商业贿赂成因与治理的经济学分析

垄断为商业贿赂的产生和蔓延创造了条件,特别是供求失衡和信息不对称的存在为经营者进行商业贿赂带来了动力。虽然我国近年来更加重视和加强了对商业贿赂的治理,但在成本约束和信息不对称的作用下,单纯依靠政府的监管来治理商业贿赂成本高昂且效果有限。所以要想有效治理商业贿赂,我们就要从商业贿赂的成因出发,瓦解其滋生的环境,在加强政府监管的同时进一步完善法律规制,并借助全社会力量构筑全方位的商业贿赂治理体系。     

Tax Auditing as a Public Good Game: An Experimental Study on Punishment and Compliance

Prior experimental studies on tax evasion generally assume that the budget and the probability of audit are exogenously given, and ignore taxpayers' incentives to detect evasion and their compliance behaviour under such incentives. The experimental evidence of the present paper shows that, on average, subjects are willing to spend 20 to 30% of their tax revenue on auditing. Compliance is also greatly improved if subjects can determine the budget and, hence, the probability of audit. These findings suggest that taking taxpayers' incentives to detect evasion into consideration is important for the design of compliance‐improvement audit schemes.     

Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game

We measure beliefs in an experimental game. Player 1 may take x < 20 Dutch guilders, or leave it and let player 2 split 20 guilders between the players. We find that the higher is x (our treatment variable), the more likely is player 1 to take the x. Out of those who leave the x, many expect to get back less than x. There is no positive correlation between x and the amount y that 2 allocates to 1. However, there is positive correlation between y and 2's expectation of 1's expectation of y. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92.     

结构化多人博弈的分析框架

结构化多人博弈是一种把博弈方嵌入到具体的社会关系之中,在两两博弈的基础上求解整体博弈均衡状态的分析框架。和现有的合作博弈(Cooperative Game Theory)、网络博弈(Network Games)、进化图论(Evolutionary Graph Theory,EGT)、计算博弈论(Computational Game Theory)等多人博弈分析框架相比,结构化博弈既有和它们相似的地方,也有非常重要的差别。结构化博弈更适合用来分析政治问题和社会现象中的多人博弈局面。作为最简单的情况,本文先给出了一个三人结构化博弈的一般分析框架,然后根据这个分析框架对传统的联盟博弈进行了新的分析,发现经典的"三人分300元"博弈事实上有稳定的均衡解,即三人各分100元。作为一个简单的应用,文章分析了三个国家之间的"战争-同盟博弈",我们发现该博弈有两个稳定的均衡解,在这两个稳定的均衡解中,超级大国和小国总是选择结盟,而小国总是选择和地区大国进行战争。从这两个例子可以看出,结构化多人博弈在分析复杂的政治、经济、社会问题上具有传统博弈论方法所不具备的很多优势,其获得的均衡解也更符合社会实际。     

Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation

I propose a bribery model that examines decentralized bureaucratic decision‐making. There are multiple stable equilibria. High levels of bribery reduce an economy's productivity because corruption suppresses small business, and reduces the total graft, even though the size of an individual bribe might increase. Decentralization prevents movement towards a Pareto‐dominant equilibrium. Anticorruption efforts, even temporary ones, might be useful to improve participation, if they lower the bribe levels demanded and thus encourage small businesses to participate.     

实验教学法在“经济博弈论”中的应用研究

探讨了＂经济博弈论＂中实验教学的总体思路与教学体系,分析了实验设计、实验实施过程、实验结果讨论等三个基本环节需要注意的问题,对＂经济博弈论＂中实验教学法的基本内容进行了说明,阐明了实验教学法在＂经济博弈论＂教学中的优越性。     

An Observable Delay Game with Unionised Managerial Firms

The endogenous order of moves is analysed in a unionised Cournot duopoly with managerial delegation and firm‐specific unions, where firms choose whether to set quantities sequentially or simultaneously. It is shown that, in contrast to the standard duopoly with profit‐maximising firms where both firms prefer to be the leader and thus simultaneously chosen quantities emerge as an endogenous equilibrium, a rich set of equilibrium outcomes may occur. In particular, the result of sequential choices, which reverses the conventional wisdom in regard to Cournot duopolies, emerges as the endogenous equilibrium when the union's wage orientation is sufficiently high.     

转基因食品监管的演化博弈分析

转基因食品的发展是一个世界各国普遍关注的问题,转基因食品的监管对于转基因食品的发展尤为重要。因此,深入研究转基因食品的监管问题对于转基因食品产业的发展具有重要意义。信息不对称的存在使得转基因食品生产企业和转基因食品监管部门存在博弈关系。转基因食品生产企业和转基因食品监管部门的策略选择决定了转基因食品市场的均衡。针对转基因食品生产企业和监管部门的策略选择,运用演化博弈的分析方法,对转基因食品监管的稳定状态进行了深入分析。研究结果表明：加大对转基因食品企业的监管力度、惩罚力度和对转基因食品监管部门的奖励力度能够使转基因食品生产企业与监管部门良性互动,逐步达到帕累托最优状态,从而促进转基因食品产业的健康发展。     

信誉机制在欺诈行为中的运行分析--来自一次博弈与重复博弈的解释

信誉机制是维护市场经济中行为主体交易活动正常化的基石。没有信誉机制的市场是杂乱无章的市场，同时也将伴随着行为主体利益的损失，产生一种低效的市场绩效。本文将分别用一次博弈和重复博弈模型来说明信誉机制在欺诈行为产生及其演变过程中所起的作用，并以相应的结论来说明市场中信息的透明度、信息的传播方式与手段以及政府执法的及时性、公正性等制度因素对信誉机制发挥作用的影响。     

A Common Pool Resource Game with Sequential Decisions and Experimental Evidence

We describe a common pool resource game in which players choose how much of the stock to extract in a sequential manner. There are two choices and one represents taking a larger proportion of the stock than the other. After a player makes a choice, the remaining stock grows at a constant rate. We consider a game with a finite number of alternating moves. It is shown that changes in the larger proportion of the stock that the players are allowed to take and the growth rate affect equilibrium, but have little effect on behavior in the laboratory. In addition to observing more cooperation than predicted, we observe that parameters that are strategically irrelevant affect behavior. The results of this research might help policy makers in developing adequate policies to prevent overexploitation of some natural renewable resources.     

商业贿赂的危害及治理

商业贿赂是贿赂的一种形式，是随着商品经济的发展而逐步产生和发展起来的经济现象。改革开放后，曾在我国计划经济体制下较长一段时间内几乎绝迹的商业贿赂行为又重新出现和泛滥。现已成为最主要的一种贿赂形式，成为严重破坏竞争秩序，腐蚀干部队伍，侵蚀党的肌体，为广大人民群众切齿痛恨的社会公害。运用法律手段有效制裁商业贿赂行为，维护党的形象，保障经济健康发展，是非常必要和迫切的。     

地方政府间竞争行为的博弈分析

从非合作博弈的角度出发,结合后转型时期地方政府间竞争成本逐渐凸显的现实,本文建立市场分割模型、重复建设模型和政治竞争模型,从三个不同的维度分析后转型时期地方政府间的竞争行为及其竞争后果,并探讨使地方政府行为从竞争转向合作的激励机制和制度安排。研究发现:市场分割、重复建设是地方政府过度利用地区经济发展权的后果,政治竞争根源于单一的地方政府绩效评估体制,而适当的制度安排可以在保持地方政府发展经济积极性的同时,约束地方政府间的竞争行为,促进地方政府间的合作,有利于区域经济体系的完善和经济的和谐发展。     

博弈论视角的制度观

博弈论是研究决策主体的行为发生互相作用时的决策及均衡问题.经济学家从博弈论的视角给出不同的制度观.本文通过建立主观双层博弈模型,分析制度的互补、并存和变迁.     

企业创新竞争的期权博弈行为分析

本文在不确定环境中,探讨专利权体制下实物期权与创新竞争的相互关系．建立模型刻画了两个对称企业在合作与非合作情况下进行创新投资的最佳策略。企业间的竞争并不一定损害延迟期权的价值,相反,企业对引发专利竞争的畏惧使竞争的影响内在化,进一步提高了延迟的价值,推迟了投资时间。     

Bribery,inefficiency, and bureaucratic delay

We examine bribery in a dynamic setting with a partially honest bureaucracy. The presence of honest officials lowers the bribe that a corrupt official can extract from efficient applicants. Consequently, efficient applicants may face delays in receiving licenses, or may never receive licenses, as inefficient applicants are serviced ahead of them. An increase in the proportion of honest officials, while directly increasing the incidence of socially optimal decisions, can also induce greater inefficiencies (misallocation and delay) from corrupt officials. As a result, social welfare may be non-monotonic in the proportion of honest officials, and small differences in monitoring costs may lead to very different levels of corruption. Competition between officials can hurt efficiency; its desirability depends on the prevalence of applicants' ability to pay bribes.     

区域科技创新机理的博弈分析

分析了我国科技创新体系的现状，研究了科技创新体系的发展思路，并通过博弈论模型探讨了科技创新的经济学机理，得出了相关结论。     

风险投资中的控制权信号传递博弈分析

文章运用博弈论分析了风险投资中逆向选择问题产生的原因及其后果.通过引入风险企业家出让企业控制权大小这一信号,讨论了精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡存在的条件.文章认为,风险投资契约作为双方的博弈规则,对防范逆向选择具有重要意义.     

Learning to Punish: Experimental Evidence from a Sequential Step-Level Public Goods Game

This paper studies how subjects in a three-person sequential step-level public good game learn to punish free riders more over time. Our current work makes several additions to the literature on other regarding behavior. First, our experiment provides evidence that subjects care about the actions that lead to an outcome as well as the outcome itself, replicating the results of A. Falk, E. Fehr and U. Fischbacher (Economic Inquiry, in press), J. Brandts and C. Solà (Games and Economic Behavior, 36(2), 138–157, 2001.) and J.H. Kagel and K. Wolfe (Working paper, Ohio State University, 1999). Second, our experiment provides one of the first tests of the newer theories of reciprocity by A. Falk and U. Fischbacher (Working paper, University of Zurich, 2000) and G. Charness and M. Rabin (Quarterly Journal of Economics, in press) that take a psychological games approach. We find that these theories fail to explain the experimental data. Finally, we examine the mechanism by which subjects learn to punish free-riding more ofter over time.