Are universal banks bad for financial stability? Germany during the world financial crisis

This case study explores the contribution of universal banking to financial stability in Germany during the recent financial crisis. Germany is a prototype for universal banking and has suffered from a rather small number of banking crises in the past. We review the banking literature and analyze the major institutional and regulatory features of the German financial system to establish a nexus between universal banking and stability. We focus on the following questions. First, which banks failed and did they because they were universal or because of other reasons? Second, which types of distress beside outright bank failures resulted from the crisis and how did German universal banks dealt with them? We show that only few German banks failed and these banks did so not because they were universal banks but because they were publicly owned. Most banks instead contributed to reduce the impact of the recent crisis.     

Liquidity,bank runs,and fire sales under local thinking

We examine the implications on banking crises when markets are populated by agents that neglect tail risks and form expectations conditioned on a favorable subset of possible states of the economy. We find that optimal bank liquidity is lower than would be the case under rational expectations, and, consequently, the banking system is more vulnerable to adverse shocks, which lead to bank runs. Asset pledgeability of surviving banks is also affected so that their capacity to raise external funds for purchasing assets of distressed banks is weakened. Further, we examine the case when asset returns are correlated through securitization. In this case adverse shocks are felt uniformly across the banking sector and banks that survive with the help of a public liquidity backstop will become risk-averse and reluctant to purchase distressed assets. Finally, we explore a government funded asset purchase program, that is implemented with an asset price target.     

金融生态视角下我国商业银行流动性问题研究

在金融危机影响下,我国银行业体系一方面要在国际竞争中争取利益,另一方面又要尽力摆脱危机所带来的负面效应。目前,流动性过剩的问题对于银行来说,就是巨大的考验。本文在维护良好金融生态的前提下,提出优化我国金融生态环境、加强央行对商业银行"过剩流动性"的回收力度、完善我国外汇管理体制等有效化解流动性危机对策。     

Contagion risk in the Czech financial system: A network analysis and simulation approach

This paper examines the potential for contagion within the Czech banking system via the channel of interbank exposures of domestic banks, enriched by a liquidity channel and an asset price channel, over the period March 2007 to June 2012. A computational model is used to assess the resilience of the Czech banking system to interbank contagion, taking into account the size and structure of interbank exposures as well as balance sheet and regulatory characteristics of individual banks in the network. The simulation results suggest that the potential for contagion due to credit losses on interbank exposures was rather limited. Even after the introduction of a liquidity condition into the simulations, the average contagion was below 3.8% of the remaining banking sector assets, with the exception of the period from December 2007 to September 2008. Activation of the asset price channel further increases the losses due to interbank contagion, showing that the liquidity of government bonds would be essential for the stability of Czech banks in stress situations. Finally, the simulation results for both idiosyncratic and multiple bank failure shocks suggest that the potential for contagion in the Czech banking system has decreased since the onset of the global financial crisis.     

Indirect Convertibility,Equity‐Based Banking and Financial Stability

Banking reform proposals put forward in the wake of the recent financial crisis maintain that equity‐based banking would be stable and would prevent bank runs. This article argues that complementing this form of banking with an indirect convertibility monetary standard and thereby dispensing with base money would enhance financial stability further. Banks would not hold a distinctive asset (base money) that would be called upon by customers at short notice, thereby removing the possibility of bank runs. No discrepancy in value between the two sides of a bank's balance sheet would arise as its assets (securitised loans) would be marked to market. Unlike other recent contributions, the intermediation model outlined here is not ‘limited purpose’ in nature as banks would not be restricted in the form of lending activity they can pursue. Common sources of banking and financial instability – liquidity risk, solvency risk, moral hazard – would be absent.     

Bank fee-based shocks and the U.S. business cycle

Efficient liquidity matching requires from banks to track external shocks (e.g., GDP growth shocks, stock market shocks and monetary policy shocks) in order to optimally allocate their assets between loans and other business lines. Profit maximizing banks have to rebalance their product-mix to take advantage of these changes. However, even though banking is cyclical, and contemporaneously reacts to shocks outside the banking sphere, there may also be some feedback effects at play, whereby bank changes, in turn, could affect economic and financial conditions. Generalizing the results of Marcucci and Quagliariello (2006, 2009), who indeed find an asymmetric impact of credit shocks on economic and financial time series in recession, we use a similar VAR framework to show that an even stronger feedback effect is prevalent for fee-based shocks. If the feedback effects of credit and fee-based shocks might have been both at play before the subprime crisis, the feedback effect of credit shocks seems to have faded away during the subprime crisis, whereas the feedback effect stemming from fee-based shocks has gained further strength.     

A hazard rate analysis of Russian commercial banks in the period 1994–1997

The number of commercial banks in Russia increased at a fast pace after the 1988 banking reform. Many of these banks lacked supervision and operated with dangerously low funding capital. After the 1995 liquidity crisis, many of these banks disappeared. In this paper, we investigate the determinants of the hazard rates of banks active on the Moscovian deposits market during the 1994–1997 period. We find that market share and duration have negatively affected the hazard rate, while the deposit interest rate has had a positive effect. The market share and interest rate effects are robust to controlling for ‘financial clans’.     

There is no smoke without a fire: The effect of government interventions in less advanced economies

The lack of liquidity in the interbank market during the crisis of 2007–2011 led governments to impose different policies to rescue their countries’ banking sectors. While in advanced countries interventions in the banking sector were mostly related to a lack of liquidity and significant asymmetric information regarding counterparty risk, in many less advanced countries they had a precautionary motive. In our article, we investigate the effectiveness of policy interventions on healthy banking markets, with possible negative spill-over effects from other countries. To this extent, we use an event study methodology to test the effect of liquidity and financial sector policy announcements on interbank spread changes in six Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries over the period between 2007 and 2011. We find that standard liquidity interventions did not provide effective stabilization. In fact, our evidence suggests that the spread widened after their announcement, probably as a result of the negative signal and consequently increased risk aversion of banks. In such situations, regulators should consider policy instruments that aim to decrease uncertainty in the market.     

The impact of government intervention on the stabilization of domestic financial markets and on U.S. banks’ asset composition

The 2007–2009 financial crisis that evolved from various factors including the housing boom, aggressive lending activity, financial innovation, and increased access to money and capital markets prompted unprecedented U.S. government intervention in the financial sector. We examine changes in banks’ balance sheet composition associated with U.S. government intervention during the crisis. We find that the initial round of quantitative easing positively impacts bank liquidity across all bank samples. Our results show a positive impact of repurchase agreement market rates on bank liquidity for small and medium banks. We conclude that banks have become more liquid in the post-crisis period, especially the larger banks (large and money center banks). We show that real estate loan portfolio exposures have reverted to pre-crisis levels for money center banks and remained flat for all other bank samples.     

Asymmetries between Rich and Poor Countries in Financial Crisis Responses: The Need for a Flow-of-Funds Approach

This paper focuses on the manner in which interest rates have been raised to, and sustained at, extremely high levels in developing and emerging market economies as a consequence of recent financial crises. By contrast rich market economies have typically lowered interest rates and injected liquidity in response to incipient financial crises. The paper first sketches the logic that lies behind extremely high interest rates (nominal and real) as an element of crisis resolution. It suggests that this reflects a money-phobic view of financial markets and also conflicts with some well-established economics. It then reviews the conventional wisdom about why richer economies have enjoyed sustained price stability in recent years and why this in turn has allowed their monetary authorities to be relaxed about injecting additional liquidity in response to LTCM (1998) and September 11 (2001)-type crises. It is pointed out that this conventional wisdom is also money-phobic in that it neglects the build up of corporate and government debt in bond and financial derivative form that has been associated with recent financial developments. This analysis helps to contest the common view that emerging market economies pay a higher price merely because their polices are "bad'. Finally, the paper reviews the manner in which the financial systems of developing and emerging market economies respond to the destabilization created by corrosively high real rates of interest. Even when bankruptcy arrangements are well established, certain new forms of financial flows and instruments are implicit in this response, but are invariably ignored in formal modelling.     

Foreign banks and short-term macroeconomic fluctuations: Do financial development and regions matter?

In this paper, we investigate the association between bank integration, measured with the share of foreign banks in the banking industry, and macroeconomic volatility in emerging economies. We find a negative and significant relationship between bank integration and short-run fluctuations in output, consumption and investment, controlling for financial development, bank concentration and the real effective exchange rate. However, this relationship is found to be positive at high levels of financial development. We also explore the association at the regional level and show that the presence of foreign banks in Latin America is negatively and significantly correlated with macroeconomic volatility both in normal times and times of crisis. Despite widespread concerns in emerging Europe, which experienced greater financial vulnerability during the global financial crisis, we find no significant association between growth volatilities and bank integration.     

Market microstructure,banks’ behaviour and interbank spreads: evidence after the crisis

We present a study of the European electronic interbank market of overnight lending (e-MID) before and after the beginning of the financial crisis. The main goal of the paper is to explain the structural changes of lending/borrowing features due to the liquidity turmoil. Unlike previous contributions that focused on banks’ dependent and macro information as explanatory variables, we address the role of banks’ behaviour and market microstructure as determinants of the credit spreads. We show that all banks experienced significant variations in their liquidity costs due to the sensitivity of interbank rates to the timing and side of trades. We argue that, while larger banks did experience better funding conditions after the crisis, this was not just a consequence of the “too big to fail” perception of the market. Larger banks have been able to play more strategically when managing their liquidity by taking advantage of the changing market microstructure.

     

Factors influencing bank risk in Europe: Evidence from the financial crisis

We use a dynamic panel data model to analyze bank-specific and macroeconomic determinants of bank risk for a large sample of commercial banks operating in the euro area. The selected time span, from 2001 to 2012, considers the impact of the on-going financial and economic crisis on the Eurozone banking system. Our results indicate that capitalization, profitability, efficiency and liquidity are inversely and significantly related to bank risk. However, the recourse to wholesale funding by banks seems to increase their risk. We also find that less-concentrated markets, lower interest rates, higher inflation rates and a context of economic crisis (with a falling GDP) increase bank risk.     

Liquidity creation and bank profitability

This paper examines the effect of liquidity creation on bank profitability. Using a panel of US banks, we find that liquidity creation is associated with higher profitability. This result holds during normal times and the financial crisis, and for banks of different sizes. When we decompose liquidity creation into its individual components, we find that liability-side and off-balance sheet liquidity creation are positively related to profitability, while asset-side liquidity creation is negatively related to profitability.     

COMMENT ON THE 2011 WINCOTT LECTURE, ‘CONTROL RIGHTS (AND WRONGS)’

Over a long period leading up to the current financial crisis, small banks within a small banking system were replaced by unsafe, large banks within a huge banking system. The banks have now grown so big and so dangerous that they have the capacity to wreck economies and bring down governments.     

Financial stability of Islamic banking and the global financial crisis: Evidence from the Gulf Cooperation Council

Using a sample of 76 banks from the Gulf Cooperation Council region, we use accounting- as well as market-based measures of financial stability to examine whether Islamic banks outperformed conventional banks in the time of financial shocks during the period 2000–2013. We find that the difference between the two banking types was initially not significant during the GFC. However, when the financial shock spread to the real economy during the later phases of the crisis, Islamic banks suffered a significantly higher level of financial instability than conventional banks. This result holds true for large banks but not for small Islamic banks. Small Islamic banks demonstrated a relatively better handling of the economic downturn than large Islamic banks, supporting the argument that Islamic banks are more stable when they operate at a small scale but lose this stability when they increase their scale of operations. Hence, while Islamic banks may have escaped the consequences of highly volatile financial instruments, they were not spared from a major shock in the real economic sectors.     

Liquidity indicators,early warning signals in banks,and financial crises

This research compares the performance of three liquidity indicators, namely liquidity ratio (LiqR), liquidity creation (LiqC) and net stable funding difference (NSFD), for sending early warning signals for distressed banks. Recent evidence has shown that LiqR appears incapable of measuring the liquidity condition of banks. However, LiqC and NSFD have not yet been fully examined. Thus, which indicator is more useful in an early warning model becomes an interesting issue. We classify distressed banks as banks that have experienced a bank run, bailout, or failure. Sample data are collected from the United States and the European Union from before and after the financial crisis. We then estimate model predictive value using the sample before the crisis to predict liquidity shortages. Evidence shows that the academic (LiqC) and officially recommended indicators (NSFD) outperform LiqR as early warning signals. Furthermore, LiqC performs best when banks actively engage in income diversification but not fund diversification. Therefore, a well income-diversified bank with high LiqC tends to have high distress probability in the next period.     

Banking efficiency in South East Europe: Evidence for financial crises and the gap between new EU members and candidate countries

In this study we compare the cost efficiency of banks in ten South East European countries and find out how differences in efficiency are related to EU membership. The results reveal a statistically significant cost efficiency gap between EU and non-EU banking systems in the region, where on average EU banking systems tend to be more cost efficient than their non-EU counterparts. In contrast to other similar studies analyzing banking efficiency in South East European countries, we also run β-convergence and σ-convergence tests, as proposed in the literature. Based on these tests we can draw conclusions concerning the existence of a catching-up effect, since the detected cost efficiency gap is closing predominantly because of adjustments on the side of the less efficient banks. Additionally, we found that during the 2008 global financial crisis, the average cost efficiency scores of banks in the region improved, which could be explained by enhanced incentives of bank managers for intensified cost optimization in banks in crisis times. Our results suggest that the institutional adjustments in the non-EU countries should continue towards EU standards, as the EU banking systems tend to dominate in terms of measured cost efficiency.     

Pricing in the Norwegian Interbank Market – the Effects of Liquidity and Implicit Government Support

We investigate the effects of central bank liquidity and possible implicit government guarantees against default on Norwegian overnight interbank interest rates. We conduct an econometric study of these interest rates over the period 2006–09, which includes the sharp fall in interbank trading during the financial crisis. Our findings suggest relatively lower funding costs for banks of systemic importance, particularly for banks with many and valuable linkages to other banks. Moreover, interest rates are found to depend not only on overall liquidity in the interbank market, but on its distribution among banks as well. There is also evidence of stronger effects on interest rates of systemic importance, creditworthiness and liquidity demand and supply factors during the financial crisis.