Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public‐‐private partnerships

We study the agency costs of delegated public service provision, focusing on the link between organizational forms and uncertainty at project implementation. We consider a dynamic multitask moral hazard environment where the mapping between effort and performance is ex ante uncertain but new information may arise during operations. Our analysis highlights the costs and benefits that bundling planning and implementation—as under public‐‐private partnerships—can bring in terms of project design and operational costs under various scenarios, possibly allowing for asymmetric information, moral hazard and renegotiation. It also shows that relying on private finance enhances the benefits of bundling only if lenders have enough expertise to assess project risks.     

Information Aggregation via Contracting

When a group of investors with dispersed private information jointly invest in a risky project, how should they divide the project's profit? We show that a simple contract dividing profits in proportion to investors' risk tolerances may facilitate information aggregation by altering investors' risk-taking incentives when they decide on how investment strategies respond to private information. Our results provide a contracting-based approach for information aggregation, which is an alternative to learning from endogenous market variables (e.g., prices) via contingent schedules as seen in well-known rational expectations equilibrium models.     

Informational Black Holes in Financial Markets

We show that information aggregation in primary financial markets fails precisely when investors hold socially useful information for screening projects. Being wary of the Winner's Curse, less optimistic investors refrain from making financing offers, since their offers would be accepted only when a project is unviable. Their information is therefore lost. The Winner's Curse and associated information loss grow with the number of informed market participants, so that larger markets can lead to worse financing decisions and higher cost of capital for firms seeking financing. Precommitment to ration fundraising allocations, collusive club bidding, and shorting markets can mitigate the inefficiency.     

The role of audit thresholds in the misreporting of private information

The accounting profession has faced considerable criticism in recent years for failing to effectively combat reporting manipulation. A particular point of contention is the use of audit thresholds. The tendency for auditors to suppress inconsistencies that are deemed immaterial has been viewed as an open invitation for abuse. This paper revisits the effectiveness of audits and the misreporting of private information in light of audit thresholds. The paper demonstrates that while audit thresholds may create incentives for misstatements, the predictability of such misstatements may actually serve to promote efficiency. In effect, an environment in which parties are expected to systematically bias their reports can bring the threat of audit consequences for further exaggeration to the forefront. Such a consideration also suggests that more relaxed audit thresholds (and the ensuing increase in equilibrium misstatements) may be condoned by report recipients and can actually lessen inefficiencies wrought by adverse selection.     

Communication and control in outsourced IS development projects: Mapping to COBIT domains

Internal control over information technology (IT control) in complex outsourced information system development (ISD) projects is an ambiguous and sensitive issue. In this study we bring together Information Systems and Accounting perspectives to investigate how internal controls are incorporated into existing communication practices in outsourced ISD projects. The paper proposes that tools used for client-vendor communication are capable of supporting some of the IT control functions governed by the COBIT framework. In addition, it analyzes the influence of project complexity on the performance of communication tools as informal IT controls. Perceptual field data for the analysis were collected from project managers through an online survey instrument.The findings suggest that control objectives and types of project complexity are each supported by different communication tools. The level of support varies across communication tools categories and control objectives. Early analysis of a project's complexity can help with selection of communication tools which reinforce project support of control objectives while improving communication between client and vendor.     

Knowledge transfer in project reviews: the effect of self‐justification bias and moral hazard

In this study, we examine two factors that impact managers’ willingness to share private information during the project review stage of capital budgeting. Drawing on the cognitive dissonance theory and the agency theory, we find that both high perceived personal responsibility and the use of project reviews for performance evaluation result in a greater tendency for managers to withhold negative private information. However, we do not find an interaction between these two factors. Our study makes a contribution to both the academic literature investigating factors affecting project reviews and the practitioner literature looking at design and implementation of effective project reviews.     

Complementary controls and ERP implementation success

Many organisations have sought to improve their competitiveness by investing in advanced information technology, such as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems. They have implemented ERP systems for a variety of reasons, including solving year 2000 issues, reengineering business processes, and facilitating e-business. The implementation of an ERP system and associated changes in business processes, however, is not straightforward. ERP implementation projects are but another example of an information systems development project that needs to be controlled, yet the implementation of an ERP system is significantly different than a traditional system implementation. Control can be exerted by both formal and informal means [Kirsch, L.J., V. Sambamurthy, D-G. Ko, and R.L. Purvis. 2002. Controlling information systems development projects: The view from the client. Management Science. 48(4): 484–498]. Research has demonstrated that single modes of control are not sufficient, rather that a portfolio of control modes should be utilized. We expand upon this concept and suggest that this need for a mix of overlapping and redundant control mechanisms identified in the literature is explained through the use of the theory of complementarity [Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts. 1990. The economics of modern manufacturing: Technology, strategy and organization. American Economic Review 80: 511–528; Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts. 1994. Comparing equilibria. American Economic Review 84: 441–459; Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts. 1995. Complementarities and fit: Strategy, structure, and organizational change in manufacturing. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 19: 179–208; Topkis, D.M. 1998. Supermodularity and Complimentarity. Princeton University Press]. Surveys of chief information officers and internal auditors were conducted to obtain data on the controls used in ERP implementations. We find that groups of complementary controls need to be employed in the implementation of ERP systems to achieve a successful implementation.     

Econometric Methods for Testing for Asymmetric Information: A Comparison of Parametric and Nonparametric Methods with an Application to Hospital Daily Benefits

Since Chiappori and Salanié, testing for asymmetric information has become tantamount to testing for a positive relation between risk and coverage which is predicted by (equilibrium) models for adverse selection and moral hazard. In this paper we review parametric tests and a recently developed nonparametric test (Su and Spindler) and discuss the underlying assumptions. As an illustrative example, we apply the tests to hospital daily benefits which is part of the accident/disability insurance. We compare the results and show that the pattern of asymmetric information is mixed. The main finding is that we detect asymmetric information for low insured sums, but not for high insured sums which is a surprising result. We can also show that in certain ranges both types of test deliver similar results, while under certain circumstances, approaches using aggregation to binary variables might run into difficulties.     

The Effects of Stock Characteristics on the Direction and Extent of Herding by Foreign Institutional Investors in the Taiwan Stock Exchange

We use a dynamic herding measure to explore the causes of foreign institutional investor (FII) herding in the Taiwan stock market and examine the effects of stock characteristics on the direction and extent of such herding. We find that FII herding primarily results from cascades rather than habit investing or momentum trading. The result of a panel smooth transition regression shows that FIIs' negative cascades focus on their largest net purchases of stocks, but FIIs' positive cascades focus on winner and small-sized stocks. To increase portfolio returns, investors can use FIIs' cascades to inform their stock purchases.     

Geographic area disclosures under SFAS 131: materiality and fineness

This paper describes and evaluates certain aspects of the enterprise-wide geographic area disclosures provided by Fortune 500 companies in the implementation of SFAS 131, “Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information.” The first objective of this study is to determine how companies are complying with the materiality criterion of SFAS 131 for determining when an individual country is reportable. The second objective is to evaluate whether foreign operation disclosures provided by companies in accordance with SFAS 131 result in a finer set of information than was provided under SFAS 14. The results suggest that there is considerable diversity among companies in the way that materiality is defined, with a majority of companies that provide country-level disclosures using quantitative thresholds less than 10%. For a large percentage of companies, the information provided under SFAS 131 appears to be finer than the information provided under SFAS 14. However, a significant minority of companies has taken a step backward in this regard.     

CHALK AND CHEESE: GROUNDED THEORY CASE STUDIES OF THE INTRODUCTION AND USAGE OF ACTIVITY-BASED INFORMATION IN TWO BRITISH BANKS

During the conduct of a research project into influences on the use of management accounting information, the use of activity-based techniques and information in two British banks was studied by the application of grounded theory principles. Juxtaposition of these two case studies reveals insights about the managers' significantly different experiences of ongoing applications, and the different outcomes of implementation that may arise, despite commonality in the organization and industry environment. This paper presents these two case studies, highlights the similarities and differences between them, and draws some conclusions about the causes of the differences. Factors that can be managed to achieve a greater use of these particular management accounting techniques, and the information they generate, are revealed. In particular, the findings suggest that the introduction of transfer charging between the bank's internal units highlights the need for activity-based techniques, and that education, communication and implementor support are vital, both for implementation success and for the widespread continuing use of the resultant applications. Further, between the two cases the greatest consensus was found in a common concern about the amount of detail in the databank and reports.     

Capital budgeting, information timing, and the value of abandonment options

This paper investigates how an abandonment option influences the optimal timing of information in a sequential adverse selection capital budgeting model. While the divisional manager has imperfect private pre-contract information, headquarters can time whether the manager obtains perfect project information before (timely information) or after (delayed information) the contract is signed. In the absence of the abandonment option, headquarters favors timely (delayed) information if the investment costs are high (low). The presence of the abandonment option favors delayed information because under the timely information regime the value of the abandonment option is zero, whereas under the delayed information regime the value of the option is positive.     

Project selection based on intellectual capital scorecards

In this paper we present a tool for the selection of a project portfolio in knowledge intensive organizations. Standard methods mostly focus on project selection on the basis of expected returns. In many cases other strategic factors are important such as customer satisfaction, innovation capacity, and development of best practices. These factors should be considered in their interdependence during the process of project selection. Here the point of departure is the intellectual capital scorecard in which the indicators are periodically measured against a target. The scores constitute the input of a programming model. From the optimal portfolio computed, clear objectives for management can be derived. The method is illustrated in an industrial case study. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A theory of socialistic internal capital markets

We develop a model of a two-division firm in which the “strong” division has, on average, higher quality investment opportunities than the “weak” division. We show that, in the presence of agency and information problems, optimal effort incentives are less powerful and thus managerial effort is lower in the strong division. This leads the firm to bias its project selection policy against the strong division. The selection bias is more severe when there is a larger spread in the average quality of investment opportunities between the two divisions.     

Delegation and incentives

This article analyzes the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal‐agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority. The agent's subsequent choice of effort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project. We find that the consideration of effort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent. In fact, if the agent is protected by limited liability, delegation is never optimal.     

Information Aggregation Bias and Samuelson's Dictum

Under the assumption of incomplete information, idiosyncratic shocks may not dissipate in the aggregate. An econometrician who incorrectly imposes complete information and applies the law of large numbers may be susceptible to information aggregation bias. Tests of aggregate economic theory will be misspecified even though tests of the same theory at the microlevel deliver the correct inference. A testable implication of information aggregation bias is “Samuelson's Dictum” or the idea that stock prices can simultaneously display “microefficiency” and “macroinefficiency;” an idea accredited to Paul Samuelson. Using firm-level data from the Center for Research in Security Prices, we present empirical evidence consistent with Samuelson's dictum. Specifically, we conduct two standard tests of the linear present value model of stock prices: a regression of future dividend changes on the dividend-price ratio and a test for excess volatility. We show that the dividend price ratio forecasts the future growth in dividends much more accurately at the firm level as predicted by the present value model, and that excess volatility can be rejected for most firms. When the same firms are aggregated into equal-weighted or cap-weighted portfolios, the estimated coefficients typically deviate from the present value model and “excess” volatility is observed; this is especially true for aggregates (e.g., S&P 500) that are used in most asset pricing studies. To investigate the source of our empirical findings, we propose a theory of aggregation bias based on incomplete information and segmented markets. Traders specializing in individual stocks conflate idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks to dividends. To an econometrician using aggregate data, these assumptions generate a rejection of the present value model even though individual traders are efficiently using their available information.     

Private information and limitations of Heckman's estimator in banking and corporate finance research

Private information is a common problem in banking and corporate finance research. Heckman's (1979) two-step estimator is commonly used to test for sample selection using a simple t-test on the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) coefficient. Following Puri (1996), this test is often interpreted as a test for private information. We conduct a series of Monte Carlo simulations to show that researchers can reliably use the Heckman estimator to test for private information when this private information is random. However, private information often takes the form of an omitted variable with a deterministic relationship to selection and outcomes. In this case, we show that the IMR coefficient is biased and inconsistent and that t-tests lead to incorrect conclusions regarding the significance of private information as well as its impact on selection and outcomes. We illustrate our results using a unique case in prior literature in which a bank's prior information was revealed. In conclusion, the Heckman model cannot be interpreted as a test for private information (or sample selection) when private information takes the form of an omitted variable in the first-stage regression.     

凝聚多方力量 开创业内先河

"诚信、务实,拼搏、创新"是中国工商银行科技人员热情工作的理念基石与动力源泉。凭借这种精神,该行信息化成本核算和效益分析项目组在工作中用实践行动贯彻信息科技文化,努力攻关,自主创新研发了信息化成本核算和效益分析管理体系。在全行各部门的大力支持和     

Sequential Sales,Learning, and Cascades

When IPO shares are sold sequentially, later potential investors can learn from the purchasing decisions of earlier investors. This can lead rapidly to “cascades” in which subsequent investors optimally ignore their private information and imitate earlier investors. Although rationing in this situation gives rise to a winner's curse, it is irrelevant. The model predicts that: (1) Offerings succeed or fail rapidly. (2) Demand can be so elastic that even risk-neutral issuers underprice to completely avoid failure. (3) Issuers with good inside information can price their shares so high that they sometimes fail. (4) An underwriter may want to reduce the communication among investors by spreading the selling effort over a more segmented market.     

试论商业银行竞争情报系统的建立与应用

竞争情报系统的建立与应用是在市场经济条件下，商业银行评价自身的市场竞争力并提出改进策略的优良方法，也是商业银行在项目选择的可行性研究和商业银行发展战略研究中常用的手段。由于它是在全面搜集银行自身状况、同业动态、市场信息、政策环境等系统信息的基础上，采用了定性和定量相结合的、数模分析的科学方法，因此结果比较可靠，成为目前国内外银行采用的一种实用的辅助决策方法。本文强调要充分发挥竞争情报系统的重要作用，在构建竞争情报系统的同时保护好自身的竞争情报，使我国商业银行在进一步深化改革和对外开放的严峻环境下，能够在竞争中立于不败之地。