Distributive inefficiency in horizontal mergers: Evidence from wealth transfers between merging firms and their customers

The ultimate goal of antitrust enforcement is to maximize the surplus consumers enjoy by enhancing production efficiency and eliminating market power. Previous literature focuses on the average net wealth effects on merging firms and their stakeholder firms and reports evidence of efficiency gains while no evidence of market power in horizontal mergers. In this paper, we examine how efficiency gains distribute between the merging firms and their customer firms. We find a significant negative relation between the combined abnormal returns on the merging firms and those on their customer firms, demonstrating a wealth transfer effect. Such a negative relation is more pronounced when market power is likely to be more intensive. On average, the merging firms gain, and their customers do not lose. Our results suggest that market power allows merging firms to withhold merger gains that would have been passed to the downstream under perfect competition and prevents customers from enjoying the whole consumer surplus. Distributive inefficiency exists in horizontal mergers.     

OPTIMAL TIMING AND TERMS IN A VERTICAL MERGER WITH TWO SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY

In this article we provide the optimal timing and equilibrium terms of a vertical merger with two sources of uncertainty in the production chain, namely, marginal cost of raw material and price level of final product. By eliminating monopoly power and transaction cost in the production process between upstream and downstream firms, a vertical merger can increase social welfare, which is consistent with the literature. The optimal threshold of a vertical merger is negatively correlated with transaction cost in the intermediate product market. Vertical mergers also accelerate when merging provides natural hedging for the postmerger firm, that is, when the correlation between the two uncertainties increases.     

Increasing Market Share as a Rationale for Corporate Acquisitions

This study examines the relative importance of market share in acquisitions because anecdotal evidence and economic theory suggest that merging firms benefit from larger market share. Firms might focus on market share to improve shareholder value through improved efficiency, which benefits consumers. Alternatively, higher market share could generate greater market power, which adversely affects consumers. I find that market share of merging firms increases by more than 30%, relative to the pre‐acquisition level, and the increase is even larger after I account for industry changes. Abnormal returns are positively correlated with changes in market share around acquisitions, but not with changes in industry concentration, which suggests stock market's expectation of future benefits from efficiency rather than market power. More directly, I find that merging firms' long‐run profitability increases with market share, and the increase in profitability primarily results from better asset management.     

Product market advertising and new equity issues

We analyze the interaction between a firm's product market advertising and its corporate financing decisions. We consider a firm that faces asymmetric information in both the product and financial markets and that needs to raise external financing to fund its growth opportunity (new project). Any product market advertising undertaken by the firm is visible to the financial market as well. In equilibrium, the firm uses a combination of product market advertising, equity underpricing, and underfinancing (raising a smaller amount of external capital than the full information optimum) to convey its true product quality and the intrinsic value of its projects to consumers and investors. The following two predictions arise from our theoretical analysis for the relation between product market advertising and equity underpricing around new equity issues. First, firms choose a higher level of product market advertising when they are planning to issue new equity, compared with situations in which they have no immediate plans to do so. Second, product market advertising and equity underpricing are substitutes for a firm issuing new equity. We empirically test the above two predictions and find supporting evidence in the context of firms making initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings.     

The impact of product market competition on earnings quality

The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of product market competition on earnings quality. Based on a sample from the US manufacturing sector for the period 1996–2005, we find consistent evidence showing a positive relation between product market competition and earnings quality. Additional tests also confirm a positive relation between product market competition and the precision of public and private information held by investors and analysts. We also provide evidence that firms competing in concentrated and heterogeneous industries are associated with a number of earnings attributes and information quality not shared by those competing in concentrated but homogeneous industries. These findings are consistent with the intuition that firms enjoying a monopolistic advantage tend to avoid the attention of their competitors and politicians by creating a more opaque information environment.     

Product market power,industry structure,and corporate earnings management

This is the first study to establish a link between product market power of firms and the degree of earnings management. We hypothesize and document a significant and robust association between (a) a firm’s product market pricing power and its degree of earnings management, and (b) industry competitiveness and the degree of earnings management in the industry. Our study reveals that firms with inferior product market pricing power engage in greater discretionary earnings accruals, adding a new dimension to our understanding of the transparency and informativeness of firms’ financial statements. These findings are mirrored at the industry level where we document that more competitive industries are associated with greater earnings manipulation. The empirical evidence has direct implication on the informativeness and earnings quality of firms based on their product market power and competitiveness.     

Do product market threats affect analyst forecast precision?

We examine how product market threats influence the precision of analyst forecasts. Greater competitive threats may make forecasting more difficult by increasing the uncertainty regarding future cash flows and by influencing the quality of financial disclosure. Using a firm-specific measure of product market threats (i.e., fluidity), we find that analysts are more likely to be less precise forecasting earnings for highly fluid firms and that the lack of precision is not fully explained by performance volatility. Our findings further suggest that firms with fluid products have lower accruals quality and that they are more likely to withheld information regarding contract terms and sales from major customers. Cross-sectional analysis further suggests that the effect of fluidity on analyst forecasts is more pronounced when firms have flexibility in disclosure choices. Using significant changes in tariff rates as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that analyst forecast precision is significantly lower following tariff reductions.     

Product market competition and cost stickiness

Extant literature on cost stickiness has focused on how firm-specific characteristics affect the asymmetric cost behavior. In this paper, we explore how a firm’s operating environment affects the firm’s cost stickiness. Specifically, we examine the effect of product market competition on cost stickiness since a firm’s investment and cost retention decisions partly depend on how the firm interacts with its rival firms in the product markets. Using two firm-level text-based product market competition measures extracted from management disclosures in firms’ 10-K filings (Li et al. in J Account Res 51(2):399–436, 2013; Hoberg and Phillips in Rev Financ Stud 23(10):3773–3811, 2010; J Polit Econ, 2015), we find strong evidence consistent with cost asymmetry increasing in competition after controlling for known economic determinants of cost stickiness. In additional analyses, we also find that the effect of product market competition on the degree of cost stickiness increases in firms’ financial strength, likely because management in financially stronger firms has more resources for investment expenditures in spite of a sales fall. We also find that cost stickiness is increasing in competition if management is optimistic about future demand, whereas competition is not associated with cost asymmetry if management is pessimistic about future demand. Finally, we find that the relationship between competition and cost stickiness, although statistically insignificant at conventional levels, is more pronounced for single-segment firms relative to multi-segment firms.     

跨市场融合性人民币产品创新研究

结合对新兴市场国家(地区)的发展路径及对目前国内金融市场所存问题的分析,本文认为,市场对四类跨市场融合性人民币产品存在强烈需求,其中,跨资本和期货市场、跨货币和资本市场两类融合性产品的发展前景较为乐观,跨货币和外汇市场融合性产品次之,跨货币和期货市场融合性产品的发展则尚有待于一些条件的成熟.国内商业银行参与跨市场融合性产品创新时应遵循审慎经营原则,近期以跨货币与外汇市场融合性人民币产品为主,长期以跨货币与期货市场融合性人民币产品为目标.从提高信贷资产流动性的迫切程度来看,中小银行可能会成为跨货币与资本市场融合性人民币产品创新的主要推动力.     

跨市场融合性人民币产品创新研究

结合对新兴市场国家（地区）的发展路径及对目前国内金融市场所存问题的分析，本文认为，市场对四类跨市场融合性人民币产品存在强烈需求，其中，跨资本和期货市场、跨货币和资本市场两类融合性产品的发展前景较为乐观，跨货币和外；12市场融合性产品次之，跨货币和期货市场融合性产品的发展则尚有待于一些条件的成熟。国内商业银行参与跨市场融合性产品创新时应遵循审慎经营原则，近期以跨货币与外汇市场融合性人民币产品为主，长期以跨货币与期货市场融合性人民币产品为目标。从提高信贷资产流动性的迫切程度来看，中小银行可能会成为跨货币与资本市场融合性人民币产品创新的主要推动力。     

Differentiated networks: equilibrium and efficiency

We consider a model of price competition in a duopoly with product differentiation and network effects. In the efficient allocation, both networks are active and the firm with the highest expected quality has the largest market share. To characterize the equilibrium allocation, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the equilibrium of the coordination game played by consumers for given prices. The equilibrium allocation differs from the efficient one for two reasons. First, the equilibrium allocation of consumers to the networks is too balanced, because consumers fail to internalize network externalities. Second, if access to the networks is priced by strategic firms, then the product with the highest expected quality is also the most expensive. This further reduces the asymmetry between market shares and therefore social welfare.     

Local product market competition and bank loans

We investigate the influences of local product market competition on the cost of private debt. Our evidence suggests that the cost of bank loans is significantly higher for firms headquartered in states with greater local product market competition measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for resident industries. To establish causality, we examine the recognition of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and firm relocations to identify exogenous shocks to local product market competition. We find that the cost of bank loans is lower for firms facing less intense local product market competition after the adoption of IDD and higher for firms relocated to states with more competitive product markets. The results imply that banks value the characteristics of a firm's local product market when approving loan contracts.     

The effects of mergers on product positioning: evidence from the music radio industry

This article shows that mergers between close competitors in the music radio industry lead to important changes in product positioning. Firms that buy competing stations tend to differentiate them and, consistent with the firm wanting to reduce audience cannibalization, their combined audience increases. However, the merging stations also become more like competitors, so that aggregate variety does not increase, and the gains in market share come at the expense of other stations in the same format. The results shed light on the effects of mergers and, more broadly, on how multiproduct firms may use product positioning as a competitive tool.     

Illiquidity shocks and the comovement between stocks: New evidence using smooth transition

This paper extends the smooth transition conditional correlation model by studying for the first time the impact that illiquidity shocks have on stock market return comovement. We show that firms that experience shocks that increase illiquidity are less liquid than firms that experience shocks that decrease illiquidity. Shocks that increase illiquidity have no statistical impact on comovement. However, shocks that reduce illiquidity lead to a fall in comovement, a pattern that becomes stronger as the illiquidity of the firm increases. This discovery is consistent with increased transparency and an improvement in price efficiency. We find that a small number of firms experience a double illiquidity shock. For these firms, at the first shock, a rise in illiquidity reduces comovement while a fall in illiquidity raises comovement. The second shock partly reverses these changes as a rise in illiquidity is associated with a rise in comovement and a fall in illiquidity is associated with a fall in comovement. These results have important implications for portfolio construction and also for the measurement and evolution of market beta and the cost of capital as it suggests that investors can achieve higher returns for the same amount of market risk because of the greater diversification benefits that exist. We also find that illiquidity, friction, firm size and the pre-shock correlation are all associated with the magnitude of the correlation change.     

Product Market Competition and Financial Decisions During a Financial Crisis

We find that in the presence of the “flight to quality” during the 2007‐2008 financial crisis, firms that depended less on external financing (or internal finance dependent (IFD) firms) prior to the crisis were able to secure additional financing and increased investments, while external finance dependent (EFD) firms significantly contracted their external financing and investments. IFD firms’ increased investments during the crisis were associated with higher market share growth, while EFD competitors lost their market share. The results indicate that firms’ financial decisions during the financial crisis are interrelated with their product market dimensions.     

Product market competition and earnings management: Evidence from discretionary accruals and real activity manipulation

We examine the association between product market competition and earnings management activities. We use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a widely used measure for market concentration, as a proxy for product market competition. We examine two forms of earnings management: accrual-based and real activity-based. Our results are mixed, but generally suggest that both income-increasing accrual manipulation and real activity-based manipulation are more prevalent among firms in low competition industries than those in high competition industries. Our findings are robust to various measures of earnings management, alternative measures of product market competitions, and different subsamples. We further explore the reasons why firms in low competition industries are more inclined to manage earnings and find that the market consequences of missing important earnings targets are more severe among firms in low competition industries than those in high competition industries.     

Product market pricing power, industry concentration and analysts’ earnings forecasts

This is the first study to establish a link between product market power and analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy and bias. Relating two different dimensions of market power to earnings forecastability, we document that (a) a firm’s relative pricing power and (b) its industry concentration are strong positive determinants of analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. We find that forecasting earnings of higher market power firms is less complex due to their ability to withstand cost shocks as well as greater informational-efficiency enjoyed by such firms. Further, forecast optimism increases with weakening product market pricing power and with lower industry concentration. The knowledge derived from this study will hopefully improve the accuracy of equity valuation, and thereby engender better buy-side (stock selections) and sell-side recommendations by analysts. Our analysis also suggests that brokerage firms compensating analysts based on forecast accuracy need to adjust for the differential in the information complexity of different industries.     

Auditor Market Share,Product Differentiation and Audit Fees

This study examines the effects of auditor market share and product differentiation on audit fees. Previous studies have attributed the price premium charged by the Big Eight (the Big Six in the present study) to Big Eight product differentiation. However, such a price premium could be partly due to monopoly pricing. In the present study, the Hong Kong audit market provides a unique setting in which a non-Big Six local auditor has a market share comparable to those of the third and fourth largest Big Six firms. This makes it feasible to control for the effects of market share via matching. Also, the wide disparity among the Big Six firms ‘market shares in Hong Kong makes it feasible to test for the effects of market power on audit fees. The results show that, consistent with prior studies, the Big Six audit firms charge higher audit fees than non-Big Six firms in the small auditee, but not the big auditee, market. This suggests that similar economic forces to those other audit markets are also at work in Hong Kong. Despite the Big Six firms’ widely different market shares, there was no price differentiation among them. Yet there was a Big Six price premium over the large local firm with a similar market share to those of two of the Big Six. Together, these results suggest that the Big Six price premium is a result of product differentiation rather than monopoly pricing.     

Product market power and management’s action to avoid earnings disappointment

We investigate the empirical relationship between a firm’s product market power and its management’s action to use real-activity-based earnings management techniques to avoid earnings disappointment by meeting or beating earnings targets such as analysts’ earnings forecasts, positive earnings, or higher earnings relative to previous years. While there is a general consensus that product market competition in an industry affects management’s operating and financial decisions, and thus is an important intervening factor in a firm’s strategies for many economic situations (Nickell in J Political Econ 104:724–746, 1996; Porter in The competitive advantage of nations. Macmillan, London, 1990), the linkage between product market power, managerial incentives, and financial reporting quality has so far received little academic attention. Our analyses show that while the firms manage both accruals and real activities in varying degrees, the firms having greater product market power with the ability to differentiate their products to earn additional revenue, if necessary, are less inclined to engage in real-activity-based earnings management in certain suspect economic situations compared to the firms with less market power. We, however, do not find any significant relationship between product market power and accrual-based earnings management.     

Environmental regulation and firm product quality improvement: How does the greenwashing response?

With the growing requirements for green development, a firm's product quality matters greatly for targeting sustainable growth and industry improvements, thus it is vital to clarify the subtle relationship between environmental regulation and how firms improve product quality. This paper discusses the internal mechanisms of environmental regulation to improve the product quality during this green transformation period by enhancing the greenwashing capabilities of firms. Through matching and constructing a unique database including firm-level fundamental variables, product quality, and ESG information, we obtained a firm-level unbalanced dataset for the years 2013 and 2015. From this, we drew several findings. First, environmental regulations can help improve the quality of products. Specifically, environmental regulations cannot significantly and directly improve the product quality for heavy-pollution firms, and there is a positive and significant relationship between environmental regulation and product quality for low-pollution firms. Second, for heavy-pollution firms, environmental regulation has a negative and significant impact on product quality, which illustrates that greenwashing strongly motivates heavy-pollution firms and results in decreasing product quality. Third, financial constraints motivate the heavy-pollution firms to significantly decrease their product quality rather than improve it. Finally, there is a negative and significant effect on SOEs toward product quality improvement caused by environmental regulation for heavy-pollution industries. In the contrast, for low-pollution firms, SOEs are more incentivized to increase product quality.