Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Side-Payments

We consider repeated games with side-payments: players have an endowment of wealth in each period in which transfers can be made. We show that if endowments are large enough and the common discount factor high enough, then a strongly renegotiation–proof equilibrium (SRP) in the sense of Farrell and Maskin exists. As the discount factor goes to 1, the set of SRP payoffs converges to the set of efficient, individually rational payoffs. These results provide a justification for the efficiency principle when agreements are not enforceable. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, D23, L14.     

Asymmetric Capital Tax Competition with Profit Shifting

This paper analyses capital tax competition between jurisdictions of different size when multinational firms can shift some fraction of their tax base between them. For the case of revenue maximizing governments, we show that introducing profit shifting will not generally increase downward pressure on tax rates. We find that profit shifting decreases the tax-base sensitivity of the low tax jurisdiction while increasing the sensitivity of the high tax jurisdiction. Tax rates will converge as a result of additional profit shifting opportunities. This will be the case even though in general equilibrium tax rates in both jurisdictions may decrease or increase.     

Globalization, Asymmetric Tax Competition, and Fiscal Equalization

Trade integration and the increasing mobility of firms have raised the need for international coordination in corporate tax. In this paper, we study the ability of fiscal equalization to avoid the misallocation of capital across asymmetric countries arising from tax competition. Such a reform respects the principle according to which the tax decision is entirely left up to the nation and links nations engaged in strategic tax policy by transfers. We use a model of trade and location where firms produce under imperfect competition. Our analysis suggests that falling trade costs increase the distortion created by tax competition in the international allocation of production. However, we show that fiscal equalization based on differences in tax revenues or tax base can implement a more efficient tax wedge and spatial allocation of the tax base.     

资本集聚、税收互动与纵向税收竞争

依据2003—2007年中国26个省区269个城市的面板数据,通过构造3维误差成分结构的空间计量模型,以及工具变量两步sys-GMM估计、双重固定效应法和多重空间权重矩阵设置,本文发现政府层级之间存在显著的纵向税收外部性。这种互补性质的策略互动影响不同于西方理论考虑的具有充分和稳定税收管辖权的各级政府会由于共享税基产生交互影响,而是上级政府基于政治和行政权威,面向辖内下级政府实施的具有利维坦特征的税收驱赶和"挤压"影响,是一种纵向政府层级间的"税收竞争"。     

A Repeated Interactions Model of Tax Competition

Models of tax competition usually assume a single-period framework. This paper sets up a repeated interactions model of tax competition and establishes conditions under which fiscal policy harmonization can result from repeated interactions between governments. It is shown that fiscal policy harmonization cannot prevail when regional asymmetries are too strong. In such a case, the only way to achieve fiscal policy harmonization is to set up a central fiscal authority.     

Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information

An infinite sequence of elections with no term limits is modelled. In each period a challenger with privately known preferences is randomly drawn from the electorate to run against the incumbent, and the winner chooses a policy outcome in a one-dimensional issue space. One theorem is that there exists an equilibrium in which the median voter is decisive: an incumbent wins re-election if and only if his most recent policy choice gives the median voter a payoff at least as high as he would expect from a challenger. The equilibrium is symmetric, stationary, and the behavior of voters is consistent with both retrospective and prospective voting. A second theorem is that, in fact, it is the only equilibrium possessing the latter four conditions — decisiveness of the median voter is implied by them.     

Repeated Contests with Asymmetric Information

The same contestants often meet repeatedly in contests. Behavior in a contest potentially provides information with regard to one's type and can therefore influence the behavior of the opponents in later contests. This paper shows that if effort is observable, this can induce a ratchet effect in contests: high ability contestants sometimes put in little effort in an early round in order to make the opponents believe that they are of little ability. The effect reduces overall effort and increases equilibrium utility of the contestants when compared with two unrelated one-shot contests. It does, however, also introduce an allocative inefficiency since sometimes a contestant with a low valuation wins. The model assumes an imperfectly discriminating contest. In an extension I show that, qualitatively, results are similar in a perfectly discriminating contest (all pay auction).     

不完全税权、政府竞争与税收增长

本文在一个同时包含了政府间横向和纵向竞争的框架内分析了中国税收增长路径的内生决定机制。在名义税率不变,但存在较大征管空间的情况下,横向竞争倾向于压低实际均衡税率,纵向竞争则恰恰相反。分税制改革以来的税权向上集中趋势,以及中央对地方财政收入的规范化进程等因素,使得纵向竞争效应趋强,横向竞争效应相对趋弱,最终体现为十几年的税收持续超经济增长。当前,减税以及相关的分权、分税体制改革可作为增进社会福利的备选方案。     

Environmental Tax Reform and Growth: Income Tax Cuts or Profits Tax Reduction

This study investigates how recycling revenues, which are generated by environmental taxes, affect growth through different types of tax cuts. A growth model with creative destruction (Aghion and Howitt Econometrica 60(2):323–351,1992, Aghion and Howitt The economics of growth, 2009) is modified to include the production of final output as a source of pollution. This paper demonstrates that introducing an environmental tax, accompanied by either an income tax cut or a profits tax reduction, increases the output growth rate. The analysis also shows that, if technological change is resulted from deliberate activities of economic agents, the reduction of the profits tax rate for an intermediate monopolist is more growth-enhancing than an income tax cut since a profits tax reduction directly promotes R&D activities.     

Paternalism and Tax Competition

When consumers make mistakes, the government may wish to use paternalistic taxation as a corrective measure. We analyse the extent to which tax competition undermines the feasibility of paternalistic taxation. We show that the paternalistic component of a tax on a harmful good is reduced when there is cross-border shopping, but it does not disappear altogether. In a model with tax competition between two countries, only one of which has a paternalistic objective, we show that a minimum tax rate requirement can be Pareto improving despite the divergence in policy objectives. Tax harmonization, however, reduces welfare in the non-paternalistic country.     

Commodity Tax Competition with Constrained Taxes

This paper examines a symmetric Nash equilibria of a two-country model of fiscal competition with a continuum of taxable commodities in each country. The innovation is to impose a uniformity restriction that there can be only two rates of tax on the different commodities, a positive rate and the zero rate. The main results characterize, under two alternative modes of taxation, the equilibrium fiscal rules chosen by countries, i.e., the level of the positive rate and the set of taxed commodities. Under the origin principle, it appears that the equilibrium fiscal base is narrower than the optimal one and the tax rate is too high. In contrast, under the destination principle, the optimal rule is implemented.     

Increasing Returns, Learning, and Beneficial Tax Competition

We analyze the welfare impact of entrepreneur mobility in a two‐country overlapping generations model. Increasing returns in production yield multiple equilibria that are stable under adaptive learning. Governments compete for the mobile resource by setting income taxes. We show that large welfare gains can arise from noncooperative taxation. If expectational barriers prevent the realization of high output equilibria, tax competition can sufficiently perturb expectations so that high steady states become attainable. Once in a high production regime, governments may institute cooperative tax increases or reductions so as to bring the economy to the global joint optimum without disturbing the regime.     

Wages and International Tax Competition

We introduce wage bargaining and private information into a model of profit shifting and tax competition between a large and a small country. Shifting profits to the small country not only reduces a firm's tax bill but also creates private information on profitability, altering the wage bargaining in favor of the firm. This additional shifting incentive makes the tax base of the large country more elastic and leads to higher outflows, lower wages, higher firm profits and lower equilibrium tax rates. Tax rates are no longer the only determinant of the direction and extent of profit shifting.     

Tax Competition and Economic Integration

This article examines the role of tax competition and economic integration in a core–periphery setting, where agglomeration forces are present. I present a New Economic Geography model, which accounts for firm entry/exit and international mobility of skilled labor employed in the public R&D sectors. In contrast to other literature on tax competition, I focus on its impact on labor migration and net earnings of skilled and unskilled labor. Economic integration is modeled as trade liberalization, an easing of factor mobility restrictions and technology diffusion. I find that tax competition favors skilled labor when trade costs are reduced. In contrast, unskilled labor benefits when factor mobility restrictions are eased and technology diffusion is enhanced.     

Tax Competition and Economic Geography

Tax competition between two countries is considered in a trade–and–location setting with differentiated products and monopolistic competition. There are two groups of workers, mobile ones and immobile ones. Taxes are used for producing a public good. It is shown that an equilibrium with mobile workers dispersed across countries is destabilized by increased taxes on these mobile workers—even for perfectly coordinated tax increases. It is also shown that while tax competition gives rise to standard distortions in a tax–competition game when mobile workers are dispersed, different distortions result when they are concentrated in one country.     

东道国税率、企业避税与跨国企业创新

为了更好地把握我国跨国企业在境外关联关系影响下创新活动的变化规律,文章将跨国企业境外关联特征纳入跨国企业创新行为的分析框架,以我国上市公司500强当中的355家A股上市公司2012-2017年的数据为研究样本,基于企业避税视角重点考察了东道国税率对我国跨国企业创新产出的影响及其机制.研究发现,当东道国平均税率下降时,跨国企业很有可能通过转移研发活动地点的方式将研发投入向境外转移,且这种避税行为所导致的创新数量减少大于研发可用资金增加所带来的创新数量增加,从而使跨国企业国内创新产出下降,并最终导致其整体创新产出水平的降低.此外,东道国税率对我国跨国企业创新的影响还受到知识产权所得税优惠制度的强化以及反避税制度的制约,且这种影响在不同所有权性质以及避税程度不同的企业当中具有差异性.因此,我国在设计创新激励税收政策时需要避免与其他国家或地区形成过大落差,减少跨国企业避税动机;同时要加强我国反避税措施的针对性以及与最新税收优惠制度的适配性;最后,考虑出台我国的专利盒制度,增强我国知识产权税收制度的国际竞争力.     

利率、汇率、税率和通货膨胀率的变动对证券市场的影响

证券市场是国民经济的重要组成部分,国民经济的宏观走势对证券市场有着非常重要的影响,在证券投资领域中,宏观经济形势不仅对投资对象有深刻影响,而且证券业本身的生存,发展和繁荣也与宏观经济因素息息相关,因此,在进行证券投资分析时,首先要将其置于宏观经济运行的大背景之中,在确定基本面的影响之后才能展开有关的技术分析。     

转移成本、价格歧视和非对称寡头竞争

通过在Hotelling空间差异模型的基础上结合转移成本构建非对称企业竞争博弈模型.主要研究在非对称情况下,两企业在一致定价与价格歧视下竞争的均衡结果.还对两种不同定价体制下的均衡结果进行了比较,分析价格歧视是否强化竞争.研究发现价格歧视对竞争的效应是不确定的,很大程度受到两企业不对称程度的影响.     

Capital Tax Competition and Cooperation with Endogenous Capital Formation

Incorporating consumption–savings choices under a general concave utility function and hence an endogenous capital supply into a model of capital tax competition, we re‐investigate Nash equilibrium and compare it with the optimum under cooperative tax policy. In contrast to the case of fixed capital supply, it is shown that if savings sufficiently increase with the interest rate, a Nash equilibrium may be more efficient than a cooperative tax policy. Therefore, the distortionary effects of capital supply are important to issues of tax policy coordination.     

Efficient Migration and Income Tax Competition

This paper examines the consequence of the brain drain for the income tax systems of the source and destination countries for the migration, if the two countries' policies are set noncooperatively by self–interested voters. It is assumed that the brain drain does increase the value of world output: workers with the highest income–earning ability are assumed to be more productive in one country than in another. There are costs to migration of these high–ability workers, costs that are less than the gain in the value of their production. However, for lower–ability workers, the gains in production in moving from the low–productivity country to the high–productivity country are assumed to be less than the migration costs. Voters in the high–productivity country want to capture rents from migrants. These voters are aware of the influence their tax policy has on people's migration decisions. Voters in the low–productivity country also behave strategically. I solve for the Nash equilibrium income tax rates. Increased mobility of highly skilled workers cannot decrease, and may increase, progressivity in the income tax system of the destination country, if migration actually occurs. Finally, the effects of transfers between countries on their income tax systems are examined. Redistribution between countries tends to lead to less redistribution within countries. If transfers between countries are set by a vote of all residents of both countries, then the transfer chosen will be the one that leads to the least progressive tax possible being chosen in each country.