Time‐Varying Capital Requirements and Disclosure Rules: Effects on Capitalization and Lending Decisions

We investigate how banks’ capital and lending decisions respond to changes in bank‐specific capital and disclosure requirements. We find that an increase in the bank‐specific regulatory capital requirement results in a higher bank capital ratio, brought about via less asset risk. A decrease in the requirement implies more lending to firms but also less Tier 1 capital and higher bank leverage. We do not observe differences between confidential and public disclosure of capital requirements. Our results empirically illustrate a tradeoff between bank resilience and a fostering of the economy through more bank lending using banks’ capital requirement as policy instrument.     

Bank Capital Regulation of Trading Portfolios: An Assessment of the Basel Framework

In setting minimum capital requirements for trading portfolios, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996, 2011a, 2013) initially used Value‐at‐Risk (VaR), then both VaR and stressed VaR (SVaR), and most recently, stressed Conditional VaR (SCVaR). Accordingly, we examine the use of SCVaR to measure risk and set these requirements. Assuming elliptically distributed asset returns, we show that portfolios on the mean‐SCVaR frontier generally lie away from the mean‐variance (M‐V) frontier. In a plausible numerical example, we find that such portfolios tend to have considerably higher ratios of risk (measured by, e.g., standard deviation) to minimum capital requirement than those of portfolios on the M‐V frontier. Also, we find that requirements based on SCVaR are smaller than those based on both VaR and SVaR but exceed those based on just VaR. Finally, we find that requirements based on SCVaR are less procyclical than those based on either VaR or both VaR and SVaR. Overall, our paper suggests that the use of SCVaR to measure risk and set requirements is not a panacea.     

Subordinated Debt,Market Discipline,and Bank Risk

This paper demonstrates that subordinated debt (subdebt thereafter) regulation can be an effective mechanism for disciplining banks. By reducing the chance that managers of distressed banks can take value‐destroying actions to benefit themselves, subdebt regulation may encourage banks to lower asset risk. Moreover, subdebt regulation and bank capital requirements can be complements for alleviating the banks’ moral hazard problems. To make subdebt regulation effective, regulators may need impose ceilings on the interest rates of subdebt, prohibit collusion between banks and subdebt investors, and require subdebt to convert into the issuing bank's equity when the government provides assistance to the bank.     

Liquidity Provision,Bank Capital,and the Macroeconomy

New bank equity must come from somewhere. In general equilibrium, raising bank capital requirements means either that banks produce less short‐term debt (as debt holders must become shareholders), or short‐term debt is not reduced and the banking system acquires nonbank equity (as the shareholders in nonbanks become shareholders in banks). The welfare effects involve a trade‐off because bank debt is special as it is used for transactions purposes, but more bank capital can reduce the chance of bank failure (producing welfare losses).     

Bank Capital: Lessons from the Financial Crisis

Using a multicountry panel of banks, we study whether better capitalized banks experienced higher stock returns during the financial crisis. We differentiate among various types of capital ratios: the Basel risk‐adjusted ratio, the leverage ratio, the Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios, and the tangible equity ratio. We find several results: (i) before the crisis, differences in capital did not have much impact on stock returns; (ii) during the crisis, a stronger capital position was associated with better stock market performance, most markedly for larger banks; (iii) the relationship between stock returns and capital is stronger when capital is measured by the leverage ratio rather than the risk‐adjusted capital ratio; (iv) higher quality forms of capital, such as Tier 1 capital and tangible common equity, were more relevant.     

Banking Competition and Capital Ratios

Empirical studies provide evidence that bank capital ratios exceed regulatory requirements. But why do banks maintain capital levels above regulatory requirements? We use data for more than 2,600 banks from 10 European countries to test recent theories suggesting that competition incentivises banks to maintain higher capital ratios. These theories also predict that banks that engage in arm's length lending have lower capital ratios, and that shareholder rights and deposit insurance characteristics affect capital ratios. Consistent with these theories, our evidence robustly indicates that competition increases capital holdings. Banks that lend at arm's length exhibit lower capital ratios, whereas banks in countries with strong shareholder rights operate with higher capital ratios. We also show some evidence that generous deposit protection schemes that exclude non‐deposit creditors are associated with higher capital ratios. Our results have important policy implications. First, while the traditional view suggests imposing restrictions on bank activities in order to restrain competition, our analysis indicates the opposite, even after adjusting the regressions for risk‐taking. Second, weak shareholder rights undermine market forces that would otherwise encourage banks to hold higher capital ratios.     

Regulatory Arbitrage in Cross‐Border Banking Mergers within the EU

Expanding the cross‐country footprint of an organization's profit‐making activities changes the geographic pattern of its exposure to loss in ways that are hard for regulators and supervisors to observe. This paper tests and confirms the hypothesis that differences in the size and character of safety‐net benefits available to banks in individual EU countries help to account for cross‐border merger activity. Our results suggest that central bankers need to develop statistical procedures for assessing the consequences of differences in supervisory strength and weakness in partner countries. We believe that the methods used here can help in this task.     

M‐PRESS‐CreditRisk: Microprudential and Macroprudential Capital Requirements for Credit Risk under Systemic Stress

M‐PRESS‐CreditRisk is a novel stress testing approach that can help authorities gauge banks' capital adequacy related to credit risk. For the first time, it combines the assessment of microprudential capital requirements under Pillars 1 and 2 and macroprudential buffers in a unified, coherent framework. Its core element is an advanced credit portfolio model—SystemicCreditRisk—built upon a rich, nonlinear dependence structure for correlated bank portfolios. The model is applied to a sample of 12 systemically important German banking groups and delivers measures for systemic credit risk and the banks' contributions to it in both baseline and stress scenarios.     

Bank Recapitalization,Regulatory Intervention,and Repayment

We use prudential supervisory data for all German banks during 1994–2010 to test if regulatory interventions affect the likelihood that bailed‐out banks repay capital support. Accounting for the selection bias inherent in nonrandom bank bailouts by insurance schemes and the endogenous administration of regulatory interventions, we show that regulators can increase the likelihood of repayment substantially. An increase in intervention frequencies by one standard deviation increases the annual probability of capital support repayment by 7%. Sturdy interventions, like restructuring orders, are effective, whereas weak measures reduce repayment probabilities. Intervention effects last up to 5 years.     

Bank Capital Regulation and Structured Finance

We model the interaction between bank capital regulation and financial innovation. Innovation takes the form of structured finance, namely, pooling and tranching of assets and the creation of separate structures with different seniority, different risk, and different capital charges. Structured finance can improve welfare by manufacturing safer securities, saving on the capital that the structures with different seniority need to satisfy incentive constraints. The divergence between private and social interests in future profits motivates regulation. Regulation lowers profits and may induce banks to innovate to evade the regulation itself, even if this decreases welfare.     

Venture Capital Backing and Overvaluation: Evidence from the High‐Tech Bubble

We investigate the association between venture capital (VC) backing and the likelihood of firm overvaluation in the high‐tech bubble period. We find strong evidence that a VC‐backed firm is more likely than a non‐VC‐backed firm to be overvalued during the bubble period. A further investigation suggests that such an association exists only for VC‐backed firms that have gone public recently and VC‐backed firms over which venture capitalists (VCs) have high ownership or control. But outside the bubble period, all the differences in overvaluation between VC‐backed and non‐VC‐backed firms disappear. Our findings provide additional evidence supporting VC opportunism in boom periods.     

Regulatory Capital Charges for Too‐Connected‐to‐Fail Institutions: A Practical Proposal

The recent financial crisis has highlighted once more that interconnectedness in the financial system is a major source of systemic risk. I suggest a practical way to levy regulatory capital charges based on the degree of interconnectedness among financial institutions. Namely, the charges are based on the institution's incremental contribution to systemic risk based on a risk budgeting approach. The imposition of such capital charges could go a long way towards internalizing the negative externalities associated with too‐connected‐to‐fail institutions and providing managerial incentives to strengthen an institution's solvency position, and avoid too much homogeneity and excessive reliance on the same counterparties in the financial industry.     

Agency Costs and the Short‐Run Stock Price Response to Capital Expenditures

We estimate the short‐run stock price response to unanticipated capital expenditures. We use association study methodology to avoid the self‐selection bias in event studies and to facilitate construction of a large sample of firm‐years likely to exhibit agency problems. We find that the average price response to routine capital expenditures is negative, and that commonly used agency cost measures explain fully the negative response. Subsample results support the conclusion that the market is skeptical of cash flow financed spending by low‐q firms and even capital spending by high‐q firms when the firm is large and q is only marginally high.     

Capital Regulation with Two Banking Sectors: Cyclicality and Implementation

We present a capital regulation policy in a model in which banks can choose to be unregulated, by operating in the shadow banking sector, when the cost of being regulated (restriction on portfolio risk) exceeds the benefit (cheaper funding/insurance). We show that the welfare maximizing capital requirement policy can be procyclical: lower requirement during booms and higher requirement during recessions. Our policy specifies the level of capital requirement as a function of the observed relative size of the unregulated and regulated banking sectors. This specification achieves the optimal aggregate risk exposure by obtaining the right mix of the two sectors.     

Procyclical Capital Regulation and Lending

We use a quasi‐experimental research design to examine the effect of model‐based capital regulation on the procyclicality of bank lending and firms' access to funds. In response to an exogenous shock to credit risk in the German economy, capital charges for loans under model‐based regulation increased by 0.5 percentage points. As a consequence, banks reduced the amount of these loans by 2.1 to 3.9 percentage points more than for loans under the traditional approach with fixed capital charges. We find an even stronger effect when we examine aggregate firm borrowing, suggesting that microprudential capital regulation can have sizeable real effects.     

Managerial Behavior and the Link between Stock Mispricing and Corporate Investments: Evidence from Market‐to‐Book Ratio Decomposition

We examine the impact of mispricing on corporate investments and its components: capital expenditures, research and development, acquisitions, and asset sales. By decomposing the market‐to‐book ratio into mispricing and growth components, we show that corporate investments are linked to mispricing through market‐timing and catering, after controlling for growth and financial slack. This investment‐mispricing link is more pronounced in financially constrained firms and in firms with short‐horizon shareholders. Overall, our study indicates that the sensitivity of investments to mispricing is a function of the nature of mispricing, the type of investment, and the firm's characteristics.     

An empirical analysis of the economic impact of federal terrorism reinsurance

This paper examines the role of the federal government in the market for terrorism reinsurance. We investigate the stock price response of affected industries to a sequence of 13 events culminating in the enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) of 2002. In the industries most likely to be affected by TRIA—banking, construction, insurance, real estate investment trusts, transportation, and public utilities-the stock price effect was primarily negative. The Act was at best value-neutral for property-casualty insurers because it eliminated the option not to offer terrorism insurance. The negative response of the other industries may be attributable to the Act's impeding more efficient private market solutions, failing to address nuclear, chemical, and biological hazards, and reducing market expectations of federal assistance following future terrorist attacks.     

EXTENSIONS OF THE STANDARDIZED CROSS‐SECTIONAL APPROACH TO SHORT‐HORIZON EVENT STUDIES

Strong evidence indicates that short‐horizon event‐induced abnormal returns and volatility vary significantly over event days. Event‐study methods that assume constant event‐induced abnormal returns and volatility over event days have potentially inflated Type I error rates and poor test power. Our simple extensions of the Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) approach scale abnormal returns with conditional variance, which is estimated with GARCH(1,1) and an indicator of the event in a two‐stage estimation. Our method improves the Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen approach on model specification and test power, even under challenging event‐induced mean and volatility structures, and could standardize short‐horizon event studies.