Social decision rules are not immune to conflict

Why is rent-seeking so endemic in societies? Might it not be possible to design a Pareto-improving social decision rule that sidesteps the inefficient waste of resources resulting from conflict? We study this question for a multi-player contest. We assume that a benevolent planner knows the winning payoffs, the effectiveness of each rent-seeker, that the cost of expending resources is isoelastic, and that it is the same across all players. But she does not know the precise value of this elasticity. We show that this minimal lack of information leads to the impossibility of a Pareto-improving social decision rule, as long as there are at least four agents. Received: June 1999 / Accepted: January 24, 2000     

Optimal Money Burning: Theory and Application to Corporate Dividends

We explore signaling behavior in settings with a discriminating activity and several costly nondiscriminating ("money-burning") activities. Existing theory provides no basis for selecting one method of burning money over another. When senders have better information about activity costs than receivers, each sender's indifference is resolved, the taxation of a money-burning signal is potentially Pareto-improving, and the use of the taxed activity becomes more widespread as the tax rate rises. We apply this theory to dividend signaling. Its central testable implication—that an increase in the dividend tax increases the likelihood of dividend payout—is verified empirically.     

Identification of Pareto-improving policies: Information as the real invisible hand

Finite sets of market data may not suffice to determine Pareto-improving policies.     

非缺陷退货情形下的供应链协调

非缺陷退货指的是没有功能或质量上的缺陷却被客户退给零售商的产品.非缺陷退货造成的成本相当惊人,且主要由生产商承担,然而,减少非缺陷退货则主要靠零售商的努力和投入.本文研究了怎样通过供应链协调来减少非缺陷退货.本文介绍国外学者提出的一种“目标补偿”合同,即当非缺陷退货量低于某一特定目标值时,生产商将对低于目标值的每单位非缺陷退货量支付一定的补偿金.这种合同能有效地激励零售商加大努力来降低非缺陷退货,从而提高整条供应链的期望利润,研究表明,该合同在大多数情形下是Pareto改进的,在某些情形下对生产商和零售商都有利.     

Efficient,Pareto-improving processes

We give two optimization programs for determining whether Pareto improving local changes are possible. When they are, the programs compute them. Any procedure generating efficient and Pareto improving changes can be replicated by these programs. The two programs are dual to each other. We apply the programs to Pareto improving exchange processes and to Pareto-improving tax-tariff reforms.     

The nonlinear effect of green innovation on the corporate competitive advantage

This study uses Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS) to explore the nonlinear relationships between green innovation performance and corporate competitive advantage. The result indicates that green innovation performance has the nonlinear effect on the corporate competitive advantage. If companies hope to enhance their competitive advantages through green innovation, they must check their green innovation performance in advance. If their green innovation performance is low, they can obtain competitive advantages through the increase of the green innovation performance; however, if their green innovation performance is high, they can not necessarily obtain competitive advantages through the increase of the green innovation performance.     

The <Emphasis Type="Italic">n</Emphasis>-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations

This study examines the behavior of simple n-person bargaining problems under pre-donations where the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution is operant. Pre- donations are a unilateral commitment to transfer a portion of one’s utility to someone else, and are used to distort the bargaining set and thereby influence the bargaining solution. In equilibrium, these pre-donations are Pareto-improving over the undistorted solution; moreover, when the agents’ preferences are sufficiently distinct, the equilibrium solution coincides with the concessionary division rule.     

Taxing capital is a good idea: The role of idiosyncratic risk in an OLG model

We investigate an overlapping generations (OLG) model in which agents who live for two periods receive idiosyncratic productivity shocks when they are old. We show that, around zero tax equilibria, we can always construct a combination of a small capital tax and a lump-sum transfer that are Pareto-improving. As Dávila et al. (Econometrica (2012)) show, a capital reduction in one period raises the welfare level of agents who are old in that period, but lowers that of the young agents, because it reduces their wages. We show that the government can compensate for these wage losses by additionally taxing the old agents, such that their welfare gains remain positive. Our result is unchanged when earnings are uncertain at young age.     

Housing-choice hindrances and urban spatial structure: Evidence from matched location and location-preference data in Chinese cities

In a monocentric city with a well-functioning residential market, Pareto-efficient spatial equilibrium entails the sorting of residents according to their bid–rent gradient in descending order away from city center. Violation of this sorting condition creates opportunities for Pareto-improving trading of locations and can be sustained only if the market is hindered. We propose a simple ordered-location-choice model using matched location and location-preference data of individual households to examine violations of the Pareto-efficient spatial sorting condition. In so doing we are able to identify population groups facing housing-choice hindrances. We find in a sample of Chinese cities undergoing housing market liberalization that poor marketability of the previously state-provided homes, inadequate provision of housing finance, and spatial mismatch between job-market and housing-market opportunities contribute to a Pareto-inefficient spatial structure.     

Housing-choice hindrances and urban spatial structure: Evidence from matched location and location-preference data in Chinese cities

In a monocentric city with a well-functioning residential market, Pareto-efficient spatial equilibrium entails the sorting of residents according to their bid–rent gradient in descending order away from city center. Violation of this sorting condition creates opportunities for Pareto-improving trading of locations and can be sustained only if the market is hindered. We propose a simple ordered-location-choice model using matched location and location-preference data of individual households to examine violations of the Pareto-efficient spatial sorting condition. In so doing we are able to identify population groups facing housing-choice hindrances. We find in a sample of Chinese cities undergoing housing market liberalization that poor marketability of the previously state-provided homes, inadequate provision of housing finance, and spatial mismatch between job-market and housing-market opportunities contribute to a Pareto-inefficient spatial structure.     

Welfare targeting in networks

This paper investigates welfare targeting for public goods in networks. First, we show that a tax/subsidy scheme (not necessarily budget-balanced) affects each consumer only insofar as it affects his neighbourhood. Second, we show that either a Pareto-improving income redistribution can be found or there exist Negishi weights, which we relate to the network structure. Third, in the case of Cobb–Douglas preferences, we show that a Law of Welfare Targeting holds and links two well-known notions of the comparative statics of policy interventions: neutrality and welfare paradoxical effects. Collectively, our findings uncover the importance of the $-1$ eigenvalue to economic and social policy: it is an indication of how consumers absorb the impact of income redistribution.     

Foreclosure with Incomplete Information

We investigate the robustness of the new foreclosure doctrine and its associated welfare implications to the introduction of incomplete information. In particular, we let the upstream firm's marginal cost be private information, unknown to the downstream firms. The previous literature has argued that vertical integration is harmful because it allows an upstream monopolist to limit output to monopoly levels, whereas a disintegrated structure will "over-sell," producing more in equilibrium. By contrast, we find that with incomplete information, high-cost firms will often "under-sell" in equilibrium, that is, supply less than their monopoly output. Low-cost firms continue to over-sell, so all types of firms have a reason to integrate downstream, but this is socially harmful only for low-cost types. For high-cost firms vertical integration can be Pareto-improving, resulting in higher output, profits, and consumer surplus.     

Employment in the EC,EFTA, and the EEA: A regional analysis

This study examines free trade zones from a regional perspective. These trade agreements are an attempt to create a large functional and administrative region that can improve the competitive position of member countries. With this in mind, techniques commonly used in regional economics can be employed to study the competitive effects of free trade zones. This paper develops the application of shift-share analysis to free trade zones. More specifically, the paper conducts a shift-share analysis of Europe over two time periods to asses the competitive advantages from belonging to the European Common Market.     

基于生态位理论的轿车生产企业竞争态势分析

本文运用生态位理论,将消费者视为企业生存所倚重的资源,利用价格生态位分析了主要轿车生产企业之间的竞争态势,力求为我国轿车生产企业的经营者利用生态位理论认识、分析轿车市场的竞争状况,制定竞争战略提供理论支持。而且,随着汽车生产企业和其产品的增多,消费者购买能力和需求的增高,以及能源危机引发的机遇与挑战,全球汽车制造业将会面临着越来越激烈的市场竞争。在这个阶段,汽车生产企业如果能够尝试从生态位的视角出发,观察整个市场的竞争态势,认清自己所处的位置,明确竞争对手的情况,进而调整到适合自身生存的价格生态位,那么就有望实现企业在适度的竞争关系中和谐共生并健康持续地发展。     

Do Dominant Firms Provide More Training?

A canonical Cournot competition model shows that the profitability of training can increase as the number of competitors decreases. British establishment evidence from 1998, 2004, and 2011 confirms that firms in less competitive markets provide more formal training. This persists within three separate cross‐sections and in two separate panel estimates. It persists with alternative measures of training, with alternative measures of market competition and in estimates designed to account for endogeneity. These results suggest that a dominant product market position, indeed, increases the incentives to invest in training.     

Validation of an instrument to measure absorptive capacity

Absorptive capacity is an ability firms should develop if they wish to adapt to changes in an increasingly competitive and changing environment and to achieve and sustain competitive advantage. Despite the increase in literature on absorptive capacity, some ambiguity remains in determining the dimensions that shape the construct. Thus, no measurement instrument can be adapted to these dimensions. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the literature on absorptive capacity by using a resource-based view to present an alternative measurement instrument for absorptive capacity. This instrument differentiates between the phases of acquisition, assimilation, transformation and exploitation of knowledge, as well as between the two dimensions of absorptive capacity (potential and realized), to reduce the problem of measuring and identifying the dimensions that shape this important construct. The instrument’s validity and reliability are guaranteed and have been tested using data from 168 Spanish organizations.     

出租车数量管制对社会福利的影响

运用经济学的研究方法对出租车行业的数量管制问题进行了考查。研究发现,由于出租车行业具有很强的竞争性,单纯依靠市场的自发调节就能够实现该行业的资源优化配置;对出租车行业的数量管制,不但影响了出租车行业的自身发展,而且造成了社会福利损失。事实上,管制的重要原因是为了获得管制租金而不是增进社会福利。因此放宽对出租车行业的数量管制才是增进社会福利的有效选择。     

供应商管理库存探析

供应商管理库存是一种先进的供应链管理策略它可以增加供应链的收入,降低供应链的总成本,提高客户的服务水平,增强供应链的竞争能力。从分析供应商管理库存的概念入手,提出供应商管理库存的实施步骤,并讨论了实施VMI给供应链上下游企业带来的益处和供应商管理库存应注意的事项等问题。     

关于企业实行战略成本管理需要的思考

随着我国市场经济的不断深化,要求企业在管理理念与管理手段上进行创新。传统成本管理已经不能完全适应现代企业管理的需要。为了适应企业竞争的需要,战略成本管理应运而生了。实施战略成本管理主要是在于提高企业核心竞争力。本文认为在规范的市场经济条件下,建立起完善的成本管理体系及企业竞争机制是战略成本管理的核心。     

Noncompliance and the effects of the minimum wage on hours and welfare in competitive labor markets

This paper shows that increases in the minimum wage rate can have ambiguous effects on the working hours and welfare of employed workers in competitive labor markets. The reason is that employers may not comply with the minimum wage legislation and instead pay a lower subminimum wage rate. If workers are risk neutral, we prove that working hours and welfare are invariant to the minimum wage rate. If workers are risk averse and imprudent (which is the empirically likely case), then working hours decrease with the minimum wage rate, while their welfare may increase.