ASYMMETRIC DYNAMIC PRICING IN A LOCAL GASOLINE RETAIL MARKET*

Asymmetric‐price adjustment is a common phenomenon in many markets around the world, particularly in retail gasoline markets. This paper studies the existence of this phenomenon in the retail gasoline market in the city of Santiago, Chile, using a data set of weekly gas station prices that covers a period of almost four years. We found that prices adjust asymmetrically, and the asymmetry is different for branded gas stations and unbranded stations. In addition, we found that the asymmetry for high‐margin stations is statistically equivalent to that for low‐margin stations. This evidence is suggestive of collusion as a rationale for the asymmetric pricing policy observed.     

Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly when Markets are Covered*

We analyze oligopolistic third-degree price discrimination relative to uniform pricing when markets are covered. Pricing equilibria are critically determined by supply-side features such as the number of firms and their marginal cost differences. It follows that each firm's Lerner index under uniform pricing is equal to the weighted harmonic mean of the firm's relative margins under discriminatory pricing. Uniform pricing then lowers average prices and raises consumer surplus. We can calculate the gain in consumer surplus and loss in firms' profits from uniform pricing based only on the market data of the discriminatory equilibrium (i.e., prices and quantities).     

Collusion at the extensive margin

We augment the multi-market collusion model of Bernheim and Whinston (1990) by allowing for firm entry into, and exit from, individual markets. We show that this gives rise to a new mechanism by which a cartel can sustain a collusive agreement: Collusion at the extensive margin whereby firms collude by avoiding entry into each other's markets or territories. We characterise parameter values that sustain this type of collusion and identify the assumptions where this collusion is more likely to hold than its intensive margin counterpart. Specifically, it is demonstrated that where duopoly competition is fierce collusion at the extensive margin is always sustainable. Finally, we provide a theoretic foundation for the use of a “proportional response” enforcement mechanism.     

PRICE COMPETITION IN U.S. BREWING*

This study utilizes a brand‐level dataset that captures a unique natural experiment, a 100% increase in the excise tax, to evaluate different pricing models in the U.S. beer industry. To assess the plausibility of different models, the increase in marginal cost resulting from the tax increase is exploited: observed prices in the post‐increase period are compared to the prices that should be observed under various pricing models. Three types of models are analyzed: Bertrand‐Nash, leadership, and collusion. Results indicate that extreme cases of collusion can be confidently ruled out while several models may explain the observed prices equally well.     

Collusion and leadership

The paper explores the role of price or quantity leadership in facilitating collusion. It extends the standard analysis of tacit collusion by allowing firms to make their strategic choices either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that price leadership indeed facilitates collusion by making it easier to punish deviations by the leader. In case of pure Bertrand competition, price leadership restores the scope for (perfect) collusion in markets where collusion would not be sustainable otherwise. When firms face asymmetric costs or offer differentiated products, price leadership can also enhance the profitability of collusion—in case of asymmetric costs, the less efficient firm must act as the leader. Finally, such leadership is less effective in case of Cournot competition since, following an aggressive deviation by the leader, the follower would rather limit its own output, making it more difficult to punish the deviation. Still, quantity leadership may enhance collusion when it is already somewhat effective in a simultaneous move setting.     

Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms

We explore the effects of asymmetries in capacity constraints on collusion where market demand is uncertain and where firms’ sales and prices are private information. We show that all firms can infer when at least one firm's sales are below some firm‐specific ‘trigger level.’ When firms use this public information to monitor the collusive agreement, price wars may occur on the equilibrium path. Symmetry facilitates collusion but, if price wars are sufficiently long, then the optimal collusive prices of symmetric capacity distributions are lower on average than the competitive prices of asymmetric capacity distributions. We draw conclusions for merger policy.     

Ocean Carriers’ Collusion Under Antitrust Immunity: Evidence of Asymmetric Pass-Through

As fuel costs are the largest component of the shipping industry’s operating costs, this study examines whether ocean carriers pass fuel cost increases through to freight rates more quickly than they pass through fuel cost decreases. The focal price collusion theory suggests that such asymmetric pass-through could be a result of collusive behavior because collusion is easier to sustain when costs are falling than when costs are rising. Using a lag-adjustment model as the econometric framework, findings from this study show strong evidence for asymmetric adjustments of the US inbound freight rates in response to fuel cost changes. Such asymmetry persisted after the passage of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998. Moreover, the findings do not support the consumer search theory as an alternative explanation for the freight rate asymmetry.     

Temporality of resource adjustments in business networks during severe economic recession

Business cycles are not a new phenomenon. Firms have in the past found ways to, more or less successfully, adjust their resources to such cyclical changes. However, the combination of a global crisis in financial markets and a severe down turn in demand on globally interdependent markets in the “real” economy is unprecedented which suggests that established business practices to handle cyclical variations are challenged. In this article we focus on temporal aspects of resource adjustments, taking into account also network interdependencies in contemporary markets. We develop a conceptual framework towards understanding how business actors construct temporality of resource adjustment activities. We relate temporal orientation of actors to temporal profiles of activities, seeing them as both influenced by actors' network orientation.     

Multi-market contact and competition: evidence from the Depression-era portland cement industry

Theoretical work has suggested that contact between firms in different markets can facilitate tacit collusion. Empirical work on this link has been limited. We address the paucity of empirical evidence with a novel plant-level dataset for the cement industry during the Great Depression. We find that multi-market contact fosters tacit collusion and higher prices based on a new measure of contact that accounts for capacity utilization. A one standard deviation increase in our measure of contact increases prices by around 4.3%. We then examine the effect of the National Industrial Recovery Act's “Codes of Fair Conduct,” introduced in 1933 to stem deflation through cooperative behavior within industries. We find that the effects of the codes were most strongly felt in markets with the highest level of multi-market contact. This suggests that multi-market contact can be a useful ‘tool’ for firms to support collusive outcomes, tacit or otherwise.     

An empirical investigation of the determinants of asymmetric pricing

This article empirically investigates the cause of asymmetric pricing: retail prices responding faster to cost increases than decreases. Using daily price data for over 11,000 retail gasoline stations, I find that prices fall more slowly than they rise as a consequence of firms extracting informational rents from consumers with positive search costs. Premium gasoline prices are shown to fall more slowly than regular fuel prices, which supports theories based upon competition with consumer search. Further testing also rejects focal price collusion as an important determinant of asymmetric pricing.     

Sales Promotion and Cooperative Retail Pricing Strategies

Supermarket retailers make strategic pricing decisions in a high-frequency, repeated game environment both in buying and selling fresh produce. In this context, there is some question as to whether a non-cooperative equilibrium can emerge that produces margins above the competitive level. Supermarket pricing results from tacitly collusive equilibria supported by trigger price strategies played in upstream markets. Upstream activities are, in turn, driven by periodic retail price promotions. This hypothesis is tested using a sample of fresh produce pricing data from 20 US supermarket chains. The results support the existence of tacitly collusive non-cooperative equilibria in upstream and downstream markets.     

The Antecedents and Consequences of Affordable Value Innovations for Emerging Markets

Emerging markets offer tremendous growth opportunities for firms. While established multinational firms typically focus on premium segments in emerging markets, they often fail to leverage additional growth opportunities in so‐called good enough or low‐income segments in emerging markets. Customers in these low‐income markets have substantially different requirements and are very price sensitive. Theoretical and case‐based research suggests that innovating for these low‐income segments in emerging markets differs significantly from innovating for premium or traditional Western markets. We argue that tapping successfully into low‐income segments in emerging markets requires the development of new products that meet the low price expectations while at the same time offering also value to customers in these segments. We refer to these new products as affordable value innovations. We analyze the antecedents of affordable value innovation for emerging markets. We draw on institutional theory to derive three potentially relevant antecedents of affordable value innovation for emerging markets. These are bricolage, local embeddedness, and standardization. We test our hypotheses using multiple informant data from 47 multinational corporations involving 103 innovation projects that target low‐income customers in emerging markets. Our empirical analysis shows that all three antecedents have significant effects on the level of affordable value innovation: while bricolage and local embeddedness are positively related to the level of affordable value innovation, standardization has a negative impact. We also examine the relationship between the level of affordable value innovation and performance. We find evidence for our basic assumption that a firm's capability to develop and launch affordable value innovations is key to success in emerging markets. It indicates that a firm's investments in affordable value innovations for emerging markets pay off financially. Finally, a cross‐regional comparison of our data shows that the key findings on antecedents of affordable value innovation and its impact on performance do not vary across various emerging markets. Overall, our findings offer important implications for research on and the practice of innovation for low‐income segments in emerging markets.     

Competing with complementors: An empirical look at Amazon.com

Research Summary : Platform owners sometimes enter complementors' product spaces and compete against them. Using data from Amazon.com to study Amazon's entry pattern into third‐party sellers' product spaces, we find that Amazon is more likely to target successful product spaces. We also find that Amazon is less likely to enter product spaces that require greater seller efforts to grow, suggesting that complementors' platform‐specific investments influence platform owners' entry decisions. While Amazon's entry discourages affected third‐party sellers from subsequently pursuing growth on the platform, it increases product demand and reduces shipping costs for consumers. We consider the implications of these findings for complementors in platform‐based markets. Managerial Summary : Platform owners can exert considerable influence over their complementors' welfare. Many complementors with successful products are pushed out of markets because platform owners enter their product spaces and compete directly with them. To mitigate such risks, complementors could build their businesses by aggregating nonblockbuster products or focusing on products requiring significant platform‐specific investments to grow. They should also develop capabilities in new product discovery so that they could continually bring innovative products to their platforms.     

Domestic concentration,foreign trade and economic performance

In a competitive fringe model the impact of concentration on price-cost margins can be shown to be ambiguous. Therefore, looking at the relationship between rates of return and concentration ratios is not sufficient for perceiving collusive elements. In this paper a model is set up that permits discerning collusion more clearly. Additional evidence concerning collusion can be gained by analyzing the influence of exports and imports on price-cost margins. Applying this approach to West Germany yields the result that the collusiveness prevailing in domestic markets has not visibly decreased in spite of a substantial increase in foreign trade.     

The competitive effects of partial equity interests and joint ventures

Antitrust authorities should consider the trade-off between enhanced efficiency and reduced competition in cases of partial ownership. This paper examines the competitive effects side of that trade-off in the context of a modified Cournot model. We show that, in markets where entry is difficult, partial ownership arrangements could result in less output and higher prices than otherwise, even if the ownership shares are relatively small. These effects arise solely because these arrangements link the fortunes of actual or potential competitors, producing a positive correlation among their profits. In this sense, the effects are purely structural: they arise not because of increased opportunities for collusion or changes in the concentration of control, but because the linking of profits reduces each firm's incentive to compete. Since these links internalize free rider problems associated with policing collusion and investing in entry deterrence, however, they could also enhance cartel stability and profitability.     

Barriers to Entry and Competitive Behavior: Evidence from Reforms of Cable Franchising Regulations

Between 2005 and 2008, nineteen of the fifty states of the U.S. reformed the franchising process for cable television, significantly easing entry into local markets. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach that exploits the staggered introduction of reforms, we find that prices for ‘Basic’ service declined systematically by about 5.5 to 6.8 per cent following the reforms, but we find no statistically significant effect on average price for the more popular ‘Expanded Basic’ service. We also find that the reforms led to increased actual entry in reformed states, by about 11.6% relative to non‐reformed states. Our analysis shows that the decline in price for ‘Basic’ service holds for markets that did not experience actual entry, consistent with limit pricing by incumbents. To control for potential state‐level shocks correlated with the reforms, we undertake a sample‐split test that finds larger declines in prices for both ‘Basic’ and ‘Expanded Basic’ services in local markets which faced a greater threat of entry (because they were close to a prominent second entrant). Our results are consistent with limit pricing models that predict incumbents respond to increased threat of entry, and suggest that the reforms facilitated entry and modestly benefited consumers in reformed states.     

INEFFICIENCIES AND MARKET POWER IN FINANCIAL ARBITRAGE: A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY MARKETS*

For two years prior to the collapse of California's restructured electricity market, power traded in both a forward and a spot market for delivery at the same times and locations. Nonetheless, prices in the two markets often differed in significant and predictable ways. This apparent inefficiency persisted, we argue, because most firms believed that trading on inter‐market price differences would yield regulatory penalties. For the few firms that did make such trades, it was not profit‐maximizing to eliminate the price differences entirely. Skyrocketing prices in 2000 changed the major buyers' (utilities') incentives and exacerbated the price differentials between the markets.     

Platform Pricing at Sports Card Conventions

We study a new data set of U.S. sports card conventions from the perspective of the pricing theory of two‐sided markets. Conventions are two‐sided because organizers must set fees to attract both consumers and dealers. We present several findings: first, consumer pricing decreases with competition, but pricing to dealers is insensitive to competition and in longer distances even increases with competition. Second, when consumer price is zero (and thus constrained), dealer price decreases more strongly with competition. These results are compatible with existing models of two‐sided markets, but are difficult to explain without such models.     

Contestability and creative destruction: Two approaches to monopoly

The theory of contestability ’attempts to base a model of economic efficiency on oligopolistic markets, thereby justifying adoption of laissez-faire policies in the absence of atomistic competition. The analysis is similar to Schumpeter’s condemnation of government intervention in the theory of creative destruction: both theories claim that superior economic performance is associated with concentrated rather than competitive market structures. Yet in many respects the contestability analysis is less convincing than Schumpeter’s. Whereas Schumpeter admitted the existence of short rum profits and restrictive strategies, arguing that these inefficiencies, are outweighed in the long run, the theory of contestable markets is based on short run efficiency and cannot accommodate evidence of excess profits nor many of the existing models of oligopolistic strategies, including collusion and predatory pricing. Furthermore, the theory lacks a logical explanation of investment, by entrants and convincing empirical support for its claim that concentrated markets maximize consumer welfare.     

Testing the Competitive Environment and the Persistence of Profits Hypotheses

In the present paper I examine Brozen's (1970, 1971a, b, c, 1982) Competitive Environment Hypothesis and Mueller's (1977) Persistence of Profits Hypothesis in the Greek manufacturing industries between 1958 and 1984. The analysis reveals a positive (market power) association between past and current price-cost margins, although a considerable scrambling in the ranks of price-cost margins takes place over time. A high concentration and high barriers to entry sub-sample of markets examined, showed a general reduction in concentration, barriers to entry and a mobility in price-cost margins ranks, indicating that disciplinary competitive forces are also at work within manufacturing markets.