Do Lending Relationships Affect Corporate Financial Policies?

This paper provides new evidence on how lending relationships impact firms’ financing and investment decisions. I find that lending relationships have a significant impact on leverage ratios, issuance choices, and the investment structures of relationship borrowers. The influence of relationships is heightened for financially constrained firms. I find a significant decrease in leverage, net debt issuing, and investment activity in the aftermath of lender‐specific shocks to lending relationships, including announcements of bank write‐downs and downgrades in banks’ credit ratings. My findings are robust to controlling for confounding effects that might arise due to unobserved demand and relationship changes.     

Do Firms Decouple Corporate Governance Policy and Practice?

We test whether Thai listed firms with higher levels of good governance policy adoption are less likely to violate listing rules and laws designed to protect shareholders. Our results suggest that firms on average implement, substantively as opposed to symbolically, recommended governance policies, as violations occur less frequently among firms with higher governance policy adoption scores. However, we also find evidence of symbolic governance among a small group of ‘talk‐only’ firms that issue statements about governance while lagging in the adoption of policies related to shareholder rights and the board of directors.     

Do Changes in Industrial Policy Affect Allocation of Financial Resources Among Subsidiaries?

This study explores how enterprise groups adjust the allocation of financial resources among subsidiaries after the industrial policy is amended. Results show that compared to subsidiaries experiencing minimal impact due to changes in industrial policy, a higher inflow of financial resources from enterprise groups is witnessed by subsidiaries experiencing a positive impact than those experiencing a negative impact. From the specific channels of allocation of financial resources, subsidiaries experiencing a positive effect obtain more equity investment from the parent company and pay fewer cash dividends. Contrarily, subsidiaries experiencing a negative impact obtain less equity investment and have minimum cash adequacy ratio.     

Do Opinions on Financial Misstatement Firms Affect Analysts’ Reputation with Investors? Evidence from Reputational Spillovers

We examine whether opinions on firms subsequently revealed to have misstated earnings affect analysts’ reputation with investors. We find that positive opinions by bullish analysts hurt their reputation, leading investors to react less to their research on non‐misstatement firms after the misstatement revelation (i.e., negative spillovers). We also find that bearish analysts issuing more negative opinions gain reputation and experience positive spillovers. Finally, for analysts who dropped coverage of the misstatement firm before the misstatement revelation, we find no spillovers, which suggests that analysts experience limited reputational gains when they did not issue a public negative opinion.     

Do Financial Markets Care about Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure? Further Evidence from China

Corporations increasingly define their corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities as a part of their business. However, is this trend beneficial to investors? Based on an event study methodology and a sample of Chinese listed companies, we extend the literature on voluntary disclosure by exploring the role of CSR disclosure in reducing stock market information asymmetry, as proxied by share price volatility and liquidity. Our results show that the share price volatility after CSR disclosure is lower than before CSR disclosure; however, the trend is that it decreases first and then increases for three months following disclosure. Stock liquidity also significantly improves after CSR disclosure; however, it increases first and then decreases. Additionally, by dividing CSR disclosure into economic (hard) disclosure and generic (soft) disclosure, we find that the reduction in information asymmetry is higher for hard disclosure than soft disclosure, suggesting that although CSR disclosure does indeed have an impact on investors’ behaviour in China, an economic‐based disclosure contributes more substantially. Finally, to better understand the characteristics of the Chinese financial market, we also explore the role of marketisation with results that show that the effect in reducing information asymmetry is greater for companies located in a region with a higher degree of marketisation.     

How Do Institutional Investors Affect Corporate Performance? Evidence from Private Placements in China

Using data on private placements in China from 2007 to 2014, we show that abnormal returns of issuing companies’ stocks are significantly positive on the announcement day, but they become significantly negative during the event window [?20, +20]. Participation by institutional investors has a significant and negative impact on the short-term stock returns. This negative effect is also present in issuing companies’ long-term stock returns and profitability. Furthermore, we find that participation by institutional investors reduces dividend payments after private placements. Overall, our findings do not support the monitoring hypothesis of institutional investors’ role in corporate finance but are consistent with the management entrenchment hypothesis and shareholder pessimism hypothesis.     

Why Do Firms Evade Taxes? The Role of Information Sharing and Financial Sector Outreach

Tax evasion is a widespread phenomenon across the globe and even an important factor in the ongoing sovereign debt crisis. We show that firms in countries with better credit information–sharing systems and higher branch penetration evade taxes to a lesser degree. This effect is stronger for smaller firms, firms in smaller cities and towns, firms in industries relying more on external financing, and firms in industries and countries with greater growth potential. This effect is robust to instrumental variable analysis, controlling for firm fixed effects in a smaller panel data set of countries, and many other robustness tests.     

Do Voting Rights Affect Institutional Investment Decisions? Evidence from Dual‐Class Firms

We examine whether, and to what extent, shareholder voting rights affect institutional investment decisions. We find that institutional ownership in dual‐class firms is significantly lower than it is in single‐class firms after controlling for other determinants of institutional investment. Although institutions of all types hold fewer shares of dual‐class firms, this avoidance is more pronounced for long‐term investors with strong fiduciary responsibilities than for short‐term investors with weak fiduciary duties. Following the unification of dual‐class shares into a single class, institutional investors increase their shareholdings in the unifying firm. Overall, our results suggest that voting rights are an important determinant of institutional investment decisions.     

Are Member Firms of Corporate Groups Less Risky?

The evidence we uncover suggests that the practice of profit and risk sharing among keiretsu firms reduces the firm level idiosyncratic risk. However, rather than eliminating firm-level risk, it is being transformed into market-level risk. Since market-level risk is priced, this actually destroys shareholders' wealth. Additionally, the heightened correlation among keiretsu firms essentially diminishes the diversification efficacy of a portfolio of keiretsu firms. In summary, our results suggest that the practice of profit and risk sharing, which on the surface seems to be a blessing, may actually have a detrimental effect on the value of keiretsu firms.     

Why Do European Firms Go Public?

We survey chief financial officers (CFOs) from 12 European countries regarding the determinants of going public and exchange listing decisions. Most CFOs identify enhanced visibility and financing for growth as the most important benefits of an IPO, but other motivations for IPOs differ significantly across firms, countries, and legal systems. We find strong support for the IPO theories that emphasise financial and strategic considerations, such as enhanced reputation and credibility, and financial flexibility as a major advantage of an IPO. At the same time, we find moderate support for theories that focus on exit strategy, balance of power with creditors, external monitoring, and merger and acquisition motivations. European CFOs' views on the major benefits of an IPO are generally similar to those of US managers as reported in Brau and Fawcett (2006) , but differ significantly on outside monitoring; outside monitoring is considered a major benefit by European CFOs but a major cost by US CFOs. Our evidence suggests that the decision to go public is a complex one, and cannot be explained by one single theory because firms seek multiple benefits in going public. These motivations are influenced by the firm's ownership structure, size and age as well as by the home country's institutional and regulatory environment.     

Does the Quality of Financial Advice Affect Prices?

Using a large data sample of 58,562 new municipal issues covering the period from 1984 to 2002, we examine whether the quality of advice provided by a financial advisor affects new issue interest costs. We find that higher‐quality financial advisors are associated with statistically significant decreases in new issue yields. The effect of advisor quality on yields is more pronounced for revenue, negotiated, and opaque bond issues than for general obligation and competitively sold issues. However, issuers of revenue or negotiated bonds are more likely to choose a low‐quality advisor.     

Do Bond Covenants Affect Borrowing Costs?

High yield bond investors spend a great deal of time studying covenants. They even hire specialized consultants to help them interpret the dense language of indentures. But for all that, does a company's decision to offer strong rather than weak covenants—or to offer covenants at all—have a measurable impact on its borrowing costs? There is surprisingly little evidence that variation in credit risk premiums reflects the presence or absence of covenants. Taking advantage of a newly available kind of data—Moody's Investors Service's Covenant Quality (CQ) ratings, which were initiated in 2011—the authors studied each newly issued U.S. high yield bond beginning in 2011 using Moody's CQ ratings, where a rating of “1” represents the strongest covenant rating and “5” the weakest. The authors hypothesize that if investors are willing to pay for covenant protection, bonds with weak CQ scores should have spreads that are higher, on average, than the medians of the bonds in their rating group. What they found, however, was that even bonds rated CQ5, indicating negligible protection, had spreads that were only 9.54 basis points higher than the median of companies with the same credit rating. The authors also found, contrary to their initial supposition, that higher yields were associated with stronger covenants, suggesting that investors demand more protection on issues they view as having greater credit risk than other equivalently rated issues.     

Do Corporate Venture Capitalists Add Value to Start-Up Firms? Evidence from IPOs and Acquisitions of VC-Backed Companies

We present evidence that corporate venture capitalists (CVCs) add value to start-up companies only when the start-ups have a strategic fit with the parent corporations of CVCs. We find that CVCs provide a variety of services and support that suit the specific needs of start-ups operating in different industries. CVC-backed start-ups are able to obtain higher valuations at the IPO than non-CVC-backed ones, and the value added by CVCs concentrates in start-ups with a strategic overlap with CVC parents. Entrepreneurial companies with strategic CVC backing also receive higher takeover premiums when they become acquisition targets .     

Do Female Executives Prioritize Corporate Social Responsibility?

How do female executives view corporate social responsibility (CSR)? Previous studies have reported mixed findings on the relationship between female executives and CSR. We select a sample of Chinese listed firms and use propensity score matching to construct a new sample of firms and evaluate the gender transition (from male to female) of chief executive officers or board chairpersons (executives) who are randomly assigned to firms (i.e., the gender transition of executives is regarded as an exogenous event). Subsequently, we use a difference-in-differences approach to identify the pure effect of female executives on CSR. Our results indicate that female executives are more likely to encourage CSR reporting. Moreover, we suggest that the mechanism behind female executives prioritizing CSR is altruism preference rather than risk aversion preference.     

Do Analysts Influence Corporate Financing and Investment?

We examine whether abnormal analyst coverage influences the external financing and investment decisions of the firm. Controlling for self-selection bias in analysts' excessive coverage, we find that firms with high (low) analyst coverage consistently engage in higher (lower) external financing than do their industry peers of similar size. Our evidence also demonstrates that firms with excessive analyst coverage overinvest and realize lower future returns than do firms with low analyst coverage. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts favor the coverage of firms that have the potential to engage in profitable investment-banking business.     

Is Family Control Relevant for Corporate Cash Holding Policy?

This empirical research examines the effect of family control on firms’ cash holding policy. Using a sample of Western European firms, we confirm the precautionary motive for holding cash as family‐controlled firms’ desire to perpetuate the family legacy for future generations motivates them to accumulate more cash than their non‐family counterparts. We also show that, given family‐controlled firms’ long‐term perspective, they focus on cash flow volatility rather than cash flow level. Finally, the relation between financing constraints and cash holdings is not homogeneous: financially constrained family‐controlled firms hold higher levels of cash than financially constrained non‐family firms. Overall, these results suggest that family firms’ cash holding policy is the result not of a specific financial outcome but rather on the strategic objectives of the firm.     

Do Islamic Bond (Sukuk) Prices Reflect Financial and Policy Uncertainty? A Quantile Regression Approach

We studied the relationship between Islamic bond (sukuk) prices and financial and policy uncertainty conditions using a quantile regression approach. Our empirical results for the period 2010–2014 show that US bond prices had a negative impact and causality effects on sukuk prices, whereas European Monetary Union bond prices only co-moved with sukuk prices. We also show that financial uncertainty had a negative effect that was limited to intermediate sukuk quantiles; moreover, sukuk prices were not affected by economic policy uncertainty or stock market returns. Therefore, although Islamic bonds are distinctive assets, their price dynamics are dependent on other bond-related asset prices and so incorporate financial market uncertainty.     

Do Banks Value Innovation? Evidence from US Firms

This study evaluates how innovation within companies alleviates the information asymmetry problems in relationship lending. We hypothesize that patenting activities could reveal favorable private information and, hence, reduce the information asymmetry between innovative borrowers and banks. Using a sample of US patenting firms from 1987 to 2004, we show that borrowers with higher innovation capability (revealed by having more patent applications, higher research & development (R&D) productivity, or higher‐quality patents) enjoy lower bank‐loan spreads and better nonprice‐related loan terms. Our evidence further suggests that the information benefits of patenting activities on loan spreads is more pronounced for small or less R&D‐intensive firms.     

How Do Firms Implement Impairment Tests of Goodwill?

This study seeks first to examine how firms implement impairment tests as required by IAS 36, and second, to explore factors which may explain why some firms are not entirely in compliance with IAS 36. It is based on a survey which includes 58 completed questionnaires representing 73% of the firms on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange that recognize goodwill on the balance sheet. The findings imply a variety in the application of IAS 36. Based on our analysis, it is difficult to determine whether this simply indicates that firms adopt an approach suited to their organizational and economic structures, or if it reveals that firms are uncertain as how to apply the standard. Our analysis further indicates inconsistencies in the implementation of IAS 36. This includes both how firms define a CGU and how they estimate the recoverable amount. Further, multivariate analysis reveals that the inconsistencies detected here are less likely in firms that systematize the procedures for impairment testing and use persons with considerable valuation experience. The findings should be of interest to a number of parties including firms, financial advisers, auditors, standard setters and users of financial statements.