THE SO2 EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAM: COST SAVINGS WITHOUT ALLOWANCE TRADES

Title IV of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act initiated a historic experiment in incentive-based environmental regulation by permitting electric generating facilities to trade allowances for emission of sulfur dioxide. To date, relatively little allowance trading has occurred. However, the costs of compliance have been much less than anticipated. The purpose of this paper is to address the apparent paradox—that the allowance trading program may not require (very much) trading in order to be successful. Title IV represented two great steps forward in environmental regulation: (i) a move toward performance standards and (ii) formal allowance trading. The first step has been sufficient to date for improving dynamic efficiency and achieving relative cost-effectiveness.     

Phase I Completed: An Empirical Assessment of the 1990 CAAA

With the conclusion of Phase I trading of SO₂ allowances, the EPA declared the allowance trading policy to be a success. The time had come to include cap-and-trade programs in the arsenal of effective policy tools. In terms of reducing atmospheric emissions of sulfur dioxide, the program appears to be successful. It is not clear, however, whether or not the program has minimized the cost of achieving the emission reductions. The measure of the true success of a market-based incentive program, however, has yetto be quantified: Has the program resulted in converging marginalabatement costs across participant plants? In this study I report theshadow prices of Phase I power plants from 1994 to 1998 anddetermine that there are more costs to be saved within theambitious public policy experiment.     

Implementing technology-forcing policies: The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments and the introduction of advanced automotive emissions controls in the United States

Technology forcing is a strategy where a regulator specifies a standard that cannot be met with existing technology, or at least not at an acceptable cost. Using the 1970 U.S. Clean Air Act for controlling automobile emissions as a baseline example, we demonstrate the importance of the regulatory implementation process if regulations are to foster technological change. The 1970 legislation required steep emissions reductions for new 1975 and 1976 automobiles, which presented automakers with major technical and economic challenges. Nevertheless, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency successfully forced the adoption of two marquee control technologies—the catalytic converter in 1975 and the three-way catalyst in 1981. We focus on three factors critical to the implementation process: agency credibility to enforce standards, competitive pressures to drive industry research and development, and uncertainty about technological development.     

Environmental participation in the U.S. sulfur allowance auctions

The 1990 Clean Air Act established a sulfur emissions-trading program among utilities. This was the first large scale adoption of this type of emissions-trading program and the program’s success has attracted international attention. An interesting aspect of this program is that in addition to trades among the polluting firms and brokers or investors, individuals and groups have been participants, buying allowances to retire them and reduce sulfur emissions. This provides a relatively unique way to examine the “willingness to pay” for further reductions of sulfur emissions. I examine environmental participation in the sulfur allowances market, focusing on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) allowance auctions which have been conducted annually since 1993. The existence of groups purchasing these allowances in order to retire them suggests that the overall cap on sulfur emissions may be higher than the optimal emissions level. The marginal benefits from the first ton of emissions reduction appear to be significantly larger than marginal abatement costs. Total spending to retire sulfur emissions allowances, while small in relation to the total market, is sizeable in terms of the alternate purchases these groups and individuals could have made.      

INCREASED INDUSTRIAL USES OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES POLICY, TRADE AND ETHANOL

Using agricultural feedstocks for industrial products affects domestic and international agricultural markets, all of which are encumbered with complex policies. This article examines the interaction of three seemingly unrelated policies: the Clean Air Act, the U.S. corn program, and European Union agricultural subsidies. More ethanol production, resulting from new regulations associated with the Clean Air Act, increases the use of U.S. corn and increases the supply of corn gluten feed, an ethanol co-product. Corn gluten feed is primarily exported to Europe under a loophole in European Union trade barriers. But recent reform of European Union farm policy will lower the price of the European grain for which corn gluten feed is a substitute. This development lowers prices for a major ethanol co-product and thus makes ethanol itself less profitable just as the demand for the fuel is expanding. NAFTA, GATT, and new technologies also play cameo roles in the story .     

Examining Trends of Criteria Air Pollutants: Are the Effects of Governmental Intervention Transitory?

Despite its growth in other areas of economics,time series econometric methods have not beenwidespread in the area of environmental andresource economics. We illustrate one use oftime series methods by examining the time pathof US nitrogen oxide (NO_x) emission dataover the period 1900–1994. The analysishighlights that proper time series methods canaid in optimal regulatory policy as well asdeveloping empirical verification of theoriesput forth to explain economic phenomena. Inaddition, several interesting results emerge. First, we find that the emissions seriescontains both a permanent and random component. Second, if one attributed all of the emissionsreductions to regulatory policy, interventionanalysis suggests that the 1970 Clean Air Act(CAA) did not merely have transitory effects,but permanently influenced the NO_xemission path. In terms of total regulatoryimpact, an upper bound on the emissions saveddue to the 1970 CAA is in the range of27%–48%.     

Why did US air pollution decline after 1970?

US economic growth and air pollution were decoupled after 1970. Possible explanations include regulation, oil price shocks, technology and income growth. This paper uses VAR analysis to show that the 1970 Clean Air Act (CAA) may have actually increased pollution in the short run but led to accelerated improvements in abatement technology. Gross domestic product and consumption growth had little direct effect while oil price increases caused small but significant emissions reductions. Recursive simulation shows that overall, the CAA, by accelerating improvements in abatement technology, reduced total emissions as of 1998 to 46% of what they would have been.      

Greenhouse gas policy and California electricity prices

California has adopted a policy of mandatory reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2020. (California Legislature (2006) Assembly Bill 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, California Air Resources Board (2008) Climate change draft scoping plan, Sect. 2) Electricity utilities will need to recover related expenses, such as for the purchase of emissions permits. Economists often assume that raising usage prices for the commodity is the best way to recoup such expenses. However, regulated usage prices to California residential customers already exceed the cost of electricity generation plus a plausible externality cost for carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions. Instead, recovering compliance expenses through usage insensitive charges could avoid causing unnecessary economic harm to consumers.     

Controlling acid deposition: A general equilibrium assessment

In this paper, we evaluate the impact of the SO₂ provisions in the 1990 Clean Air Act. A computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the United States is used to evaluate the implications of this law for a number of economic sectors. We find that the largest negative impact falls on the coal industry. Output in the refining sector also decreases, but agricultural production increases as consumers shift spending into food and wood based products.     

SO2 policy and input substitution under spatial monopoly

Following the U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, electric utilities dramatically increased their utilization of low-sulfur coal from the Powder River Basin (PRB). Recent studies indicate that railroads hauling PRB coal exercise a substantial degree of market power and that relative price changes in the mining and transportation sectors were contributing factors to the observed pattern of input substitution. This paper asks the related question: To what extent does more stringent SO₂ policy stimulate input substitution from high-sulfur coal to low-sulfur coal when railroads hauling low-sulfur coal exercise spatial monopoly power? The question underpins the effectiveness of incentive-based environmental policies given the essential role of market performance in input, output, and abatement markets in determining the social cost of regulation. Our analysis indicates that environmental regulation leads to negligible input substitution effects when clean and dirty inputs are highly substitutable and the clean input market is mediated by a spatial monopolist.     

Climate Change Taxes and Energy Efficiency in Japan

In 2003 Japan proposed a Climate Change Tax to reduce its CO₂ emissions to the level required by the Kyoto Protocol. If implemented, the tax would be levied on fossil fuel use and the revenue distributed to encourage the purchase of energy efficient equipment. Analysis using the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model shows that this policy is unlikely to bring Japan into compliance with its Kyoto target unless the subsidy encourages improvement in energy intensity well beyond Japan’s recent historical experience. Similar demand-management programs in the US, where there has been extensive experience, have not been nearly as effective as they would need to be to achieve energy efficiency goals of the proposal. The Tax proposal also calls for limits on international emission trading. We find that this limit substantially affects costs of compliance. The welfare loss with full emissions trading is 1/6 that when Japan meets its target though domestic actions only, the carbon price is lower, and there is a smaller loss of energy-intensive exports. Japan can achieve substantial savings from emissions trading even under cases where, for example, the full amount of the Russian allowance is not available in international markets.     

Bush v. Gore and the Effect of New Source Review on Power Plant Emissions

New Source Review (NSR) is a Clean Air Act regulation that requires electric utilities to meet emission standards when making modifications to existing power plants. The regulation increases the cost of replacing worn out parts, and limits the firm’s scope of potential capital investments. Such restrictions may lead to greater retirements and lower utilization, adversely affecting profits. Prior to the 2000 presidential election, investors expected Bush to have a narrower interpretation of NSR than Gore. Therefore, we use changes in stock prices to estimate the effect on profits of differences in NSR policy. Our results indicate that investors expected the average boiler to be $38 million more valuable under the Bush administration. Over the boilers’ lifetimes, the additional utilization will have increased emissions by 19 million tons of sulfur dioxide, 5.9 million tons of nitrogen oxides and 980 million tons of carbon dioxide, relative to natural gas generation.      

CUTTING CARBON EMISSIONS AT A PROFIT (PART I): OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES

This article identifies and corrects shortcomings in recent modeling studies on the economics of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. The major assessments of the Kyoto Protocol—by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the Clinton White House Council of Economic Advisers, the U.S. Department of Energy Interlaboratory Working Group, and the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum—are found to be seriously incomplete. Each study omits one or several of four major cost-reducing policy options, resulting in cost estimates that are far too pessimistic.
In the present study, these shortcomings are overcome through the integrated evaluation of all major cost-cutting policy options within a coherent least-cost framework. Three domestic policies—a national carbon cap and permit trading program, productivity-enhancing market reforms and technology programs, and recycling of permit auction revenues into economically advantageous tax cuts—are combined with international emissions allowance trading.
This analysis shows that an integrated least-cost strategy for mitigating U.S. greenhouse gas emissions would produce an annual net output gain of roughly 0.4% of GDP in 2010 and about 0.9% of GDP in 2020. On a cumulative net present value basis, the United States would gain $250 billion by 2010 and $600 billion by 2020. International flexibility mechanisms (including emissions trading) are of only secondary significance in realizing these productivity, output, and welfare gains.     

Enforcing Emissions Trading when Emissions Permits are Bankable

We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871.     

Implications of CO<Subscript>2</Subscript> emissions trading for short-run electricity market outcomes in northwest Europe

We examine the short-run implications of CO₂ trading for power production, prices, emissions, and generator profits in northwest Europe in 2005. Simulation results from a transmission-constrained oligopoly model are compared with theoretical analyses to quantify price increases and windfall profits earned by generators. The analyses indicate that the rates at which CO₂ costs are passed through to wholesale prices are affected by market competitiveness, merit order changes, and elasticities of demand and supply. Emissions trading results in large windfall profits, much but not all of which is due to free allocation of allowances. Profits also increase for some generators because their generation mix has low emissions, and so they benefit from electricity price increases. Most emission reductions appear to be due to demand response not generation redispatch.      

Trading Sulphur Emissions in Europe: `Guided Bilateral Trade'

In this paper a system of `guided permit trading' is developed for SO₂emissions reduction which considers permit trading as a bilateral andsequential process. This implies that in order to meet the deposition targetsat the end of the trading process, not every single trade transaction hasto meet the deposition targets. To ensure that the target is ultimately met,the number of permits traded should be controlled by a trade coordinatinginstitution. A simulation of the system of guided bilateral trading ofSO₂ permits among European countries on the basis of the SecondSO₂ Protocol indicates that some non-profitable trade transactionstake place. This prevents the cost effective emission allocation from beingfully achieved. However, the calculations show that guided bilateral permittrading may generate substantial cost savings while contributing toenvironmental protection.     

Emission trading in Europe with an exchange rate

This paper explores the analytical and empirical properties of a new method for emission trading according to a fixed exchange rate. The exchange rate is based on the ratios of the marginal costs of abatement in the optimal solution in order to account for the impact of the location of emission sources on the deposition. It is shown that, generally, this system will not achieve the optimal solution and does not guarantee that environmental deposition constraints are not violated, although total abatement costs are always reduced. A routine was developed to mimic trading as a bilateral, sequential process, subject to an exchange rate. In the example used, results for SO₂ emissions in Europe show that, starting from a uniform reduction, exchange-rate trading achieves higher cost savings than one-to-one trading, without achieving the cost minimum. Sulfur deposition targets are not violated since the initial emission allocation overfulfilled targets at many places. The results are sensitive to: pre-trade emission levels, the transaction costs, the availability of information on potential cost savings and assumptions made on the behavior of trading partners.     

On the option to invest in pollution control under a regime of tradable emissions allowances

Abstract.  Optimal decisions of a firm facing the option of retrofitting its plant to reduce pollution and thereby eliminate the need to purchase emissions allowances are analysed. The decision is treated as a real option with the price of pollution permits following a known stochastic process. The model is formulated as a set of one‐dimensional partial differential equations. At discrete points in time, the firm owner makes optimal decisions about the retrofit, including whether to mothball temporarily. The model is used to analyse a firm's decision to instal a scrubber as a result of the 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act. JEL Classification: Q25, D81, G31
Sur la possibilité d'investir dans le contrôle de la pollution dans un régime de permis d'émission de pollution échangeables commercialement.  Ce mémoire examine les décisions optimales d'une entreprise face à la possibilité d'adapter ses installations pour réduire la pollution, et ce faisant d'éliminer le besoin de se procurer des permis d'émission de pollution sur le marché. Le décision est traitée comme une option réelle où le prix des permis résulte d'un processus stochastique connu. Le modèle est formulé sous forme d'un ensemble d'équations différentielles partielles à une dimension. A des points discontinus dans le temps, le propriétaire de l'entreprise prend des décisions optimales de mise à niveau des installations – y compris la possibilité de les fermer temporairement. Le modèle est utilisé pour analyser une décision d'installer un épurateur suite à la mise en place de la loi américaine de 1990 (Clean Air Act).     

Who Wins from Emissions Trading? Evidence from California

Researchers and environmental policy advocates have raised questions regarding the distributional impacts of emissions trading programs, a.k.a. “cap-and-trade”. While previous research has been careful to identify the causal effect of emissions trading on emissions reductions (Fowlie et al. in Am Econ Rev 102(2):965–993, 2012, hereafter FHM), we argue that existing estimates of differential impacts on demographic groups have relied on unrealistic assumptions regarding pollution dispersion. In this paper, we estimate the emissions reduction due to the RECLAIM cap-and-trade program in Southern California following the identification strategy of FHM, but we relax the assumption of uniform dispersion surrounding point sources. We model the transport of effluents using a state-of-the-science dispersion model to determine the areas impacted by emissions from each source. Importantly, conditional on race and ethnicity, we find that higher income areas receive larger reductions in pollution under cap-and-trade. Furthermore, conditional on income (or poverty rates), we find that Blacks benefit while Hispanics lose relative to whites under RECLAIM.     

Impacts of an EC carbon/energy tax and deregulating thermal power supply on CO2, SO2 and NOx emissions

Emission of CO₂, SO₂ and NO_x are all closely linked to the burning of fossil fuels. Here we report on simulations done by linking a Sectoral European Energy Model (SEEM), covering energy demand in nine Western European countries, with the emission-transport-deposition model RAINS developed by IIASA. The study analyses emissions of CO₂, SO₂ and NO_x, deposition of sulphur and nitrogen and the extent of areas where the critical load for sulphur is exceeded in year 2000 under four different energy scenarios. Two different sets of future behavioural patterns for the thermal electric power production sector are considered. In one regime, called the plan-efficient regime, the sector is assumed to follow official plans with regard to investment in new capacity. In the other regime, called the cost-efficient regime, the thermal power sector is assumed to behave in a cost minimizing manner. The effects of the proposed EC carbon/energy tax are studied under both regimes, giving rise to altogether four scenarios.In both regimes the effect of the EC tax is to reduce emissions by between 6 and 10 per cent in year 2000 relative to the scenarios without the tax. A change of regime, from the regulated, plan-efficient regime to the market-based, cost-efficient regime, will, by itself, reduce emissions of CO₂ and NO_x by approximately 3 per cent, while SO₂ emissions are reduced by 13 per cent. The EC tax will reduce sulphur deposition by more than 5 per cent in the nine model countries under the plan-efficient regime. A change of regime further reduces the total deposition by 9 per cent. The area where depositions exceed the critical load is reduced by approximately 6 per cent in year 2000 by the tax in both regimes. Changing from the plan-efficient to the cost-efficient regime has a similar impact.Although the emission reductions due to the EC tax may seem modest, they are shown to have a sizeable effect on the technological abatement costs of reaching targets like those prescribed in the Sofia protocol on the stabilisation of NO_x emissions, and the Helsinki protocol on SO₂ emission reductions. This is part of what can be considered to be secondary benefits of the EC carbon/energy tax.