论财政政策与货币政策协调配合

论财政政策与货币政策协调配合●刘青刘美清国民经济能否持续稳定协调地向前发展，关键在于社会总供给与社会总需求是否平衡。在社会主义市场经济的条件下，资源配置的主体是市场，国家只能通过相应的财政政策和货币政策以及它们之间的相互配合，对国民经济进行间接地调节...     

财政政策与货币政策协调的经济条件

财政政策与货币政策协调的经济条件郑传锋宏观经济政策的选择和利用对经济体制和环境、条件有一定的要求，使经济政策有一个赖以发挥作用的基础。财政政策与货币政策的协同配合作用也是如此。认清财政政策与货币政策两者协调配合的经济条件显然具有很强的现实意义。一、货...     

财政政策和货币政策的协调配合

在市场经济的国家中,宏观经济调控的财政政策和货币政策是两大重要工具。在不同的时期,根据宏观经济调控的目标要求,两大政策的运用在总体和单个程度上、方式上应有所不同。这就需要两者的搭配、协调。协调配合好,才能取得调控的良好效果。财政政策和货币政策在协调配合上有几种主要类型。第一,财政、货币政策的双松。为促进经济增长的较快速度,在宏观经济调控上,往往增加财政支出、扩大财政赤字,增加银行信贷,扩大货币供应量。但是,要达到这个要求,收到效果,必须有足够的未被利用的物资资源和人力资源。同时,还要有先进的生产技术、科学的…     

财政政策与货币政策协调配合问题研究

财政政策和货币政策的不同作用机制、特点、局限性以及相互影响性,决定二者必须协调配合.具体来说,应根据宏观经济运行态势的变化,确定财政政策和货币政策的主从关系,注意政策性金融与财政政策、货币政策的协调配合,加强财政政策和货币政策调控结合部重点领域的合理协调.     

财政政策和货币政策的组合

财政和货币政策是国家宏观调控的两大重要政策工具,二者既有联系又有区别,必须协调配合。为了实现经济稳定发展的目标,提高宏观调控的有效性,更好地维护我国在开放条件下的经济利益,必须进一步加强财政与货币政策之间的协调关系。     

财政政策与货币政策协调配合的思路与对策

财政政策和货币政策是国家对国民经济进行宏观调控的主要手段,需协调运行才能使国民经济达到均衡状态。为此,应强化财政调控力度;明确财政政策、货币政策的各自侧重点;搞好国有企业,重构市场经济的微观主体;寻找财政和货币政策的最佳结合点。这些措施对调节我国经济的平衡和健康运行起着巨大的促进作用。     

要完善和协调运用财政政策和货币政策

在社会主义市场经济条件下，为了保证国民经济的健康运行，必须完善和协调运用各项宏观经济政策，本文着重探讨如何完善和协调运用财政政策和货币政策的问题。一、财政政策和货币政策目标的确定和协调财政政策和货币政策备由最终调节目标、中间目标和政策手段构成。（一）财政政策和货币政策的最终目标的确定和协调在社会主义市场经济条件下，财政政策的最终调节目标是资源有效配置、经济稳定增长和国民收入的合理分配。要通过财政直接分配和间接调节，实现社会资源的合理分配和效用最大化。在社会主义市场经济条件下，由于公共物品、外部效…     

财政政策与货币政策协调浅析

一、宏观经济政策的两种选择和两种结果 从目前我国经济的发展趋势来看,宏观政策可能有两种不同的选择,也有两种不同的结果。实行扩张经济性政策,适当调低汇率,增加货币供给,解决银行坏帐问题,使物价有所上升,经济会不断恢复,增长速度回升,利率水平随之上升。实行适度从紧的经济政策,汇率保持不变,经济将继续保持低速增长,通货紧缩的状况不会改变,利率水平较低。这时如果增加货币供给,就要首先增加外汇储备,但并不会解决通货紧缩的问题。如果是后一种结果,就会出现类似日本的情况,而且中国是否能够在低生产、低消费、低物价、低利率的条件下长期维持仍然是一个问题。 二、财政政策和货币政策之间的选择     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy-Makers in the European Economic and Monetary Union: Allies or Adversaries?

Optimal monetary and fiscal policies within the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) are determined by simulating a global model under alternative assumptions about the objective function of the European Central Bank (ECB) and about cooperation vs. non-cooperation between monetary and fiscal policy-makers and among the latter. The results show the high effectiveness of fixed rules in the presence of supply-side shocks and the usefulness of cooperative discretionary measures against demand-side shocks. More generally, cooperation among fiscal policy-makers in the EMU is nearly always superior to non-cooperative equilibrium solutions, yielding a strong case for the coordination of fiscal policies.     

The Economic Case for Monetary Union in the European Union

Differential requirements for seigniorage provide a weak case for retaining monetary independence. As regards adjustment to asymmetric shocks, nominal exchange rate flexibility is at best a limited blessing and at worst a limited curse. Absence of significant fiscal redistribution mechanisms among EU members is not an obstacle to monetary union. Neither is limited international labour mobility. Convergence of real economic performance is irrelevant for monetary union. A common currency is the logical implication of unrestricted capital mobility. The Maastricht criteria need not hinder monetary union provided the political will exists to adopt a flexible interpretation of the fiscal criteria.     

Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union

Central to ongoing debates over the desirability of monetary unions is a supposed trade-off, outlined by Mundell (1961) : a monetary union reduces transactions costs but renders stabilization policy less effective. If shocks across countries are sufficiently correlated, then, according to this argument, delegating monetary policy to a single central bank is not very costly and a monetary union is desirable.
This paper explores this argument in a setting with both monetary and fiscal policies. In an economy with monetary policy alone, we confirm the presence of the trade-off and find that indeed a monetary union will not be welfare improving if the correlation of national shocks is too low. However, fiscal interventions by national governments, combined with a central bank that has the ability to commit to monetary policy, overturn these results. In equilibrium, such a monetary union will be welfare improving for any correlation of shocks.     

Monetary policy implementation and transmission in the European Monetary Union

I discuss possible problems engendered by loss of national monetary policies, and study them from three empirical perspectives. First, are business cycles sufficiently synchronized across EMU member countries? The evidence suggests that economic activity in those countries has become increasingly correlated in the 1990s, and that policy co–ordination has played a role in generating that outcome. Second, are there asymmetries in the mechanisms through which policy affects economic activity? The paper documents that policy transmission was indeed heterogeneous in the member countries, and that structural and financial factors were sensibly related to cross–country differences in the response of output to a monetary policy shock. Third, how is policy implemented in an environment of diverse business cycle fundamentals and transmission mechanisms? Estimation of monetary policy reaction functions finds that the European Central Bank is closer to an aggregate of the central banks in Germany, France, and Italy than to the Bundesbank alone.     

Fiscal and regulatory federalism in the European Union

This contribution summarizes some quantitative results and presents relevant policy-oriented conclusions obtained from research program No. PBS91-0363. It is mainly supported by the Inter-ministerial Committee on Science and Technology of the Spanish government, which was carried out at the Public Finance and Public Sector Economics Research Unit of University of Valencia (Spain) to analyze, from a fiscal and regulatory point of view, the dynamic characteristics of federalism in the European Union. The research was performed in order to contribute to the establishment of the basis for the acceleration of the economic European integration and the future constitution of the United States of Europe.     

Macroeconomic Policy Design in the European Monetary Union: A Numerical Game Approach

Optimal economic reactions of European policy-makers on exogenous shocks are determined by simulating a global macroeconomic model under different institutional arrangements. In particular, it is investigated whether discretionary or rule-based policies and whether non-cooperative or cooperative policies for Europe result in a better performance as measured by intertemporal objective functions. The results show that the answers to these questions depend strongly on the nature of the shock to which European economies are exposed. For a negative supply shock, rule-based policies dominate, whereas for a negative demand shock, cooperative fiscal policy-making within the European Monetary Union gives the best results.