Untangling Goal Tensions in Family Firms: A Sensemaking Approach

While economic and non-economic goals may converge in the long term, they often lead to tensions for organizational decision-makers in the short term, especially in family firms that place much emphasis on family-related goals. We draw on a sensemaking approach to investigate such potential tensions in the decision-making of family firms. Based on a qualitative analysis of 59 interviews, 501 items of archival data and 39 observations from eight private Irish firms, we explore the perceived goal tensions of family firm decision-makers as they seek to balance economic and non-economic goals. We identify three sensemaking mechanisms – ensuring continuity in the family firm, preserving family cohesion, and delegating responsibilities to trusted advisors – that assist family firm decision-makers in managing these goal tensions. Moreover, we identify that sensegiving based on three different values – sense of commitment, community embeddedness, and family firm identity – helps family firm decision-makers to justify and communicate their decisions. Our model contributes to a more granular understanding of the management of goal tensions and of decision-making in family firms by going beyond the question of whether family firms prioritize economic or non-economic; instead, it reveals concrete processes showing how firms balance and aim to incorporate both goals. Furthermore, we advance knowledge on sensemaking in family firms by revealing how sensemaking can explain idiosyncratic family firm behaviour and by showing how family firm decision-makers use specific values when ‘giving sense’ to justify their decisions.     

Private Environmental Activism and the Selection and Response of Firm Targets

Environmental activists are increasingly resorting to private strategies such as boycotts and protests focused on changing individual firms' behavior. In this paper, we examine activists' use of such "private politics" to engender firm compliance with activist objectives. We begin by developing a simple theoretical model of an activist campaign from which we develop a set of empirical hypotheses based on a set of observable features of firms. We test our hypotheses using a unique dataset of environmental activist campaigns against firms in the United States from 1988 to 2003. This paper fills an important need in the literature as one of the first empirical attempts to examine the private political strategies of activists and has important implications for the burgeoning literatures on industry self-regulation and the nonmarket strategies of firms.     

Emotional framing of NGO press releases: Reformative versus radical NGOs

Drawing on the literature on framing, we explore the emotional framing differences in radical and reformative NGOs over time. We analyse the sentiment of a sample of 5880 press releases issued by five NGOs positioned differently on the reformative-radical spectrum and examine how they address large companies. Our findings reveal an increasing polarisation of sentiment in these NGOs' framing, with individual NGOs gravitating towards ideal-type radical or reformative positions, respectively. In alignment with the differences in their framing, we observe differences in their approaches to cross-sector partnerships. Policymakers need to note the implications of the observed polarisation for the effectiveness and credibility of cross-sector partnerships and multi-stakeholder initiatives more generally, given the risk of co-optation (for reformative NGOs) as well as the risk of foregoing significant funding and governance opportunities (for radical NGOs).     

Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy

This paper provides a theory of private politics in which an activist seeks to change the production practices of a firm for the purpose of redistribution to those whose interests it supports. The source of the activist's influence is the possibility of support for its cause by the public. The paper also addresses the issue of corporate social responsibility by distinguishing among corporate redistribution as motivated by profit maximization, altruism, and threats by the activist. Private politics and corporate social responsibility not only have a direct effect on the costs of the firm, but also have a strategic effect by altering the competitive positions affirms in an industry. From an integrated-strategy perspective the paper investigates the strategic implications of private politics and corporate social responsibility for the strategies of rival firms when one or both are targets of an activist campaign. Implications for empirical analysis are derived from the theory.     

Exporting firms and retail internationalization: Evidence from France

This paper questions the impact of the globalization of the retail sector on the export activity of origin country agri‐food firms. We use an original firm‐level database of French agri‐food exports that identifies the domestic suppliers of French retailers through certification with the private International Featured Standard (IFS). The results show that IFS certified French firms are more likely to export and export larger volumes than noncertified firms to markets where French retailers have established outlets. We also show that when French retailers stop their activities in a market, certified firms reduce their exports to this market in the following years. The results are robust to the use of different sets of firm‐year‐ and country‐year‐specific controls and fixed effects, and are not affected by possible selection and endogeneity biases. The difference in the behavior of certified and noncertified exporting firms on markets where French retailers operate confirms the network effect that benefits retailers’ suppliers, which is lost when French retailers exit from the destination country.     

Cross listing,disclosure regimes,and trading volume sensitivity to stock returns

In this paper, we propose that investors of cross-listed firms use trading volume to revise their perception of firms’ value. We further propose that firms that cross list from low-disclosure regimes (usually from emerging economies) have higher trading volume sensitivity to returns than those that cross list from high-disclosure regimes (usually from developed economies), as those from low-disclosure regimes have relatively lax and less stringent disclosure requirements. We use a sample of foreign firms that are cross listed in the U.S. as exchange-listed American Depositary Receipts, adopted the international financial reporting standards (formerly international accounting standards), and filed Form 20-F reconciliation with the U.S. Securities and Exchanges Commission during the period of 1994–2005. Using these firms and a matched-sample of U.S. firms based on exchange, industry and firm size, we document results supporting our hypotheses. Our results have implications for policy makers, regulators and academics.     

Saints and Markets: Activists and the Supply of Credence Goods

This paper contains a theoretical exploration of the potential effects of an information-supplying activist on a market for credence goods. Using a non-cooperative game-theoretic model with incomplete information, we find that such an activist can alter the decisions of firms and consumers and enhance the social welfare of market exchange. We also find that an activist can support equilibria in which firms differentiate their products on some credence characteristic even though this characteristic remains unknown to the consumer both prior and subsequent to consumption. In general, our analysis has several implications for the study of private collective action in markets.     

The relationship between private investors and small firms: an agency theory approach

Many small firms in Sweden are characterized by a lack of equity capital. For several years measures to increase the equity capital have been discussed. In this discussion the private investors' market has received virtually no attention. This study presents some preliminary results of the private investors in Sweden.

The research in small firms financing is characterized by a lack of theoretical framework. One basic assumption in the study is that agency theory can provide an essential framework to explain the interaction between the private investor and entrepreneur. Twenty-five hypotheses generated from agency theory are formulated and tested on 62 small unlisted firms in Sweden. Multiple regression analysis is used for the causal analyses.

The empirical results in the study show inter alia that the geographic distance and the private investor's knowledge about the portfolio firm's transformation process seem to be the most influential factors for determining the private investor's involvement in the portfolio firms. It is also interesting to notice that none of the variables, frequency of contacts and the private investor's operational work in the portfolio firm affect the performance of the firm. Contrary to conventional wisdom, private investors do not add value to their portfolio firms through their interaction with the entrepreneurs.

The theoretical conclusion is that agency theory does not provide any satisfactory framework to explain the private investor - entrepreneur relationship. Some of the basic assumptions in agency theory seem to be invalid. A model for the relationship between private investors and entrepreneurs is developed in which four interaction strategies are identified. The model gives implications on two levels: the portfolio level and the individual case level.     

Supply Chain Management as Private Sector Regulation: What does it Mean for Business Strategy and Public Policy?

The growing practice of environmental supply chain management by firms constitutes private sector regulation that is analogous in many ways to public sector regulation. Similarly to their public counterparts, private sector regulators set standards, apply standards, monitor for compliance, apply sanctions and require corrective action. Private sector regulation differs, however, in the source of authority, external oversight, analytical requirements, public participation and available sanctions. This article argues that supply chain management by firms goes beyond business objectives by creating positive environmental externalities for society, and that more systematic study of the similarities and contrasts between the two forms of regulation may provide valuable lessons for both. Further, it may be possible to increase the effectiveness of private sector regulation to achieve both public societal and private business goals. From a business perspective, supply chain management enables firms to strategically redefine their relationships with government, reduce uncertainty and promote goal‐oriented collaboration. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

A Positive Theory of Moral Management, Social Pressure, and Corporate Social Performance

This paper provides a theory of firm behavior motivated by moral duty, self-interest, and social pressure. A morally managed and a self-interested firm compete in a market in which their corporate social performance (CSP) provides product differentiation. Some citizens have altruistic or warm glow preferences for products with associated CSP, personal giving to social causes, holding shares in firms providing CSP, and contributing to social pressure to increase CSP. Social pressure is delivered by an activist NGO funded by voluntary contributions by citizens. The model characterizes an equilibrium in the product market, the capital market, and the market for social pressure. The equilibrium establishes a price for CSP and for activist-induced social pressure. The theory provides predictions of the market values of firms, the prices of products, firm profits, target selection, contributions to the activist, and the amount of CSP supplied. For example, if citizens do not distinguish between morally motivated CSP and CSP induced by social pressure, the activist is more likely to target the softer, morally motivated firm. Higher quality activists are better funded, target self-interested firms, and obtain greater corporate social performance. Lower quality activists target morally managed firms.     

Identifying the effects of firing restrictions through size-contingent differences in regulation

We study the effects of the more stringent employment protection legislation (EPL) that applies in Italy to firms with over 15 employees. We consider firms' propensity to grow when close to that threshold and changes in employment policies when they pass it. Using a comprehensive matched employer–employees dataset, we find that the probability of firms' growth is reduced by around 2 percentage points near the threshold. Using the stochastic transition matrix for firm size, we compute the long-run effects of EPL on the size distribution, finding that they are quantitatively modest. We also find that, contrary to the implications of more stringent firing restrictions, workers in firms just above the threshold have on average less stable employment relations than those just below it. We document that this might be because firms above the threshold make greater use of flexible employment contracts, arguably to circumvent the stricter regulation on open-end contracts.     

Private Politics

This paper introduces the subject of private politics, presents a research agenda, and provides an example involving activists and a firm. Private politics addresses situations of conflict and their resolution without reliance on the law or government. It encompasses the political competition over entitlements in the status quo, the direct competition for support from the public, bargaining over the resolution of the conflict, and the maintenance of the agreed-to private ordering. The term private means that the parties do not rely on public order, i.e., lawmaking or the courts. The term politics refers to individual and collective action in situations in which people attempt to further their interests by imposing their will on others. Four models of private politics are discussed: (1) informational competition between an activist and a firm for support from the public, (2) decisions by citizen consumers regarding a boycott, (3) bargaining to resolve the boycott, and (4) the choice of an equilibrium private ordering to govern the ongoing conflicting interests of the activist and the firm.     

Greenwash: Corporate Environmental Disclosure under Threat of Audit

We develop an economic model of “greenwash,” in which a firm strategically discloses environmental information and an activist may audit and penalize the firm for disclosing positive but not negative aspects of its environmental profile. We fully characterize the model's equilibria, and derive a variety of predictions about disclosure behavior. We rationalize conflicting results in the empirical literature, finding a nonmonotonic relationship between a firm's expected environmental performance and its environmental disclosures. Greater activist pressure deters greenwash, but induces some firms to disclose less about their environmental performance. Environmental management systems discourage firms with poor expected environmental performance from greenwashing, which may justify public policies encouraging firms to adopt them.     

Dominant CEO,Deviant Strategy,and Extreme Performance: The Moderating Role of a Powerful Board

This study examines the effect of dominant CEOs – defined as CEOs who are very powerful relative to other executives in their top management teams – on firm strategy and performance. Based on a sample of 51 publicly traded, single‐business firms from the US computer industry for the period 1997–2003, our results suggest that firms with dominant CEOs tend to have a strategy deviant from the industry central tendency and thus extreme performance – either big wins or big losses. Further, powerful boards weaken the tendency of dominant CEOs towards extremeness and, more important, improve the likelihood of dominant CEOs having big wins versus big losses. This study reconciles the pessimistic and heroic views regarding dominant CEOs, and suggests that the notion of power balance should be considered in a broader context.     

Competing for the Public Through the News Media

Interest groups seek to influence economic activity through public and private politics. Public politics takes place in the arena of public institutions, whereas private politics takes place outside public institutions often in the arena of public sentiment. Private politics refers to action by interest groups directed at private parties, as in the case of an activist group launching a campaign against a firm. This paper presents a model of informational competition between an activist and an industry, where both interest groups seek to influence public sentiment and do so by advocating their positions through the news media. Citizen consumers make both a private consumption decision and a collective choice on the regulation of a product that has an externality associated with it. In the absence of the news organization, the collective choice is not to regulate. The activist and the industry obtain private, hard information on the seriousness of the externality and provide favorable information to the news media and may conceal unfavorable information. The news media can conduct investigative journalism to obtain its own information, and based on that information and the information it has received from its sources, provides a news report to the public. Because of its role in society, the media has an incentive to bias its report, and the direction of bias is toward regulation. Its bias serves to mitigate both market failure by decreasing demand and a government failure by shifting votes in favor of regulation. The activist then has incentive to conceal information unfavorable to its interests, whereas the industry fully reveals its information.     

Firms’ linkages with public research organisations in Argentina: Drivers, perceptions and behaviours

This paper analyses firms’ drivers for linking to public research organisations (PRO) (first goal) and compares perceptions and behaviours of linked vs. unlinked firms (second goal). We used an original firm database constructed from a representative survey with information for linked and unlinked firms for year 2005 in Argentina. Drivers were estimated using a Probit model, while differences in perceptions and behaviours between linked and unlinked firms were assessed with propensity score matching techniques. For our first goal we found that (i) firms’ knowledge bases were not drivers for linking to PRO and (ii) networking capabilities matter but there is a substitution effect between interacting with PRO and interacting with other economic agents in the market when firms aim at exchanging information rather than doing joint research. These findings may imply that current linkages are not exploiting properly their knowledge potential; it may be worth designing a division of labour among PRO in their functions in PRO-industry interactions. For our second goal: we found that (i) linked firms invest more in innovative activities; (ii) they are more prone to patenting; (iii) both groups of firms value similarly PRO research outputs available at arm length (i.e. without direct linking). Given the asymmetric development on appropriability tools between PRO and firms and the fact that all firms benefit from PRO research outputs, the higher predisposition of linked firms towards patenting, suggests that special attention should be placed at analysing the risks of a private appropriation of publicly created knowledge.     

Skill shortages and labor market outcomes in Central Europe

The new Central European members of the EU have been characterized by low employment rates, especially among unskilled workers, despite the GDP recoveries and large private sector shares in output and employment. Evidence points at skill shortages in Central Europe as a key impediment to faster labor reallocation and convergence to the EU-15 employment structures. In this paper, we develop a simple model of labor reallocation with transaction costs and show how skill shortages can inhibit firm creation and increase income inequality. We use the model to examine the impact of training subsidies and their financing on skill acquisition and start-ups of new private firms, and show that the positive effect of subsidies would be mostly offset by high wage taxes. Shifting financing from wage to consumption taxes would improve incentives for workers’ training and firm start-ups, while relying more on income taxes could reduce the income gap between workers and entrepreneurs.     

The Relationship between Slack Resources and the Performance of Entrepreneurial Firms: The Role of Venture Capital and Angel Investors

In this study, we seek to further delineate factors that condition the relationship between slack resources and firm performance. To do so, we develop and test a model that establishes the role of venture capital (VC) and angel investors as powerful external stakeholders who positively moderate the slack–performance relationship. In addition, we provide more insight into this relationship by examining differences between these two types of private investors and by examining the role of their ownership stakes. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 1215 private firms, including VC‐backed firms, angel‐backed firms, and similar firms without such investors. We find that the presence of VC investors positively moderates the relationship between both financial and human slack resources and firm performance, while angel investors only positively moderate the effect of human resource slack. Further, VC investors are only marginally better at helping entrepreneurs to extract value from human resource slack than angel investors and they are no better when it comes to financial slack. Finally, we find that the impact of financial and human resource slack on firm performance is more positive in VC‐backed firms when investors hold high ownership stakes, an effect which is significantly stronger than when angel investors hold high ownership stakes.     

管理者激励机制、内部竞争与兼并效应分析

参与兼并企业作为子企业存在于兼并所形成的新企业时,新企业的所有者可能对子企业管理者设置与内部所有子企业利润都相关的激励机制,文章即对这种情形建立了两阶段博弈模型考察横向兼并效应问题。结果表明,当少于市场企业数目50％的企业进行兼并时,新企业所有者将确定导致内部竞争的管理者激励机制,社会福利将会增加;此时,兼并活动对参与兼并企业是有利的,对未参与兼并企业是不利的,从而部分地消除了“兼并悖论”。     

CEO optimism,CEO selection,compensation, and corporate investment decision: The case of CEOs who were rehired as CEOs by another firms after turnover

What happens to CEOs after they are let go by their firm? This study is designed to investigate CEOs who are rehired as CEOs by another firms after turnover. CEOs defined as “moderately optimistic” and those who left voluntarily from their departing firms, are younger, have better prior performance, and work in larger firms are found to have a greater likelihood of being rehired as a CEO by another employer. Moreover, new-hire firms with higher growth opportunity and higher R&D expenditures are found to be significantly more willing to hire overconfident CEOs. Furthermore, more-optimistic CEOs are found to receive higher total compensation from their new-hire firms than CEOs who are less optimistic. Finally, overconfident CEOs working in firms with high growth opportunity and higher R&D show a significantly greater tendency toward increasing firm investment.