Axiomatization of weighted (separable) utility

Nontrivial decision problems typically involve a trade-off among multiple attributes of choice options. One simple way of resolving such trade-offs is to aggregate multiple attributes into one real-valued index, known as weighted or separable utility. Applications of weighted utility can be found in choice under risk (expected utility) and uncertainty (subjective expected utility), intertemporal choice (discounted utility) and welfare economics (utilitarian social welfare function). This paper presents an alternative behavioral characterization (preference axiomatization) of weighted utility. It is shown that necessary and sufficient conditions for weighted utility are completeness, continuity, bi-separable transitivity (and transitivity if none of the attributes is null, or inessential).     

Menu-dependent self-control

The literature on self-control problems has typically put forth models that imply behavior that is consistent with the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP). We argue that when choice is the outcome of some underlying internal conflict, the resulting choices may not be perfectly consistent across choice problems: an agent’s ability to resist temptation may well depend on what alternatives are available to him. We generalize Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) so that self-control weakens in the presence of temptation. To model choices from menus explicitly, we consider a choice correspondence as well as a preference over menus and relax both the Independence axiom for the preference and the WARP condition for the choice correspondence. The model is shown to unify a range of well-known findings in the experimental literature on choice under risk and over time within a single specification.     

Testing for intertemporal nonseparability

This paper presents a nonparametric analysis of a common class of intertemporal models of consumer choice that relax consumption independence. Within this class and in the absence of any functional form restrictions on instantaneous preferences, we compare the revealed preference conditions for rational habit formation and rational anticipation. We show that these models are observationally equivalent in the presence of finite data sets composed of prices, interest rates, and consumption choices.     

A utility representation theorem with weaker continuity condition

We prove that a mixture continuous preference relation has a utility representation if its domain is a convex subset of a finite dimensional vector space. Our condition on the domain of a preference relation is stronger than Eilenberg (1941) and Debreu (1959, 1964), but our condition on the continuity of a preference relation is strictly weaker than the usual continuity assumed by them.     

On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings

This paper studies the structure of stable multipartner matchings in two-sided markets where choice functions are quotafilling in the sense that they satisfy the substitutability axiom and, in addition, fill a quota whenever possible. It is shown that (i) the set of stable matchings is a lattice under the common revealed preference orderings of all agents on the same side, (ii) the supremum (infimum) operation of the lattice for each side consists componentwise of the join (meet) operation in the revealed preference ordering of the agents on that side, and (iii) the lattice has the polarity, distributivity, complementariness and full-quota properties. Received: 5 March 1999 / Accepted: 12 May 2000     

Revealed Preference and Location Choice

The assumption that population and structural densities are defined over parcels of land with zero area is problematic when interpreting the standard residential land use model as approximating a large finite economy. This paper extends revealed preference theory to depict a spatial economy with land parcels of finite area. The model generalizes the standard utility function approach, allowing for many consumer types with different tastes and incomes and labor-leisure choice, to show that the most important predictions of the standard theory hold in the general finite framework studied here.     

The testable implications of zero-sum games

We study collective choices from the revealed preference theory viewpoint. For every product set of individual actions, joint choices are called Nash-rationalizable if there exists a preference relation for each player such that the selected joint actions are Nash equilibria of the corresponding game. We characterize Nash-rationalizable joint choice behavior by zero-sum games, or games of conflicting interests. If the joint choice behavior forms a product subset, the behavior is called interchangeable. We prove that interchangeability is the only additional empirical condition which distinguishes zero-sum games from general non-cooperative games.     

Mixture models of choice under risk

This paper is concerned with estimating preference functionals for choice under risk from the choice behaviour of individuals. We note that there is heterogeneity in behaviour between individuals and within individuals. By ‘heterogeneity between individuals’ we mean that people are different, in terms of both their preference functionals and their parameters for these functionals. By ‘heterogeneity within individuals’ we mean that the behaviour may be different even by the same individual for the same choice problem. We propose methods of taking into account all forms of heterogeneity, concentrating particularly on using a Mixture Model to capture the heterogeneity of preference functionals.     

A von Neumann–Morgenstern representation result without weak continuity assumption

In the paradigm of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), a representation of affine preferences in terms of an expected utility can be obtained under the assumption of weak continuity. Since the weak topology is coarse, this requirement is a priori far from being negligible. In this work, we replace the assumption of weak continuity by monotonicity. More precisely, on the space of lotteries on an interval of the real line, it is shown that any affine preference order which is monotone with respect to the first stochastic order admits a representation in terms of an expected utility for some nondecreasing utility function. As a consequence, any affine preference order on the subset of lotteries with compact support, which is monotone with respect to the second stochastic order, can be represented in terms of an expected utility for some nondecreasing concave utility function. We also provide such representations for affine preference orders on the subset of those lotteries which fulfill some integrability conditions. The subtleties of the weak topology are illustrated by some examples.     

A theory of stochastic choice under uncertainty

In this paper we propose a characterization of stochastic choice under risk and under uncertainty. We presume that decision makers’ actual choices are governed by randomly selected states of mind, and study the representation of decision makers’ perceptions of the stochastic process underlying the selection of their state of mind. The connections of this work to the literatures on random choice, choice behavior when preference are incomplete; choice of menus; and grades of indecisiveness are also discussed.     

The geometry of revealed preference

In this paper, we examine how the geometry underlying revealed preference determines the set of preferences that can be revealed by choices. Specifically, given an arbitrary binary relation defined on a finite set, we ask if and when there exists a data set which can generate the given relation through revealed preference. We show that the dimension of the consumption space affects the set of revealed preference relations. If the consumption space has more goods than observations, any revealed preference relation can arise. Conversely, if the consumption space has low dimension relative to the number of observations, then there exist both rational and irrational preference relations that can never be revealed by choices.     

消费者精神偏好视角下消费选择的经济学分析

消费选择问题是企业社会责任是否能够进行价值创造的关键环节。本文在结合弗洛伊德的精神分析理论基础上,将心理因素纳入传统的偏好效用框架,在消费者精神偏好视角下建立了全新的消费选择模型,并进一步分析发现,企业社会责任能够满足消费者精神层面的需求,得出主要结论如下:第一,不同层次的企业社会责任可以使其企业的产品满足消费者精神层面的需求并获得消费者偏好;第二,企业可以通过消费者精神层面需求的特征实现市场细分,并通过企业社会责任战略与项目的设计与实施,实现盈利能力的提升。     

审计师行为选择与其独立性偏好关系分析

现行关于审计师行为实证研究中,大都基于审计意见类型推断审计师独立性,没有对审计意见类型为什么能代表审计师独立性进行分析和讨论,本文采用偏好、选择与效用经济学基础理论来进行分析和证明。通过逻辑分析、模型构建和推导发现,对审计意见类型的选择结构能够推断审计师对独立性的偏好关系,这种关系是基于审计师效用最大化做出的。     

Revealed preference theory on the choice of lotteries

The choice behavior of a decision-maker is said to be consistent with expected utility maximization if there exists a utility function defined on the set of prizes such that the decision-maker chooses lotteries with the highest expected utility. We present a revealed preference characterization of choice behavior that is consistent with expected utility maximization. A necessary and sufficient condition for expected utility maximization is that there does not exist a way to compound lotteries such that the probability distribution over the final prizes generated by the chosen lotteries of each observation is equal to that generated by the rejected lotteries of each observation. Our result is quite general and can be applied to any compact set of prizes and any choice correspondence.     

上市公司配股选择影响因素分析

本文分析了上市公司配股选择行为的影响因素,通过文献分析,发现上市公司配股的动机是扩大资本规模、改善财务结构、进行资产重组、上市公司配股行为的影响因素主要分三方面:制度性因素、大股东偏好、融资成本和机会主义行为,在此分析的基础上,本文提出相关对策建议。     

Demand properties of concavifiable preferences

The purpose of the present paper is to clarify the relation between choice theory for individual consumers, i.e., the observed demand behavior, and the preference ordering ?$?$ of that individual. Specifically, we study how concavifiability (i.e., representability of ?$?$ by a concave utility function) is expressed by quantities (cross-coefficients) appearing in revealed preferences theory. We present a sequence of rather explicit necessary conditions for concavifiability. All these conditions are quantitative asymptotic strengthenings of the strong axiom of revealed preference. The results and concepts are illustrated by means of examples in which an expenditure data is defined by providing its generating utility function.     

The Computational Complexity of Rationalizing Behavior

We study the computational complexity of rationalizing choice behavior. We do so by analyzing two polar cases, and a number of intermediate ones. In our most structured case, that is where choice behavior is defined in universal choice domains and satisfies the “weak axiom of revealed preference,” finding the complete preorder rationalizing choice behavior is a simple matter. In the polar case, where no restriction whatsoever is imposed, either on choice behavior or on choice domain, finding a collection of complete preorders that rationalizes behavior turns out to be intractable. We also show that the task of finding the rationalizing complete preorders is equivalent to a graph problem. This allows the search for existing algorithms in the graph theory literature, for the rationalization of choice.     

Entry mode choices in the international new ventures context. A study from different theoretical perspectives

Few studies have investigated the factors that enhance entry mode choice in the context of international new ventures (INVs). In this paper, we hypothesize that the characteristics of INVs’ products or services can explain their preference for equity entry modes. We also hypothesize that the inter-firm networks in which INVs are embedded play a deciding role in their choice of non-equity entry modes. When INVs are in inter-firm networks in which activities are developed to manage them, non-equity entry modes are preferred. We have adopted an effectuation approach to study the influence of different inter-firm network management activities on entry mode choice. In short, we have studied the effect of developing inter-firm network knowledge exchange, coordination, adaptation, conflict resolution and resource sharing management activities. In this paper we attempt to contribute to international entrepreneurship studies by reconciling the most widely accepted approaches to entry mode choice (Transactional Cost Economics, Organizational Capabilities-based and Network perspective) and international new ventures. Our findings show that the technological complexity of INVs’ products/services explain their preference for equity entry modes. Additionally, the development of network management activities among the networked firms determines the INVs’ preference for non-equity entry modes. Our results draw a decision model that differs from the ones derived from previous perspectives, which highlight the role of different characteristics of international new ventures.     

Preferences,choices, tournaments: Alternative foundations for the evaluation of voting schemes

The standard assumption underlying most of the negative results of the social choice theory is that the individuals have complete and transitive preference relations over the candidates. As an alternative to this assumption we consider the possibility that individuals can be characterized as possessing preference tournaments (i.e. asymmetric and complete relations) over the candidate set. We discuss the implications of the latter assumption to the negative results of social choice theory. Finally some solution concepts applicable in the individual preference tournament framework are outlined.     

Recoverability revisited

This study considers the uniqueness problem of the preference relation corresponding to a demand function, which is called the “recoverability problem”. We show that if a demand function has sufficiently wide range and is income-Lipschitzian, then there exists a unique corresponding upper semi-continuous preference relation. Moreover, we explicitly construct a utility function that represents this preference relation. Compared with related research, a feature of our result is that it ensures not only the uniqueness, but also the existence of the corresponding upper semi-continuous preference relation. Further, we introduce two axioms related to demand functions, and show that these axioms are equivalent to the continuity of our preference relation in the interior of the consumption set. In addition to these results, we present three examples that explain why our requirements (including the upper semi-continuity of preference relations and the wide range requirement and income-Lipschitzian property of demand functions) are necessary, and a further two examples in which there is no continuous preference relation corresponding to the given demand function.