债务期限结构理论综述

企业的债务期限结构与企业价值是密切相关的。为此 ,一些经济学家对企业的债务期限结构进行了研究。本文在阅读这些文献的基础上 ,将债务期限结构理论划分为基于契约成本的理论、基于信息不对称的理论、基于税收的理论和基于期限匹配的理论四种 ,并分别对它们进行了概述     

Household Debt Overhang and Unemployment

We use a labor‐search model to explain why the worst employment slumps often follow expansions of household debt. We find that households protected by limited liability suffer from a household‐debt‐overhang problem that leads them to require high wages to work. Firms respond by posting high wages but few vacancies. This vacancy posting effect implies that high household debt leads to high unemployment. Even though households borrow from banks via bilaterally optimal contracts, the equilibrium level of household debt is inefficiently high due to a household‐debt externality. We analyze the role that a financial regulator can play in mitigating this externality.     

A Gap‐Filling Theory of Corporate Debt Maturity Choice

We argue that time variation in the maturity of corporate debt arises because firms behave as macro liquidity providers, absorbing the supply shocks associated with changes in the maturity structure of government debt. We document that when the government funds itself with more short‐term debt, firms fill the resulting gap by issuing more long‐term debt, and vice versa. This type of liquidity provision is undertaken more aggressively: (1) when the ratio of government debt to total debt is higher and (2) by firms with stronger balance sheets. Our theory sheds new light on market timing phenomena in corporate finance more generally.     

Household Debt Overhang and Transmission of Monetary Policy

We investigate how the level of household indebtedness affects the monetary transmission mechanism in the U.S. economy. Using state‐dependent local projection methods, we find that the effects of monetary policy are less powerful during periods of high household debt. In particular, the impact of monetary policy shocks is smaller on GDP, consumption, residential investment, house prices, and household debt during a high‐debt state. We then build a partial equilibrium model of borrower households with financial constraints to rationalize these facts. The model points to the weakening of the home equity loan channel as a possible reason for the decline in monetary policy effectiveness when initial debt levels are high.     

The Determinants of Debt Maturity at Issuance: A System-Based Model

We examine the determinants of corporate debt maturity while taking into account the interdependent relation between maturity and leverage. We do this by estimating a simultaneous-equations model on debt maturity and leverage for a sample of bond-issuing firms. To compare with previous studies, we also estimate a single-equation model on debt maturity using OLS. We define debt maturity as either the maturity of bonds at issuance (incremental approach), or the percentage of a firm's total debt that matures in more than three years (balance-sheet approach). Corroborating the findings of many previous studies, our single-equation OLS results support the underinvestment hypothesis purporting that firms with greater growth opportunities have shorter-term debt. However, under the simultaneous-equations model, the negative relation between a firm's debt maturity and its growth opportunities ceases to hold. Instead, it is the leverage decision that is influenced by growth opportunities. This suggests that existing models may overestimate the effect of growth opportunities on debt maturity.     

The Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt

We provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Our evidence offers strong support for the contracting-cost hypothesis. Firms that have few growth options, are large, or are regulated have more long-term debt in their capital structure. We find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market. The evidence is consistent, however, with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short-term debt. We find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity.     

Tobin's Q, Debt Overhang, and Investment

Incorporating debt in a dynamic real options framework, we show that underinvestment stems from truncation of equity's horizon at default. Debt overhang distorts both the level and composition of investment, with underinvestment being more severe for long‐lived assets. An empirical proxy for the shadow price of capital to equity is derived. Use of this proxy yields a structural test for debt overhang and its mitigation through issuance of additional secured debt. Using measurement error‐consistent GMM estimators, we find a statistically significant debt overhang effect regardless of firms' ability to issue additional secured debt.     

Mortgage Debt Overhang: Reduced Investment by Homeowners at Risk of Default

Homeowners at risk of default face a debt overhang that reduces their incentive to invest in their property: in expectation, some value created by investments in the property will go to the lender. This agency conflict affects housing investments. Homeowners at risk of default cut back substantially on home improvements and mortgage principal payments, even when they appear financially unconstrained. Meanwhile, they do not reduce spending on assets that they may retain in default, including home appliances, furniture, and vehicles. These findings highlight an important financial friction that has stifled housing investment since the Great Recession.     

债务期限结构和区域因素——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文采用参数和非参数检验方法经验检查中国上市公司注册地所在区域因素与公司债务期限结构之间关系。研究发现：（1）不同区域之间的债务期限结构存在系统性差异：（2）区域因素能解释公司债务期限结构3％左右的变异；（3）中部地区的债务期限显著高于东部、西部地区的债务期限；（4）市场化程度高、经济发达的地区具有相对低的债务期限。     

Debt Maturity Structure and Firm Investment

This study shows that the maturity structure of a firm's debt has a significant impact on its investment decisions. We show, after controlling for the effect of the overall level of leverage, that a higher percentage of long-term debt in total debt significantly reduces investment for firms with high growth opportunities. In contrast, the correlation between debt maturity and investment is not significant for firms with low growth opportunities. The results are strong at the firm level and at the business segment level. These results hold even after controlling for the endogeneity problem inherent in the relationship between total leverage, the maturity composition of leverage, and investment.     

The Determinants of the Maturity of Corporate Debt Issues

We document the determinants of the term to maturity of 7,369 bonds and notes issued between 1982 and 1993. Our main finding is that large firms with investment grade credit ratings typically borrow at the short end and at the long end and of the maturity spectrum, while firms with speculative grade credit ratings typically borrow in the middle of the maturity spectrum. This pattern is consistent with the theory that risky firms do not issue short-term debt in order to avoid inefficient liquidation, but are screened out of the long-term debt market because of the prospect of risky asset substitution.     

Debt Overhang, Costly Expandability and Reversibility, and Optimal Financial Structure

Abstract:   This article compares the investment and financing decisions of a firm that adopts a 'first‐best' strategy with those of a firm that adopts a 'second‐best' strategy. The former issues bonds upon deciding an initial capacity, while the latter issues bonds, and only then decides an initial capacity. The former is thus able to avoid the agency cost associated with the 'debt overhang' problem. Accordingly, the former will both issue more bonds and install a larger initial capacity than the latter. However, the agency cost of debt, i.e., firm value difference between these two strategies, is modest for plausible parameter values.     

公司债务期限结构问题研究综述

本文对国内外公司债务期限结构间题的理论和经验研究进行了全面、系统的回顾，包括两方面内容：一是公司债务期限结构与公司价值之间的关系，二是公司债务期限结构的影响因素。本文评价了现有文献存在的问题和不足之处，为中国上市公司债务期限结构问题研究提供了依据和方向。     

Trade-off Model of Debt Maturity Structure

In this paper, we suggest the trade-off model to explain the choice of debt maturity. This model is based on balancing between risk and reward of using shorter-term loans. Shorter-term loans have cost advantage over, but incur higher refinancing and interest rate risk than longer-term loans. Using the Compustat data, we show that the principal components of financial attributes are financial flexibility and financial strength. Therefore, only firms with greater financial flexibility and financial strength can use proportionately more short-term loans. We also document that financially strong firms take advantage of lower interest rates of short-term debt. They use proportionately more short-term loans when the term premium is high. The results of our study also provide evidence supporting the agency cost hypothesis, which is strongly supported by current literature.     

The Determinants of Debt Maturity: The Case of Bank Financing in Singapore

This study presents important international evidence by examining the determinants of debt maturity of listed firms in Singapore, a major financial center in Asia. We focus on bank debt because it is the principal source of financing for most Singapore firms. We find that consistent with the contracting-cost hypothesis, firms with greater growth opportunities rely more heavily on short-term bank debt whereas larger firms are more likely to use long-term bank debt. In contrast, we find no strong support for either the tax or signaling hypotheses.     

Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice

When capital market investors and firm insiders possess the same information about a company's prospects, its liabilities will be priced in a way that makes the firm indifferent to the composition of its financial liabilities (at least under certain, well-known circumstances). However, if firm insiders are systematically better informed than outside investors, they will choose to issue those types of securities that the market appears to overvalue most. Knowing this, rational investors will try to infer the insiders' information from the firm's financial structure. This paper evaluates the extent to which a firm's choice of risky debt maturity can signal insiders' information about firm quality. If financial market transactions are costless, a firm's financial structure cannot provide a valid signal. With positive transaction costs, however, high-quality firms can sometimes effectively signal their true quality to the market. The existence of a signalling equilibrium is shown to depend on the (exogenous) distribution of firms' quality and the magnitude of underwriting costs for corporate debt.     

Financial Reporting Quality,Debt Maturity,and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the influence of different financing channels—bond issuance or bank loans—as well as debt maturity and the quality of financial reporting on the cost of debt in China. The authors find that conservative accounting is an important characteristic of high-quality financial reporting that can reduce the cost of longer maturity debt such as bank loans and bonds. Even state-owned enterprises, which have fewer financial constraints than non-state-owned enterprises, benefit from accounting conservatism's ability to reduce financial costs. Moreover, the findings indicate that bond investors are concerned about the issuer's fundamentals, while banks are more likely to focus on the operation and bankruptcy risk of borrowers.     

A Comparative‐Advantage Approach to Government Debt Maturity

We study optimal government debt maturity in a model where investors derive monetary services from holding riskless short‐term securities. In a setting where the government is the only issuer of such riskless paper, it trades off the monetary premium associated with short‐term debt against the refinancing risk implied by the need to roll over its debt more often. We extend the model to allow private financial intermediaries to compete with the government in the provision of short‐term money‐like claims. We argue that, if there are negative externalities associated with private money creation, the government should tilt its issuance more toward short maturities, thereby partially crowding out the private sector's use of short‐term debt.     

非标意见与债务融资——基于银行借款和债务期限结构的经验证据

理论上,年报被出具非标意见会降低企业的债务融资能力。但本文发现非标意见对企业新增银行借款和债务期限结构没有显著负面影响,不支持理论预期。我们认为,在中国,银行是一个并非完全以利润最大化为目标的独立市场主体,他们会为了地方社会稳定和经济发展向企业提供贷款;另外,企业有政府的隐性支持,银行不需要太关注企业的偿债风险。因此,虽然非标意见传递出会计信息质量低或未来经营风险高等问题,但它对银行借款的影响相当有限。本文的研究有助于我们理解中国上市公司会计造假盛行、非标意见比例过高的现象。