The allocation of specific assets,relationship duration,and contractual coordination in buyer–seller relationships

This study explores the interaction effect of bilateral dependence and relationship duration on contractual coordination. In particular, the study compares how the allocation of specific assets, unilateral or mutual, affects contractual coordination across buyer–seller relationships with a short prior history as opposed to a long one. Data from a survey of 157 industrial purchasing relationships demonstrates that unilateral investments in specific assets by either the buyer or the supplier are more strongly supported by contractual coordination as the length of the relationship increases. On the other hand, contractual coordination of mutually deployed specific assets is significantly relaxed as relationships evolve over time.     

The influence of contractual and relational factors on the effectiveness of third party logistics relationships

Outsourcing has become popular in both management literature and practice, but few studies have examined the effects of two important and potentially complementary elements – contractual and relational elements – on the effectiveness of logistics outsourcing relationships. It is theorized that contract formality, the thoroughness of contract negotiations, trust and commitment increase the effectiveness of 3PL provider–client relationships. For empirical validation a survey was carried out in the 3PL industry among both 3PL providers and clients. Using PLS path modelling, we observed that for both LSPs and clients, contract formality, trust and commitment are all positively related to relationship effectiveness. The results for negotiation thoroughness are mixed. The model explains 59% (LSPs) and 60% (clients) of the variance in relationship effectiveness. It is concluded that both ‘hard’ contractual aspects and ‘soft’ relationship aspects are important for effective supply chain collaboration. Theoretical and managerial implications are provided.     

Just‐cause provisions,severance pay,and the efficiency wage hypothesis

A simple model of employment contracting is employed to examine the effectiveness of just‐cause provisions in alleviating employer opportunism in two types of efficiency wage contracts—standard contracts, in which wages exceed the worker's marginal contribution, and deferred wages, which are paid after a period of tenure in the firm. It is argued that just‐cause employment policies are necessary and sufficient to prevent employer opportunism when standard efficiency wages are utilized. However, just‐cause policies are not sufficient to deter employer opportunism when employment contracts are of the delayed‐payment type. In these contracts, other contractual provisions, such as severance provisions, are also necessary. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Organizational Learning in Project‐Based Companies: A Process Thinking Approach

Although a traditional project model is clearly useful for laying out the patterns of relationships surrounding a project, it does not provide the temporally embedded accounts that enable us to understand how organizational learning takes place. The process thinking perspective offers a means to solving this problem. This article provides an analysis of how different processes interact dynamically in order to benefit project‐based companies' organizational learning. Two findings from this study are: (1) organizational learning is a dynamic concept that emphasizes the continually changing nature of a project‐based company and (2) sensemaking and negotiation of meaning are ongoing processes in project‐based companies.     

Differentiating two types of learning in contract design: Evidence from the construction industry

This research investigates the learning of inter-organizational contract design in greater depth. Two types of learning, i.e. learning from all past partnerships and learning from one specific partner, are distinguished in terms of their influence on the complexity of three different functions of the contract, namely control, coordination, and adaptation. Contract design capability and interorganizational routines are employed as mediators to explain the two types of learning respectively. Empirical tests using data from the Chinese construction industry reveal that there are significant indirect effects between partner-specific experience and contractual coordination, and between general partnership experience and all the three functions of the contract. This research contributes to the literature by providing more nuanced conclusions regarding the contract learning issue.     

Governance, Negotiations, and Alliance Dynamics: Explaining the Evolution of Relational Practice

This paper explores relational practice in strategic alliances. Focusing on how governance mechanisms and negotiation strategies evolve and form patterns of interaction that are under influence of both recursive and adaptive forces, four modes of relational practice are discussed: recursively integrative, recursively distributive, adaptive toward integrative, and adaptive toward distributive. Three longitudinal cases are examined. I find that different contractual conditions enable (or restrain) interaction patterns. Negotiation behaviour, in turn, affects future contractual conditions and their combination and recombination form the evolution of relational practice. As relationships progress, initial governance mechanisms are complemented and negotiation behaviours change. I explain how perceptions of both process and relational outcomes influence relational practice. In addition, I explicate why relational practices have both recursive and adaptive characteristics, and identify conditions that cause relational practices to move towards more integrative or distributive modes.     

Chapter 11 bankruptcy and the termination of collective bargaining contracts

In 1984 the Supreme Court ruled that employers can unilaterally break an existing collective bargaining contract upon filing a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. This ruling changed both the contractual responsibilities of the employer to honor the collective bargaining agreement and the rights that workers have under the National Labor Relations Act. The purpose of this article is to show the conditions under which a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding will lead to the termination of a labor contract. Our results suggest that (a) legal rulings that reduce the costs of bankruptcy will increase the number of contractual dissolutions and (b) a Chapter 11 bankruptcy is more likely to occur when a firm operates in a climate of uncertain expectations.     

The influence of relational experience and contractual governance on the negotiation strategy in buyer–supplier disputes

This paper theoretically refines and empirically extends the debate on the type of interplay between relational experience and contractual governance in an under-researched area: supply chain disputes. We define relational experience as either cooperative or competitive; distinguish between control and coordination functions of contractual governance; and assess their interplay on the negotiation strategy used in disputes. Using a unique data set of buyer–supplier disputes, we find, in particular that increasing contractual control governance weakens the positive effect of cooperative relational experience on cooperative negotiation strategy. However, increasing contractual control governance for a buyer–supplier dyad with competitive relational experience will increase cooperative negotiation strategy. Contractual coordination governance reinforces the positive effect of cooperative relational experience. Through this study, we reach a better understanding of how and when contractual and relational governance dimensions interact; rather than whether they act as substitutes or complements as has been studied in prior research. We discuss the implications of these findings for the field of supply chain management.     

Learning from the alien: knowledge relationships with temporary workers in network contexts

This paper contributes to our understanding of the role of temporary workers in learning for innovation in network contexts. The strategy literature advocates that the knowledge and talent of workers is vital to competitive success yet at the same time temporary workers are becoming more prevalent, making relationships with workers more ephemeral. These shifting competitive and employment contexts make insights into learning from, and with, contractual nomads paramount. The setting is the UK television industry, where such workers are dominant. Internationally, creative industries are a prime site of networks where temporary workers are brought together for specific projects. In the television industry, a range of knowledge attachment employee relationships have been developed by firms to ‘contain’ and sustain worker contributions in terms of knowledge and talent. These relationships are identified as freelance, regular contract, golden handcuffs and invest in knowledge firm. This paper highlights the learning implications both positive and negative arising from these different ways of relating to temporary workers thereby extending our understanding of employee relationships built on mutuality.     

Organization‐Based Self‐Esteem,Psychological Contract Fulfillment,and Perceived Employment Opportunities: A Test of Self‐Regulatory Theory

This study addresses organization‐based self‐esteem (OBSE) development by examining the role of perceptions of employer psychological contract fulfillment, and the self‐regulatory processes by which OBSE evolves and produces its effects. Self‐regulatory theory helps reveal why psychological contract fulfillment relates to OBSE, how OBSE mediates its effects, and the ways in which OBSE might interact with perceived employment opportunities to affect job satisfaction, performance, and turnover intentions. The results show that OBSE is related to and mediates the relationships between relational contract fulfillment and employee job satisfaction and performance, but OBSE is not related to transactional contract fulfillment. Nor does OBSE mediate the relationships between transactional contract fulfillment and the dependent variables. Perceived employment opportunities moderate the relationships of OBSE with job satisfaction and turnover intentions. This study concludes with recommendations of ways managers can increase their sensitivity to the types of messages they communicate to employees. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Strategic interdependence, governance effectiveness and supplier performance: A dyadic case study investigation and theory development

Inter-organizational exchange governance approaches are often characterized as two broad types: relational and transactional. However, in fast changing business contexts, the contextual contingencies do not present ideal conditions for practicing purely relational or transactional approach. Understanding the dynamic of key contextual factors and their effects on a firm's resource capabilities and inter-organizational power structure is crucial for identifying the appropriate governance structure over time. In this paper we explore the exchanges between an OEM and five of its strategic suppliers that operate in high-end, short product life cycle motorbike industry, to understand the key contextual factors and the relationships among business context, governance structure, and exchange practices in a dyadic context. It is observed that firms deviate from the conventional choices of either transactional or relational governance to a combination of contractual and relational aspects to make the governance structure effective. Based on case studies, a theoretical framework is proposed to explain the rationale, feasibility and effectiveness of combining contractual and relational aspects in different contexts. The framework suggests that the degree of strategic interdependence between the trading partners fundamentally drives the effectiveness of governance structure and exchange practices.     

再论无效劳动合同的解除:从劳动合同解除的社会实益视角出发

《劳动合同法》上规定的无效劳动合同解除制度因其违反合同效力的一般原理而饱受非议。但"双重法律效果"理论的发展,已经使无效劳动合同之解除不再是"概念上不可能的事"。无效劳动合同的解除,在效果上可以达到"有效——解除"路径的效果,同时可以达到私法上合同无效以及合同解除理论所无法给予的社会实益。劳动合同无效制度置于社会法的视角下,体现的是国家对劳动市场秩序的积极干预和构建的理念,具体是通过直接否定合同效力、固有利益剥夺以及激励合同守约方运用解除制度确保"合同惩罚"实施来实现的。     

论工程合同管理中风险评估及应对

工程项目中合同内容及签订一直是人们最关注的问题,合同可保证签订的双方必须要按照所签订的内容去履行,受法律保护,这也是约束双方的有效手段。而建设项目合同作为建设方与施工方之间的合同关系,同样受到法律的保护。本文就工程项目合同管理中同施工方签订合同的注意事项及风险评估进行了详细的分析说明,以便大家今后在工程项目合同管理中,处理、评估好合同风险。     

承包商工程变更调价失误案例分析

工程施工过程中往往牵扯到工程变更,在工程变更使得涉及的工程细目单价不合理或者不适用的情况下,承包商应当按照施工合同文件中相关条款赋予的正当权力,在施工合同文件约定的时间期限内,向监理工程师提出重新定价意向,报请工程业主审批。否则,承包商将丧失依据施工合同文件相关条款所能够获得的正当利益。本文通过一项工程变更的真实案例,分析了承包商失误的原因。     

Does Australia's Unfair Contracts Act Limit Or Enhance Contractual Freedom?

In late 2015 Australia banned ‘unfair’ contract terms between large and small businesses. This article explains the context of the legislation and defends it from a free‐market perspective. It argues that the legislation enhances contractual freedom by codifying the elements that define a commercial contract at common law, and so protects the trust that is embedded in the structure of the contract.     

From fixed to state‐dependent duration in public‐private partnerships

A government delegates a build‐operate‐transfer project to a private firm. In the contracting stage, the operating cost is unknown. The firm can increase the likelihood of facing a low cost, rather than a high cost, by exerting costly effort when building the infrastructure. Once the infrastructure is in place, the firm learns the true cost and begins to operate. Under limited commitment, either partner may renege on the contract at any moment thereafter. The novelty with respect to incentive theory is that the contractual length is stipulated in the contract in such a way that it depends on the cost realization. Our main result is that, if the break‐up of the partnership is sufficiently costly to the government and/or adverse selection and moral hazard are sufficiently severe, then the efficient contract is not robust to renegotiation unless it has a longer duration when the realized cost is low. This result is at odds with the literature on flexible‐term contracts, which recommends a longer duration when operating conditions are unfavorable, yet, with regard to a different setting, where the demand is uncertain and the cash‐flow is exogenous.     

Franchisee Associations as Sources of Bargaining Power? Some Evidence

The empirical literature in economics and strategy on contract structure, including on franchise contract structure, has been largely based on agency and transaction cost theories. The effects of bargaining power have been much less studied. This paper considers the role of independent franchisee associations in franchising relationships as a means to test for the presence of bargaining power effects. We find that the presence or absence of a franchisee association is significantly related to each of three key contractual and relationship characteristics: contract duration, noncompete stringency, and terminations/nonrenewals. This suggests that bargaining power should be accounted for in studies of contract structure and relationship outcomes.     

The dynamics of contractual and relational governance: Evidence from long-term public–private procurement arrangements

This paper investigates the detail and dynamics of how contractual and relational governance mechanisms are deployed in managing complex, long-term public–private supply arrangements. Using empirical data from two UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI) cases, the paper analyses the interplay of governance mechanisms along a timeline of project phases. Conceptual and practical findings confirm that relational and contractual mechanisms are indeed complementary forms of exchange governance but also that the relational intentions of all parties frame whether the contract is interpreted as a written sign of distrust or commitment. Equally, relational and contractual governance follow different development paths: both follow cumulative trajectories but (a) inter-personal relational mechanisms are more incremental and fragile, whereas (b) contractual mechanisms move with fewer degrees of freedom and ‘anchor’ the exchange throughout the life cycle. Finally, the different development characteristics of relational and contractual mechanisms mean that their dynamic interplay does not follow consistent patterns. The paper concludes with suggestions for more longitudinal studies.     

Contract Formalization and Governance of Exporter–Importer Relationships

abstract    Exporting relationships between manufacturers and foreign importers pose unique coordination problems because, on the one hand, transactions are recurrent and both firms make non-trivial relationship-specific investments, but at the same time, the exchange partners maintain separate legal entities with individual profit claims. This study examines the role of contracts as a governance mechanism in these relationships that are neither market-based discrete transactions, nor can be governed through ownership-based hierarchies. Drawing upon recent research on contract law and interorganizational relationships, we develop and empirically test a model that incorporates both the antecedents and performance implications of the nature of contract governing exporter–importer relationships.     

Risky Businesses? Young People in Informal Self‐Employment in Sofia

This article studies how perceptions of the risks associated with informal self‐employment depend on the interplay between the institutional, structural (network) and cultural embeddedness of economic action. Informal self‐employment should create at least three types of risk. The first concerns the possible legal and social sanctions that stem from the illegal character of the entrepreneurial action. The second is related to the complete lack of social security protection among those for whom informal self‐employment is their sole employment. The third is connected with the lack of guarantees concerning contract enforcement, which may increase the probability of opportunistic behaviour by business partners and clients. On the basis of a qualitative study of young, highly educated, informally self‐employed workers in Bulgaria's capital Sofia, I argue that these risks are compensated by the specific network and cultural embeddedness of the economic action. This compensation takes the form of various types of insurance against risks. Its core is the replacement of the vacuum of institutional‐system trust with interpersonal trust. Thus, the specific constellation of institutional, network and cultural embeddedness is able to solve the problem of opportunism, as well as to create the perception that the informally self‐employed are faced with not much greater risks than registered self‐employed workers.