Price uncertainty, saving, and welfare

We analyze how commodity price uncertainty affects saving behavior and welfare in a dynamic model with multiple commodities, portfolio hedging, and a preference structure that disentangles ordinal preferences, attitudes towards risk, and attitudes towards intertemporal substitution. We show that the effect of price uncertainty on savings boils down to knowing (1) hf degree of resistance to intertemporal substitution and (2) the effect that uncertainty has on the certainty-equivalent real interest rate. We also show that, if the certainty-equivalent real interest rate is lower with uncertainty, consumers' welfare is also lower.     

Axiomatization of weighted (separable) utility

Nontrivial decision problems typically involve a trade-off among multiple attributes of choice options. One simple way of resolving such trade-offs is to aggregate multiple attributes into one real-valued index, known as weighted or separable utility. Applications of weighted utility can be found in choice under risk (expected utility) and uncertainty (subjective expected utility), intertemporal choice (discounted utility) and welfare economics (utilitarian social welfare function). This paper presents an alternative behavioral characterization (preference axiomatization) of weighted utility. It is shown that necessary and sufficient conditions for weighted utility are completeness, continuity, bi-separable transitivity (and transitivity if none of the attributes is null, or inessential).     

Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions

We allocate agents to three kinds of hierarchical positions: top, medium, and low. No monetary transfers are allowed. We solve for the incentive-compatible (IC) mechanisms that maximize a family of weighted social welfares that includes utilitarian and Rawlsian welfares. When the market is tough (all agents bear positive risk of obtaining a low position in any IC and feasible mechanism), then the pseudomarket mechanism with equal budgets (PM) and the Boston mechanism without priorities (BM) yield identical assignments which are always optimal. Otherwise, when the market is mild, PM and BM differ and each one implements the optimal rule under different assumptions on the curvature of virtual valuations. We also establish that both BM and PM mechanisms guarantee IC Pareto-optimal assignments for a domain of preference distributions satisfying weak assumptions.     

The political intergenerational welfare state

Using a three-period overlapping generations economy framework, we characterize an intergenerational welfare state with endogenous education and pension under voting. We show that although politically establishing Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) social security in isolation in a dynamically efficient economy will always reduce the capital investment and therefore the social welfare as expected, in contrast politically implementing education-pension policy package instead can improve both human and physical capital accumulation and social welfare over laissez faire. However for this the political influence of the old has to be small thus limiting the size of the PAYG social security program.     

Is there a Political Support for the Double Burden on Prolonged Activity?

In many countries elderly workers are subject to a double distortion when they consider prolonging their activity: the payroll tax and a reduction in their pension rights. It is often argued that such a double burden would not be socially desirable. We consider a setting where it would be rejected by both a utilitarian and a Rawlsian social planner. Furthermore, each individual would also reject it as a citizen candidate. We show that the double burden may nevertheless be (second-best) Pareto efficient and can be supported by a particular structure of social weights biased towards the more productive workers. The paper has been presented at the “Atelier Retraites”, Bordeaux, October 2003. We would like to thank the participants and in particular our discussant, Ronan Mahieu, for their remarks. We are also grateful to our two referees who provided detailed and constructive comments and suggestions. Support for this research project has been provided by the European RTN program through the FINRET network     

Optimal fiscal and monetary policy with occasionally binding zero bound constraints

This paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policy when the nominal interest rate is subject to the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint in a stochastic New Keynesian economy. In the baseline model calibrated to match key features of the U.S. economy, it is optimal for the government to increase its spending when at the ZLB in the stochastic environment by about 60 percent more than it would in the deterministic environment. The presence of uncertainty creates a unique time-consistency problem if the steady state is inefficient. Although access to government spending policy increases welfare in the face of a large deflationary shock, it decreases welfare during normal times as the government reduces the nominal interest rate less aggressively before reaching the ZLB.     

Uncertainty, the structure of production and the pattern of trade of centrally planned economies

Conclusions In this paper we have demonstrated that terms of trade uncertainty imposes a welfare loss on a centrally planned economy by reallocating resources toward the production of import substitutes and domestic consumption of exportables and a consequent decrease in the volume of trade. We have also shown that the centrally planned economies have developed a number of institutions, such as trade agreements and pricing rules, designed to minimize the losses caused by terms of trade uncertainty. Finally, we have suggested that the behavior of these economies during the post-Warperiod is consistent with welfare maximization under terms of trade uncertainty.I am indebted to Edward A. Hewett and Paul N. Rappoport for their assistance and comments at various stages of my work on this paper. Any errors and all opinions are entirely my responsibility.     

Condorcet meets Bentham

We show that if the statistical distribution of utility functions in a population satisfies a certain condition, then a Condorcet winner will not only exist, but will also maximize the utilitarian social welfare function. We also show that, if people’s utility functions are generated according to certain plausible random processes, then in a large population, this condition will be satisfied with very high probability. Thus, in a large population, the utilitarian outcome will be selected by any Condorcet consistent voting rule.     

Complete monotonicity of the representative consumer’s discount factor

A univariate real-valued function is said to be completely monotone if it takes positive values and alternate the signs of its higher order derivatives, starting from everywhere negative first derivatives. We prove that the representative consumer’s discount factor of a continuous-time economy under uncertainty is a power function of some completely monotone function of time satisfying certain boundary conditions if and only if it may be derived from a group of consumers having constant and equal relative risk aversion, and constant and yet possibly unequal discount rates.     

Balance sheets, exchange rate policy, and welfare

We evaluate the welfare implications of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes in a small open-economy model that incorporates the financial accelerator coupled with liability dollarization. We solve the model up to a second-order approximation which allows us to rigorously address the relationship between uncertainty and welfare. We identify leverage and debt-to-GDP ratios above which an exchange rate peg is welfare superior to a flexible exchange rate regime. The results indicate that emerging market countries with even moderate levels of foreign currency-denominated debt may find it beneficial to stabilize their exchange rates.     

Financial intermediation in an overlapping generations model with transaction costs

We analyze an overlapping generations economy where agents interact to share liquidity risk. We show that a pure exchange economy has excessive trade in equilibrium because agents interact to rebalance their portfolios. Intergenerational financial intermediaries reduce the number of interactions because agents only transact when they face liquidity needs. In the absence of asset risk, intermediaries match redemptions with deposits and dividends, and never sell assets. If the economy is subject to transaction costs, the intermediated economy can sustain higher stationary investment and welfare. We also find that dead weight transaction costs can increase welfare because it protects banks from interbank arbitrage and dampens the inherent cyclicality of market economies.     

Investment in Fixed Capital Stock: Testing for the Impact of Sectoral and Systemic Uncertainty*

This paper applies current theory recognizing the irreversibility of investment, in order to test for the impact of uncertainty on investment expenditure for a middle income country. The contribution of the paper is unique in two respects. First, it employs dynamic heterogeneous panel estimation techniques not previously applied to investment functions. Secondly, it explicitly tests for the impact of both sectoral and systemic uncertainty on investment expenditure. We find that both sectoral (as measured by output volatility) and systemic uncertainty (as measured by political instability) have a negative impact on investment rates in a middle income country context. Liquidity constraints and growth in total factor productivity are found to have no impact on investment, while trade liberalization has the impact predicted by Heckscher‐Ohlin trade theory. Finally, we find complementarity effects between physical capital and skilled human capital, suggesting that South African educational policies may have hampered investment in physical capital as well as the growth performance of the economy. Policy implications emphasize the importance of lowering uncertainty for investors, and the need for sound human capital investment.     

Reducing government debt in the presence of inequality

What are the welfare effects of government debt? In particular, what are the welfare consequences of government debt reductions? We answer these questions with the help of an incomplete markets economy with production. Households are subject to uninsurable income shocks. We make several contributions. First, by targeting the skewed wealth and earnings distribution of the US economy in our calibration, we identify inequality as the major driver of the welfare effects of public debt/GDP changes. Second, we show that in order to fully gauge the welfare consequences and the political feasibility of government debt changes, it is crucial to consider the transitional dynamics between stationary equilibria. Our results therefore have important implications for the design of debt reduction policies. Since the skewed wealth distribution generates a large fraction of borrowing-constrained households, a public debt reduction should be non-linear, such that the tax burden is postponed into the future.     

Disclosure Policy in a Mixed Market

This paper investigates the optimal disclosure strategy for private information in a mixed duopoly market, where a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and a joint-stock company compete to supply products. I construct a model where the two firms compete in either quantity or price, and uncertainty is associated with either marginal cost or market demand. The model identifies the optimal disclosure strategies that constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium by type of competition and uncertainty. In Cournot competition, both firms disclose information under cost uncertainty, while only the SOE or neither firm discloses information under demand uncertainty. Alternatively, in Bertrand competition, only the joint-stock company discloses information under cost uncertainty or demand uncertainty. Recently, developed countries have required the same level of disclosure standards for SOEs as for ordinary joint-stock companies. The findings described in this paper warn that such mandatory disclosure by SOEs can trigger a reaction by joint-stock companies, putting the economy at risk of a reduction in welfare.     

Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions

We study Pareto efficiency in a setting that involves two kinds of uncertainty: Uncertainty over the possible outcomes is modeled using lotteries whereas uncertainty over the agents’ preferences over lotteries is modeled using sets of plausible utility functions. A lottery is universally Pareto undominated if there is no other lottery that Pareto dominates it for all plausible utility functions. We show that, under fairly general conditions, a lottery is universally Pareto undominated iff it is Pareto efficient for some vector of plausible utility functions, which in turn is equivalent to affine welfare maximization for this vector. In contrast to previous work on linear utility functions, we use the significantly more general framework of skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions as introduced by Fishburn (1982). Our main theorem generalizes a theorem by Carroll (2010) and implies the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem. We discuss three natural classes of plausible utility functions, which lead to three notions of ordinal efficiency, including stochastic dominance efficiency, and conclude with a detailed investigation of the geometric and computational properties of these notions.     

THE EQUAL ABSOLUTE SACRIFICE PRINCIPLE REVISITED

Abstract.  We summarize the literature on equal absolute sacrifice income taxes, and make some extensions. We adapt the utilitarian equal sacrifice criterion to a wide class of rank-dependent social welfare functions, and find that liabilities depend on both income and position in the distribution. We investigate whether such taxes need be progressive, using a combination of analytics and simulation, and in the process uncover tax functions not previously recognized as equating sacrifices. Finally, out of horizontal equity considerations a new concept of 'the equal treatment of equals' by an income tax emerges, with implications for future work whose significance is discussed.     

Expansionary effects of the welfare state in a small open economy

We examine the relationship between welfare state policies and economic performance in a small open economy with (i) free trade in final goods and international capital mobility, and (ii) aggregate increasing returns to scale. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we find that a retrenchment of welfare programmes is not an inevitable consequence of economic integration. Instead, by improving the exploitation of aggregate scale economies, social expenditure policies and international openness complement each other in facilitating an improvement in economic performance that can sustain a more generous welfare protection.     

The implications of inflation in an estimated new Keynesian model

This paper studies the steady state and dynamic consequences of inflation in an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy. It is found that 10 percentage points of inflation entail a steady state welfare cost as high as 13% of annual consumption. This large cost is mainly driven by staggered price contracts and price indexation. The transition from high to low inflation inflicts a welfare loss equivalent to 0.53% of annual consumption. The role of nominal/real frictions as well as that of parameter uncertainty is also addressed.     

The macroeconomic impact of economic uncertainty and financial shocks under low and high financial stress

External financial frictions might increase the severity of economic uncertainty shocks. We analyze the impact of aggregate uncertainty and financial condition shocks using a threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR) model with stochastic volatility during distinct US financial stress regimes. We further examine the international spillover of the US financial shock. Our results show that the peak contraction in euro area industrial production due to uncertainty shocks during a financial crisis is nearly-four times larger than the peak contraction during normal times. The US financial shocks have an influential asymmetric spillover effect on the euro area. Furthermore, the estimates reveal that the European Central Bank (ECB) is more cautious in implementing a monetary policy against uncertainty shocks while adopting hawkish monetary policies against financial shocks. In contrast, the Fed adopts a more hawkish monetary policy during heightened uncertainty, whereas it acts more steadily when financial stress rises in the economy.     

Coordination and non-coordination risks of monetary and macroprudential authorities: A robust welfare analysis

This study compares a central bank’s leaning against the wind approach with a mix of monetary and macroprudential policies under parameter uncertainty in an estimated DSGE model with two financial frictions. We show that uncertainty of the economic environment is an essential constituent in properly designing macroprudential policy. Although coordination between monetary and macroprudential policies minimizes the policymakers’ Bayesian risk, coordination and non-coordination risks threaten the goals of both authorities. The former describes the situation where the authorities partly resign from implementing the monetary policy objectives to stabilize macroprudential risk. The latter is when conducting a non-coordinated macroprudential policy induces higher total Bayesian risk than when only the central bank minimizes the expected total welfare loss. The robust Bayesian macroeconomic rules show that when financial shocks shrink the banks’ or entrepreneurial net worth, a contractionary macroprudential policy should be combined with an expansionary monetary policy. However, if capital adequacy ratio or risk shocks strike the economy, such a conflict in macroeconomics policy instruments disappears, thus synchronizing both policies.