Implementation and information in teams

A risk-neutral principal hires risk-averse agents to work in a team production process. Each agent can observe the actions taken by some subset of the other agents, and (perhaps) the realization of a random variable which is correlated with output. The principal cannot observe actions or the random variable. However, the agents can communicate with the principal, and final output is verifiable. We characterize the information structures that make it possible for the principal to implement his first best. In general it will be desirable to restrict the information available to the agents. If the first best can be implemented, then it can be implemented by a very simple mechanism, in which each agent forecasts the team output, but sends no other message.     

The Ignored Performance Measure

This paper studies a setting in which a risk-averse agent must be motivated to work on two tasks: evaluating a potential project and, if the project is adopted, implementing it. Although a performance measure that is informative of an agent's action is typically valuable because it can be used to improve the risk sharing of the contract, this is not necessarily the case in this two-task setting. I provide a sufficient condition under which a performance measure that is informative of the agent's implementation effort is worthless for contracting despite the agent being risk averse. This shows that information content is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a performance measure to be valuable.     

Optimal R&D investment for a risk-averse entrepreneur

Entrepreneurs investing in R&D projects face technical uncertainty associated with the cost to completion of the project, which is idiosyncratic and inherently unhedgeable. We extend existing real options models of R&D investment to incorporate the cost of bearing this unhedgeable risk and find it decreases risk-averse entrepreneurs’ valuations of R&D projects and increases the minimum NPVs required for continued investment in R&D (threshold NPVs) relative to ‘unpriced risk’ values and threshold NPVs. As in the ‘unpriced risk’ case, for less risk-averse entrepreneurs with small R&D projects, threshold NPVs remain negative and decrease with technical uncertainty. However, for sufficiently risk-averse entrepreneurs with sufficiently large R&D projects, threshold NPVs can become positive and increase with technical uncertainty.     

Timing of information in agency problems with hidden actions

This paper endogenizes in a standard hidden action model the point in time when a risk neutral and wealth constrained agent and the principal observe the realization of an additional signal: before the agent’s effort choice (ex ante information) or after (ex post information). In a decision problem, ex ante information does (weakly) better than ex post information because the decision maker can tailor efforts to the information. We show that this is not the case for incentive problems: a negative incentive effect arises under ex ante information that prevails even though the principal tailors the agent’s effort to the information.     

On the generalized principal-agent problem: a comment

Faynzilberg and Kumar (Rev Econ Design 5(1):23–58, 2000) show that the usual Mirrlees–Rogerson conditions to validate the first-order approach in moral hazard agency models are no longer valid in the generalized agency case. They consider the risk-averse agent case and identify one set of technological conditions, where the production technology satisfies the linear distribution function condition in actions and types, that validates ex-ante the first-order approach. With the usefulness of their decomposition approach, we show that the first-order approach in the generalized agency case can be checked ex-ante under the Mirrlees–Rogerson conditions when the agent is risk-neutral but there is a binding limited liability constraint on the agent’s wage.      

Information value and efficiency measurement for risk-averse firms

This paper has three goals. First, we demonstrate that standard arguments and methods from production and duality analysis can be used to provide a comprehensive and general treatment of the value of information for a risk-averse firm with expected-utility (linear-in-probabilities) preferences and a general stochastic technology. Second, we place bounds on the value of information for a risk-averse firm and relate these bounds to characteristics of the technology and the producer’s preferences. The third and final goal is to derive the implications that information differences can have for measured efficiency differences and to relate the bounds on the value of information to those measured differences.      

Stochastic costly state verification and dynamic contracts

I consider a dynamic costly state verification environment in which a risk-averse agent enters into a contract with a risk-neutral principal. The agent has random income which is unknown to the principal but can be verified at a cost. The principal can commit to executing random verifications.I extend the standard recursive methods to study the problem and show that it is optimal to set verification probabilities strictly less than 1. If the agent׳s absolute risk aversion declines sufficiently slowly, the principal will use verification regardless of its cost. If the agent's income is verified then he would get consumption and continuation utility strictly higher than if his income were not verified.     

Risk aversion,public disclosure,and partially informed outsiders

In this paper, we examine the impact of public disclosure and partially informed outsiders on a risk-averse insider’s trading behavior, market efficiency, and market depth. In our model, under disclosure requirements, except for the final auction, market depth is the same at every auction. When informed outsiders are risk-neutral, in contrast to the case of a risk-averse insider with no informed outsiders, the insider is more concerned about the uncertainty about future price risk. When the number of informed outsiders increases, market liquidity improves, and the insider increases the variance of her random component to conceal her trading strategy. However, since the insider is relatively more risk-averse, she pays less attention to doing this on her own. Besides, the order flow provided by informed outsiders and randomly added by the insider injects additional liquidity into the market. When informed outsiders are risk-averse, compared to risk-neutral informed outsiders, an insider is most concerned about trading risks brought by informed outsiders at the beginning of trading. Furthermore, whether the trader is an insider or informed outsider, the more risk-averse trader has lower expected profits. Moreover, outsiders’ greater risk aversion leads to a smaller market depth.     

The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions

We determine the conditions under which the seller in a first-price sealed-bid auction has an incentive to reveal his private information about the mean of bidders’ valuations in order to increase his expected revenue. With risk-neutral bidders, we show that the seller’s expected revenue is higher when information is revealed. However, when bidders are risk-averse, this result does not necessarily hold; it depends on the bidders’ risk-aversion level and on the number of bidders.     

Monopsony and two-part tariffs

We adapt the traditional model of two-part tariffs by a monopolist to the case of monopsony. We show that the resulting offer is that the seller pays its producer surplus as an access fee in exchange for the buyer's promise to buy everything that the seller wants to sell when price equals marginal cost. In addition, we show that this is equivalent to the surplus that the buyer captures with first-degree price discrimination as well as an all-or-nothing offer. We also extend this analysis to the case of uncertainty for a risk-averse monopsonist.     

Equilibrium theory with unbounded consumption sets and non-ordered preferences : Part I. Non-satiation

A new condition is introduced for the existence of equilibrium for an economy where preferences need not be transitive or complete and the consumption set of each agent need not be bounded from below. The new condition allows us to extend the literature in two ways. First, the result of the paper can cover the case where the utility set for individually rational allocations may not be compact. As illustrated in Page et al. [Page Jr., F.H., Wooders, M.H., Monteiro, P.K., 2000. Inconsequential arbitrage. Journal of Mathematical Economics 34, 439–469], the no arbitrage conditions do not apply to an economy with a non-compact utility set. Second, we generalize the arbitrage-based equilibrium theory to the case of non-transitive preferences.     

Efficient sets with and without the expected utility hypothesis

Consider a feasible set, X, of c.d.f.'s. Assume that the set of decision makers, who must choose from X, includes non-expected utility decision makers who are risk averse in some weaker notions. We show that in this case the efficient set of X expands relative to the expected utility case. We characterize the efficient sets for each notion of risk aversion including the expected utility case. It is also shown that the limited-coverage insurance policies, which are not efficient under the expected utility hypothesis, belong to the efficient set when weakly risk-averse non- expected utility functionals are assumed to exist.     

The Japanese Tenant Protection Law and Asymmetric Information on Tenure Length

The Japanese Tenant Protection Law (JTPL) protects tenure security to such an extent that landlords cannot terminate a contract at the end of a tenancy period without just cause. Hence, information on intended tenure length is important for landlords in managing rental housing. A model is developed in which landlords cannot foresee the intended tenure length of prospective tenants. If landlords are sufficiently risk-averse under asymmetric information on tenure length, the JTPL reduces the equilibrium quantity of rental housing, resulting in inefficiency of the Japanese rental-housing market.     

Rational plunging and the option value of sequential investment: The case of petroleum exploration

The potential to invest sequentially in related assets creates a tradeoff between diversification and concentration. Loading a portfolio with correlated assets has the potential to inflate variance, but also creates information spillovers and real options that may augment total return and mitigate variance. We examine this tradeoff in the context of petroleum exploration. Using a simple model of geological dependence, we show that the value of learning options creates incentives for investors to plunge into dependence; i.e., to assemble portfolios of highly correlated exploration prospects. Risk-neutral and risk-averse investors are distinguished not by the plunging phenomenon, but by the threshold level of dependence that triggers such behavior. Aversion to risk does not imply aversion to dependence. Indeed the potential to plunge should be larger for risk-averse investors than for risk-neutral investors. We test the empirical validity of our theory by examining bidding activity in petroleum lease sales. We find significant plunging behavior across a broad sample of oil companies. We also find that privately-held firms pursue even more concentrated (less diversified) prospect portfolios than publicly-held firms—which we attribute to risk aversion rather than size.     

A profit-center game with incomplete information

Profit centers in a firm in multidivisional form agree in the ex ante stage upon a plan about their joint production and profit imputation. The plan is executed in the subsequent two periods of the interim stage: the setup period and the manufacturing period. In the setup period, each center has its private information, but a part of its information is revealed to the other centers through its action. Based on the information endogenously pooled this way, the centers take another round of actions in the manufacturing period. A core plan is defined as a Bayesian incentive-compatible plan of the grand coalition of profit centers, upon which no coalition can improve using its Bayesian incentive-compatible plan. A core plan is called full-information revealing if each center fully reveals its private information in the setup period. Three existence theorems for a full-information revealing core plan are established. The first two theorems impose alternative conditions on returns to scale: (1) the neoclassical convex technology, and (2) increasing returns to scale. In case (2), a stronger condition than Scarf's distributiveness is imposed on the total production set. The third theorem is based on a specific supplier-customer relationship among the divisions. Received: 13 October 1997 / Accepted: 26 July 1999     

Auctions with endogenous participation

We study endogenous-participation auctions where bidders only know the number of potential participants. After seeing their values for the object, potential participants decide whether or not to enter the auction. They may not want to enter the auction since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize equilibrium bidding strategies and entry decisions for both first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions when participation is endogenous. We show that there is a pure strategy entry equilibrium where only bidders with values greater than a certain cut-off point actually bid. In this context, both types of auctions generate the same expected revenue. We also show that, contrary to the predictions of the fixed number of bidders literature, the seller's expected revenue may decrease when the number of potential participants increases. In addition, we show that it is optimal for the seller to charge an entry fee, which contrasts with results from the existing literature on auctions with entry. As in the fixed-n literature, we show that first-price auctions generate more expected revenue than second-price auctions when buyers are risk-averse. Finally, we characterize the optimal auction – the auction that maximizes the seller's expected revenue – by using a direct revelation mechanism. The optimal auction involves a reserve price larger than the optimal reserve price in the fixed-n literature. The winner's payment is the second highest bid less the participation cost and losers receive a subsidy equal to the participation cost. Received: 17 August 1998 / 21 September 1999     

Theorems on the core of an economy with infinitely many commodities and consumers

It is known that the classical theorems of Grodal [Grodal, B., 1972. A second remark on the core of an atomless economy. Econometrica 40, 581–583] and Schmeidler [Schmeidler, D., 1972. A remark on the core of an atomless economy. Econometrica 40, 579–580] on the veto power of small coalitions in finite dimensional, atomless economies can be extended (with some minor modifications) to include the case of countably many commodities. This paper presents a further extension of these results to include the case of uncountably many commodities. We also extend Vind’s [Vind, K., 1972. A third remark on the core of an atomless economy. Econometrica 40, 585–586] classical theorem on the veto power of big coalitions in finite dimensional, atomless economies to include the case of an arbitrary number of commodities. In another result, we show that in the coalitional economy defined by an atomless individualistic model, core–Walras equivalence holds even if the commodity space is non-separable. The above-mentioned results are also valid for a differential information economy with a finite state space. We also extend Kannai’s [Kannai, Y., 1970. Continuity properties of the core of a market. Econometrica 38, 791–815] theorem on the continuity of the core of a finite dimensional, large economy to include the case of an arbitrary number of commodities. All of our results are applications of a lemma, that we prove here, about the set of aggregate alternatives available to a coalition. Throughout the paper, the commodity space is assumed to be an ordered Banach space which has an interior point in its positive cone.     

引入风险厌恶偏好的供应链部分回购协调契约

研究了由一个风险中性的供应商和一个风险厌恶的零售商组成的供应链系统的部分回购契约。将部分回购契约建模讨论,并进行数值模拟分析。结果表明,当零售商为风险厌恶时,供应链系统仍能达到协调,且回购比例是零售商的风险厌恶程度的增函数,批发价格是零售商的风险厌恶程度的减函数。     

The role of public intervention in R & D

The purpose of this paper is threefold: (1) we emphasize the rule of uncertainty in achieving an efficient allocation of resources to R & D activities; (2) we identify and discuss optional mechanisms that are directed at minimizing the role of uncertainty in determining R & D decisions; and (3) we analyze the role of public intervention in R & D via a formal structure. More specifically, we explain why and under what conditions a risk-averse decision-maker will invest less than a government in research and inventive activities. Sufficient conditions that lead to private underinvestment in these activities are established. Furthermore, if the option of buying information exists, then we identify a set of private governmental contracts that may lead to the acceptance of a research project that a priori is unfeasible.     

A Paradigm for Masking (Camouflaging) Information

This is an expository paper. Here we propose a decision-theoretic framework for addressing aspects of the confidentiality of information problems in publicly released data. Our basic premise is that the problem needs to be conceptualized by looking at the actions of three agents: a data collector, a legitimate data user, and an intruder. Here we aim to prescribe the actions of the first agent who desires to provide useful information to the second agent, but must protect against possible misuse by the third. The first agent is under the constraint that the released data has to be public to all; this in some societies may not be the case.
A novel aspect of our paper is that all utilities—fundamental to decision making—are in terms of Shannon's information entropy. Thus what gets released is a distribution whose entropy maximizes the expected utility of the first agent. This means that the distribution that gets released will be different from that which generates the collected data. The discrepancy between the two distributions can be assessed via the Kullback–Leibler cross-entropy function. Our proposed strategy therefore boils down to the notion that it is the information content of the data, not the actual data, that gets masked. Current practice of "statistical disclosure limitation" masks the observed data via transformations or cell suppression. These transformations are guided by balancing what are known as "disclosure risks" and "data utility". The entropy indexed utility functions we propose are isomorphic to the above two entities. Thus our approach provides a formal link to that which is currently practiced in statistical disclosure limitation.