Are Analysts’ Recommendations for Other Investment Banks Biased?

This paper provides evidence of a “Potential conflict of interest by equity analysts” who issue recommendations for investment banks that are related to their own bank through syndication. Analysts issue significantly more optimistic recommendations for investment banks with which their bank is syndicated. Recommending banks upgrade their recommendations just before a relation is initiated, suggesting that they use analyst optimism as a means of currying favor with the syndicate lead in hopes of being invited to join. It also appears that as part of a quid pro quo of sorts, relatively optimistic recommendations are rewarded with more syndicate appointments in the year after the recommendations.     

What Drives the Consequences of Intentional Misstatements? Evidence from Rating Analysts’ Reactions

This paper aims to identify the mechanisms through which intentional misstatements adversely affect firms by analyzing rating analysts’ reaction to misstatements. In order to identify the mechanisms through which the misstatement affects firms’ credit ratings, we analyze the content of rating reports. Rating analysts are concerned about seven different mechanisms. They are most concerned about misstatement‐related violations of debt covenants that increase a firm's liquidity risk. We find that, subsequent to an intentional misstatement becoming publicly known, credit ratings of misreporting firms are adversely affected for up to seven years. The adverse impact of an intentional misstatement on a firm's credit rating is most pronounced in cases in which rating analysts mention concerns about misstatement‐related violations of covenants. Our results suggest that these covenant violations are the most severe mechanism through which misstatements adversely affect firms’ creditworthiness.     

Do Opinions on Financial Misstatement Firms Affect Analysts’ Reputation with Investors? Evidence from Reputational Spillovers

We examine whether opinions on firms subsequently revealed to have misstated earnings affect analysts’ reputation with investors. We find that positive opinions by bullish analysts hurt their reputation, leading investors to react less to their research on non‐misstatement firms after the misstatement revelation (i.e., negative spillovers). We also find that bearish analysts issuing more negative opinions gain reputation and experience positive spillovers. Finally, for analysts who dropped coverage of the misstatement firm before the misstatement revelation, we find no spillovers, which suggests that analysts experience limited reputational gains when they did not issue a public negative opinion.     

Picking Winners? Investment Consultants’ Recommendations of Fund Managers

Investment consultants advise institutional investors on their choice of fund manager. Focusing on U.S. actively managed equity funds, we analyze the factors that drive consultants’ recommendations, what impact these recommendations have on flows, and how well the recommended funds perform. We find that investment consultants’ recommendations of funds are driven largely by soft factors, rather than the funds’ past performance, and that their recommendations have a significant effect on fund flows. However, we find no evidence that these recommendations add value, suggesting that the search for winners, encouraged and guided by investment consultants, is fruitless.     

Are All Ratings Created Equal? The Impact of Issuer Size on the Pricing of Mortgage‐Backed Securities

Initial yields on both AAA‐rated and non‐AAA rated mortgage‐backed security (MBS) tranches sold by large issuers are higher than yields on similar tranches sold by small issuers during the market boom years of 2004 to 2006. Moreover, the prices of MBS sold by large issuers drop more than those sold by small issuers, and the differences are concentrated among tranches issued during 2004 to 2006. These results suggest that investors price the risk that large issuers received more inflated ratings than small issuers, especially during boom periods.     

Are Risk Management Disclosures Informative or Tautological? Evidence from the U.S. Banking Sector

Banks experienced increasing risk levels during the latest financial crisis. Investors’ confidence was shaken by the effectiveness of bank risk management practices, which has opened new challenges for bank management in approaching its risk. Understanding and communicating adopted risk management mechanisms is likely to provide insights and enable diagnosis on firm risk exposure. Conveying data that reduces information asymmetry might be reflected on stock performance. Investigating the impact of risk management disclosures content on stock price change and return volatility, using a sample of U.S. national commercial banks during 2009–2010, shows that informative risk management disclosures seems to be valued by investors. This is reflected on current‐year stock prices and reduces the subsequent‐year return variances.     

Do students’ perceptions matter? A study of the effect of students’ perceptions on academic performance

Prior accounting education literature documents that students typically associate accounting subjects with negative perceptions, but there are also recent suggestions that the stereotype of the accountant has positive associations. These perceptions of accounting are likely to affect students’ attitudes towards learning and, consequently, influence their performance. We examine the relationship between students’ perceptions and students’ performance. The present study involved undergraduate and graduate students enrolled in management accounting subjects. Our findings indicate that students’ performance is negatively affected by the negative perceptions of accounting that students bring to the subject. Our findings also suggest that positive perceptions of accounting held by students at the end of the semester have a positive impact on students’ performance.     

Are Individual Investors Influenced by the Optimism and Credibility of Stock Spam Recommendations?

This study examines attention‐driven investment decisions using a sample of firms essentially unknown to investors prior to becoming the target of a stock spam campaign. We show that the market reaction to spam varies predictably with the content of the spam message. Spam date returns and volume are significantly higher for stocks targeted by spam emails containing optimistic target price projections bundled with ostensibly credible information quoted from a previously issued company press release. There is also some evidence that disclaimers in spam messages reduce, but do not eliminate, the market response. Attention effects also contribute to spammers’ selection of stocks to target and to spam‐related enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission.     

Impact of MiFID II tick-size regime on equity markets—Evidence from the LSE

This study investigates the impact of MiFID II on the London Stock Exchange. We find that a tick-size reduction leads to lower bid–ask spreads, lower trade values, reduced cost of trading at and beyond the best bid-offer, an acceleration of quote updates, an increase in aggressive trades and a reduction in price impact. Increased tick size widens spreads and increases trading costs. Step functions reveal that liquidity adjusts opposite to the tick change. To determine if impacts are proportional, we identify potential functions that predict cost changes with tick updates, implying that traders adjust their trade sizes according to the new tick levels.     

Are stock markets really efficient? Evidence of the adaptive market hypothesis

This study examines the adaptive market hypothesis in the S&P500, FTSE100, NIKKEI225 and EURO STOXX 50 by testing for stock return predictability using daily data from January 1990 to May 2014. We apply three bootstrapped versions of the variance ratio test to the raw stock returns and also whiten the returns through an AR-GARCH process to study the nonlinear predictability after accounting for conditional heteroscedasticity through the BDS test. We evaluate the time-varying return predictability by applying these tests to fixed-length moving subsample windows and also examine whether there is a relationship between the level of predictability in stock returns and market conditions. The results show that there are periods of statistically significant return predictability, but also episodes of no statistically significant predictability in stock returns. We also find that certain market conditions are statistically significantly related to predictability in certain markets but each market interacts differently with the different market conditions. Therefore our findings suggest that return predictability in stock markets does vary over time in a manner consistent with the adaptive market hypothesis and that each market adapts differently to certain market conditions. Consequently our findings suggest that investors should view each market independently since different markets experience contrasting levels of predictability, which are related to market conditions.     

Have Financial Statements Become Less Informative? Evidence from the Ability of Financial Ratios to Predict Bankruptcy

Using a hazard model, we examine secular changes in the ability of financial statement data to predict bankruptcy from 1962 to 2002. We identify three trends in financial reporting that could influence predictive ability with respect to bankruptcy: FASB standards, the perceived increase in discretionary financial reporting behavior, and the increase in unrecognized assets and obligations. A parsimonious three-variable model provides significant explanatory power throughout the time period, with only a slight deterioration in predictive power from the first to the second time period. The striking feature of the results is the robustness of the predictive models over a forty-year period.JEL Classification: M41, G14, G33, C41     

Accounting Education and the Prerequisite Skills of Accounting Graduates: Are Accounting Firms’ Moving the Boundaries?

The current requisite skills of accounting graduates guide the graduate attributes delivered by university learning outcomes. A recent trend by Australian accounting firms to outsource accounting services may impact on accounting graduates if entry‐level tasks normally completed by graduates are sent to offshore processing centres. This study examines the impact of the outsourcing of accounting services by Australian accounting firms and classifies the current requisite skills for accounting graduates identified by accounting firms. Following a review of the current academic literature, a positivist approach using empirical data is taken in this paper. The responses elicited from a survey questionnaire mailed to a random sample of Australian accounting firms provide information for the data analysis. One of the most widely outsourced services identified is the preparation of income tax returns, which has been identified as a key area where graduate accountants normally learn the basic skills required to phase them into the profession. Accounting firms that considered the outsourcing of accounting services would change the 12 ranked prerequisite skills for graduates presented in this paper in order of importance.     

Are Auditors Professionally Skeptical? Evidence from Auditors’ Going‐Concern Opinions and Management Earnings Forecasts

We examine whether auditors exercise professional skepticism about management earnings forecasts when making going‐concern decisions. Using publicly issued management earnings forecasts as a proxy for earnings forecasts provided by managers to auditors, we find that management earnings forecasts are negatively associated with both auditors’ going‐concern opinions and subsequent bankruptcy. The weight auditors put on management forecasts in the going‐concern decision is not significantly different from the weight implied in the bankruptcy prediction model. Moreover, compared with the bankruptcy model, auditors assign a lower weight to management forecasts they perceive as being less credible, including those (1) issued by managers who issued optimistic forecasts in the previous two years, and (2) predicting high earnings increases or high earnings. Taken together, our evidence is consistent with auditors being professionally skeptical about management earnings forecasts when making going‐concern decisions.     

Are Options on Index Futures Profitable for Risk‐Averse Investors? Empirical Evidence

American options on the S&P 500 index futures that violate the stochastic dominance bounds of Constantinides and Perrakis (2009) from 1983 to 2006 are identified as potentially profitable trades. Call bid prices more frequently violate their upper bound than put bid prices do, while violations of the lower bounds by ask prices are infrequent. In out‐of‐sample tests of stochastic dominance, the writing of options that violate the upper bound increases the expected utility of any risk‐averse investor holding the market and cash, net of transaction costs and bid‐ask spreads. The results are economically significant and robust.     

How costly is the Sarbanes Oxley Act? Evidence on the effects of the Act on corporate profitability

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was intended to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures. However, critics have argued that the costs of SOX far outweigh its intended benefits. Prior studies based on stock-price reactions to SOX-related events document mixed evidence on the expected impact of SOX. In contrast, we provide evidence on the net realized costs of SOX by examining its impact on operating profitability. We find that average cash flows decline by 1.3% of total assets after SOX. These costs are more significant for smaller firms, for more complex firms, and for firms with lower-growth opportunities. Annually, these costs range from $6 million for smaller firms to $39 million for larger firms. Further, we document that net SOX-related costs are not limited to one-time expenses associated with internal-control design and implementation. In aggregate, for the 1428 firms in our sample, these costs amount to about $19 billion per year. Profitability is lower for up to four years post-SOX. To our knowledge, ours are the first estimates of the realized net costs imposed by SOX.     

Informal or formal financing? Evidence on the co-funding of Chinese firms

Different modes of external finance provide heterogeneous benefits for the borrowing firms. Informal finance offers informational advantages whereas formal finance is scalable. Using unique survey data from China, we find that informal finance is associated with higher sales growth for small firms but lower sales growth for large firms. We identify a complementary effect between informal and formal finance for the sales growth of small firms, but not for large firms. Co-funding, thereby simultaneously using the informational advantage of informal finance and the scalability of formal finance, is therefore the optimal choice for small firms.     

What Do Consumers’ Fund Flows Maximize? Evidence from Their Brokers’ Incentives

We ask whether mutual funds’ flows reflect the incentives of the brokers intermediating them. The incentives we address are those revealed in statutory filings: the brokers’ shares of sales loads and other revenue, and their affiliation with the fund family. We find significant effects of these payments to brokers on funds’ inflows, particularly when the brokers are not affiliated. Tracking these investments forward, we find load sharing, but not revenue sharing, to predict poor performance, consistent with the different incentives these payments impart. We identify one benefit of captive brokerage, which is the recapture of redemptions elsewhere in the family.     

The Impact of Range Pricing on Marketing Time and Transaction Price: A Better Mousetrap for the Existing Home Market?

In various markets around the country, some real estate professionals are employing a new pricing strategy that involves marketing homes for sale with a price range rather than a single asking price. This strategy is often touted as a mechanism that will attract more potential buyers to look at a house and thus result in reduced marketing times for existing homes, with prices determined by competitive forces. The purpose of this study is to empirically examine whether houses using range pricing, often referred to as value range marketing, sell in the same amount of time and sell for similar prices as those marketed in the traditional manner. Two staged least squares with a correction for sample selection and Weibull duration models are used to test the hypotheses, employing a sample of 5,852 residential houses that were sold during the period January 1999 to December 2000. In contrast to claims of the strategy’s proponents, the results indicate that houses take longer to sell when using the range pricing strategy after controlling for physical characteristics and market conditions. Furthermore, there is no evidence that this strategy has any significant impact on transaction prices.     

Who Moves the Asia-Pacific Stock Markets—US or Japan? Empirical Evidence Based on the Theory of Cointegration

This study examines the recent debacle of the Asian-Pacific stock markets by utilizing the theory of cointegration to investigate which developing markets are moved by the markets of Japan and the United States. The empirical evidence suggests that some countries are dominated by the US, some are dominated by Japan, and the remaining countries are dominated by neither during the time period investigated. The appropriate error correction model is estimated and is used to perform out-of-sample forecasting.