Diffusion and spatial equilibrium of a social norm: voting participation in the United States, 1920–2008

Social conformity can spread social norms and behaviors through a society. This research examines such a process geographically and over time for voting, which is strongly influenced by the norm that citizens should vote. A mathematical model for the spread of voting participation under the influence of social conformity is developed based on the diffusion equation, and predictions are tested with spatial analysis of state-level voter turnout in American presidential elections from 1920 to 2008. Results show that voter turnout has converged to a stable equilibrium in its geographical distribution across the states—but it is an equilibrium that results in persistent differences at the state level. Results are compared to individual-level and agent-based models. The model may be applied to other types of social diffusion that depend on specific geographical location.     

Hybrid Forms Of Accountability: Citizen engagement in institutions of public-sector oversight in India

The public sector institutions which are responsible for monitoring government performance are not normally open to citizen participation. Yet there is widespread dissatisfaction with the capacities of states to exercise self-restraining functions effectively, and a growing interest amongst citizens to inform, monitor, or participate directly in the workings of these oversight institutions. This paper examines two citizen-initiated efforts in India to engage with public sector oversight functions. In one case, citizens attempted to engage with administrative accountability institutions (monitoring efficiency and quality in the food subsidy system), and in the second, citizens challenged official auditing systems in local government by producing parallel accounts of local spending which contradicted official versions. Both cases involved citizens breaking away from the ‘vertical’ channels of accountability traditionally open to civil society (lobbying, voting), and insinuating themselves to previously closed ‘horizontal’ accountability functions (the state's internal procedures for administrative review or financial auditing). We argue that for such ‘hybrid’ forms of accountability to be effective, it is important that citizens be given legal standing within institutions of public sector oversight, a continuous presence within the oversight agency's work, structured access to official documentary information, including spending records, and the right to issue dissenting perspectives directly to legislative bodies.     

Voter turnout in a multidimensional policy space

Many factors influence the likelihood of citizens turning out to vote. In this paper we focus our attention on issue voting, that is, on the likelihood that different policies offered by politicians affect the probability of voting. If voters consider both the benefits and the costs of voting, rational voters will only vote when politicians offer differentiated policies. In a multidimensional policy space this implies that citizens only vote when they perceive enough difference on the issues they care about the most. We investigate the role of voter abstention due to indifference in a unidimensional and a multidimensional policy setting using data from the US National Election Studies for 1972–2000 and find support for our predictions: voters perceiving a small difference between the platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties are less likely to vote; and voters who perceive the two parties as more different on a larger number of issues are significantly more likely to vote.     

Geographical Proximity and Mutual Funds' Proxy Voting Behavior

This paper examines the influence of geographical proximity on mutual fund proxy voting decisions. Using mutual fund proxy voting data for the sample period July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004, we find that fund managers vote more in favor of management of locally headquartered firms. The results are strong for proposals related to executive compensation, anti‐takeover provisions, social and political issues. We provide evidence to show that bias in proxy voting is not being driven by informational advantage; voting bias is prevalent in small as well as large size companies. Additionally, the voting pattern suggests that geographical proximity does not facilitate in better corporate monitoring as revealed in their voting decisions. We find that local fund managers vote more favorably in those proposals which do not increase shareholders' wealth and rights. Our results suggest that familiarity and social interaction between fund managers and firm executives located in the same geographic area might explain the local bias in mutual fund proxy voting behavior. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Assigning Patents to Industries: Tests of the Yale Technology Concordance

We describe a method to predict patent counts disaggregated by industry, using available data on patenting by technology field. This method—the Yale Technology Concordance (YTC)—exploits a data set of patents that have been individually assigned by the Canadian Patent Office to both an industry and a technology field. The procedure for predicting patents by industry is developed as a statistical model so that the standard errors of the predictions can be estimated. The YTC is tested on several subsets of Canadian patents by comparing out-of-sample predictions with industry assignments made by the Canadian Patent Office. We find that the predictions of patents by industry are quite accurate for the subset of patents form US inventors. The prediction errors are much greater for the subset of patents granted or published after 1989. This suggests that the relationship between the technology fields and industries has shifted in a way that the procedure does not capture. Nonetheless, predictions from the YTC do appear to give a reasonably accurate picture of the pattern of patenting by industry.     

Determinants of post-congressional lobbying employment

This paper studies the determinants of lobbying-employment decisions of former members of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 105th–108th Congresses. The main empirical findings indicate that there are two groups more likely to become lobbyists: members not re-elected who had more conservative voting records and held important committee assignments and longer-serving members who voluntarily retired and voted less conservatively in their last term compared to their previous terms in office. A decomposition analysis confirms that the revolving doors for the two groups of legislators differ because of differences in employer response rather than in legislator characteristics.     

Collective decision making by committee

Implicitly or explicitly, economic decisions always contain elements of compromise. However, the bargaining models of economic theory treat only the two decision maker case with linearly aggregated priorities; i.e. compromise decisions under Pareto optimality and no side payments. Even then the relative importance of the decision makers remains indeterminate. This paper proposes a simplified bargaining model with three new features: (a) it allows multiple participants; (b) it uses optimal voting patterns to combine the policy proposals, rather than the policy priorities, to form those compromise decisions; and (c) it determines the relative power of each participant endogenously. Perhaps more important, the method does not depend on each decision maker knowing the preferences of his colleagues exactly.     

Estimating Bayesian Decision Problems with Heterogeneous Expertise

We consider the recent novel two‐step estimator of Iaryczower and Shum (American Economic Review 2012; 102 : 202–237), who analyze voting decisions of US Supreme Court justices. Motivated by the underlying theoretical voting model, we suggest that where the data under consideration display variation in the common prior, estimates of the structural parameters based on their methodology should generally benefit from including interaction terms between individual and time covariates in the first stage whenever there is individual heterogeneity in expertise. We show numerically, via simulation and re‐estimation of the US Supreme Court data, that the first‐order interaction effects that appear in the theoretical model can have an important empirical implication. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Voting on public pensions with hands and feet

Aging changes the political power in a democracy in favor of the older generations. With free labor mobility like that of the EU, the success of the gerontocracy is, nevertheless, limited by migration of the young generations. This connection between political voting and voting with the feet is analyzed in a two-country model with overlapping generations. The interregional competition on public pensions yields premium payments which are larger when the young generations' migration decisions take the impact on future pensions into account (strategic migration) than when these decisions are made myopically. The paper also pays attention to migration (in-)efficiency and to the implications of harmonization principles. Received: November 1999 / Accepted: July 2001 RID="*" ID="*" The paper benefited greatly from discussions at the EEA conference in Santiago de Compostela, the CESifo Workshop on Public Pensions in Munich and seminars in G?ttingen, Mainz, and Tellow. We are grateful to many seminar participants, two anonymous referees of Economics of Governance and, in particular, to Paolo Manasse for their valuable comments and creative hints. The usual disclaimer applies.     

On stable rules for selecting committees

A voting rule is said to be stable if it always elects a fixed-size subset of candidates such that there is no outside candidate who is majority preferred to any candidate in this set whenever such a set exists. Such a set is called a Weak Condorcet Committee (WCC). Four stable rules have been proposed in the literature. In this paper, we propose two new stable rules. Since nothing is known about the properties of the stable rules, we evaluate all the identified stable rules on the basis of some appealing properties of voting rules. We show that they all satisfy the Pareto criterion and they are not monotonic. More, we show that every stable rule fails the reinforcement requirement.     

Can People Explain Their Own Vote? Introspective Questions as Indicators of Salience in the 1995 Quebec Referendum on Sovereignty

Most scholars doubt that voters are able to explain their own vote. We argue that introspective questions whereby respondents are invited to tell, in their own words, the reasons why they vote the way they do, provide useful information on which considerations are most salient in their voting decisions. We show that open-ended questions about reasons for voting Yes or No in the 1995 Quebec referendum on sovereignty help us to sort out subgroups of voters for whom a given consideration is more salient.     

A game theoretic analysis of interactions between law abiding citizens and criminals with respect to ownership of guns

In this paper, it is recognized that there are criminals and law abiding citizens in any society, and that their decisions to own guns are based on rather different, through interdependent, motives. These ideas are used as a conceptual basis for a game theoretic model which is used to analyze one isolated interaction and two forms of repeated interactions. The Nash equilibrium is the main results in the static form of the game. It is concluded from the analysis of the dynamic forms that this equilibrium in globally stable. The presentation proceeds to the study of possible consequences of direct and indirect policy interventions regulating the proportion of law abiding citizens and of criminals that own guns. The paper concludes with some observations on the model's limitations and some suggestions for its improvement.     

The effects of police performance on agency trustworthiness and citizen participation

ABSTRACT

We examine the effect of performance information on citizens’ willingness to engage with government. We hypothesize that when performance information is positive, citizens perceive government as trustworthy, which increases proclivity for participation. To validate this framework, we conduct an experiment that tests the effect of police performance on citizens’ perceptions of police trustworthiness and intentions to participate in a neighbourhood watch programme. We find that information about police performance strongly affects perceptions of police trustworthiness. Yet, citizen decisions to participate in the community watch programme are more complex and can be triggered by either positive or negative police performance.     

有限责任公司僵局探略

公司僵局主要发生在有限责任公司。根据不同的原因,公司僵局有不同的分类,但其主要原因在于有限责任公司的公司决策和管理实施的资本多数表决制、有限责任公司典型的人合性特征,以及法律规定的有限责任公司股东退出机制不完善。有限责任公司僵局的存在,不仅危害公司和股东的利益,还会对相关利益人的利益造成危害。     

Voting over selective immigration policies with immigration aversion

Selective immigration policies set lower barriers to entry for skilled workers. However, simple economic intuition suggests that skilled majorities should welcome unskilled immigrants and protect skilled natives. This paper studies the voting over a selective policy in a two-country, three-factor model with skilled and unskilled labor, endogenous migration decisions, costly border enforcement and aversion to immigration. Results show that heterogeneity in capital distribution forces skilled voters to form a coalition with unskilled voters, who become pivotal. The voting outcome is therefore biased towards the preferences of the latter, and consists in a selective protectionism. Finally, immigration aversion helps to explain why skilled majorities do not bring down entry barriers against unskilled workers.     

Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: An axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting

We study axiomatically situations in which the society agrees to treat voters with different characteristics distinctly. In this setting, we propose a set of intuitive axioms and show that they jointly characterize a new class of voting procedures, called Type-weighted Approval Voting. According to this family, each voter has a strictly positive and finite weight (the weight is necessarily the same for all voters with the same characteristics) and the alternative with the highest number of weighted votes is elected. The implemented voting procedure reduces to Approval Voting in case all voters are identical or the procedure assigns the same weight to all types. Using this idea, we also obtain a new characterization of Approval Voting.     

Historical family structure as a predictor of liberal voting: Evidence from a century of Russian history

Family structure is considered a particularly important predictor of social and political development; historical differences in family size and other family characteristics cast a long shadow over societal development. This paper explores the effect of differences in historical family size on political behavior based on within-country variations in this characteristic in Russia. Unlike most papers on historical legacies, we trace the effect of family size over a century of Russian history with a focus on the first competitive and free elections in Russia—to the Constituent Assembly—held in 1917 and on the presidential elections in post-Soviet Russia in 1996 and 2000. Mean family size is measured based on the census data for 1897. We find a robust and significant association between smaller family size and a voting preference for parties that are economically liberal, which holds despite differences in the political, economic, and social environment between the 1910s and 1990s     

Action embedded in social structure: A systematic theory Part II,explanations

This research develops a systematic theory, which premises a responsible and reasonable actor, of how social structure can affect rational social action, applies this general theory to explain 29 specific empirical findings about voting, and illustrates how deductive theories can synthesize prior empirical findings and provide a focus for subsequent empirical research. Part II, Explanations applies the systematic theory to account for specific empirical propositions that relate social statuses to the decisions voters make. Voters are classified by such graduated social statuses as socioeconomic class, age, and education; and by such nominal social statuses as religion, urban or rural residence, region, gender, race, and ethnicity. Positions on two key issues affect voting choice, the desire for economic equity and the desire for social equality. The members of the various social groups interpret these issues as they affect their own self-interest, and align with the party they perceive as furthering their interests. To corroborate aspects of the theory and to quantify the effects of the variables, survey data are analyzed.     

有限责任公司僵局探略

公司僵局主要发生在有限责任公司。根据不同的原因,公司僵局有不同的分类,但其主要原因在于有限责任公司的公司决策和管理实施的资本多数表决制、有限责任公司典型的人合性特征,以及法律规定的有限责任公司股东退出机制不完善。有限责任公司僵局的存在,不仅危害公司和股东的利益,还会对相关利益人的利益造成危害。     

Action embedded in social structure: A systematic theory Part I,theory and evidence

This research develops a systematic theory, which premises a responsible and reasonable actor, of how social structure can affect rational social action, applies this general theory to explain 29 specific empirical findings about voting, and illustrates how deductive theories can synthesize prior empirical findings and provide a focus for subsequent empirical research. Part II, Explanations applies the systematic theory to account for specific empirical propositions that relate social statuses to the decisions voters make. Voters are classified by such graduated social statuses as socioeconomic class, age, and education; and by such nominal social statuses as religion, urban or rural residence, region, gender, race, and ethnicity. Positions on two key issues affect voting choice, the desire for economic equity and the desire for social equality. The members of the various social groups interpret these issues as they affect their own self-interest, and align with the party they perceive as furthering their interests. To corroborate aspects of the theory and to quantify the effects of the variables, survey data are analyzed.