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1.
Selling to Socially Responsible Consumers: Competition and The Private Provision of Public Goods 总被引:7,自引:3,他引:7
We model firms as competing for socially responsible consumers by linking the provision of a public good (environmentally friendly or socially responsible activities) to sales of their private goods. In many cases, too little of the public good is provided, but under certain conditions, competition leads to excessive provision. Further, there is generally a trade-off between more efficient provision of the private and the public good. Our results indicate that the level of private provision of the public good varies inversely with the competitiveness of the private-good market and that the types of public goods provided are biased toward those for which consumers have high participation value. 相似文献
2.
Regulation, Corporate Social Responsibility and Activism 总被引:2,自引:1,他引:1
Aleix Calveras Juan-JosÉ Ganuza Gerard Llobet 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2007,16(3):719-740
This paper analyzes the interplay between firms' self-regulation (often denoted as corporate social responsibility) as opposed to the formal regulation of a negative externality. Firms respond to increasing activism in the market (conscious consumers that take into account the external effects of their purchase) by providing more socially responsible goods. However, because regulation is the outcome of a political process, an increase in activism might imply an inefficiently high externality level. This may happen when a majority of non-activist consumers collectively free-ride on conscious consumers. By determining a softer than optimal regulation, they benefit from the behavior of firms, yet they have access to cheaper (although less efficient) goods . 相似文献
3.
Akio Kawasaki Tohru Naito 《Review of urban and regional development studies : RURDS : journal of the Applied Regional Conference》2019,31(1-2):60-76
Under the assumption that a public firm provides goods or services to two markets and that a private firm provides goods or services to one market only, this study examines whether public firms should be privatized. It also investigates how the production quantity of a private firm changes when its degree of privatization increases. We find that when the market share of a duopoly market is large (small), partial privatization (nationalization) is socially preferable. We also find that the quantity produced by the private firm does not always increase along with the degree of privatization. 相似文献
4.
Spatial Cournot competition and economic welfare: a note 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We investigated welfare implications in location-quantity models in a symmetric linear city. We found that when firms are not agglomerated in equilibrium, increasing the distance between firms raises (reduces) producer surplus and social welfare (consumer surplus). Moreover, central agglomeration is always optimal for consumers among symmetric locations, but not necessarily for producers. Central agglomeration can be inefficient even if it is the unique equilibrium outcome. In short, the firms are more likely to agglomerate or locate closer than what welfare maximizers would dictate, whereas they locate farther apart than what consumer surplus maximizers would recommend. 相似文献
5.
Constantine Manasakis Evangelos Mitrokostas Emmanuel Petrakis 《Managerial and Decision Economics》2014,35(7):460-473
We investigate the incentives of firms' owners to commit voluntarily to corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities in an oligopolistic market. The socially responsible attributes attached to products are considered as credence goods, with consumers forming expectations about their existence and level. We show that hiring an ‘individually’ socially responsible CEO and delegating to him the CSR effort and market decisions acts as a commitment device for the firm's owners and credibly signals to consumers that the firm will undertake the ‘missioned’ CSR activities. We also find that CSR activities are welfare enhancing for consumers and firms and thus, they should be encouraged. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
6.
Revealing Incentives for Compatibility Provision in Vertically Differentiated Network Industries
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We determine the incentives for compatibility provision of firms that produce network goods with different intrinsic qualities when firms do not have veto power over compatibility. When network effects are strong, there are multiple equilibria in pricing and consumer decisions. We show that in some equilibria, it is the high‐quality firm that invests in compatibility, whereas in others, the low‐quality firm triggers compatibility. The socially optimal compatibility degree is zero, except under very strong network effects, where one of the equilibria has all consumers buying the low‐quality good. In this case, a partial degree of compatibility is optimal. 相似文献
7.
8.
Contrary to much of the existing literature, we obtain robust and clear-cut results for the incentives and welfare effects of information sharing when information is firm-specific. We show that firms’ incentives to share this type of information are aligned with social welfare. Whenever revealing information is the dominant strategy (such as for Cournot firms revealing costs or Cournot and Bertrand firms revealing demand), it is socially beneficial. Only cost information in Bertrand competition will not be revealed but this is socially desirable, too. These findings are independent of distributional assumptions on random shocks and signals and hold for general asymmetric oligopoly with any mixture of substitute, complementary and independent goods. 相似文献
9.
Maarten C.W. Janssen Vladimir A. Karamychev Peran van Reeven 《Regional Science and Urban Economics》2005,35(6):700-714
This paper develops a model for multi-store competition between firms. Using the fact that different firms have different outlets and produce horizontally differentiated goods, we obtain a pure strategy equilibrium where firms choose a different location for each outlet and firms' locations are interlaced. The location decisions of multi-store firms are completely independent of each other. Firms choose locations that minimize transportation costs of consumers. Moreover, generically, the subgame perfect equilibrium is unique and when the firms have an equal number of outlets, prices are independent of the number of outlets. 相似文献
10.
A bstract The Canada US Free Trade AGreement (FTA) which came into force January 1. 1989 caused heated debate within Canada about the impact it would have on social programs , other directly or indirectly It was argued that Canada would have to give up some social programs because they would be deemed to be substdues to the production of goods or services Alternatively, it was feared that firms would argue that the programs would need to be cut in order to ensure that they could compete with US firms in firms in terms of taxes It is shown that public unease about the fate of social programs was based both on a misunderstanding of FTA provisions, and on 'misperception'of the mag nitude of social program expenditures Social Programs Such as unemployment insurance , even when they subsidize particular groups of people (eg fisher men) are not normally deemed to be unfair competition which would be countervailable In addition, firsm do not expertence any greter benefit costs in Canada than in the US, albeit there is a different public/private split and thus there is no justification for firms to argue for cutting programs in order tobe competitive, other things being equal 相似文献
11.
Intermediation Can Replace Certification 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
We consider a market in which consumers do not have perfect information about product quality. Producers can perfectly reveal that a good is of high quality through certification, which entails socially wasteful costs. Firms can choose whether to sell through an intermediary or to sell independently (vertical integration). We show that multibrand retailing, which leads to a redistribution of profits but not to social costs, can fully or partially replace certification by signaling product quality. Renting the image of a competing high-quality brand is shown to be an outcome that can be sustained through intermediation. 相似文献
12.
A model of duopoly competition in nonlinear pricing when firms are imperfectly informed about consumer locations is analyzed.
A continuum of consumers purchase a variable amount of a product from one of two firms located at the endpoints of the market.
At the Nash equilibrium in quantity-outlay schedules, consumers buy the same quantities as they would from the same firm if
it were a monopolist facing the same informational asymmetries, but they receive greater surplus. Hence, no efficiency gains
result from competition. If consumers have the option to reveal their locations and have the firms deliver the goods, all
consumers choose to reveal their locations in equilibrium. Thus, the inefficiencies from information asymmetries may not arise
because firms can deliver the good to consumers. In contrast, with a monopoly seller, consumers have no incentives to reveal
their locations. 相似文献
13.
Recent theories of the strategic use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) emphasize the role of information asymmetry and how CSR is likely to be incorporated into a firm's product differentiation strategy. A key empirical implication of these theories is that firms selling experience or credence goods are more likely to be socially responsible than firms selling search goods. Using firm-level data, we report evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis. 相似文献
14.
Many of the attributes that make a good “socially responsible” (SR) are credence attributes that cannot be learned by consumers either through search or experience. Consumers, then, use for their purchasing decisions “noisy” information about these attributes obtained from potentially contradictory channels (media, advertisement, NGOs). In this paper we model such informational framework and show the positive relationship between the accuracy of the information transmitted to consumers and corporate social responsibility. We also show that a firm may be tempted to add noise to the information channel (through lobbying of the media), which might reduce the supply of the SR attributes and even harm the firm itself (with lower profits). It might then be profitable to the firm to commit ex ante to not manipulate the information regarding the firm's business practices (e.g., with a partnership with an NGO). Finally, we extend our model to a competition framework endogenizing the number of firms active in the SR segment. We show both that in more transparent markets a larger number of firms will be SR, and that in a market with more intense competition, a higher degree of transparency is required in order to sustain a given number of SR firms. 相似文献
15.
Alexei Alexandrov 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2016,25(1):179-194
I examine strategic implications of competing for consumers with self‐control problems. For investment goods, like health clubs, I find that the equilibrium sign‐up (lump‐sum) fees decrease when competition intensifies, similarly to prices in standard oligopoly models. However, the equilibrium attendance (per‐unit) price increases due to firms' deteriorated ability to take advantage of consumers' self‐control problems. Moreover, firms earn less profit due to consumers' self‐control problems—the firms have a unilateral incentive to charge per‐unit fees lower than the marginal cost; however, they cannot make up the lost margins by increasing the lump‐sum fee, due to competition. I also show that for plausible parameter regions the market adjusts to consumers' self‐control problem in such a way that firms play the standard equilibrium strategies that they would have engaged in with fully rational consumers, with identical market outcomes. Most of the results are qualitatively the same for leisure goods (for example, credit cards); however, some results are reversed: the per‐unit fees are higher than marginal cost and decrease as competition intensifies. 相似文献
16.
Francesco Perrini Sandro Castaldo Nicola Misani Antonio Tencati 《Business Strategy and the Environment》2010,19(8):512-526
This paper investigates the determinants of consumer attitudes toward organic products marketed by mainstream retailers under a private label. Since organic products are credence goods, consumers cannot directly verify whether these products comply with official standards. Organic labels are the primary source of consumer trust in organics, but these labels must be noticed and understood before consumers will actively seek them out. In that some consumers may not prioritize product labels when they shop, it is sometimes up to retailers to strengthen consumer trust. Within the antecedents of this trust, we isolated the contribution of the corporate social responsibility associations held by consumers about retailers. We surveyed Italian customers interested in organics and found that they are more likely to trust the private‐label organic products sold by a retailer when it is considered socially responsible. Our results also show that consumer trust translates into brand loyalty and a willingness to pay a premium price for organic products. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. 相似文献
17.
Konstantinos Eleftheriou Nickolas J. Michelacakis 《Managerial and Decision Economics》2020,41(7):1202-1210
The welfare effects of regulation are of crucial importance to policy makers. To this end, we present a model of n firms with differentiated costs competing in a linear market within the framework of spatial price discrimination. We prove that the Nash equilibrium locations of firms are always socially optimal irrespective of the number of competitors, the distribution of consumers, firms' cost heterogeneity, the level of privatization, and the number and/or the varieties of the produced goods. We also provide an algorithm on how to find the unique Nash equilibrium in the case of uniformly distributed consumers. 相似文献
18.
In a production economy, multiple public goods are produced by firms in competitive markets, and provided by the government together with contributions from consumers. There are widespread externalities: all consumers’ consumption and contributions and all firms’ production enter into utility functions. Public goods can be imperfect substitutes or complements, and they can be local public goods or club goods. Zero bounds that require consumers to make nonnegative contributions complicate the differentiable approach. Applying the transversality theorem for smooth economies in a regular parameterization, we obtain the existence of equilibrium in such an economy, and generically equilibria are regular and locally unique. 相似文献
19.
When do wholesalers issue green bonds to finance their socially responsible activities instead of charging a premium for the products they produce? We show that in less competitive retail markets when retailers can “skim” more of the premium that end consumers pay for socially responsible products, green bonds provide additional funds to help cover the cost of a wholesaler's socially responsible activities. Similar incentives arise if the wholesaler's input is a small component of the end consumers’ product, or if it is difficult for end consumers to identify the wholesaler's socially responsible activities. 相似文献
20.
We consider a country made up of two regions, where each region owns a local public firm and a domestic private one. A national authority decides whether or not to merge the two local public firms. The result depends on whether the goods produced by the firms are homogeneous, substitutes or complements. We find that if the two local public firms produce the same good, the national authority is indifferent as to whether to merge or not. When local public firms produce different goods two cases arise. First, if the firms in each region produce homogeneous goods the national authority merges the two local public firms when the goods are complements, independent in demand and weak substitutes. Second, if the firms in each region produce heterogeneous goods the national authority merges the two local public firms only when the goods are close complements. Therefore, there is greater scope for mergers in the former case than in the later. 相似文献