Risk Premium Shocks and the Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates

Quantitative dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models often admit that the zero bound on nominal interest rates does not constrain (optimal) monetary policy. Recent economic events, however, have reinforced the relevance of the zero bound. This paper sheds some light on this disconnect by studying a broad range of shocks within a standard DSGE model. In contrast to earlier studies, we find that risk premium shocks are key to building quantitative models where the zero bound is relevant for monetary policy design. Other commonly included shocks, such as productivity, government spending, and money demand shocks, are unable to push nominal rates close to zero.     

Labor Force Participation and Monetary Policy in the Wake of the Great Recession

This paper provides compelling evidence that cyclical factors account for the bulk of the post‐2007 decline in the U.S. labor force participation rate (LFPR). We then formulate a stylized New Keynesian model in which the LFPR is practically acyclical during “normal times” but drops markedly following a large and persistent aggregate demand shock. These considerations have potentially crucial implications for the design of monetary policy, especially when interest rate adjustments are constrained by the zero lower bound; specifically, monetary policy can induce a more rapid recovery of the LFPR by allowing the unemployment rate to fall below its natural rate.     

Japan's Deflation and the Bank of Japan's Experience with Nontraditional Monetary Policy

This paper offers a brief summary of nontraditional monetary policy measures adopted by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) during the last two decades, especially the period 1998–2006, when the so‐called zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) and quantitative easing (QE) were put in place. The paper begins with a typology of policies usable at low interest and inflation rates. They are: strategy (i), management of expectations about future policy rates; strategy (ii), targeted asset purchases; and strategy (iii), QE. Alternatively, QE may be decomposed into a pure attempt to inflate the central bank balance sheet, QE0, purchases of assets in dysfunctional markets, QE1, and purchases of assets to generate portfolio rebalancing, QE2. Strategy (ii), when nonsterilized, is either QE1 or QE2. Using this typology, I review the measures adopted by the BOJ and discuss evidence on the effectiveness of the measures. The broad conclusion is that strategies (i) and (ii) have affected interest rates, while no clear evidence exists so far of the effectiveness of the pure form of strategy (iii), or QE0. Strategy (ii) has been effective especially in containing risk/liquidity premiums in dysfunctional money markets; that is, QE1 has been effective. The effectiveness of QE2, however, is less clear‐cut. The strategies, however, have failed to bring the Japanese economy out of the deflation trap so far. I discuss some possible reasons for this and also implications for the current U.S. situation.     

The Effectiveness of Unconventional Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound: A Cross‐Country Analysis

This paper assesses the macroeconomic effects of unconventional monetary policies by estimating a panel vector autoregression (VAR) with monthly data from eight advanced economies over a sample spanning the period since the onset of the global financial crisis. It finds that an exogenous increase in central bank balance sheets at the zero lower bound leads to a temporary rise in economic activity and consumer prices. The estimated output effects turn out to be qualitatively similar to the ones found in the literature on the effects of conventional monetary policy, while the impact on the price level is weaker and less persistent. Individual country results suggest that there are no major differences in the macroeconomic effects of unconventional monetary policies across countries, despite the heterogeneity of the measures that were taken.     

Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy with a Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates

I characterize optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a stochastic New Keynesian model when nominal interest rates may occasionally hit the zero lower bound. The benevolent policymaker controls the short‐term nominal interest rate and the level of government spending. Under discretionary policy, accounting for fiscal stabilization policy eliminates to a large extent the welfare losses associated with the presence of the zero bound. Under commitment, the gains associated with the use of the fiscal policy tool remain modest, even though fiscal stabilization policy is part of the optimal policy mix.     

Fiscal Multipliers at the Zero Lower Bound: The Role of Policy Inertia

The presence of the lagged shadow policy rate in the interest rate feedback rule reduces the government spending multiplier nontrivially when the policy rate is constrained at the zero lower bound (ZLB). In the economy with policy inertia, increased inflation and output due to higher government spending during a recession speed up the return of the policy rate to the steady state after the recession ends, which in turn damps the expansionary effects of the government spending during the recession via expectations. In our baseline experiment intended to capture the effectiveness of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the output multiplier at the ZLB is 1.9 when the weight on the lagged shadow rate is zero, and 0.5 when the weight is 0.85.     

Macroeconomic factors and yield curve for the emerging Indian economy

This article investigates the dynamic linkages between the estimated parameters of a zero coupon yield curve and macroeconomic variables like inflation, gross domestic product growth in the presence of a monetary policy indicator in India for the period July 1997 to February 2004. The study finds that there exists strong causality from financial factors, defined by three parameters of the yield curves (‘Level’, ‘Slope’, ‘Curvature’) to macroeconomic factors; growth, inflation and monetary policy indicators (changes in the call money rate). However, the causality in the opposite direction is found to be weaker. It is found that theyield and macro factors do not cause each other before the launch of a liquidity adjustment facility, so the evidence of causality from financial to macroeconomic factors can be attributed to the introduction of a liquidity adjustment facility in June 2000. The causality from yield factors to macro factors is primarily driven by the fact that the ‘changes in level’ of yield curve brings an impact on inflation through the changes in monetary policy. This finding suggests that monetary policy plays a key role in driving the causality. This also implies that the indirect instrument of monetary policy mechanism is becoming increasingly important to influence the aggregate demand in the economy.     

Monetary policy and financial stability: What role for the futures market?

This paper examines interactions between monetary policy and financial stability. There is a general view that central banks smooth interest rate changes to enhance the stability of financial markets. But might this induce a moral hazard problem, and induce financial institutions to maintain riskier portfolios, the presence of which would further inhibit active monetary policy? Hedging activities of financial institutions, such as the use of interest rate futures and swap markets to reduce risk, should further protect markets against consequences of unforeseen interest rate changes. Thus, smoothing may be both unnecessary and undesirable. The paper shows by a theoretical argument that smoothing interest rates may lead to indeterminacy of the economy's rational expectations equilibrium. Nevertheless, our empirical analysis supports the view that the Federal Reserve smoothes interest rates and reacts to interest rate futures. We add new evidence on the importance for policy of alternative indicators of financial markets stress.