改革预期、动态博弈与专项中央银行票据兑付北大核心

专项票据是新一轮农村信用社改革中主要的资金支持方式。本文通过分析认为,中央银行在专项票据兑付考核中建立的"威胁"具有不完全可置信,农村信用社对改革及专项票据的兑付存有强烈的预期,专项票据兑付是中央银行与农村信用社间的完全但不完美信息动态博弈,博弈的结果取决于中央银行设立的"威胁"的可信性,较低的"威胁"将引致农村信用社较高的作假行为,达不到"花钱买机制"的改革目标。为此,中央银行要提高"威胁"的置信度,降低农村信用社对专项票据兑付的预期,激励农村信用社通过真实努力深化改革,实现改革方案设计的目标。     

Central bank intervention and the volatility of foreign exchange rates: evidence from the options market

This paper tests the effects of central bank intervention on the ex ante volatility of $/DM and $/yen exchange rates between 1985 and 1991. In contrast to previous research which employed GARCH estimates of conditional volatility, we estimate ex ante volatility using the implied volatilities of currency option prices. We also control for the effects of other macroeconomic announcements. We find little support for the hypothesis that central bank intervention decreases expected exchange rate volatility. Instead, central bank intervention is generally associated with a positive change in ex ante exchange rate volatility, or with no change.     

Do jumps mislead the FX market?

This paper investigates the link between jumps in the exchange rate process and rumours of central bank interventions. Using the case of Japan, we analyse specifically whether jumps trigger false reports of intervention (i.e. an intervention is reported when it did not occur). Intraday jumps are extracted using a non-parametric technique recently proposed by Lee and Mykland in 2008 and by Andersen et al. in 2007, and later modified by Boudt et al. in 2011. Rumours are identified by using a unique database of Reuters and Dow Jones newswires. Our results suggest that a significant number of jumps on the YEN/USD have been falsely interpreted by the market as being the result of a central bank intervention. The paper has policy implications in terms of central bank interventions. We show that in times where the central bank is known to intervene, some investors may attach a lot of weight to central bank interventions as a source of exchange rate movement, leading to a false ‘intervention explanation’ for observed jumps.     

央行汇市干预的效果与经验

外汇市场干预是大多数国家央行管理汇率的主要手段。2008年全球金融危机以及其后的欧美债务危机,使得金融市场动荡加剧,外汇市场因避险资金的流动也日益不平静,央行的汇市干预在目标、方式、效果、影响等方面部呈现出一些新的特点,文章对此进行回顾和总结,并从将外汇干预作为宏观调控的组成部分、变被动干预为主动干预以及扩展干预模式等方面,就进一步完善央行汇市干预方式提出政策建议。     

Foreign reserve and money dynamics with asset portfolio adjustment: international evidence

In this paper we argue that more complete modeling of foreign exchange intervention and sterilization dynamics is necessary when there are adjustment costs to changing private portfolios and/or the central bank attempts to balance longer-run monetary control against short-term exchange rate objectives. We show that measured correlations between domestic credit and foreign asset changes, often interpreted as ‘sterilization coefficients’, may be misleading because they vary with the pattern of disturbances as well as private agent and central bank behavior. We assess the empirical significance of this issue by estimating vector error correction models of the domestic and foreign asset components of the monetary base for Japan and Germany. In both countries, we find that that the impact of foreign exchange intervention on domestic credit falls markedly after several months, implying that the degree of sterilization decreases over time. However, the monetary base remained largely insulated as foreign asset positions were subsequently ‘unwound.’     

Central Bank Intervention in USD/INR Market: Estimating Its Reaction Function and Impact on Volatility

Econometric evidence on why central banks intervene in the foreign exchange market and the impact of such intervention has remained inconclusive. We contribute to the literature with evidence from India, a managed float regime that sees consistent monitoring and intervention by Reserve Bank of India, India’s central bank. Estimation of the central bank reaction function shows that increased volatility in the foreign exchange market and misalignment from targeted rates are important objectives behind intervention. The paper further uses the GARCH framework to study how intervention influences exchange rate volatility. We find that intervention in the spot market increases volatility while that in the forward market reduces volatility.     

To intervene,or not to intervene: Monetary policy and the costs of currency crises

In case of speculative attacks, the central banks' decisions to intervene or not to intervene seem to play an important role for the economic costs of currency crises. The central bank can either abstain from intervening or start an intervention, which in turn can be successful or unsuccessful. Therefore, an adequate analysis of the costs of currency crises has to take into account three different types of currency crises: (i) an immediate depreciation without any central bank interventions, (ii) a successful defense, and (iii) an unsuccessful attempt to defend the exchange rate. We find that the decision of the central bank to intervene or to remain passive is risky. If the central bank intervenes and succeeds she can achieve the best growth performance on average. However, if the interventions are not maintained and the currency depreciates the subsequent output loss is particularly severe. Abstaining from an intervention yields a scenario with a relatively small drop in output. Giving in to a speculative attack rather than trying to fight it can thus be a suitable option for a risk-averse central bank.     

The cost of a central bank leaning against a random walk

Using a stochastic model we show that a central bank is expected to suffer a loss when it temporarily affects the exchange rate by sterilized intervention against a random walk. We also demonstrate that the methodology used in several studies of the profitability of official central bank intervention biases their results towards finding positive profits. This bias, created by only observing periods where cumulative intervention sums to zero, accounts for the seemingly contradictory empirical results of several intervention profitability studies.     

中央银行沟通、实际干预与通货膨胀稳定

近年来,中央银行沟通已成为一种重要的货币政策工具。本文把中央银行沟通因素引入修正的卢卡斯总供给函数,发现加大中央银行沟通力度有利于引导通货膨胀预期,稳定通货膨胀。采用2003-2009年月度数据,利用结构向量自回归方法对中央银行沟通及实际干预在稳定通货膨胀中的作用进行实证研究,主要结论如下:(1)正的中央银行沟通冲击能有效降低通货膨胀预期以及名义通货膨胀率,且时滞短;(2)正的实际干预(包括银行贷款利率、央票利率及货币供应量)冲击,在短期内不但不能降低通货膨胀预期及名义通货膨胀率,反而会加剧通货膨胀,出现"价格之谜"现象。此外,本文对大多数情况下我国中央银行沟通模棱两可的合理性进行了解释。     

A friction model of daily Bundesbank and Federal Reserve intervention

This paper takes a novel approach to derive a central bank intervention reaction function. A GARCH model for exchange rates is amended to allow interventions to have an effect on both the mean and the variance of exchange rate returns. An intervention reaction function is obtained by combining the model with a loss function for the central bank. Estimation results for the implied friction model reproduce the familiar ‘leaning against the wind’ policy by the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve. Furthermore, the central banks appear to have reacted to increases in the conditional variance of daily DM/$-returns.     

The Price of Options Illiquidity

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of illiquidity on the value of currency options. We use a unique dataset that allows us to explore this issue in special circumstances where options are issued by a central bank and are not traded prior to maturity. The value of these options is compared to similar options traded on the exchange. We find that the nontradable options are priced about 21 percent less than the exchange-traded options. This gap cannot be arbitraged away due to transactions costs and the risk that the exchange rate will change during the bidding process.     

人民币外汇市场压力与央行外汇干预的经验估计

本文采用Weymark指数法估计了1994年来我国面临的外汇市场压力和央行外汇干预指数,实证结果显示1994年来人民币一直面临着升值压力,样本期间中央银行平均干预指数为0.97,说明我国央行实行的是强势干预政策以保持人民币汇率的稳定。利用人民币外汇市场压力指数对我国潜在货币危机的研究表明,2005年人民币汇率改革之后,人民币面临的外汇市场压力过度了,存在货币危机的可能性。     

Capturing the time dynamics of central bank intervention

We estimate central bank reaction functions using the autoregressive conditional hazard model and the autoregressive conditional binomial model. We find that the Federal Reserve and Bundesbank intervened when the market was calmer, and the Bundesbank intervened in response to exchange rates being out-of-line with fundamentals. Japan intervened in response to changes in the nominal exchange rate, and intervention differed before and after Eisuke Sakakibara became Director General of the International Finance Bureau of the Ministry of Finance in Japan. We argue that these results are consistent with central bank policy goals and the effect of intervention on the exchange rate.     

Central bank FOREX interventions assessed using realized moments

This paper assesses the impact of G3 official central bank interventions on daily realized moments of DEM/USD exchange rate returns obtained from intraday data, 1989–2001. Event studies of the realized moments for the intervention day, the days preceding and following the intervention illustrate the shape of this impact. Rolling regressions results for an AR(FI)MA model for realized moments are used to measure the impact and its significance. The analysis confirms previous empirical findings of a temporary increase of volatility after a coordinated central bank intervention. It highlights new findings on the timing and the temporary nature of the impact of coordinated interventions on exchange rate volatility and on cross-moments between foreign exchange markets.     

Central bank financial strength and inflation: Is there a robust link?

Central bank financial strength has not been a fundamental issue for a substantial period of time. However, recent theoretical and empirical studies argue that central banks need to maintain a sufficient level of financial strength to perform their functions effectively and to achieve monetary policy objectives. In this study, we examine the empirical relationship between central bank financial strength and inflation using an unbalanced panel data set for a sample of selected advanced and emerging countries. We observe a statistically significant and robust negative relationship between central bank financial strength and inflation. This relationship is robust in the presence of other determinants of inflation and for alternative estimation methods. Our results have important implications for policy makers and central bankers. Particularly, our results suggest that avoiding persistent losses and maintaining the health of the central bank balance sheet remain vital pre-conditions for desirable policy outcomes of a central bank.     

央行冲销政策可持续性分析

新世纪以来,中国人民银行面对人民币升值和国内通货膨胀的压力,采取了以央行票据为主要手段的冲销政策。持续的央行票据发行,在部分实现政策目标的同时,也产生了高昂的成本,并可能威胁到其他货币政策目标的实现。在中美货币政策差异以及人民币汇率变动的情况下,随着央行票据发行规模和存量不断增加,央行票据冲销成本越来越高,2008年之后发行的央行票据已经接近或超过了可持续的界限。调整央行票据的期限结构,适度增加3年期以上的票据发行比重,积极培育多元化的冲销工具体系是摆脱对央行票据依赖的根本出路。     

日本量化宽松政策的影响及对中国的启示

自2012年9月份以来,美联储、欧洲央行以及日本银行（中央银行）纷纷推出量化宽松政策,其间日本银行在9月19日、10月30日和12月20日,四个月内连续三次推出量化宽松政策,这在日本历史上实属罕见。日本银行是在2001年初最早使用这一非传统金融政策的中央银行,中国与日本经贸往来密切,日本银行的量化宽松政策必将对我国经济和金融政策带来一定的影响,如何直面和应对,是摆在我们面前刻不容缓的课题。     

货币政策波动、银行信贷与会计稳健性

宏观经济政策(如货币政策)如何通过改变微观企业行为来影响经济发展是学术界探讨得比较少的领域。本文在此方向上进行研究尝试,并以货币政策波动对企业会计政策稳健性与银行贷款之间的关系为切人点。具体来说,当货币政策进入紧缩期时,我们预期企业会计政策变得更加稳健,以更容易取得银行贷款。运用1998～2008年的年度数据,并根据央行要求的金融机构存款准备金率、对金融机构的再贷款利率和再贴现利率的变化,我们定义2004、2006、2007年为我国的货币政策紧缩阶段。实证结果基本上支持我们的预期。我们进一步发现依赖于外部融资和拥有更高债务水平的企业会计稳健性更高,持有大量现金的企业会计稳健性更低,国有企业的会计稳健性更低。在会计稳健性的经济后果上,本文发现在货币政策紧缩阶段,会计稳健性的提高有助于企业获得更多的信贷资源。     

US government TARP bailout and bank lottery behavior

Considerable debate surrounds how the US government's TARP bailout intervention has affected the risk-taking and moral hazard behavior of U.S. banks around the global financial crisis. We examine this issue with a focus on lottery behavior introducing MAX/MIN as a new measure of lotteryness in banking to capture the loss protection from bank bailout guarantees. We find that the TARP bailout increased the likelihood of bank lotteryness and risk shifting. Lottery-like bank equities are riskier after TARP and exhibit fatter right to left tails. A consistent pattern of risk taking and lottery behavior extends both before and after the 2008–2009 crisis, engulfing the largest systemic banks (SIFIs). While confirming that lottery-like bank equities have lower short-term return, we find they exhibit better cumulative long-term return performance. Our findings have important policy implications regarding government intervention in banking crises.     

Does transparency in central bank intervention policy bring noise to the FX market?: The case of the Bank of Japan

This paper empirically investigates the induced effect of a more and less transparent central bank intervention (CBI) policy on rumors that can emerge. Using the case of Japan, we estimate a dynamic-probit model that explains the main determinants of false reports (i.e. falsely reported interventions) and anticipative rumors (i.e. rumors about future interventions) with reference to the intervention strategy adopted by the central bank for actual and oral interventions, and the uncertainty climate of the market captured by two volatility measures. Our results suggest that the induced effect of a transparent CBI policy on market rumors critically depends on the type of speeches made by officials.