1-share orders and trades

1-share trades are the most common odd lot trade size, accounting for 9.62% of all odd lot transactions and 3.65% of all trades on NASDAQ in 2012. While 50.41% of 1-share trades result from broken orders, 34.89% of 1-share trades are intentional. We provide substantial evidence that traders use 1-share trades to “ping” for hidden liquidity. In particular, our results indicate that 1-share trades are disproportionately aggressive and also execute against hidden liquidity more than any other odd lot trade size. We also find a relative increase in trading immediately following a 1-share trade. Our results are in line with Clark-Joseph (2014), who suggests that traders may use small, unprofitable trades to detect information from other traders. Specifically, 1-share trades represent the minimum cash outlay necessary to trade, while simultaneously producing the smallest possible effects on a market maker's inventory, and in turn, a security's price.     

Odd Lot Trades: The Behavior,Characteristics, and Information Content,Over Time

I investigate the role odd lot trades play in equity markets, and how this role changes over four periods: 2005, 2007, 2010, and 2012. In each of these years, I examine the determinants, price contribution, and characteristics of odd lot trading. I find that odd lot proportions are increasing, but the determinants of the proportions remain consistent. I find that odd lot transactions contribute to price formation, this contribution is in excess of the odd lot proportion of volume, and is increasing over time. An intraweek pattern of odd lot trading exists with Monday having the highest proportions.     

Odd lot trading and earnings announcements

This study investigates odd lot trading, both trades and orders, around quarterly earnings announcements to determine whether odd lot traders are informed regarding the information contained in earnings announcements. We find pre-announcement odd lot order imbalances are not positively correlated with post-announcement returns and odd lot traders do not earn excess returns. Portfolios long stocks highly bought by odd lot traders in the pre-announcement period and short stocks highly sold by odd lot traders do not outperform the market. We conclude that odd lot traders are not in possession of earnings announcement information prior to its release to the public.     

You can’t always get what you want: Trade-size clustering and quantity choice in liquidity

This paper examines whether investors care more about trading their exact quantity demands at some times than at others. Using a new data set of foreign exchange transactions, I find that customers trade more precise quantities at quarter-end, as evidenced by less trade-size clustering. Customers trade more odd lots and fewer round lots, while the number of trades and total volume are not significantly changed. I also find that the price impact of order flow is greater when customers care more about trading precise quantities. This work sheds new light on trade-size clustering and offers a potential explanation for time-series and cross-sectional variation in common liquidity measures.     

In search of retail investors: The effect of retail investor attention on odd lot trades

We study the effect of retail investor attention on odd lot trading. We observe that increases in abnormal Google search volume predict odd-lot trading. Importantly, this relationship is share price-sensitive: For stocks priced below $11, an increase in abnormal search volume leads to less odd lot trading. For stocks priced above $46, on the other hand, an increase in abnormal search volume leads to more odd lot trading. For a stock priced at $78 – the mean share price in our sample – a one standard deviation increase of abnormal search volume increases the average share of odd lot trading by 10 basis points. This effect is even stronger for more expensive stocks. Our results are consistent with attention-induced trading when investors face wealth constraints and are robust to alternative channels including news and institutional investor attention.     

Competition among Trading Venues: Information and Trading on Electronic Communications Networks

This paper explores the competition between two trading venues, Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) and Nasdaq market makers. ECNs offer the advantages of anonymity and speed of execution, which attract informed traders. Thus, trades are more likely to occur on ECNs when information asymmetry is greater and when trading volume and stock‐return volatility are high. ECN trades have greater permanent price impacts and more private information is revealed through ECN trades than though market‐maker trades. However, ECN trades have higher ex ante trading costs because market makers can preference or internalize the less informed trades and offer them better executions.     

Ex‐Dividend Profitability and Institutional Trading Skill

We use institutional trading data to examine whether skilled institutions exploit positive abnormal ex‐dividend returns. Results show that institutions concentrate trading around certain ex‐dates, and earn higher profits around these events. Dividend capture trades represent 6% of all institutional buy trades but contribute 15% of overall abnormal returns. Institutional dividend capture trading is persistent. Institutional ex‐day profitability is also strongly cross‐sectionally related to trade execution skill. The relation between execution skill and profits disappears around placebo non‐ex‐days. Results suggest that skilled institutions target certain opportunities rather than benefiting uniformly over time. Furthermore, only skilled institutions can profit from dividend capture.     

IPO Trading without Market Makers or Underwriter Price Support

We investigate the trading behavior and liquidity supply of Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs) that trade in an order‐driven market system with pure limit order books where no market makers or price support is allowed. We find large trades and quoted depths dominate the first day of trading, but this pattern quickly reverses as small trades and quoted depths are more prevalent on subsequent trading days. Quoted depths are positively related to the number of shares offered in the IPO and trade size, but are negatively related to underpricing. Trade size and transaction immediacy are positively related, and large and positive (negative) order imbalance is associated with more aggressive buys (sells). Finally, long‐run performance is not related to initial order imbalance. Overall, our results suggest that despite underwriters not participating in the IPO aftermarket, liquidity provision evolves very quickly and price discovery is immediately reflected in prices.     

Words versus Deeds: Evidence from Post‐Call Manager Trades

We examine the impact of conference call tones on the direction and magnitude of subsequent manager trades. Our univariate results show that corporate insiders buy company shares following negative‐tone conference calls and sell shares following positive‐tone conference calls. This inverse call tone–trading pattern holds for both managers’ introductory sessions and subsequent question‐and‐answer (Q&A) sessions. Our multivariate results confirm the univariate call tone–trading patterns and show that contrarian manager trades are mostly driven by managerial selling activity. In contrast to the consistent and strong evidence of managers trading in the opposite direction of their call tones, we find no evidence of managers trading in the same direction of their call tones. We also examine the impact of analyst Q&A challenges on post‐call manager trades. Our findings suggest that managers learn from analyst feedback and adjust their post‐call trades accordingly.     

INFORMATION AND NOISE IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM THE E‐MINI INDEX FUTURES

I examine the informational contributions and effects on transitory volatility of trades initiated by different types of traders in three actively traded index futures markets. The results show that trades initiated by exchange member firms account for more than 60% of price discovery during the trading day. These institutional trades appear to be more informative than trades of individual exchange members or off‐exchange traders. I also find that off‐exchange traders introduce more noise into the prices than do exchange members. My findings provide new evidence on the role of different types of traders in the price formation process.     

Liquidity in a Market for Unique Assets: Specified Pool and To‐Be‐Announced Trading in the Mortgage‐Backed Securities Market

Agency mortgage‐backed securities (MBS) trade simultaneously in a market for specified pools (SPs) and in the to‐be‐announced (TBA) forward market. TBA trading creates liquidity by allowing thousands of different MBS to be traded in a handful of TBA contracts. SPs that are eligible to be traded as TBAs have significantly lower trading costs than other SPs. We present evidence that TBA eligibility, in addition to characteristics of TBA‐eligible SPs, lowers trading costs. We show that dealers hedge SP inventory with TBA trades, and they are more likely to prearrange trades in SPs that are difficult to hedge.     

Synthetic Trades and Calendar Day Patterns The Case of the Dollar/Sterling Markets

Significant day of the week patterns are shown to exist in the dollar/sterling market. These patterns are associated with the returns to synthetic and actual forward trades as well as to spot trades. These trading strategies, geared to buying or selling sterling, reflect different timing, if not valuation, considerations on the part of traders. Nevertheless, pronounced calendar patterns are observed on Wednesdays for all the trading strategies evaluated. This is attributable to significantly different risks on Wednesdays. The observed end‐of‐the‐week patterns in forward returns persist and reinforce the returns at the start of the next week of trading. Furthermore, the overall returns to forward speculation on Fridays and Mondays are of opposite sign. Our results on calendar day patterns are thus supported by both parametric and non‐parametric tests. We provide evidence that the frequency of synthetic trading opportunities is inversely related to maturity. We also find that the period of market turbulence analyzed did not trigger abnormal opportunities for covered interest arbitrage.     

TRADE SIZE AND INFORMED TRADING: WHICH TRADES ARE “BIG”?

We find adverse‐selection spread components increase sharply in the ratio of trade size to quoted depth, and spike when trade size equals quoted depth. We find that two previously documented and prominent indicators of informed trading, raw trade size and high‐trading volume half‐hours, offer almost no explanatory power for informed trading measures beyond trade size to quoted depth, and a third indicator, time of day, offers no explanatory power among trades with high trade size to quoted depth. Our results suggest trade size to quoted depth is perhaps the single most important indicator that a trade is informed.     

THE CHOICE OF TRADING VENUE AND RELATIVE PRICE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL TRADING: ADRs VERSUS THE UNDERLYING SECURITIES IN THEIR LOCAL MARKETS

We address two important themes associated with institutions’ trading in foreign markets: (1) the choice of trading venues (between a company's listing in its home market and that in the United States as an American Depositary Receipt [ADR]) and (2) the comparison of trading costs across the two venues. We identify institutional trading in both venues using proprietary institutional trading data. Overall, our research underscores the intuition that the choice of institutional trading in a stock's local market or as an ADR is a complex process that embodies variables that measure the relative adverse selection and liquidity at order, stock, and country levels. Institutions route a higher percentage of trades to more liquid markets, and these trades are associated with higher cumulative abnormal returns. We also find that institutional trading costs are generally lower for trading cross‐listed stocks on home exchanges even after controlling for selection bias.     

Early Movers Advantage? Evidence from Short Selling during After‐Hours on Earnings Announcement Days

We examine short sellers’ after‐hours trading (AHT) following quarterly earnings announcements released outside of the normal trading hours. Our innovation is to use the actual short trades immediately after the announcements. We find that on these earnings announcement days, there is significant shorting activity in AHT relative to shorting activity both during AHT on nonannouncements days and during regular trading sessions around announcements. Short sellers who trade after‐hours on announcement days earn an excess return of 0.82% and 1.40% during before‐market‐open (BMO) and after‐market‐close (AMC)sessions, respectively. The magnitude of these returns increases to 1.48 (3.92%) for BMO (AMC) earnings announcements with negative surprise. We find that the reactive short selling during AHT has information in predicting future returns. Short sellers’ trades have no predictive power if they wait for the market to open to trade during regular hours. In addition, we find that the weighted price contribution during AHT increases with an increase in after‐hours short selling. Overall, our results suggest that short sellers in AHT are informed. Our findings remain robust using alternative holding periods and after controlling for macroeconomic news announcements during BMO sessions.     

Intraday Patterns in the Cross‐section of Stock Returns

Motivated by the literature on investment flows and optimal trading, we examine intraday predictability in the cross‐section of stock returns. We find a striking pattern of return continuation at half‐hour intervals that are exact multiples of a trading day, and this effect lasts for at least 40 trading days. Volume, order imbalance, volatility, and bid‐ask spreads exhibit similar patterns, but do not explain the return patterns. We also show that short‐term return reversal is driven by temporary liquidity imbalances lasting less than an hour and bid‐ask bounce. Timing trades can reduce execution costs by the equivalent of the effective spread.     

Insider Trading and Financing Constraints

Insider trading may alleviate financing constraints by conveying value‐relevant information to the market (the information effect) or may exacerbate financing constraints by impairing market liquidity and distorting insiders’ incentives to disclose value‐relevant information (the confidence effect). We examine the significance of these two contrasting effects by investigating the link between insider trading and financing constraints as measured by the investment‐cash flow sensitivity. We find that, overall insider trading exacerbates financing constraints; however the information effect dominates the confidence effect for insider purchases. Only trades by executive directors are significantly related to financing constraints.     

Does informed trading occur in the options market? Some revealing clues

This paper analyses the relationship between proxy variables for informed trading in the options market and a set of exogenous news variables. The aim was to test directly for the presence or absence of informed trading in the options market and for the possible impact of this trading on underlying asset prices. Our findings reveal that potential informed trading in options markets is channelled basically through out‐of‐the‐money options, except for volatility trading which mainly involves at‐the‐money options because of their liquidity. In both cases, we have found evidence in favour of investors’ strategic fragmentation of transactions into intermediate size trades (stealth trading). Finally, it is shown that lack of consensus among agents also generates increased trading, particularly in out‐of‐the‐money and at‐the‐money options.     

The Market Evaluation of Information in Directors' Trades

The purpose of this paper is to examine the propensity, characteristics and performance of directors' trades. Consistent with prior research we show that on average, directors outperform the market. However, we also find that there exist a large number of trades which do not share these abnormal share price returns and consequently have little information content. This has important consequences for market participants who use director trading activity as a signal for their own trading strategies. Using different measures of directors' trades based on trade characteristics, we report that purchases by directors are more informative than sales. In addition, the number of directors trading within a twenty day window and the percentage of the directors' holding that is being traded are both important factors in the abnormal share price performance following the trade.     

MARKET STRUCTURE AND TRADING VOLUME

Historically, trading volume reported for NASDAQ stocks has been overstated vis‐à‐vis New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks, both because of the dealer's participation in trades as a market maker and because of interdealer trading. Beginning in 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission changed order‐handling rules and trade‐reporting rules, which may have reduced or eliminated the overstatement of NASDAQ trading. We examine trading volumes of firms changing from NASDAQ to the NYSE since 1997 and document that reported trading volume for NASDAQ stocks continues to be overstated. Moreover, the degree of overstatement is much larger for firms with high trading volume.