Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous and Misspecified Expectations

In the recent literature on monetary policy and learning, it has been suggested that private sector's expectations should play a role in the policy rule implemented by the central bank, as they could improve the ability of the policymaker to stabilize the economy. Private sector's expectations, in these studies, are often taken to be homogeneous and rational, at least in the limit of a learning process. In this paper, instead, we consider the case in which private agents are heterogeneous in their expectations formation mechanisms and hold heterogeneous expectations in equilibrium. We investigate the impact of this heterogeneity in expectations on central bank's policy implementation and on the ensuing economic outcomes, and the general result that emerges is that the central bank should disregard inaccurate private sector expectations and solely base its policy on the accurate ones.     

Optimal Monetary Policy and Transparency under Informational Frictions

This paper examines the optimal monetary policy and central bank transparency in an economy where firms set prices under informational frictions. The economy is subject to two types of shocks determining the efficient output level and firms' desired markups. To minimize the welfare‐reducing output gap and price dispersion between firms, the central bank controls firms' incentives and expectations by using a monetary instrument and disclosing information on the realized shocks. This paper shows that an optimal policy comprises the disclosure of a linear combination of the two shocks and the adjustment of monetary instruments contingent on the disclosed information.     

Phillips Curve Instability and Optimal Monetary Policy

Empirical evidence suggests the Phillips curve has flattened over the past few decades. To capture this feature of the data, I develop a framework where firms face a changing cost of price adjustment, which produces a Phillips curve with a slope coefficient that varies over time. To evaluate the implications for monetary policy, I construct the utility‐based welfare criterion where the relative weight on output gap deviations changes synchronously with the slope of the Phillips curve. The systematic component of the rule that implements optimal policy is constant under discretion and commitment.     

Labor Selection,Turnover Costs,and Optimal Monetary Policy

We study optimal monetary policy and welfare properties of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with a labor selection process, labor turnover costs, and Nash bargained wages. We show that our model implies inefficiencies that cannot be offset in a standard wage bargaining regime. We also show that the inefficiencies rise with the magnitude of firing costs. As a result, in the optimal Ramsey plan, the optimal inflation volatility deviates from zero and is an increasing function of firing costs.     

Asymmetric Preferences and the Stability Problem for Optimal Monetary Policy Rules

This paper evaluates the stability properties of optimal monetary policy rules when professionals under adaptive learning have asymmetric preferences. The asymmetric preferences require volatility estimates in real time. An expectations‐based rule can stabilize the economy, while a fundamentals‐based rule leads to instability.     

Inflation Targeting,Recursive Inattentiveness,and Heterogeneous Beliefs

We consider a monetary authority that provides an explicit inflation target in order to align expectations with the policy objective. However, biased perceptions of the target may arise due to imperfect information flows. We allow agents to revise expectations over time and we model their recursive choice among prediction strategies as an optimization problem under rational inattention. We then investigate whether a simple policy rule can steer the economy toward the targeted equilibrium. Our findings suggest that determinacy under rational expectations may not be sufficient to reach the target. Instead, monetary policy should be fine‐tuned to correct agents' biased beliefs.     

Heterogeneous Inflation Expectations and Learning

Using the panel component of the Michigan Survey of Consumers, we estimate a learning model of inflation expectations, allowing for heterogeneous use of private information and lifetime inflation experience. Life experience inflation has a significant impact on individual expectations, but only for 1‐year‐ahead inflation. Public information is substantially more relevant for longer horizon expectations. Even controlling for life experience inflation and public information, idiosyncratic information explains a nontrivial proportion of the inflation forecasts of agents. Women, ethnic minorities, and less educated agents have a higher degree of heterogeneity in their idiosyncratic information, and give less importance to recent movements in inflation.     

Optimal Monetary Policy in an Operational Medium‐Sized DSGE Model

We show how to construct optimal policy projections in Ramses, the Riksbank’s open‐economy medium‐sized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for forecasting and policy analysis. Bayesian estimation of the parameters of the model indicates that they are relatively invariant to alternative policy assumptions and supports our view that the model parameters may be regarded as unaffected by the monetary policy specification. We discuss how monetary policy, and in particular the choice of output gap measure, affects the transmission of shocks. Finally, we use the model to assess the recent Great Recession in the world economy and how its impact on the economic development in Sweden depends on the conduct of monetary policy. This provides an illustration on how Rames incoporates large international spillover effects.     

Monetary Policy and the Natural Rate of Interest

It is most important for monetary policy to track the natural rate of interest when interest rates take large and sustained swings away from their long‐run equilibrium values. Here, we study two models: a standard New Keynesian model and one in which government bonds provide liquidity. Policy rules that cannot track the natural rate perform poorly in both models, but are especially bad in the second because of sustained movements in the natural rate induced by fiscal shocks. First difference rules, on the other hand, do surprisingly well. When model uncertainty is taken into account, the dominance of the first difference rule is even more pronounced.     

Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model with Agency Costs

This paper integrates a fully explicit model of agency costs into an otherwise standard Dynamic New Keynesian model in a particularly transparent way. A principal result is the characterization of agency costs as endogenous markup shocks in an output‐gap version of the Phillips curve. The model's utility‐based welfare criterion is derived explicitly and includes a measure of credit market tightness that we interpret as a risk premium. The paper also fully characterizes optimal monetary policy and provides conditions under which zero inflation is the optimal policy. Finally, optimal policy can be expressed as an inflation targeting criterion that (depending upon parameter values) can be either forward or backward looking.     

U.S. Monetary Regimes and Optimal Monetary Policy in the Euro Area

Monetary policy in the United States has been documented to have switched from reacting weakly to inflation fluctuations during the 1970s, to fighting inflation aggressively from the early 1980s onward. In this paper, I analyze the impact of the U.S. monetary policy regime switches on the Eurozone. I construct a New Keynesian two‐country model where foreign (U.S.) monetary policy switches regimes over time. I estimate the model for the U.S. and the Euro Area using quarterly data and find that the United States has switched between those two regimes, in line with existing evidence. I show that foreign regime switches affect home (Eurozone) inflation and output volatility and their responses to shocks, substantially, as long as the home central bank commits to a time‐invariant interest rate rule reacting to domestic conditions only. Optimal policy in the home country instead requires that the home central bank reacts strongly to domestic producer‐price inflation and to international variables, such as imported goods relative prices. In fact, I show that currency misalignments and relative prices play a crucial role in the transmission of foreign monetary policy regime switches internationally. Interestingly, I show that only marginal gains arise for the Euro Area when the European Central Bank (ECB) adjusts its policy according to the monetary regime in the United States. Thus, a simple time‐invariant monetary policy rule with a strong reaction to Producer Price Index (PPI) inflation and relative prices is enough to counteract the effects of monetary policy switches in the United States.     

Collateral in Monetary Policy Operations

We present a portfolio decision model for banks that permits us to estimate the costs associated with the need to collateralise loans from the central bank. This allows us to calibrate the difference between a restrictive collateral eligibility framework for open market operations, such as that applied by the FED, with a more flexible approach such as that of Eurosystem. We also document that there could potentially appear relevant cost differences between the various collateral mobilisation procedures (pooling and earmarking) that currently coexist in the eurozone.     

Optimal Structure of Fiscal and Monetary Authorities

Why are monetary authorities not elected like fiscal authorities are? Advanced economies pair an elected fiscal authority with an independent monetary authority. Replicating the advanced economies' structure with authorities microfounded by a political economy model shows that this structure is the solution to a constrained mechanism design problem that overcomes time inconsistency and results in the highest possible welfare. Goal and instrument independence, singly and in combination, are insufficient to minimize time inconsistency, though their combination is necessary.     

On Targeting Frameworks And Optimal Monetary Policy

We show that speed limit policy, a monetary policy strategy that focuses on stabilizing inflation and the change in the output gap, consistently outperforms flexible inflation targeting and flexible price level targeting in empirical medium‐scale DSGE models under discretionary policymaking. In contrast to small‐scale New Keynesian models, this welfare ranking of the targeting frameworks is not overturned when inflation dynamics are mostly backward‐looking. Importantly, the performance of the speed limit policy shows less sensitivity to its parameterization than other frameworks that target the inflation rate or the price level.     

Banking Competition,Collateral Constraints,and Optimal Monetary Policy

We analyze optimal monetary policy in a model with two distinct financial frictions: monopolistically competitive banks that charge endogenous lending spreads, and collateral constraints. We show that welfare maximization is equivalent to stabilization of four goals: inflation, output gap, the “consumption gap” between borrowers and savers, and a “housing gap” that measures the distortion in the distribution of the collateralizable asset between both groups. Collateral constraints create a trade‐off between stabilization goals. Following both productivity and financial shocks, and relative to strict inflation targeting, the optimal policy implies sharper movements in the policy rate, aimed primarily at reducing fluctuations in asset prices and hence in borrowers' net worth. The policy trade‐offs become amplified as banking competition increases, due to the fall in lending spreads and the resulting increase in borrowers' leverage.     

Monetary Policy Response to Oil Price Shocks

How should monetary authorities react to an oil price shock? This paper shows that in a noncompetitive economy, policies that perfectly stabilize prices entail large welfare costs, hence explaining the reluctance of policymakers to enforce them. The policy trade‐off is nontrivial because oil (energy) is an input to both production and consumption. As welfare‐maximizing policies are hard to implement and communicate, I derive a simple interest rate rule that depends only on observables but mimics the optimal plan in all dimensions. The optimal rule is hard on core inflation but accommodates oil price changes.     

Ben Bernanke in Doha: The Effect of Monetary Policy on Optimal Tariffs

Trade liberalization can imply slow and long adjustment processes. Taking account of these adjustment processes can change the evaluation of trade policy, especially when policymakers care more about the next couple of years than the infinite future. In this paper, I analyze the setting of tariffs in a two‐country model taking account of adjustment processes with special emphasis on the effects of nominal price rigidity and monetary policy. I show that nominal price rigidity induces policymakers with a short planning horizon to set lower tariffs because it enhances the short‐run drop in consumption following an increase in tariffs. Monetary policy that aggressively fights deviations from its inflation target implies even lower optimal tariffs.     

Managing Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets with Monetary Policy

We study the effect of a “leaning against the wind” monetary policy on asset price bubbles in a learning-to-forecast experiment, where prices are driven by the expectations of market participants. We find that a strong interest rate response is successful in preventing or deflating large price bubbles, while a weak response is not. Giving information about the interest rate changes and communicating the goal of the policy increases coordination of expectations and has a stabilizing effect. When the steady-state fundamental price is unknown and the interest rate rule is based on a proxy instead, the policy is less effective.     

Monetary Policy Expectations at the Zero Lower Bound

We show that conventional dynamic term structure models (DTSMs) estimated on recent U.S. data severely violate the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates and deliver poor forecasts of future short rates. In contrast, shadow‐rate DTSMs account for the ZLB by construction, capture the resulting distributional asymmetry of future short rates, and achieve good forecast performance. These models provide more accurate estimates of the most likely path for future monetary policy—including the timing of policy liftoff from the ZLB and the pace of subsequent policy tightening. We also demonstrate the benefits of including macroeconomic factors in a shadow‐rate DTSM when yields are constrained near the ZLB.