Risk aversion for variational and multiple-prior preferences

The objective of this paper is to identify variational preferences and multiple-prior (maxmin) expected utility functions that exhibit aversion to risk under some probability measure from among the priors. Risk aversion has profound implications on agents’ choices and on market prices and allocations. Our approach to risk aversion relies on the theory of mean-independent risk of Werner (2009). We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for risk aversion of convex variational preferences and concave multiple-prior expected utilities. The conditions are stability of the cost function and of the set of probability priors, respectively, with respect to a probability measure. The two stability properties are new concepts. We show that cost functions defined by the relative entropy distance or other divergence distances have that property. Set of priors defined as cores of convex distortions of probability measures or neighborhoods in divergence distances have that property, too.     

Nonparametric Bayesian modelling of monotone preferences for discrete choice experiments

Discrete choice experiments are widely used to learn about the distribution of individual preferences for product attributes. Such experiments are often designed and conducted deliberately for the purpose of designing new products. There is a long-standing literature on nonparametric and Bayesian modelling of preferences for the study of consumer choice when there is a market for each product, but this work does not apply when such markets fail to exist as is the case with most product attributes. This paper takes up the common case in which attributes can be quantified and preferences over these attributes are monotone. It shows that monotonicity is the only shape constraint appropriate for a utility function in these circumstances. The paper models components of utility using a Dirichlet prior distribution and demonstrates that all monotone nondecreasing utility functions are supported by the prior. It develops a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm for posterior simulation that is reliable and practical given the number of attributes, choices and sample sizes characteristic of discrete choice experiments. The paper uses the algorithm to demonstrate the flexibility of the model in capturing heterogeneous preferences and applies it to a discrete choice experiment that elicits preferences for different auto insurance policies.     

Equilibrium theory with unbounded consumption sets and non-ordered preferences : Part I. Non-satiation

A new condition is introduced for the existence of equilibrium for an economy where preferences need not be transitive or complete and the consumption set of each agent need not be bounded from below. The new condition allows us to extend the literature in two ways. First, the result of the paper can cover the case where the utility set for individually rational allocations may not be compact. As illustrated in Page et al. [Page Jr., F.H., Wooders, M.H., Monteiro, P.K., 2000. Inconsequential arbitrage. Journal of Mathematical Economics 34, 439–469], the no arbitrage conditions do not apply to an economy with a non-compact utility set. Second, we generalize the arbitrage-based equilibrium theory to the case of non-transitive preferences.     

A simple mean–dispersion model of ambiguity attitudes

Several characterizations of ambiguity aversion decompose preferences into the expected utility of an act and an adjustment factor, an ambiguity index, or a dispersion function. In each of these cases, the adjustment factor has very little structure imposed on it, and thus these models provide little guidance as to which function to use from the infinite class of possible alternatives. In this paper, we provide a simple axiomatic characterization of mean–dispersion preferences which uniquely determines a subjective probability distribution over a set of possible priors and which uniquely identifies the dispersion function. We provide an algorithm for determining this subjective probability distribution and the coefficient in the dispersion function from experimental data. We also demonstrate that the model accommodates ambiguity aversion in the Ellsberg paradox.     

Are CEOs expected utility maximizers?

Are individuals expected utility maximizers? This question represents much more than academic curiosity. In a normative sense, at stake are the fundamental underpinnings of the bulk of the last half-century’s models of choice under uncertainty. From a positive perspective, the ubiquitous use of benefit-cost analysis across government agencies renders the expected utility maximization paradigm literally the only game in town. In this study, we advance the literature by exploring CEO’s preferences over small probability, high loss lotteries. Using undergraduate students as our experimental control group, we find that both our CEO and student subject pools exhibit frequent and large departures from expected utility theory. In addition, as the extreme payoffs become more likely CEOs exhibit greater aversion to risk. Our results suggest that use of the expected utility paradigm in decision making substantially underestimates society’s willingness to pay to reduce risk in small probability, high loss events.     

Numeraire portfolios and utility-based price systems under proportional transaction costs

In a discrete-time incomplete financial market with proportional transaction costs and with independent and bounded returns, we prove the existence of a consistent price system that can be written as the expectation of the discounted claim under the real-world probability measure P and not just under a martingale measure. In fact, the claim is then discounted by some specific dynamic portfolio called the numeraire portfolio as in the classical case of markets without transaction costs. For that specific numeraire, P will be a martingale measure. Naturally, the concept of a numeraire portfolio has here to be adapted to the concept of consistent price systems for markets with transaction costs. Moreover, again as in the classical case, the numeraire portfolio can be chosen as log-optimal portfolio. The same analysis works for power utility functions. However, then a change of measure is necessary. This paper applies methods from stochastic dynamic programming to finance.     

Credit market segmentation,essentiality of commodities,and supermodularity

We consider incomplete market economies where agents are subject to price-dependent trading constraints compatible with credit market segmentation. Equilibrium existence is guaranteed when either commodities are essential, i.e, indifference curves through individuals’ endowments do not intersect the boundary of the consumption set, or utility functions are concave and supermodular. The smoothness of mappings representing preferences, financial promises, or trading constraints is not required. Hence, we may include in our framework economies where ambiguity is allowed and agents maximize the minimum expected utility over a set of priors, or where markets include non-recourse collateralized loans.     

Developments in non-expected utility theories: an empirical study of risk aversion

This paper investigates different developments in non-expected utility theories. Our focus is to study the agent’s attitude towards risk in a context of monetary gambles. Based on simulated data of the “Deal or No Deal” TV game show, we first compare the performance of the expected utility model versus a loss-aversion model. We find that the loss-aversion model has a better performance compared to the expected utility model. We then study the attitude towards risk according to two parameters: the relative risk aversion coefficient defined over the value function and the probability weighting coefficient proposed by the Cumulative Prospect Theory. We find evidence for probability weighting being undertaken by contestants reflecting less risk aversion over large stakes. We also explore the performance of two models of rank-dependant utility: the Quiggin (1982) and the power probability weighting models. We find that the probability weighting coefficient is still significant for both models. Finally, we integrate initial wealth into the contestants’ preferences function and we show that the initial wealth level affects the estimates of risk attitudes.     

A set optimization approach to utility maximization under transaction costs

A set optimization approach to multi-utility maximization is presented, and duality results are obtained for discrete market models with proportional transaction costs. The novel approach allows us to obtain results for non-complete preferences, where the formulas derived closely resemble but generalize the scalar case.     

The Context of Entrepreneurial Judgment: Organizations,Markets, and Institutions

The economics and management literatures pay increasing attention to the technological, competitive, and institutional environment for entrepreneurship. However, less is known about how context influences the judgment of entrepreneurs. Focusing on the emerging judgment‐based approach to entrepreneurship, we argue that economics can say much about how the organizational, market, and institutional context shapes entrepreneurial judgment. We describe entrepreneurs as individuals who deploy scarce, heterogeneous resources to service customer preferences at a profit. Because of uncertainty, this process is essentially experimental, and context influences the experimental process. Thus, entrepreneurs will seek to design the internal organization of the firm so that it facilitates internal experimentation. Moreover, the market or task environment determines the need for experimentation (e.g., how fast do consumer preferences change, how does technology evolve, which assets are available at which terms, etc.). Finally, the institutional environment influences, for example, the transaction costs of acquiring and divesting assets as firms adjust their boundaries through ongoing commercial experimentation.     

Equilibrium asset pricing with Epstein-Zin and loss-averse investors

We study multi-period equilibrium asset pricing in an economy with Epstein-Zin (EZ-) agents whose preferences for consumption are represented by recursive utility and with loss averse (LA-) agents who derive additional utility of gains and losses and are averse to losses. We propose an equilibrium gain-loss ratio for stocks and show that the LA-agents are more (less) risk averse than the EZ-agents if their degree of loss aversion is higher (lower) than this ratio. When all the agents have unitary relative risk aversion degree and elasticity of intertemporal substitution, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and the market dominance of the EZ-agents in the long run. Finally, we extend our results to the case in which the LA-agents use probability weighting in their evaluation of gains and losses.     

On the performance of the tick test

In financial research, the sign of a trade (or identity of trade aggressor) is not always available in the transaction dataset and it can be estimated using a simple set of rules called the tick test. In this paper we investigate the accuracy of the tick test from an analytical perspective by providing a closed formula for the performance of the prediction algorithm. By analyzing the derived equation, we provide formal arguments for the use of the tick test by proving that it is bounded to perform better than chance (50/50) and that the set of rules from the tick test provides an unbiased estimator of the trade signs. On the empirical side of the research, we compare the values from the analytical formula against the empirical performance of the tick test for fifteen heavily traded stocks in the Brazilian equity market. The results show that the formula is quite realistic in assessing the accuracy of the prediction algorithm in a real data situation.     

Optimal lottery

This article proposes an equilibrium approach to lottery markets in which a firm designs an optimal lottery to rank-dependent expected utility (RDU) consumers. We show that a finite number of prizes cannot be optimal, unless implausible utility and probability weighting functions are assumed. We then investigate the conditions under which a probability density function can be optimal. With standard RDU preferences, this implies a discrete probability on the ticket price, and a continuous probability on prizes afterwards. Under some preferences consistent with experimental literature, the optimal lottery follows a power-law distribution, with a plausibly extremely high degree of prize skewness.     

Patience in some non-additive models

Our aim is to give an axiomatization of preferences over infinite consumption streams. At first we adopt the additive case, and give a characterization of preferences which satisfy patience [Marinacci, M., 1998. An axiomatic approach to complete patience and time invariance. Journal of Economic Theory 83, 105–144] or equivalently what Diamond [Diamond, P.A., 1965. The evaluation of infinite utility streams. Econometrica 33, 170–177] named equal treatment of all generations and then, focus on stationary additive preferences. It appears that this class of functionals contains the discounting functionals axiomatized in Koopmans [Koopmans, T.C., 1972. In: McGuire, C.B., Radner, R. (Eds.), Representations of Preference Orderings Over Time. Decision and Organization, North-Holland, Amsterdam] and what is known as Banach-Mazur limit functionals. These results are extended to non-additives preferences where similar results are generalized and naive patience receives a positive treatement through the liminf criterion.     

A note on the equilibrium theory of economies with asymmetric information

In this note, we give an equilibrium existence theorem for exchange economies with asymmetric information and with an infinite dimensional commodity space. In our model, we assume that preferences are represented by well behaved utility functions, the positive cone has a non empty interior and the individual rational utility set is compact. Our result complements the corresponding one in Podczeck and Yannelis (2008), in the sense that is applicable to commodity spaces in which the order intervals are (possibly) not compact with respect to any Hausdorff linear topology.     

Revealed preference theory on the choice of lotteries

The choice behavior of a decision-maker is said to be consistent with expected utility maximization if there exists a utility function defined on the set of prizes such that the decision-maker chooses lotteries with the highest expected utility. We present a revealed preference characterization of choice behavior that is consistent with expected utility maximization. A necessary and sufficient condition for expected utility maximization is that there does not exist a way to compound lotteries such that the probability distribution over the final prizes generated by the chosen lotteries of each observation is equal to that generated by the rejected lotteries of each observation. Our result is quite general and can be applied to any compact set of prizes and any choice correspondence.     

Intergenerational justice when future worlds are uncertain

Let there be a positive (exogenous) probability that, at each date, the human species will disappear. We postulate an Ethical Observer (EO) who maximizes intertemporal welfare under this uncertainty, with expected-utility preferences. Various social welfare criteria entail alternative von Neumann Morgenstern utility functions for the EO: utilitarian, Rawlsian, and an extension of the latter that corrects for the size of population. Our analysis covers, first, a cake-eating economy (without production), where the utilitarian and Rawlsian recommend the same allocation. Second, a productive economy with education and capital, where it turns out that the recommendations of the two EOs are in general different. But when the utilitarian program diverges, then we prove it is optimal for the extended Rawlsian to ignore the uncertainty concerning the possible disappearance of the human species in the future. We conclude by discussing the implications for intergenerational welfare maximization in the presence of global warming.     

Trip-timing decisions with traffic incidents

This paper analyzes traffic bottleneck congestion when drivers randomly cause incidents that temporarily block the bottleneck. Drivers have general scheduling preferences for time spent at home and at work. They independently choose morning departure times from home to maximize expected utility without knowing whether an incident has occurred. The resulting departure time pattern may be compressed or dispersed according to whether or not the bottleneck is fully utilized throughout the departure period on days without incidents. For both the user equilibrium (UE) and the social optimum (SO) the departure pattern changes from compressed to dispersed when the probability of an incident becomes sufficiently high. The SO can be decentralized with a time-varying toll, but drivers are likely to be strictly worse off than in the UE unless they benefit from the toll revenues in some way. A numerical example is presented for illustration. Finally, the model is extended to encompass minor incidents in which the bottleneck retains some capacity during an incident.     

Discrete-time behavioral portfolio selection under cumulative prospect theory

We formulate and study three multi-period behavioral portfolio selection models under cumulative prospect theory: (i) S-shaped utility maximization without probability weighting in a market with one risky asset; (ii) S-shaped utility maximization without probability weighting in a market with multiple risky assets which follow a joint elliptical distribution; and (iii) S-shaped utility maximization with inverse-S-shaped probability weighting in a market with one risky asset. For the first two time consistent models, we identify the well-posedness conditions and derive the semi-analytical optimal policies. For the third time inconsistent model, we assume that the investor is aware of the time inconsistency but is unable to commit to his initial plan of action. Then, we reformulate the model into an intrapersonal game model and derive the semi-analytical subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (time consistent) policy under well-posedness condition. All the three policies take a piecewise linear feedback form. Our analysis of the three models not only partially explains the well documented phenomena of non-participation puzzle and horizon effect, but also extends the two fund separation theorem into multi-period S-shaped utility setting and pushes forward the study on time inconsistency issue incurred by probability weighting.     

On the Ramsey equilibrium with heterogeneous consumers and endogenous labor supply

In this paper, we address the stability issue, stressing the role of labor supply, in a Ramsey model with heterogeneous households subject to borrowing constraints. Making labor supply endogenous leads us to prove the existence of two kinds of steady state: the one where everybody supplies labor, the other where only the most patient agent refrains from working. Going beyond models with inelastic labor supply, we show how preferences of impatient agents affect the saddle-path stability of each type of steady state and the occurrence of endogenous cycles. When their elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption exceeds one, instability and cycles are less likely, requiring lower degrees of capital-labor substitution. Conversely, elasticity values below one promote the emergence of fluctuations. We end the paper by showing the existence of the intertemporal equilibrium under market incompleteness, using a local approach based on the first-order conditions.