Australian Family Tax Reform and the Targeting Fallacy

Over recent decades, Australia's highly progressive, individual‐based taxation of families has been replaced by a system that tends towards joint taxation with an inverted U‐shaped rate scale. The reform has been implemented by introducing family‐income‐targeted child payments (now Family Tax Benefit Part A) and by lowering tax rates on higher incomes. The new system has shifted the burden of taxation to two‐earner families on low and average wages and, in particular, to working married mothers as second earners. For reasons of fairness and efficiency, we propose returning to more progressive individual taxation and universal family payments.     

Optimal income tax under the threat of migration by top-income earners

We examine how allowing individuals to emigrate to pay lower taxes changes the optimal nonlinear income tax scheme in a Mirrleesian economy. An individual emigrates if his domestic utility is less than his utility abroad, net of migration costs — utilities and costs both depending on productivity. A simple formula, that complements Saez's formula obtained in closed economy, is derived for the marginal tax rates faced by top-income earners. It depends on the labour elasticity, the tax rate abroad and the migration costs expressed as a fraction of the utility obtained abroad. The Rawlsian marginal tax rates, obtained for the whole population, illustrate a curse of the middle-skilled. Simulations are provided for the French economy.     

Voting over selfishly optimal tax schedules: Can Pigouvian tax redistribute income?

This paper studies pairwise majority voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules proposed by a continuum of individuals who differ in privately observable skills and make consumption comparisons, which creates a negative positional externality. It shows that the tax schedule preferred by the median skill type will win the voting contest. Given a reference consumption defined as the average consumption in the population, all skills face the same Pigouvian tax rate in the utilitarian optimum, whereas in selfish optima high skills face a Pigouvian tax rate larger than that facing low skills, generating a novel income redistributive effect. Under a constant elasticity of labor supply, two more results are obtained. First, for Pareto, Champernowne, Weibull, and lognormal skill distributions, the selfishly optimal tax schedule facing high (low) skills tends to be more progressive when the bottom‐skill's (top‐skill's) status concern intensifies. Second, it identifies the conditions under which, in the voting equilibrium, high skills face higher marginal tax rates while low skills face lower ones than what they face in the utilitarian optimum.     

Taxation and top incomes in Canada

We estimate the elasticity of reported income with respect to tax rates for high earners using sub‐national variation across Canadian provinces. We argue this allows for better identification of tax elasticities than the existing literature. We find that elasticities of reported income at the provincial level are large for incomes in the top 1%, but small for lower earners. There are strong indications that the response happens both through earned and capital income. While our estimated elasticities are large, changes in tax rates cannot explain much of the overall long‐run trend of higher income concentration in Canada.     

Redistributive taxation as social insurance

The modern literature on nonlinear optimal taxation treats differences in income as being due to unobserved differences in ability. A striking result of this assumption is that high income agents should face a zero marginal tax rate. In this paper I assume that differences in observed income are due to exogenous differences in luck. Hence the optimal redistributive tax involves trading off the benefits due to ‘social insurance’ with the costs due to reduced incentives. I derive the optimal forms for linear and nonlinear taxes, and compute some algebraic and numeric examples. Typically high income individuals will face quite high marginal tax rates.     

Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation with Habit Formation

It has recently been shown that incorporating “keeping up with the Joneses” preferences into a prototypical two‐ability‐type optimal nonlinear income tax model leads to higher marginal tax rates for both types of agents. In particular, the high‐skill type faces a positive marginal tax rate, rather than zero as in the conventional case. In this paper, agents’ utility functions are postulated to exhibit “habit formation in consumption” such that the prototypical two‐ability‐type optimal nonlinear income tax model becomes a dynamic analytical framework. We show that if the government can commit to its future fiscal policy, the presence of consumption habits does not affect the standard results on optimal marginal tax rates. By contrast, if the government cannot precommit, the high‐skill type will face a negative marginal tax rate, while the low‐skill type’s marginal tax rate remains positive.     

The incidence of income taxes on high earners in Canada

This article explores the “brain drain” explanation for the concentration of incomes in Canada during the past 30 years, namely, that high-skilled Canadians make use of high salaries on offer in the United States to extract higher salaries at home. If this is the case, then for a given level of US salaries, the threat to accept outside offers should be more credible when the Canadian dollar is depreciating against the US dollar, and weaker when the Canadian dollar is appreciating. The data are broadly consistent with this claim: income concentration worsened during the depreciations of the 1980s and 1990s, and eased when the Canadian dollar began to appreciate in value. The article develops a simple two-parameter model based on the propositions that high earners in Canada can use US salaries to bargain for higher salaries, and that Canadian high earners can shelter part of their income from personal income taxes. It also offers some preliminary evidence about the parameter values consistent with available data. The results suggest that higher top marginal personal income tax rates may potentially accentuate top-end after-tax income inequality. If high earners are able to use their bargaining power to extract pay increases to offset higher tax rates, then the burden of increased personal income taxes will be deflected elsewhere, and may even have the perverse effect of making the after-tax income distribution more unequal than it was before.     

The Redistributive Effects of a Minimum Wage Increase in New Zealand: A Microsimulation Analysis

This paper examines the potential effects on inequality and poverty of a minimum wage increase, based on a microsimulation model that captures the details of household composition and the income tax and welfare benefit system and allows for labour supply responses. Results suggest that, largely due to the composition of household incomes, a policy of increasing the minimum wage has a relatively small effect on the inequality of income per adult equivalent person, and a money metric utility measure, using several inequality indices. Hence, the minimum wage policy does not appear to be particularly well targeted, largely due to many low wage earners being secondary earners in higher income households, while many low income households have no wage earners at all. These results are reinforced when allowing for wage spillovers further up the wage distribution. Nevertheless, a minimum wage increase can have a more substantial effect on some poverty measures for sole parents in employment.     

Optimal tax treatment of private contributions for public goods with and without warm glow preferences

Tax-favored contributions for financing some public goods may be a useful part of optimal nonlinear income tax and expenditure policy. There are two sides to the potential gain from subsidized donations. First, for a given level of public good provision, higher private donations from high earners than low earners eases the incentive compatibility constraint for donors and so can raise social welfare. This follows since considering a lower-paid job includes a perception of a drop in public good provision. Second, private donation reduces consumption, easing the resource constraint. This paper explores optimal policy, using first a model with standard preferences and then a model with a warm glow of giving. In addition to showing the conditions for the level of public goods, the paper considers the pattern of optimal subsidization across earnings levels. Analysis of optimal taxation with warm glow preferences is sensitive to the choice of preferences that are relevant for a social welfare evaluation. After considering optimal rules with formulations of social welfare which do and do not include warm glow utility, the paper considers the choice of normative criterion. Like the earlier literature, this paper assumes that organizing private donations is costless while tax collection has a deadweight burden. Since private charitable fundraising is very far from costless, the paper is an exploration of economic mechanisms, not a direct guide to policy.     

Optimal income taxation when couples have endogenous bargaining power

This study examines the optimal income taxation for a two-earner household, where the couple bargains over their private goods consumption and time allocation between work and leisure. In the model, bargaining power is determined endogenously by the income gap between the two earners. Conventional studies have shown that the higher income tax rate should be imposed on the individual with the smaller wage elasticity, typically the individual with the higher productivity. In contrast to conventional argument, this study shows that the optimal tax rate on the household member with the higher productivity is lower than that of the individual with the lower productivity if the required tax revenue is relatively small and the influence of the gender income gap on the power balance of the couple is moderate. This is because such a tax structure encourages the labor supply of the individual with the higher productivity to mitigate the decrease in the household’s consumption induced by income taxation.     

Progressive Taxation and Wage Setting: Some Evidence for Denmark

The proposition that a progressive tax system contributes to wage moderation is studied using Danish earnings data disaggregated by occupation, gender and earnings level. Our main conclusions are that income-tax progression affects wage setting, but whether it moderates or exaggerates wage pressure is income dependent. An increase in progressivity reduces the pre-tax earnings of middle-income workers (manual male workers and moderate income earners among both male and female non-manual workers). The reverse is found for high-income earners (non-manual male workers), in that an increase in progressivity tends to raise pre-tax earnings. Finally, there is no significant effect of tax progressivity on the wages of low-income earners.
JEL classification : H 3; J 3; J 5; J 6     

Income distribution and redistribution through taxation: An international comparison

Income tax progressivity is studied with Generalized Entropy measures of inequality. Luxembourg Income Study data sets for nine countries are used for international comparison and analysis. progressivity indices are generated by using the Generalized Entropy family as well as Atkinson measures. We further our understanding by examining pre-tax and post-tax measures of inequality based respectively on gross and disposable household incomes. The decomposition property is shown to be desirable for enhancing our knowledge of income inequality and the redistributive effect of income taxes. Thus decomposition based on family size and number of earners is conducted. We learn that countries vary in their emphasis regarding redistributive effects of income taxes.     

Conditional Earnings Subsidies for Low Earners

In order to be eligible for in-work tax credits, it is often not enough to have low earnings. In Ireland, New Zeand the United Kingdom, for example, for eligibility, it is also required that the number of hours worked is sufficiently high. Similarly, in Belgium and France, the hourly wage rate must be sufficiently low. In this paper, I provide a justification for such additional conditions. I analyze Pareto-efficient redistribution from high to low ability individuals in a model where labor has several intensive margins. Besides labor hours, labor effort – a vector of unpleasant, but productive features of labor – is also an object of choice. Effort and ability determine the hourly wage rate. I find that conditional subsidies on earnings for low earners are optimal: the earnings of low earners should be subsidized at the margin, but only if they earn more by working more hours at a sufficiently low wage rate.     

Lifetime versus Annual Tax‐and‐Transfer Progressivity: Sweden, 1968–2009

In this paper, we analyze the evolution of tax‐and‐transfer progressivity in Sweden over both annual and lifetime horizons. Using a rich micro panel covering the period 1968–2009, we calculate tax rates over a cohort's entire working life cycle. Our main finding is that taxes are considerably less progressive over the lifetime than in any single year. Social insurance transfers to transitory low‐income earners account for most of this result. We offer a number of robustness checks of the measurement of lifetime incomes and progressivity, but none of them changes our overall findings.     

On Optimal Commodity Taxes When Consumption Is Time Consuming

This paper studies the problem of optimal taxation of commodities when consumption is a time‐consuming activity. This is done under two distinct preference separability assumptions: between goods and labor supply, and between goods and leisure. It argues that with the labor separability, the traditional uniform taxation results of optimal tax theory continue to hold. With leisure separability, on the other hand, consumption time is a major ingredient of optimal tax rates. However, the relationship between consumption time and optimal tax rates depends crucially on the representation of the economy. In representative consumer economies, time differences determine the pattern of optimal tax rates so that goods whose consumption take more time are subjected to higher tax rates. When individuals have different earning abilities, redistributive, incentive, and efficiency considerations also come into play resulting in a complex relationship. The paper derives formulas for optimal commodity taxes in this case on the basis of three different tax structures: linear commodity taxes in combination with linear and nonlinear income taxes, and nonlinear commodity taxes in combination with nonlinear income taxes.     

Optimal Taxation in Life-Cycle Economies

We use a very standard life-cycle growth model, in which individuals have a labor-leisure choice in each period of their lives, to prove that an optimizing government will almost always find it optimal to tax or subsidize interest income. The intuition for our result is straightforward. In a life-cycle model the individual's optimal consumption-work plan is almost never constant and an optimizing government almost always taxes consumption goods and labor earnings at different rates over an individual's lifetime. One way to achieve this goal is to use capital and labor income taxes that vary with age. If tax rates cannot be conditioned on age, a nonzero tax on capital income is also optimal, as it can (imperfectly) mimic age-conditioned consumption and labor income tax rates. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E62, H21.     

Optimal taxation and discount rate for public investment in a growth setting

This paper studies the optimal policy of a government which maximizes intertemporal social welfare using such instruments as taxes on interest income and wages, and debt in conjunction with public investment. In doing so, it has to face a decentralized economy where in each generation individuals and firms are free to maximize their own objectives subject to their own private constraints. The welfare function is a sum of discounted generational utilities and its maximization is handled by using dynamic programming. From the first order conditions so derived, it appears that an optimal policy of taxation and public capital accumulation is that which sets the tax rates according to Ramsey's optimal taxation structure and which equates the rate of return on public investment to the rate of social time preference.     

Altruism,jealousy and the theory of optimal non-linear taxation

This paper studies optimal non-linear taxes in a world in which there is altruism and jealousy. A formula for optimal marginal tax rates is derived which turns out to be a simple and intuitively appealing extension of a result due to Mirrlees. The paper shows that in this sort of economy all of optimal tax theory's general results either no longer hold or need not hold, and it sets out appropriate modifications to standard tax rules.     

Depreciation and interest deductions and the effect of the corporation income tax on investment: A comment

When all jobs are full time and workers cannot substitute alternative jobs, the skills of workers are observable. Nevertheless, the optimum may involve a benefit for those who choose not to work (making their skills unobservable). When the tax structure and benefit for nonworkers are chosen to maximize welfare, they tradeoff the social marginal utility of consumption against the needed incentive to work. In contrast to more conventional models, the optimal tax schedule may have discontinuities and may involve subsidization of the work of low earners.     

Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation

This paper analyses the set of Pareto efficient tax structures. The formulation of the problem as one of self-selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems (such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist) which have recently been the subject of extensive research, but also allows the derivation of a number of new results. We establish (i) under fairly weak conditions, randomization of tax structures is desirable; (ii) if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production, then the general equilibrium effects—until now largely ignored in the literature—of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure; in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor, the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals, and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals (the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution); (iii) if individuals differ in their preferences, Pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes; while (iv) if wage income is stochastic, the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100%.Our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic.