Revealed preferences of individual players in sequential games

This paper studies rational choice behavior of a player in sequential games of perfect and complete information without an assumption that the other players who join the same games are rational. The model of individually rational choice is defined through a decomposition of the behavioral norm assumed in the subgame perfect equilibria, and we propose a set of axioms on collective choice behavior that characterize the individual rationality obtained as such. As the choice of subgame perfect equilibrium paths is a special case where all players involved in the choice environment are each individually rational, the paper offers testable characterizations of both individual rationality and collective rationality in sequential games.     

(Hemi)continuity of additive preference preorders

It is shown that the two common notions of topological continuity for preference preorders, which require closed contour sets and a closed graph respectively, are equivalent even when completeness is not assumed, provided that the domain is a normed linear space or a topological group and the preorder is additive.     

Utility representation theorems for Debreu separable preorders

We prove the existence of arbitrary (resp., semicontinuous, continuous) utility representations for arbitrary (resp., semicontinuous, continuous) preorders satisfying some weakened Debreu order separability conditions. In this way we widely generalize a classical result for total preorders that essentially is due to Debreu.     

Similarity-based mistakes in choice

We characterize the following choice procedure. The decision maker is endowed with two binary relations over alternatives, a preference and a similarity. In every choice problem she includes in her choice set all alternatives which are similar to the best feasible alternative. Hence she can, by mistake, choose an inferior option because it is similar to the best. We characterize this boundedly rational behavior by suitably weakening the rationalizability axiom of Arrow (1959). We also characterize a variation where the decision maker chooses alternatives on the basis of their similarities to attractive yet infeasible options. We show that similarity-based mistakes of either kind lead to cyclical behavior. Finally, we reinterpret our procedure as a method for choosing a bundle given a set of individual items, in which the decision maker combines the best feasible item with those that complement it.     

Probabilistic sophistication without completeness

This is a study of probabilistically sophisticated choice behavior when the preference relation is incomplete. Invoking the analytical framework of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) and building on the work of Machina and Schmeidler (1995), the paper provides an axiomatic characterization of the general multi-prior multi-utility probabilistically sophisticated representation. In addition, the paper examines the axiomatic foundations for two special cases: complete beliefs and complete tastes. In the former case, the incompleteness is due to ambiguous tastes and in latter case it is due to ambiguous beliefs.     

Choosing an Accounting Method to Explain Public Policy: Social Return on Investment and UK Non-profit Sector Policy

We examine why certain accounting methods are chosen by government policy-makers to explain and rationalize their policy actions. We focus on the case of social return on investment (SROI), an accounting methodology that aims to capture and quantify the value created by social purpose organizations, and employs techniques of monetization and the expression of value as a ratio of benefits for investments [see REDF. (2000). SROI methodology: Analyzing the value of social purpose enterprise within a social return on investment framework. San Francisco: REDF; New Economics Foundation (NEF). (2007). Measuring real value: A DIY guide to social return on investment]. In particular, we examine how and why SROI was chosen for explaining and rationalizing the UK Government's policy of greater involvement of non-profit sector organizations in public service delivery. Our central contribution is to propose two important factors, which we identify as the capturability and communicability of accounting methods, that help to explain why a particular accounting method would be chosen by policy actors to explain and rationalize their public policy choices. The research helps further our understanding of the intersection between accounting and public policy by focusing explicitly on accounting's important role in explaining and rationalizing public policy.     

Network architecture, cooperation and punishment in public good experiments

Following Fehr and G?echter (Am Econ Rev 90(4):980–994, 2000), a large and growing number of experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment are allowed. Nearly all experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a complete network where all subjects can monitor and punish each other. The architecture of social networks becomes important when subjects can only monitor and punish the other subjects to whom they are connected by the network. We study several incomplete networks and find that they give rise to their own distinctive patterns of behavior. Nevertheless, a number of simple, yet fundamental, properties in graph theory allow us to interpret the variation in the patterns of behavior that arise in the laboratory and to explain the impact of network architecture on the efficiency and dynamics of the experimental outcomes.     

Mixture sets on finite domains

Mixture sets were introduced by Herstein and Milnor (Econometrica 21:291–297, 1953) to prove a generalised expected utility theorem. Mixture sets provide an axiomatisation of convexity suitable for discrete, as well as continuous, environments (Mongin in Decis Econ Finance 24:59–69, 2001). However, the nature of mixture sets over finite domains has been little studied. In this paper, we provide a complete characterisation. More recently, another abstract convex structure for finite domains, the antimatroid, has appeared in the literature on decision theory and social choice. The relationship between mixture sets and antimatroids has not previously been explored. We show here that neither concept is a special case of the other.     

Optimal risk taking in an uneven tournament game with risk averse players

We analyze the optimal choice of risk in a two-stage tournament game between two players that have different concave utility functions. At the first stage, both players simultaneously choose risk. At the second stage, both observe overall risk and simultaneously decide on effort or investment. The results show that those two effects which mainly determine risk taking – an effort effect and a likelihood effect – are strictly interrelated. This finding sharply contrasts with existing results on risk taking in tournament games with symmetric equilibrium efforts where such linkage can never arise. Conditions are derived under which this linkage leads to a reversed likelihood effect so that the favorite (underdog) can increase his winning probability by increasing (decreasing) risk which is impossible in a completely symmetric setting.     

Continuous representation of a preference relation on a connected topological space

Necessary and sufficient conditions are given for the existence of two continuous real valued functions u and v on a connected topological space X endowed with a preference relation ≺ (i.e., an asymmetric binary relation) such that y is preferred to x if and only if v(y)>u(x). It is shown that these conditions - a slight generalization of the usual ones encountered in classical utility theory - entail the existence of such a continuous representation u, v with u and v continuous utility functions for two complete preorders intimately connected with the preference relation ≺.     

A two-dimensional problem of revenue maximization

We consider the problem of finding the mechanism that maximizes the revenue of a seller of multiple objects. This problem turns out to be significantly more complex than the case where there is only a single object (which was solved by Myerson, 1981). The analysis is difficult even in the simplest case studied here, where there are two exclusive objects and a single buyer, with valuations uniformly distributed on triangular domains. We show that the optimal mechanisms are piecewise linear with either 2 or 3 pieces, and obtain explicit formulas for most cases of interest.     

Micro-interaction dynamics in group decision making: Face games, interaction order and boundary work

Drawing on Goffman's face theory, this paper documents and interprets the micro interaction dynamics underlying group decision making within a consultancy task force. Our analysis suggests that decision making is an instance of strategic face-to-face behavior where individuals seek to influence each other and reach decisions by means of face-work and self-presentation tactics. Moreover, face-to-face behavior generates an ‘interaction order’ that frames the decision making situation and constrains further interactions among decision makers. We discuss the implications that can be drawn from the observed case by relating our findings to the emergent stream of studies on micro-decision making.     

Bounds on average causal effects in studies with a latent response variable

Consider a case where cause-effect relationships between variables can be described as a directed acylic graph and the corresponding recursive factorization of a joint distribution. In order to provide the bounds on average causal effects in studies with a latent response variable, this paper proposes a graphical criterion for selecting covariates and variables caused by the response variable. The result enables us not only to judge from the graph structure whether the bounds on an average causal effect can be expressed through the observed quantities, but also to provide their closed-form expressions in case where its answer is affirmative. The graphical criterion of this paper is helpful to evaluate the bounds on average causal effects when it is difficult to observe a response variable.     

Probability matching and reinforcement learning

Probability matching occurs when an action is chosen with a frequency equivalent to the probability of that action being the best choice. This sub-optimal behavior has been reported repeatedly by psychologists and experimental economists. We provide an evolutionary foundation for this phenomenon by showing that learning by reinforcement can lead to probability matching and, if the learning occurs sufficiently slowly, probability matching does not only occur in choice frequencies but also in choice probabilities. Our results are completed by proving that there exists no quasi-linear reinforcement learning specification such that the behavior is optimal for all environments where counterfactuals are observed.     

A model of stochastic choice from lists

We study stochastic choice from lists. All lists present the same set of alternatives albeit in different orders. Faced with a list, the decision maker makes her choice in two stages. In the first stage she searches through the list till she sees $k$ alternatives. In the second stage she chooses from the alternatives she has seen. Both $k$ and the choice rule governing her second stage behavior are random. We show that the underlying primitives of our model are revealed by the decision maker’s choice frequencies from lists. We characterize the model and two of its special cases. In the first special case the decision maker deterministically chooses the best observed alternative according to a given preference. In the second, the decision maker maximizes random preferences.     

Investment behavior under Knightian uncertainty – An evolutionary approach

The ‘as if ’ view of economic rationality defends the profit maximization hypothesis by pointing out that only those firms who act as if they maximize profits can survive in the long run. Recently, the problem of arriving at a logically consistent definition of rational behavior in games has shown that one must sometimes study explicitly the evolutionary processes that form the basis of this view. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of genetic programming as a tool for generating hypotheses about rational behavior in situations where explicit maximization is not well defined. We use an investment decision problem with Knightian uncertainty as a borderline test case, and show that when the artificial agents receive the same information about the unknown probability distributions, they develop behavior rules as if they were expected utility maximizers with Bayesian learning rules.     

Relative efficiencies of some simple Bayes estimators of coefficients in dynamic models — I

In this paper we consider some approximations to Bayes estimators of coefficients in simple autoregressive models and give an example of a Monte Carlo experiment where these approximate Bayes estimators yield a substantial improvement over the usual sampling theory or quasi-Bayesian estimators. The practical situation is represented by the case where the coefficient vector is known to lie in or on a hypersphere of radius r with center at 0. We show that arbitrariness in the choice of the value of r is often not catastrophic if r is sufficiently large, but finite.     

ANOTHER LOOK AT ‘BANK COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING’?

This study replicates Zigraiova and Havranek's (2016) meta-analysis of banking competition and financial stability. It performs multiple types of replications: a ‘Reproduction’ replication where Z&H's data and code are verified to reproduce the results of their study; a ‘Repetition’ replication where the studies used by Z&H are independently recoded and then re-analysed; an ‘Extension’ replication where additional studies on banking competition and stability are analysed; and a ‘Robustness Analysis’ where we check Z&H's results using an alternative empirical procedure. Our analysis strongly confirms Z&H's main finding that competition in the banking sector has an economically negligible effect on financial stability. This result is consistently confirmed across a variety of replication analyses. Most impressively, we confirm their finding even when we analyse a completely independent set of 35 studies not included in Z&H's meta-analysis. Our results for Z&H's other findings are less supportive. As the first comprehensive replication of a meta-analysis, this study also provides insights into the robustness of meta-analysis. We find that meta-regression analysis, where estimated effects are related to data, estimation, and study characteristics, is sensitive to how data are coded and to the choice of estimation procedure; and that this sensitivity extends to ‘best practice’ estimates.     

A generalized randomized response technique

To eliminate a major source of bias in surveys of human populations resulting from respondents refusal to cooparate in cases where a question of sensitive nature is involved, the idea of “randomized response” was introduced by Warner (1965). In this paper, an alternative randomized response technique is presented which improves upon the pioneering work of Warner (1965). The procedure includes Warner's method as a special case for a specific choice of the parameters. In addition, a generalization of the proposed method is presented.