring efforts that were imposed by the regulator. In the third stage, each contestant determines his productive efforts in the contest. The results supply a justification to exert monitoring efforts because these efforts may benefit both the contestants and the regulator (a win‐win situation). Furthermore, the paper defines the conditions where exerting monitoring efforts would be worthwhile.     

Learning games

This paper presents a model of learning about a game. Players initially have little knowledge about the game. Through playing the same game repeatedly, each player not only learns which action to choose but also constructs a personal view of the game. The model is studied using a hybrid payoff matrix of the prisoner's dilemma and coordination games. Results of computer simulations show that (1) when all the players are slow at learning the game, they have only a partial understanding of the game, but might enjoy higher payoffs than in cases with full or no understanding of the game; (2) when one player is quick in learning the game, that player obtains a higher payoff than the others. However, all can receive lower payoffs than in the case in which all players are slow learners.     

浅谈农村土地承包经营权数据库建设

本次农村土地承包经营权确权发证是在第一轮承包经营权登记的基础上展开的,怎么做好这个工作,建立好农村承包地经营权数据库,作好与第一轮承包经营权的衔接,是我们在具体工作中面临问题。本文根据实践经验,对作业流程和需注意的问题做初步的探讨。     

Rejoinders to the comments on my paper “Performance measurement and joint production of intended and unintended outputs”

I will comment on the comments by the groups of three reviewers separately. First of all, I will thank all three groups providing a first round of reports in order for me to get rid of obvious mistakes. In the second round the reviewers were free to comment on the qualities of my revised version. I am not to change my revised paper when giving my comments on what would be honest reports on the quality of my final version. However, the reviewers will not have a go at my rejoinders to comments according to the symposium rules. I keep the section numbering of the authors in order to make it easier to identify the arguments.

     

A Cognitive Perspective on Entrepreneurship and the Firm

abstract    I propose to examine the theme of this Special Issue from the perspective of its treatment – and, of especial significance, its lack of treatment – within economics. In the course of this examination we shall observe that the concepts of entrepreneurship and the firm are generally kept separate, and attempt to explain why. I shall avoid any discussion of recent work, which is more productively left to my fellow contributors, choosing instead to devote the first half of my contribution to providing an analytical basis for the second half by exploring the problem of knowledge in economic systems, and relating this problem to the evolved nature of human beings and their relationship with their environment. In this exploration I shall rely almost entirely on the work of economists, though much of it was not directed to conventional economic issues.     

Endogenous Group Formation in Contests: Unobservable Sharing Rules

We study contests in which players compete by expending irreversible effort to win a prize, the prize is awarded to one of the players, the winner shares the prize with other players in his group, if any, and each group's sharing rule is unobservable to the other groups and the singletons, if any, when the players expend their effort. The number of groups, their sizes, and the number of singletons are exogenous in the first model, whereas they are endogenous in the second model. We show that group formation occurs if the number of players is four or smaller, but does not occur otherwise. We examine the effect of endogenous group formation on total effort level and the profitability of endogenous group formation. In each of the two models, comparing the outcomes of the case of unobservable sharing rules with those of the case of observable sharing rules, we show that the two cases yield quite different outcomes.     

Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games

A multi-player Dynkin game is a sequential game in which at every stage one of the players is chosen, and that player can decide whether to continue the game or to stop it, in which case all players receive some terminal payoff.We study a variant of this model, where the order by which players are chosen is deterministic, and the probability that the game terminates once the chosen player decides to stop may be strictly less than 1.We prove that a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in Markovian strategies exists. If the game is not degenerate this ε-equilibrium is actually in pure strategies.     

Is the Coach Paid too Much?: Coaching Salaries and the NCAA Cartel

Recently, a great deal of controversy has been generated from the salaries earned by head coaches in the NCAA. Although many figures in the world of sports earn high salaries, one important difference in the case of the NCAA is that the players do not get paid. We develop a model that shows that a cartel agreement to not pay the players raises the coach's salary if some players choose where to play based on the identity of the coach. The agreement not to pay the players improves competitive balance in the baseline model, but this result does not generalize.     

Contests with investment

Perfectly discriminating contests (all pay auctions) are widely used as a model of situations where individuals devote resources to win some prize. In reality such contests are often preceded by investments of the contestants into their ability to fight in the contest. This paper studies a two stage game where in the first stage, players can invest to lower their bid cost in a perfectly discriminating contest, which is played in the second stage. Different assumptions on the timing of investment are studied. With simultaneous investments, equilibria in which players play a pure strategy in the investment stage are asymmetric, exhibit incomplete rent dissipation, and expected effort is reduced relative to the game without investment. There also are symmetric mixed strategy equilibria with complete rent dissipation. With sequential investment, the first mover always invests enough to deter the second mover from investing, and enjoys a first mover advantage. I also look at unobservable investments and endogenous timing of investments. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.