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事后监督对强化银行内部管理,健全监督机制,提高核算质量和工作效率,防范重大事故和经济案件的发生有着积极的意义。从 20世纪 80年代末起,工商银行首先对会计业务核算采用计算机进行事后监督,之后,储蓄、信用卡、国际业务等专业部门的核算也相继采用了计算机进行事后监督。采用计算机进行事后监督在工行系统已具有相当规模,但是,由于部门的分立和系统开发的困难,各种核算业务的事后监督系统仍滞后于前台业务的发展。 一、事后监督系统存在的问题 1.版本陈旧,缺少投入 今天,我国金融业竞争非常激烈,各商业银行越来越重… 相似文献
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为探究集中会计事后监督对内部操作风险防范的积极作用,促进事后监督体系的建设与完善,笔者对应城农行实施集中会计事后监督的内在动因、工作效能发挥进行了调查和分析,得到的启发是:集中事后监督是强化操作风险防范的有效途径。 相似文献
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人民银行事后监督的有效性最终应表现在监督结果的有效性上,即在提高会计核算质量,防范人民银行资金风险中所起作用的程度。因此,事后监督有效性应主要涉及两方面的内容:一是确定事后监督的可控范围和在可控范围的控制内容;二是确定控制内容的控制措施,即实现事后监督有效性的途径。因此,可将事后监督有效性界定为:事后监督人员在其职责范围内,依据相关的监督制度,采取适当的监督方式,达到既定的监督目标或能有效防范和化解风险的程度。而要使事后监督的有效性得以最大程度的发挥,就要对会计集中核算后的业务新特点和影响会计有效性充分发挥的因素进行充分分析,从而制定有效的风险防范措施,做到有的放矢,对症下药,最大程度的发挥事后监督的作用。 相似文献
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2004年8月以来,人民银行各分支行按照总行要求相继设立了事后监督中心,独立行使会计核算监督职能,形成了新的事后监督体系,这对规范国库会计核算操作,促进核算质量提高,防范资金风险,发挥了一定作用。然而,由于事后监督中心管理体制不顺,职责划分不明,客观上造成国库事后监督成本加大,监督重点不突出,风险隐患仍然存在等问题, 相似文献
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为防范资金风险,规范国库核算业务,各县级国库会计核算业务的事后监督由事后监督中心办理,但目前采用这种事后监督方式存在一些问题。本文从和田辖内县级国库业务的事后监督工作面临的问题入手,分析了县级国库的事后监督工作人员紧缺、监督者个体差异等诸多的问题,探讨了县级国库会计事后监督工作实施集中监督可行性。 相似文献
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央行事后监督大集中运作,是指与业务枝算集中层次相适应,以中心支行乃至省会中支为监督主体,采用先进的电子监督设备和科学的系统监督手段,对央行所有核算业务进行独立的、连续的、全方位的核查与监督。[编者按] 相似文献
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随着中央银行集中核算系统的运行,事后监督工作的内容发生了很大变化。事后监督工作的重中之重就是严把资金出口,保证资金安全,因此对联行资金的监督便显得尤为重要。由于与新系统配套的事后监督制度、操作规程尚未出台,在工作中遇到一些问题。笔者就联行事后监督工作及存在的问题与大家进行探讨。 相似文献
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中央银行会计集中核算系统改变了过去各级人行单独核算的传统模式,与此相适应的集中事后监督也克服了原来事后监督不独立、职责不清、责任不明的弊端。但新核算模式下的集中事后监督也存在一些问题,主要表现在以下几个方面: 相似文献
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本文通过中央银行会计事后监督子系统在事后监督工作中近4年的运用,针对该系统目前在事后实际监督工作中存在的问题与不足,力图从确保资金的安全性,账务处理的正确性,监督的实效性出发,目前亟需对该系统监督功能进行加强与改进。 相似文献
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随着计算机技术和通信技术的迅猛发展,各商业银行的电子化进程也发生了根本的改变,主要表现在四个方面:数据由单机分散存储向区域集中甚至全国集中转变,多系统相关数据分离向多系统相关数据共享甚至共同维护转变,简单业务数据处理向复杂数据的综合处理及分析转变,业务系统功能相对固定向提高系统创新能力(对业务变化的适应能力)转变。这些转变对应用系统的设计开发提出了更高的要求。一、需求分析银行现有办公网和业务网是两个相对独立的网络,办公网上的个人贷款系统、信贷台账系统、报表系统等主要是Windows平台上的应用,而业务… 相似文献
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3月18日,由中国人民银行营业管理部、北京银监局、北京市金融工作局、北京市国资委、中关村管委会、海淀区政府与华夏银行联合推出的“龙舟计划闪耀科技金融”信贷创新推广活动,标志着华夏银行为中关村国家自主创新示范区高科技型企业量身定制的金融服务模式全面启动。 相似文献
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Indranil Chakraborty Fahad Khalil Jacques Lawarree 《The Rand journal of economics》2021,52(1):179-206
Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex post moral hazard after the competitive process is over. A procurement mechanism must combine an incentive scheme with the auction to guard against firms bidding low to win the contract and then cutting back on effort. While competition helps reduce the rent of efficient firms, it exacerbates the problem due to moral hazard. If allocative efficiency is a requirement, limiting the number of participants may be optimal. Alternatively, the same incentives can be optimally provided using inefficient allocation rules. 相似文献
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许多人认为,贷款主要是企业的事,与普通百姓关系不大,即使有一些个人贷款发生,也是麻烦事。但近几年随着个人住房贷款、个人汽车贷款的普及,个人按揭贷款已和普通百姓息息相关。银行作为提供贷款的主体,开发一套自助贷款系统已成为各家银行的共识。凭借该系统,客户通过ATM、SSB 相似文献
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Collateral is a widely used, but not well understood, debt contracting feature. Two broad strands of theoretical literature explain collateral as arising from the existence of either ex ante private information or ex post incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. However, the extant empirical literature has been unable to isolate each of these effects. This paper attempts to do so using a credit registry that is unique in that it allows the researcher to have access to some private information about borrower risk that is unobserved by the lender. The data also include public information about borrower risk, loan contract terms, and ex post performance for both secured and unsecured loans. The results suggest that the ex post theories of collateral are empirically dominant, although the ex ante theories are also valid for customers with short borrower–lender relations that are relatively unknown to the lender. 相似文献
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随着客户理财需求的不断升级和细化,我国银行业金融服务日趋完善和成熟。客户对服务的时效性提出越来越高的要求,各家银行也深刻认识到24小时服务的重要意义。华夏银行原有的综合业务系统采用传统的日间实时和日终批量的处理方法。对于日终处理时发起的联机交易,特别是持卡用户 相似文献
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There exists a lively debate as for the appropriate architecture of the financial supervision regime, with a long list of theoretical advantages and disadvantages associated with each one of its key dimensions. The present study investigates whether and how bank profit efficiency is influenced by the central bank’s involvement in financial supervision, the unification of financial authorities, and the independence of the central bank. The results show that efficiency decreases as the number of the financial sectors that are supervised by the central bank increases. Additionally, banks operating in countries with greater unification of supervisory authorities are less profit efficient. Finally, central bank independence has a negative impact on bank profit efficiency. 相似文献
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《Journal of Financial Stability》2013,9(4):487-497
This paper analyzes the incentive effects of special bank resolution schemes which were introduced during the recent financial crisis. These schemes allow regulators to take control over a systemically important financial institution before bankruptcy. We ask how special resolution schemes influence banks’ risk-taking and whether regulators should combine them with minimum capital requirements. We model a single bank which is supervised by a regulator who receives an imperfect signal about the bank's probability of success. We find that capital requirements are better than resolution from a welfare point of view if the quality of the signal is low, if it is difficult for the bank to attract deposits, or if the project return is low. 相似文献
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Fotios Pasiouras Chrysovalantis Gaganis Constantin Zopounidis 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2006,27(4):403-438
We use country level data and bank level data from 71 countries and 857 banks to investigate the impact of bank regulations,
supervision, market structure, and bank characteristics on individual bank ratings. The results indicate that less cost efficient
banks, with higher than average levels of provisions relatively to their income, and lower liquidity tend to have lower ratings.
Larger and more profitable banks tend to obtain higher ratings. Higher equity to assets ratio results in higher ratings only
when we do not control for bank supervision and regulations. Capital requirements, restrictions on bank activities, official
disciplinary power, explicit deposit insurance scheme, higher deposit insurer power, liquidity and diversification guidelines,
entry requirements, fraction of entries denied, and economic freedom have a significant impact on ratings in all of our specifications.
Disclosure requirements and foreign banks entry have a significant impact on ratings only when we simultaneously control for
the regulatory environment and the market structure, while auditing requirements have a significant impact only when we control
for the regulatory environment alone. Finally, banks in developed countries are assigned higher ratings. However, this impact
disappears when we include the regulatory and supervision variables in the models. 相似文献