具有转移成本市场中的企业策略性行为分析研究

在很多市场上,消费者在不同品牌的产品之间转换消费将面临转移成本,即使在功能相同的产品之间进行转换消费,转移成本也会存在。文章主要是在动态博弈的框架下研究转移成本存在对企业的策略性行为和社会福利的影响。在产量竞争模型中,研究表明随着转移成本的变化,在位企业可以封锁、阻止或容纳进入,当进入发生时,社会福利增加。在引入产品差异而建立的价格竞争模型中,在位企业可能阻止或容纳潜在竞争企业的进入,但不能封锁进入,不管何种情况发生,社会福利都不会恶化。从公共政策的角度看,政府应该鼓励进入。文章的研究结果部分否定了Klemperer（1988）进入导致社会福利的恶化的研究结论。     

具有转移成本市场中的企业策略性行为分析

在很多市场上,消费者在不同品牌的产品之间转换消费将面临转移成本,即使在功能相同的产品之间进行转换消费,转移成本也会存在.文章主要是在动态博弈的框架下研究转移成本存在对企业的策略性行为和社会福利的影响.在产量竞争模型中,研究表明随着转移成本的变化,在位企业可以封锁、阻止或容纳进入,当进入发生时,社会福利增加.在引入产品差异而建立的价格竞争模型中,在位企业可能阻止或容纳潜在竞争企业的进入,但不能封锁进入,不管何种情况发生,社会福利都不会恶化.从公共政策的角度看,政府应该鼓励进入.文章的研究结果部分否定了Klemperer(1988)进入导致社会福利的恶化的研究结论.     

广告、品牌忠诚与产品定价

文章建立完全信息模型来解释广告可以作为企业建立消费者品牌忠诚的一种策略。企业做广告建立了消费者对企业产品的心理需求从而形成了消费者的品牌忠诚,此时品牌忠诚类似于转移成本,消费者要转移购买其他企业的产品需要克服品牌忠诚的心理成本,由此企业对锁定的消费者具有一定的垄断力,可以定高价获得更多的利润。     

企业社会责任标准国际化背景下企业进入策略研究*

本文通过构建博弈模型，对企业社会责任（CSR）标准国际化背景下企业进入策略进行研究。本文发现，企业最优进入策略受到进入成本影响，当进入成本较低时所有企业都适合选择进入高CSR标准市场，当进入成本较高时所有企业都不适合选择进入，当成本介于两者之间时适合部分企业选择进入。在对社会福利的分析中还发现，当进入是企业最优策略时，无论是部分进入还是全部进入，企业承担更高的社会责任能同时提升企业利润和社会福利水平。     

基于战略性进入壁垒的企业应对策略研究

进入壁垒使得新进入市场的厂商必须承担一些在位厂商并不承担的成本。在位厂商有意识地利用低价格、过度生产能力设计、“抢占”手段等战略行为来构筑战略性进入壁垒。应对战略性进入壁垒,我国企业可采取协同竞争策略、产品差别化策略、利用“搭便车”效应和垂直约束策略。     

企业诚信及其治理

企业的进入门槛、规模与企业的诚信水平正相关，企业所在地的经济发展水平和市场化程度与企业的诚信水平正相关，其中市场化程度与企业诚信水平强正相关。上述结论说明，企业的专用资产、转移成本和沉淀成本在很大程度上决定了企业的诚信水平。     

基于B2C电商企业的客户体验成本策略分析

文章就B2C电商企业如何规划和实施用户体验成本策略问题,试着从用户网站体验成本策略、用户产品体验成本策略、用户服务体验成本策略等方面展开讨论与分析,以供B2C电商企业借鉴之用。     

基于网络外部性的产品差异化与兼容性选择

本文研究了网络外部性与转移成本存在下的新进入企业的产品差异化与兼容性选择问题,并考虑了在位企业的兼容性动机。研究结果表明:对于新进入企业而言,只存在两种策略组合,即(最大差异化,不兼容)和(最大差异化,兼容);在位企业是偏好兼容的。     

转移成本与客户忠诚

忠诚客户是企业巨大的财富 ,是企业生存和发展的保障和动力。企业在营销策略上 ,应该有所为 ,有所不为 ,对不同客户要区别对待 ,锁定那些忠诚客户为目标客户。在激烈的市场竞争中 ,企业要想使自己长期立于不败之地 ,既要不断开发新的客户 ,更要长久保持老的客户。企业要实现客户的忠诚 ,不仅要能够提供客户真正满意的产品和服务 ,也要善于采取有效的方法策略 ,正确运用客户的转移成本。文章就此展开探讨。     

我国企业战略成本管理应用中的问题及策略探讨

企业战略成本管理在我国的应用和推广 ,将使我国企业落后的成本管理模式出现根本性转移。目前 ,我国企业战略成本管理中仍存在着许多问题 ,因此 ,有针对性地研究制定相应策略将有助于战略成本管理在我国企业中的实践 ,并取得成效。     

Re-examining the effects of switching costs

Consumers often incur costs when switching from one product to another. Recently, there has been renewed debate within the literature about whether these switching costs lead to higher prices. We build a theoretical model of dynamic competition and solve it analytically for a wide range of switching costs. We provide a simple condition which determines whether switching costs raise or lower long-run prices. We also show that even if switching costs reduce prices in the long run, they may still increase prices in the short run. Finally, switching costs redistribute surplus across time, and as such are shown to sometimes increase consumer welfare.     

QUANTITY VERSUS PRICE IN A HOMOGENEOUS PRODUCT DUOPOLY*

In a simple homogeneous product setting, the paper looks at the debate on whether firms should choose quantity or price as their strategic variable. It examines a two-stage game between firms with symmetric costs in which the firms choose the strategic mode of operation in the first period and then, in the second period, price or output are chosen simultaneously according to the mode chosen in the first stage. In this game it is possible to have two Nash equilibria where either both play in quantities or both play in prices. One firm choosing price and the other quantity can never be a Nash equilibrium in the two-stage game. Both choosing quantity is always a Nash equilibrium. Both choosing prices may be a Nash equilibrium only in some situations: the structure of the cost functions decides this issue.     

Export price adjustments under financial constraints

Exploiting data on the product‐destination‐level transactions of a large panel of Italian firms, we provide evidence that financial constraints affect price variation across exporters. Constrained exporters charge higher prices than do unconstrained firms that export to the same product‐destination market. This pattern is the result of a two‐fold effect. Distressed firms pass on their higher production costs through prices. However, they also charge higher mark‐ups. We explain this evidence referring to models in which rival firms produce different brands of the same product for customers with significant switching costs and producers face capital market imperfections when they need external financing. Our empirical investigations corroborate this explanation: price gaps are higher when switching costs or other forms of demand rigidity are expected to be more relevant.     

MANAGING SWITCHING COSTS IN MULTIPERIOD PROCUREMENTS WITH STRATEGIC BUYERS*

This article examines the use of switching costs by long‐lived strategic buyers to manage dynamic competition between rival suppliers. The analysis reveals how buyers may employ switching costs to their advantage. We show that when switching costs are high, a buyer may induce suppliers to price more competitively by credibly threatening to replace the incumbent supplier with his rivals. The implications of this finding for adoption of technology and firm organization are explored in settings in which the buyer is integrated with the suppliers and where the buyer is an outsourcer.     

Foreign market entry,upstream market power,and endogenous mode of downstream competition

In a differentiated duopoly model of trade and FDI featuring both horizontal and vertical product differentiation, we examine whether globalization and trade policy measures can generate welfare gains by leading firms to change their mode of competition. We show that when a high-quality foreign variety is manufactured under large frictions due to upstream monopoly power, a foreign firm can become a Bertrand competitor against a Cournot local rival in equilibrium, especially when the relative product quality of the foreign variety is sufficiently high and trade costs are sufficiently low (implying higher input price distortions due to double marginalization). Our results suggest that such strategic asymmetry is welfare improving and that the availability of FDI as an alternative to trade can make welfare-enhancing strategic asymmetry even more likely, especially when both input trade costs and fixed investment costs are sufficiently low and trade costs in final goods are sufficiently large.     

Bilateral Oligopoly,Private Information,and Pollution Permit Markets

We analyze the effects of strategic behavior and private information in pollution permit markets in which all firms have market power. The market is characterized by supply-function equilibria. Firms submit net supplies for permits and a market maker determines the market-clearing price. Net supplies depend on abatement cost functions, which in turn depend on private information parameters. We calculate the increase in aggregate abatement costs due to strategic behavior and private information and show that private information attenuates the effects of strategic behavior.      

Strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly

We compare steady states of open loop and locally stable Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) in a general symmetric differential game duopoly model with costs of adjustment. Strategic incentives at the MPE depend on whether an increase in the state variable of a firm hurts or helps the rival and on whether at the MPE there is intertemporal strategic substitutability or complementarity. A full characterization is provided in the linear-quadratic case. Then with price competition and costly production adjustment, static strategic complementarity turns into intertemporal strategic substitutability and the MPE steady-state outcome is more competitive than static Bertrand competition.     

Horizontal mergers and product quality

We study the effects of a horizontal merger when firms compete on price and quality. In a Salop framework with three symmetric firms, several striking results appear. First, the merging firms reduce quality but possibly also price, whereas the outside firm increases both price and quality. As a result, the average price in the market increases, but also the average quality. Second, the outside firm benefits more than the merging firms from the merger, and the merger can be unprofitable for the merger partners, i.e., the “merger paradox” may appear. Third, the merger always reduces total consumer utility (though some consumers may benefit), but total welfare can increase due to endogenous quality cost savings. In a generalized framework with n firms, we identify two key factors for the merger effects: (i) the magnitude of marginal variable quality costs, which determines the nature of strategic interaction and (ii) the cross‐quality and cross‐price demand effects, which determines the intensity of price relative to quality competition. These findings have implications for antitrust policy in industries where quality is a key strategic variable for the firms.     

On the “merger paradox” in price competition with asymmetric product differentiation

By assuming asymmetric product differentiation, we consider the “merger paradox” in price competition (or the incentive to collude in prices). We investigate whether the emergence of the merger paradox depends on the degree of product differentiation between firms. In particular, unlike Deneckere and Davidson (1985), we demonstrate that if the degree of product differentiation between the insider and outsider is sufficiently small, then they are strategic substitutes, and thus, the merger paradox arises in price competition.     

转换成本视角下互联网企业的创新竞争策略

在转换成本和网络效应存在下互联网产业通过产品创新活动争夺市场份额。某些“创新”的主要目的为排除竞争。互联网产业一个典型的发展过程是：企业依靠外部融资支撑的策略性创新，降低消费者向其产品转换的成本，争夺市场份额，并在投资约束的限制下走向合并，最终抬高了市场集中度。特别的，转换成本的存在让企业有动力通过事前控制转换成本的创新，争夺事后的市场势力，并且“收割”事后锁定的用户。