Tax Setting in a Federal System: The Case of Personal Income Taxation in Canada

In a decentralised tax system, the effects of tax policies enacted by one government are not confined to its own jurisdiction. First, if both the regional and the federal levels of government co-occupy the same fields of taxation, tax rate increases by one layer of government will reduce taxes collected by the other. Second, if the tax base is mobile, tax rate increases by one regional government will raise the amount of taxes collected by other regional governments. These sources of fiscal interdependence are called in the literature vertical and horizontal tax externalities, respectively. Third, as Smart (1998) shows, if equalisation transfers are present, an increase in the standard equalisation tax rate provides incentives to raise taxes to the receiving provinces. A way to check the empirical relevance of these hypotheses is to test for the existence of interactions between the regional tax rate, on the one hand, and the federal tax rate, the tax rate set by competing regions, and the standard equalisation tax rate, on the other hand. Following this approach, this paper estimates provincial tax setting functions with data on Canadian personal income taxation for the period 1982–1996. We find a significant positive response of provincial tax rates to changes in the federal income tax rate, the tax rates of competing provinces, and the standard equalisation rate (only for receiving provinces). We also find that the reaction to horizontal competition is stronger in the provinces that do not receive equalisation transfers.     

Interjurisdictional Tax Competition in a Federal System of Overlapping Revenue Maximizing Governments

Academic literature in public finance has focused on interjurisdictional tax competition—namely among similar types of local governments—but has leaved vertical externalities arising from interactions between two overlapping governments sharing the same tax base aside. The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple model within which interjurisdictional tax competition and vertical interactions between two overlapping governments that share the same tax base can be analyzed simultaneously. We find that interjurisdictional tax competition reduces the global tax rate set by both overlapping governments (federal and local) but is unable to solve completely the distortion arising from vertical externalities. The model is also extended to allow for government subsidies to industrial capital. We give sufficient conditions for capital subsidies to be more efficient to attract capital when they are granted at a federal level rather than at a local level.     

Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy

This paper analyzes the relation between tax auditing and fiscal equalization in the context of fiscal competition. We incorporate a model of tax evasion by firms into a standard tax competition framework where regional governments use their audit rates as a strategic instrument to engage in fiscal competition. We compare the region’s choice of audit policies for three different cases: A scenario of unconfined competition without interregional transfers, a scenario with a gross revenue equalization (GRS) scheme and finally, a scenario with net revenue sharing (NRS), where not only the revenues from taxation but also the regions auditing costs are shared. Without regional transfers, fiscal competition leads to audit rates which are inefficiently low for revenue-maximizing governments. While in general GRS aggravates the inefficiency, NRS makes the decentralized choice of auditing policies more efficient.JEL Code: H26, H71, H77     

土地财政收入、生产性支出和经济增长研究——基于省际面板数据的非线性阈值分析

构建含土地财政收入的内生经济增长模型,从理论上证明土地财政收入对经济增长存在非线性影响,而且会因财政支出结构的变化而对经济增长产生不同的非线性影响。并以2000-2017年省级面板数据对上述假说进行实证检验。结果显示:在东部和西部地区,土地财政收入相对GDP的占比对经济增长确实先有促进作用,后出现抑制作用,呈现出较明显的倒"U"形特征。同时,土地财政收入对经济增长的影响会因财政支出结构的变化而出现阈值效应,过高的生产性支出比重将减弱土地财政收入对经济增长的促进作用。     

Fiscal Externalities and Efficient Transfers in a Federation

This paper investigates properties of the second best allocation in a fiscal federal system in which both federal tax and intergovernmental grants are involved and the taxation is distortionary. Also, optimal federal grants and tax policies in a decentralized fiscal system are examined. Our major findings are: (i) the second best does not require the equalization of marginal cost of public funds across regions in a conventional form; (ii) matching grants based on either the local tax rates or tax revenues should be introduced to internalize the tax externality; and (iii) once lump-sum and matching grants are optimized, federal tax policy becomes redundant so the optimal fiscal gap is indeterminate.     

地方政府周期性财政收支、融资依赖与地区出口结构

在财政分权与政治垂直管理的激励体制下,地方政府财政支出的逆周期性弱化。同时,地区间初始禀赋差异和风险异质性则使得地方政府财政政策的周期性特征存在明显的地区差异。本文借鉴Rajan与Zingales(1998)发展的固定效应估计模型,采用2004年我国29个省份29个行业的相关数据,考察了周期性财政政策对地区出口结构的影响。本文研究显示,财政政策逆周期性较强的地区,在外部融资依赖性高的行业出口相对更多,具有比较优势。同时,在控制了人力资本、物质资本和自然资源禀赋等传统比较优势影响因素,以及外部市场接近度、国内市场容量和基础设施等新经济地理的因素之后,本文的结论依然成立。     

Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants

This paper describes the tax and expenditure externalities that can occur in a federation, focusing on the (relatively neglected) vertical tax and expenditure externalities which arise when state governments' tax and expenditure decisions affect the federal government's budget constraint and vice versa. Formulas are derived for matching grants which correct the distortions in governments' decision-making caused by fiscal externalities. With vertical tax externalities, the matching revenue grant may result in transfers from the state government to the federal government. With vertical expenditure externalities, the federal government should provide a matching expenditure grant equal to the additional federal revenue that is generated from an additional dollar spent by a state on productivityenhancing activities such as education.     

Revenue Volatility and Fiscal Risks: An Application of Value-at-Risk Techniques to Hong Kong's Fiscal Policy

Revenue volatility poses challenges for fiscal policy makers. It can create risks to service provision, require borrowing, or entail sudden tax changes. This paper investigates the use of value-at-risk techniques to measure the fiscal risks caused by volatility as well as the sensitivity of measured risks to policies that may limit volatility. The revenue of Hong Kong's Special Administrative Region (SAR) is among the most volatile in Asia, and thus is a natural case for applying these techniques. Reflecting its revenue volatility, Hong Kong's SAR has traditionally held high fiscal savings (reserves), and the value of the self-insurance these savings provide is also discussed.     

Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangements and Provincial Consumption Risk Sharing in China

This paper utilizes a panel data set on two major fiscal reforms in China—the fiscal contract system (FCS) in 1980-93 and the tax-sharing system (TSS) after 1994—to examine how the various aspects of intergovernmental fiscal arrangement affect the ability of the fiscal system to facilitate risk sharing. The high revenue decentralization and the proliferation of extrabudgetary revenue items in the FCS generally weakened the central government's ability to support interprovincial risk sharing. This situation was reversed in the TSS period. In addition, the effect of central-to-local transfer (transfer-in) and local-to-central transfer (transfer-out) on risk sharing was asymmetric in the sense that transfer-out enhances risk sharing but transfer-in does not.     

审计处理、审计整改与财政收支违规行为

基于2006-2012年的审计年鉴数据,实证检验了国家审计中审计决定、审计移送和审计建议的处理与整改对于审计查出财政违规问题金额的影响.研究结果显示,无论审计署特派办还是地方审计机关,虽然独立性和隶属关系不同,但在审计处理和审计整改之间并未形成交互加强的互补关系.研究发现表明,在维护国家财经秩序和促进政府良治的过程中,国家审计的现实表现与服务国家治理、提倡审计免疫的理论要求尚存在差距,需要加强审计处理与审计整改协同机制的建设.     

我国非税收入体制的现状及改革设想

多年来,随着我国改革开放进程的加快,各级政府的财政收支矛盾也日益突出,迫使其频频增设预算外收入项目,造成我国非税收入总体规模偏大,资金管理上也不尽人意。比较突出的问题有:非税收入规模过大,二次分配问题突出;管理范围尚未覆盖全部非税收入;预算外挤预算内,削弱了政府的宏观调控能力;征管主体多元化,征收行为不规范;法制不健全,监督缺乏约束力等。建议针对这些问题对我国目前的非税收入体制进行改革和完善。     

税收增速减缓与地方税收竞争——基于省际面板数据的考察

本文通过理论分析明确了地方政府税收竞争对税收增长的影响机制。以此为基础,利用我国省际面板数据所做的实证研究显示,地方政府的税收竞争强度每提高0.01,全部税收、中央税收征收额和地方税收征收额分别下降0.64、0.71、0.60个百分点。为了进一步缓解地方政府经济增长激励与维护税法严肃性之间的矛盾,中央政府应逐步提高财产税收入所占的比重,将地方政府的税收竞争主要限制在财产税范围内。     

我国税收优先权制度存在的缺陷及其完善

2001年修订后的《税收征收管理法》首次规定了税收优先权制度,明确了税收债权与其他债权的清偿顺序,对于保证国家税收的实现具有重要的意义,但该规定存在诸多缺陷,有待进一步完善。     

公共福利支出视角下的农村社会保障体系建设

对于我国现行的农村社会保障体系,本文基于财政福利支出的视角提出了相关问题,主要包括：支出导向单一化、支出监督管理存在多方面的问题。随后,本文介绍了福利支出项目在社会保障体系中的分配功能及其政策效应。最后,根据农村公共福利支出多样化的发展要求,基于提高农民素质、发挥农民劳动力优势的目标,本文提出了完善我国农村社会保障体系的相关政策建议。     

收益管理国内研究综述

收益管理是在合适的时间、合适的地点、以合适的价格将产品销售给合适顾客的一种管理策略。文章对近5年的文献进行了统计、分析;对国内关于收益管理内涵的界定以及收益管理所包含的内容进行了梳理;对文献的研究目的、研究阶段、研究内容、研究方法以及研究领域进行了评价。文章对未来收益管理的进一步研究而言,具有重要的借鉴意义。     

我国房产税税制优化研究：基于公平与财政收入视角

我国现行房产税在纳税人、征税范围、征税对象、计税依据、税率、纳税申报与税收征管等方面都存在不利于增进社会公平、组织财政收入的问题。房产税税制优化应在促进公平与组织财政收入目标下扩大征收范围与对象,以评估价值为计税依据,实行幅度税率,鼓励自主申报。其中,实现税务机关与其他国家机关的信息共享、建立与完善房地产价值评估机构是关键。     

Commercial Policy Reform in Pakistan: Opening up the Economy under Revenue Constraints

We examine the potential for further reform of sales tax and tariffs on final goods and on intermediate inputs in Pakistan. Analysis is conducted at two levels. First, optimal taxes are computed under the assumption that tax revenue is exogenous and pays for a public good, and these are compared with their current levels. Second, we consider two piecemeal reform exercises to examine whether there is further scope for replacing the two tariffs by sales tax in a revenue-neutral way. Both approaches suggest that there is considerable scope for further reducing tariffs on final goods, but not on intermediate inputs. JEL Code: F1, O2, O5     

对我国财政支农资金投入政策促进三农发展的思考

我国财政支农资金总量呈现逐年上升趋势,财政支农支出占财政总支出的比例整体上呈下降趋势。目前存在的问题是：与国际上相比我国财政支农资金总量偏低,财政支农资金稳定性差,财政支农资金结构不合理,各级政府对支农资金投入的职责不明确且管理混乱。因此要增加财政支农支出总量,建立健全财政支农资金稳定增长机制,调整财政支农支出结构,明确政府的职责。     

房产税税率、房产税收入与房地产税制度设计

基于房产税税率对房产税收入影响理论,运用数理模型,依据沪渝两市自然数据,考量房产税税率变化对房产税收入的影响.结果显示:房产税税率对房产税收入具有重要影响.若提高上海市房产税税率,房产税增收效果更明显;若下调重庆市房产税税率,房产税增收效应更显著.鉴于此,未来房地产税立法改革思路:一是坚持房地产税税负不增加;二是平衡好房地产税立法与其他收费制度的关系;三是统筹税制改革的协同推进;四是兼顾房地产税的地方财政属性;五是谨慎推进.同时,应遵循税收法定原则、地方财政原则、公平原则、确实原则、渐进原则和结构性调整原则.此外,在制度设计方面,纳税人的设计要体现财产税性质,征税范围要涵盖农村,课税对象要包括存量住房,税率要体现差异性,计税依据要由市场价格评估值确定,税收优惠要兼顾免税面积和特殊人群.     

Revenue Elasticities in Complex Income Tax Structures: An Application to Spain*

This paper derives analytical expressions for the revenue elasticity of complex income tax systems, as applied to tax units and in aggregate. Among the complexities considered are the schedular nature of income tax systems and the role of central and regional governments, along with the existence of a range of intricate tax credits and eligible expenditures and deductions. Empirical estimates are obtained for the case of Spain using a cross‐sectional data set, which enables a number of important ancillary elasticities (relating to allowances and tax credits, and different income sources) to be estimated. It is found that there is considerable variation among tax units in the revenue elasticity, with highly positively skewed distributions. The nature of the distributions varies among regions of Spain, and the aggregate elasticities for each region were found to display some variation associated with income distribution differences. The national aggregate is found to be around 1.3.