Pseudo-Generic Products and Barriers to Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets

This paper examines incentives for brand-name pharmaceutical producers to market pseudo-generic versions of their own branded products upon the expiry of patent protection.Using a two-stage game model, we determine that under plausible demand and cost conditions, brand-name incumbents can find it profitable to produce pseudo-generics as a means of blocking rivals' entry even when independent firms producing true generics face low entry costs.The model shows that social welfare can be higher when firms use pseudo-generics instead of capacity for entry deterrence as long as substitutability between brand-name and generic products is sufficiently high.     

THE FAILING FIRM DEFENSE*

This paper evaluates the welfare consequences of the failing firm defense (FFD) in the EU and U.S. merger laws. To this end, I combine an oligopoly model with an ‘endogenous valuations’ auction model. The FFD is shown to work reasonably well for consumers unless small firms are too small. The FFD may, however, lead to total surplus losses, due to a ‘least danger to competition’ (LDC) condition which favors small, and thus possibly inefficient, firms. It is also shown that, in a multi‐firm setting, the FFD increases the incentive for predation only when the assets are industry‐specific.     

Risky quality choice

In vertical product differentiation with a stochastic research technology, firms should target their research at different quality levels for efficiency. In a natural monopoly where the top firm finds it most profitable to sell to the whole market, the incentives for risk-taking and for firms to differentiate their targeted qualities are optimal. In a natural oligopoly (which results when there is sufficient dispersion of tastes), the relationship between a firm’s payoff and its quality improvement over other firms is weakened. This diminishes the firms’ incentives to differentiate and the targeted qualities are too low and too close together.     

LARGE IS BEAUTIFUL: HORIZONTAL MERGERS FOR BETTER EXPLOITATION OF PRODUCTION SHOCKS*

The profitability of horizontal mergers is investigated in a situation in which firms face a production shock and therefore are uncertain about their future costs. I show that, due to production rationalization, small‐scale mergers can be profitable if the uncertainty is large. The efficiency gain in production also implies benign welfare consequences. Under cost uncertainty, a profitable merger always improves social welfare if no more than half of the industry's firms are allowed to merge. Finally, I show that the incentives to merge depend on the information structure. Firms are less likely to merge when they possess more information.     

On the vertical integration of successive monopolies

This essay studies the private incentives for, and welfare consequences of, the vertical integration of successive monopolies. When the merged firm is as efficient as its pre-merger components, private and social interests coincide and the merger raises welfare by eliminating the double mark-up. When the merger leads to higher costs it is possible that some mergers will be privately profitable but not socially desirable and that some will be socially desirable but not privately profitable. These results suggest that a laissez-faire approach to this type of merger by antitrust authorities will not always be appropriate.     

The Strategic Effect of Bundling: A New Perspective

This paper investigates the strategic effect of the bundling strategy that is adopted by a multi-product firm that produces two complementary goods and faces one single-product rival in each market. I consider both the Cournot and Bertrand cases. When firms compete in quantities, bundling is completely ineffective. Under price competition, selling as a package is profitable when market competition is particularly tough. In such circumstances, the multi-product firm resorts to bundling to dampen the negative impact of low brand differentiation and/or scarce product complementarity. However, overall prices increase as a result of bundling, and not only consumer surplus, but also total social welfare, shrink.     

Behavior based price personalization under vertical product differentiation

We study price personalization in a two period duopoly with vertically differentiated products. In the second period, a firm not only knows the purchase history of all customers, as in standard Behavior Based Price Discrimination models, but it also collects detailed information on its old customers, using it to engage in price personalization. The analysis reveals that there exists a natural market for each firm, defined as the set of customers that cannot be poached by the rival in the second period. The equilibrium is unique, except when firms are ex-ante almost identical. In equilibrium, only the firm with the largest natural market poaches customers from the rival. This firm has highest profits but not necessarily the largest market share. Aggregate profits are lower than under uniform pricing. All consumers gain, total welfare is higher herein than under uniform pricing if firms’ natural markets are sufficiently asymmetric. The low quality firm chooses the minimal quality level and a quality differential arises, though the exact choice for the high quality depends upon the cost specification.     

Alleviating managerial dilemmas in human‐capital‐intensive firms through incentives: Evidence from M&A legal advisors

Research summary: We examine how human‐capital‐intensive firms deploy their human assets and how firm‐specific human capital interacts with incentives to influence this deployment. Our empirical context is the UK M&A legal market, where micro‐data enable us to observe the allocation of lawyers to M&A mandates under different incentive regimes. We find that law firms actively equalize the workload among their lawyers to seek efficiency gains, while “stretching” lawyers with high firm‐specific capital to a greater extent. However, lawyers with high firm‐specific capital also appear to influence the staffing process in their favor, leading to unbalanced allocations and less sharing of projects and clients. Paradoxically, law firms may adopt a seniority‐based rent‐sharing system that weakens individual incentives to mitigate the impact of incentive conflicts on resource deployment. Managerial summary: The study highlights the dilemmas when professional service firms allocate their key individuals to incoming projects, and the role that monetary incentives play in aggravating or alleviating these dilemmas. In the context of UK M&A law firms, we find that partners have a tendency to be attached to too many projects and not to share enough work, which is exacerbated when individual monetary incentives are stronger. Firms adopting a seniority based incentive system (lockstep system) are able to alleviate this effect. This implies that there is a trade‐off between rewarding personal performance versus balancing workloads and fostering collaboration among professionals. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the competitive effects of vertical integration by a research laboratory

An independent research laboratory owns a patented process innovation ready to be used by an industry that produces differentiated goods. We analyze whether the laboratory prefers to license the innovation as an external patentee or to merge with one of the firms in the industry, licensing the innovation as an internal patentee. Under linear demand and Cournot competition, we show first, that the vertical merger is profitable only in the case of small innovations, whereas a merger increases welfare only for significant innovations; second, all profitable vertical mergers reduce welfare. However, some profitable mergers are welfare improving under price competition.     

Competitive customer poaching with asymmetric firms

Conditioning the pricing policies on purchase history is proven to generate a cutthroat price competition enhancing consumer surplus. This result typically relies on a framework where competitors are assumed to be symmetric. This paper demonstrates that under significant asymmetries of competing firms, the strong firm trades off current market share for future market share and the weak firm does the opposite. This inter-temporal market sharing agreement generates unidirectional poaching and entails new and distinctive welfare implications. In particular, if consumers are sufficiently myopic, price discrimination softens price competition in relation to uniform pricing, overturning the conclusion of previous studies.     

INFORMATIVE ADVERTISING: COMPETITION OR COOPERATION?*

In a duopoly version of the Grossman and Shapiro [1984] model of informative advertising, I examine firms' incentives to semicollude on advertising and the welfare implications thereof. I find that, relative to the noncooperative outcome, semicollusion on advertising is more profitable but is detrimental to welfare. I also find that when the advertising cost is ‘low,’ advertising semicollusion is more harmful to welfare than price semicollusion. These findings are important for competition policy since traditionally, cooperative advertising is not treated in the same light as price collusion.     

MERGERS WITH SUPPLY FUNCTIONS

I analyze the equilibrium effects of a merger in an industry when firms compete by submitting supply functions. Under the assumptions that the industry capital stock is fixed and production costs are quadratic and decreasing in capital, I find that any merger results in all firms reducing supply. The decrease in supply by non-participating firms makes any merger profitable. A merger from a symmetric industry lowers welfare.     

PROJECT CHOICE AND RISK IN R&D*

We introduce stochastic R&D in the Hotelling model and show that if the technical risk is sufficiently high, all firms focus on the most valuable market segment. We then endogenize technical risk by allowing firms to choose between a safe and a risky R&D technology. Firms either both target the most attractive market with at least one firm using the risky technology or they choose different niche projects and both apply the safe technology. R&D spillovers lead to more differentiated R&D projects and patent protection to less. Project coordination within an RJV implies more differentiation, and may be welfare‐improving.     

Equity‐based incentives and collaboration in the modern multibusiness firm

Research summary : This paper examines the role of equity‐based incentives in fostering cross‐business‐unit collaboration in multibusiness firms. We develop a formal agency model in which headquarters offers equity and profit incentives to business‐unit managers with the objective of maximizing total expected firm returns. The resulting compensation contract provides a rich mechanism for aggregating value from collaborative interactions across business units, aligning managers' efforts with the firm's growth prospects and organization structure and managing the dual risks in profits and firm market value. The inclusion of equity incentives elicits higher levels of own‐unit and collaborative efforts over the profits‐only contract. Our results suggest that equity‐based incentives are most beneficial when profitability is uncertain relative to long‐term growth prospects, in firms pursuing related diversification strategies, and in periods of rising equity markets. Managerial summary : Equity‐based compensation such as restricted stock grants and options are increasingly common, not only for CEOs and other top executives, but also for business unit managers and other non‐C‐suite employees. The paper studies the role of such “global” incentives in enabling multibusiness firms to benefit from cross‐unit collaboration. Results from our model show that managerial contracts that include appropriate levels of equity incentives, in addition to profit‐based incentives, generate higher own‐unit and collaborative efforts. We also find that equity incentives are likely to be most beneficial for large firms in high‐growth sectors, for firms pursuing a related diversification strategy, and in periods of rising stock markets. The model can also provide useful guidance on designing return‐maximizing compensation contracts for business unit managers in different firm, organizational, and industry contexts. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CUSTOMER POACHING AND ADVERTISING*

This paper is a first look at the dynamic effects of customer poaching in homogeneous product markets, where firms need to invest in advertising to generate awareness. When a firm is able to recognize customers with different purchasing histories, it may send them targeted advertisements with different prices. It is shown that only the firm which advertises the highest price in the first period will engage in price discrimination, a practice that clearly benefits the discriminating firm. This poaching gives rise to ‘the race for discrimination effect,’ through which price discrimination may act actually to soften price competition rather than intensify it. As a result, all firms may become better off, even when only one of them can engage in price discrimination. This paper offers a first attempt to evaluate the effects of price discrimination on the efficiency properties of advertising. In markets with low or no advertising costs, allowing firms to price discriminate leads them to provide too little advertising, which is not good for consumers and overall welfare. Only in markets with high advertising costs, might firms overadvertise. Regarding the welfare effects, price discrimination is generally bad for welfare and consumer surplus, though good for firms.     

M-form organization and firm profitability

Theoretical discussions of internal organization stress the importance of organization for firm success and profitability. The Williamsonian hypothesis that firms organized using M-form should be more profitable than firms organized using U-form or other organizational structures is the focus of empirical testing in this paper. Pairs of firms are observed over two periods of time. In the first period, the principal firm adopts M-form while the control firm is organized with a non-M-form structure. In the second period, the control firm adopts the M-form structure. Using this matched firm technique across a number of industries, we find the adoption of M-form leads to statistically significant increases in return on asset and return on equity measures.     

Ain't it “suite”? Bundling in the PC office software market

Research Summary: We examine the importance of office suites for the evolution of the personal computer (PC) office software market in the 1990s. An estimated discrete‐choice model reveals a positive correlation of consumer values for spreadsheets and wordprocessors, a bonus value for suites, and advantages for Microsoft products. We employ the estimates to simulate various hypothetical market structures to evaluate the profitability, welfare, and competitive effects of suites under alternative correlation assumptions. We find that firms benefit greatly from bundling components (i.e., a spreadsheet and a word processor) when the correlation of consumer preferences over the components in the bundle is positive. Our work adds another aspect to the recent work in the strategy literature that examines benefits from bundling when there are complementary relationships across the products in the bundle. Managerial Summary: Our research helps managers understand the conditions under which product bundling is likely to be most profitable. We show that one key to enhanced profitability is the correlation in consumer preferences over the individual products. We consider the performance implications of bundling under a variety of alternative market structures and competitive environments. Our analysis reveals that firms benefit greatly from bundling when the correlation of consumer valuations over the products is positive. Consumers benefit as well. Hence, bundling is a win‐win for firms and their customers. Since profits increase by more than consumer surplus, bundling leads to increased value capture by the firms. Consequently, it may be profitable for firms to invest in actively increasing the correlation in consumer preferences over products in the bundle.     

Firms' Growth,Size and Age: A Nonparametric Approach

This paper offers empirical evidence of firm failurerates as well as the mean of the distribution ofrealized growth rates, distinguishing between thesample of non-failing firms and the sample of allfirms, failing and non-failing. Attention is directedat identifying a set of characteristics, in particularthe size and age of firms, systematically related tothe patterns of firm growth and exit, using a panel ofSpanish manufacturing firms. The two maincontributions of the paper are the use ofnonparametric techniques and the analysis of issuesignored in other studies like theregression-to-the-mean bias and the measurement oflearning effects. We find evidence that failure ratesand the mean growth rate of successful firms declinewith size and age. When failing firms are integrated,there are no significant differences in the meangrowth rate across the age and size of firms.Regression-to-the-mean does not prove to be asubstantial factor behind the negative relationshipbetween size and growth of surviving firms.     

How does income inequality affect market outcomes in vertically differentiated markets?

The distribution of consumer incomes is a key factor in determining the structure of a vertically differentiated industry when consumer's willingness to pay depends on her income. This paper computes the Shaked and Sutton (1982) model for a lognormal distribution of consumer incomes to investigate the effect of inequality on firms' entry, product quality, and pricing decisions. The main findings are that greater inequality in consumer incomes leads to the entry of more firms and results in more intense quality competition among the entrants. More intense quality competition raises the average quality of products in the market as firms compete for the shrinking share of higher-income consumers. With zero costs of quality improvements and an upper bound on the top quality or when costs of quality are fixed and rise sufficiently fast, greater heterogeneity of consumer incomes also reduces firms' incentives to differentiate their products. Competition between more similar products tends to reduce their prices. However, when income inequality is very high, the top quality producer chooses to serve only the rich segment of the market and charges a higher price. The conclusion is that income inequality has important implications for the degree of product differentiation, price level, industry concentration, and consumer welfare.     

New Product Preannouncement as a Signaling Strategy: An Audience‐Specific Review and Analysis*

Firms in various industries with highly competitive environments use new product preannouncement (NPP) as one of the most effective and popular signaling tools. Preannouncements can bring both benefits and costs to firms. Extant research has studied NPP from different perspectives and tackled the questions, “Should a new product be preannounced and when?” and “What information should be preannounced and why?” However, the benefits and costs of preannouncements from an audience‐specific perspective are less well understood. It is important to notice that benefits and costs of a preannouncement vary among different audiences and firms need to apply group‐specific weights in assessing the overall benefits and costs prior to making new product preannouncements. The purpose of this article is to review the existing literature on new product preannouncements for commonly observed marketing problems and to develop a general approach focusing on the target audiences and the incentives in sending signals to each audience and the impacts of these signals. This paper first reviews the literature on marketing‐related NPP issues as well as the determinants and effects of various factors on NPP decisions. Then, it discusses the phenomenon of new product preannouncements linked to other marketing and economics problems: (1) product development and positioning; (2) product diffusion and adoption; (3) firm value; (4) vaporware and antitrust litigations; and (5) consumer welfare. In addition, this paper divides the target audience of the new product preannouncement into four groups: customers, competitors, investors, and distributors. Based on current signaling theory, it proposes an audience‐specific framework to analyze the determinants, incentives, and impact of new product preannouncements. The proposed approach may provide more comprehensive insights on NPP strategies to managers and industrial decision makers. Finally, the paper suggests a number of future research directions from four different perspectives (i.e., customer, firm, government/industry, and methodology).