Tuition Fees and the Dual Income Tax: The Optimality of the Nordic Income Tax System Reconsidered

Abstract. We examine the optimal tax and education policy in the case of a dual income tax. Incorporating an educational sector and endogenous capital taxation, we show that the results in Nielsen and Sørensen's study are vulnerable with respect to assumptions on the elasticity of unskilled labor supply. Tax progressivity results residually, whereas educational policy guarantees an optimal tax wedge on, but not necessarily efficiency in, educational investment. The less elastic are the unobservable educational investment and skilled labor (the latter relative to unskilled labor supply), and the more educational policy cares about the skilled labor supply, the more progressive the tax system will be. Education will be subsidized on a net basis if the complementarity effect on the skilled labor supply is strong and important; however, there is also an offsetting substitutability effect of the unskilled labor supply at play.     

Brain drain,illegal migration and capital exports from less developed economies: a neoclassical approach

This model shows that LDC's brain drain triggers emigration of unskilled labor and capital exports, skilled workers and agricultural capitalists gain, unskilled workers and industrial capitalists lose, and demodernization of the economy results. Demodernization of the economy occurs when labor force and output of the industrial sector decrease, and employment and production in agriculture increase. The problem analyzed in this model is what happens to the incomes of those who are left behind when some of the skilled workers migrate abroad. The results show that with the exodus of both skilled labor and capital, the marginal productivity of unskilled workers in industry also falls below the unskilled wage. Although one would expect a brain drain to result in gains for those skilled workers who remain in the source country, and for the capital owners who receive unskilled workers as a result of emigration, the losers are the unskilled workers and the capitalists in the sector where the migrants worked.     

Consequences of a tax on the brain drain for unemployment and income inequality in less developed countries

Welfare implications of an income tax paid by emigrant skilled workers are analyzed in a model which assumes international capital mobility and allows for unemployed labor in the modern sector of a developing country. The tax discourages overinvestment in education and also contributes to the welfare of those remaining through the direct revenue effect. However, expected earnings of unskilled workers decline as a result of the tax, while those of non-migrant skilled workers rise. The tax may thus exacerbate domestic income inequality. In addition, modern sector employment, output, and capital stock may fall.     

A SEARCH‐EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH TO THE EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION ON LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES

We analyze the impact of the U.S. skill‐biased immigration influx that took place between 2000 and 2009 within a search and matching model that allows for skill heterogeneity, differential search cost, and capital‐skill complementarity. We find that although the skill‐biased immigration raised the overall net income to natives, it had distributional effects. Specifically, unskilled native workers gained in terms of both employment and wages. Skilled native workers, however, gained in terms of employment but lost in terms of wages. Nevertheless, in an extension where skilled natives and immigrants are imperfect substitutes, even the skilled wage rises.     

Intra‐industry Trade Liberalization: Why Skilled Workers are More Likely to Support Free Trade

This paper presents a theoretical model and empirical analysis that connects the prevalence of intra‐industry trade with increased wage inequality from trade liberalization in both skilled and unskilled labor abundant countries. The Stolper–Samuelson effect is incorporated into an intra‐industry trade liberalization (intra‐ITL) hypothesis where skilled labor opposes protectionism in all countries engaged in intra‐industry trade because skilled workers gain at the expense of unskilled workers from multilateral trade liberalization within the skill‐intensive sector. We examine empirical evidence on whether skilled individuals are more supportive of trade liberalization than unskilled individuals across 31 countries with different levels of intra‐industry trade and skill endowments. We find that the extent to which countries engage in intra‐industry trade in high‐tech commodities is strongly linked with the intensity of opposition to protection by skilled labor. Regression results strongly support our hypothesis that skilled workers, almost everywhere, are more likely to support free trade.     

Trade,environment, and income inequality: An optimal taxation approach

In a small open economy, how should a government pursuing both environmental and redistributive objectives design domestic taxes when redistribution is costly? And how does trade liberalization affect the economy's levels of pollution and inequalities, when taxes are optimally and endogenously adjusted? Using a general equilibrium model under asymmetric information with two goods, two factors (skilled and unskilled labor), and pollution, this paper characterizes the optimal mixed tax system (nonlinear income tax and linear commodity and production taxes/subsidies) with both production and consumption externalities. While optimal income taxes are not directly affected by environmental externalities, conditions are derived under which under‐ or over‐internalization of social marginal damage is optimal for redistributive considerations. Assuming that redistribution operates in favor of the unskilled workers and that the dirty sector is intensive in unskilled labor, simulations suggest that trade liberalization involves a clear trade‐off between the reduction of inequalities and the control of pollution when the source of externality is only production; this is not necessarily true with a consumption externality. Finally, an increase in the willingness to redistribute income toward the unskilled results paradoxically in less pollution and more income inequalities.     

Capital–skill complementarity and the immigration surplus

We build a neoclassical growth model with overlapping dynasties and capital–skill complementarities to evaluate changes in immigration policy. Calibrating the model using US data, we quantify the differential effects of skilled and unskilled immigration on factor returns and on the welfare of different sectors of the population. An influx of high-skilled immigrants lowers the wages of skilled workers, raises the wages of unskilled workers, and because of the relative complementarity between capital and skilled labor, substantially raises the rate of return to native-owned capital. By contrast, an influx of unskilled immigrants produces an opposite effect on wages, and has only a negligible effect on the return to capital. Because of capital–skill complementarity, an increase in the number of skilled immigrants generates an immigration surplus—the overall welfare benefit accruing to the native population—that is approximately ten times larger than the immigration surplus generated by an identical increase in the number of unskilled immigrants. This differential welfare effect is far higher than can be accounted for by the disparity between the productivities of each type of worker.     

Skilled–unskilled wage inequality,product variety,public input and increasing returns: A static general equilibrium analysis

The paper develops a four sector small open economy model with two traded final good sectors, a public intermediate good producing sector and a nontraded good sector producing varieties of intermediate goods. There are three primary factors: capital, skilled labour and unskilled labour. Industrial sector producing a traded good uses capital, intermediate goods and skilled labour as inputs. Intermediate goods producing sector also uses capital and skilled labour. Public input producing sector and the agricultural sector producing the other traded good use capital and unskilled labour as inputs. It is shown that, if production technologies are the same for the agricultural sector and the public input producing sector and if the scale elasticity of output is very low, then an increase in capital stock (unskilled labour endowment) raises (lowers) the skilled–unskilled wage ratio. However, an increase in skilled labour endowment does not produce any unambiguous effect. On the other hand, an increase in the tax rate on industrial output and/or an increase in the price of the agricultural product, armed with the same set of assumptions, lowers the skilled–unskilled wage ratio.     

Shifts and twists in the relative productivity of skilled labor

Skill-biased technical change is usually interpreted in terms of the efficiency parameters of skilled and unskilled labor. This implies that the relative productivity of skilled workers changes proportionally in all tasks. In contrast, we argue that technical changes also affect the curvature of the distribution of relative productivity. Building on Rosen (1978) [Rosen, S., 1978. Substitution and the division of labor. Economica 45, 235–250] tasks assignment model, this implies that not only the efficiency parameters of skilled and unskilled workers change, but also the elasticity of substitution between skill types of labor. Using data for the United States between 1963 and 2002, we find significant empirical support for a decrease in the elasticity of substitution at the end of the 1970s followed by an increase at the beginning of the 1990s. This pattern of the elasticity of substitution has contributed to the labor productivity slowdown in the mid-1970s through the 1980s and to a speedup in the 1990s.     

International Outsourcing and R&D: Long‐Run Implications for Consumers*

We show that international outsourcing and R&D by the outsourced firm may be either substitutes or complements. Outsourcing increases the R&D investment in small markets and in highly competitive product markets, whereas it decreases the R&D investment in large markets. If the outsourced firm can be technologically very efficient under exporting, outsourcing can make the consumers worse off by reducing the R&D investment. If there is skill differential in the production process and outsourcing occurs only in the unskilled activities, R&D‐reducing outsourcing occurs in a relatively low‐skilled industry. If outsourcing of the unskilled jobs reduces the effective cost of the skilled workers by increasing the productivities of the skilled workers, outsourcing provides further disincentive for R&D compared to the situation where outsourcing of the unskilled jobs does not affect the effective cost of the skilled workers.     

Capital–Skill Complementarity and Inequality in Sweden

Income inequality increased in Sweden during the 1980s and 1990s, as did the returns to higher education. The main conclusion of this study is that increased income inequality between high‐ and low‐skilled workers is demand driven and is due to the presence of capital–skill complementarity in production. Increased investments in new, more efficient capital equipment, along with a slowdown in the growth rate of skilled labor, have raised the ratio of effective capital inputs per skilled worker, which, in turn, has increased the relative demand (and market return) for skilled labor through the capital–skill complementarity mechanism.     

Brain drain and factor complementarity

In this paper we develop an extended Solow growth model with emigration which aggregates different types of labor skills from strict complementarity to perfect substitution. The derivation of balanced growth paths shows that the most relevant cases for studying the impact of emigration are those where these paths can only be attained asymptotically. This requires and justifies the need for using transitional dynamics. We therefore derive a complete characterization of the transitional dynamics of output and wages in the sending country for all possible values taken by the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers. The model then serves to qualitatively study the effect of brain drain on per capita income and wages of the sending country.     

Tariff Elimination and the Wage Gap in an Industrial Specific Factors Model*

A specific factors model of 458 US manufacturing industries simulates the effects of eliminating manufacturing tariffs on unskilled and skilled wages. The model assumes constant elasticity substitution, industry‐specific capital inputs, and mobile unskilled and skilled labor. Tariff elimination slightly lowers both unskilled and skilled wages, and increases the skilled wage gap. Industry outputs and capital returns absorb the negative impact of the falling tariffs with losses concentrated in more highly protected industries and most industries enjoying small positive outcomes.     

WHY HAVE AGGREGATE SKILLED HOURS BECOME SO CYCLICAL SINCE THE MID‐1980s?*

We document and discuss a dramatic change in the cyclical behavior of aggregate skilled hours since the mid‐1980s. Using CPS data for 1979:1–2003:4, we find that the volatility of skilled hours relative to the volatility of GDP has nearly tripled since 1984. In contrast, the cyclical properties of unskilled hours have remained essentially unchanged. We evaluate whether a simple supply/demand model for skilled and unskilled labor with capital‐skill complementarity in production can help explain this stylized fact. Our model accounts for about 60% of the observed increase in the relative volatility of skilled labor.     

Migration and Wage‐setting: Reassessing the Labor Market Effects of Migration*

In this paper we employ a wage‐setting approach to analyze the labor market effects of immigration into Germany from 1980 to 2004. This enables us to consider labor market rigidities, which are prevalent in Europe. We find that the elasticity of the wage‐setting curve is particularly high for young workers. Moreover, natives and foreigners are imperfect substitutes. The wage and employment effects of immigration depend on the skill structure of the immigrant workforce. Because the foreign labor supply shift has mainly affected the high‐skilled labor market segment, the 4 percent increase of the workforce through immigration has not increased either aggregate or foreign unemployment.     

Organized crime and wage inequality

This paper stresses the role of industrial organization of crime, and explores how organized crime affects wage inequality. We find that, when only unskilled workers (or both skilled and unskilled workers) engage in organized crime, an increase in the number of criminal groups will increase wage inequality if (1) the skilled sector is more capital intensive than the unskilled sector, and (2) the price elasticity of demand for the skilled product is large enough. However, when there are only skilled workers engaging in organized crime, condition (1) is sufficient to widen wage inequality, irrespective of the price elasticity.     

A Schumpeterian North–South Growth Model of Trade and Wage Inequality*

The paper presents a dynamic general‐equilibrium model of interindustry North–South trade that is used to analyze the effects of trade liberalization on the Northern wage distribution. Both countries have a low‐tech sector where consumer goods of constant quality are produced by use of unskilled labor. The North also has a high‐tech sector that employs skilled labor and features a quality‐ladder model structure with endogenous growth. Both innovation and skill acquisition rates are endogenously determined. In a balanced trade equilibrium, it is found that Southern‐originated (Northern‐originated) trade liberalization leads to an increase (decrease) in Northern wage inequality both between skilled and unskilled workers and within the group of skilled workers. The endogenous change in the Southern terms of trade determines the direction of change in unskilled wages in both the North and the South.     

Tax Competition and Economic Integration

This article examines the role of tax competition and economic integration in a core–periphery setting, where agglomeration forces are present. I present a New Economic Geography model, which accounts for firm entry/exit and international mobility of skilled labor employed in the public R&D sectors. In contrast to other literature on tax competition, I focus on its impact on labor migration and net earnings of skilled and unskilled labor. Economic integration is modeled as trade liberalization, an easing of factor mobility restrictions and technology diffusion. I find that tax competition favors skilled labor when trade costs are reduced. In contrast, unskilled labor benefits when factor mobility restrictions are eased and technology diffusion is enhanced.     

The optimal public employment policy

This paper studies optimal public employment in a model with two types of labor, unskilled and skilled, and a single consumption good. A linear income tax is used to redistribute income. It is shown that, if the income tax and public employment levels are optimal, then there is less unskilled labor and more skilled labor in public production than is necessary to minimize costs at the prevailing gross wage rates. The robustness of this result is investigated by examining a second model.     

Wage endogeneity,tax evasion,and optimal nonlinear income taxation

This paper studies the interaction between tax evasion and wage endogeneity within a Mirrleesian optimal tax framework. It characterizes the optimal marginal income tax rates on the skilled and the unskilled workers and the optimal amount of resources to be spent on deterring tax evasion. It shows that tax evasion weakens the incentives for the government to manipulate the marginal tax rates for the purpose of exploiting general equilibrium effects on wages. Moreover, the extent of this depends on the curvature of the evasion cost function. It also argues that marginal income tax rates are likely to be higher when the government attempts to deter evasion.