Competition from Large, Multimarket Firms and the Performance of Small, Single-Market Firms: Evidence from the Banking Industry

We offer and test two competing hypotheses for the consolidation trend in banking using U.S. banking industry data over the period 1982–2000. Under the efficiency hypothesis , technological progress improved the performance of large, multimarket firms relative to small, single-market firms, whereas under the hubris hypothesis , consolidation was largely driven by corporate hubris. Our results are consistent with an empirical dominance of the efficiency hypothesis over the hubris hypothesis—on net, technological progress allowed large, multimarket banks to compete more effectively against small, single-market banks in the 1990s than in the 1980s. We also isolate the extent to which technological progress occurred through scale versus geographic effects and how they affected the performance of small, single-market banks through revenues versus costs. The results may shed light as well on some of the research and policy issues related to community banking.     

On the implications of market power in banking: Evidence from developing countries

This paper investigates how different degrees of market power affect bank efficiency and stability in the context of developing economies. It sheds light on the competition-stability nexus by documenting and analyzing the complex interactions between a tripod of variables that are central for regulators: the degree of market power, bank cost and profit efficiency, and overall firm stability. The results show that an increase in the degree of market power leads to greater bank stability and enhanced profit efficiency, despite significant cost efficiency losses. The findings lend empirical justification to the traditional view that increased competition may undermine bank stability, and may bear significant implications for stressed banking systems in developing economies.     

Exchange Rate Pass‐Through,Domestic Competition,and Inflation: Evidence from the 2005–08 Revaluation of the Renminbi

Import competition from China is pervasive in the sense that for many good categories, the competitive environment that U.S. firms face in these markets is strongly driven by the prices of Chinese imports, and so is their pricing decision. This paper quantifies the effect of the government‐controlled appreciation of the Chinese renminbi vis‐à‐vis the USD from 2005 to 2008 on the prices charged by U.S. domestic producers. In a panel spanning the period from 1994 to 2010 and including up to 519 manufacturing sectors, import price changes of Chinese goods pass into U.S. producer prices at an average rate of 0.7, while import price changes that can be traced back to exchange rate movements of other trade partners only have mild effects on U.S. prices. Further analysis points to the importance of trade integration, variable markups, and demand complementarities on the one side, and to the importance of imported intermediate goods on the other side as drivers of these patterns. Simulations incorporating these microeconomic findings reveal that a substantial revaluation of the renminbi would result in a pronounced increase in aggregate U.S. producer price inflation.